FROM THREAT TO THREAT
In chapters 3 and 4 we described how the U.S. government adjusted its existing agencies and capacities to address the emerging threat from Usama Bin Ladin and his associates. After the August 1998 bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, President Bill Clinton and his chief aides explored ways of getting Bin Ladin expelled from Afghanistan or possibly capturing or even killing him. Although disruption efforts around the world had achieved some successes, the core of Bin Ladin's organization remained intact.
President Clinton was deeply concerned about Bin Ladin. He and his national security advisor, Samuel "Sandy" Berger, ensured they had a special daily pipeline of reports feeding them the latest updates on Bin Ladin's reported location. In public, President Clinton spoke repeatedly about the threat of terrorism, referring to terrorist training camps but saying little about Bin Ladin and nothing about al Qaeda. He explained to us that this was deliberate--intended to avoid enhancing Bin Ladin's stature by giving him unnec- essary publicity. His speeches focused especially on the danger of nonstate actors and of chemical and biological weapons.
As the millennium approached, the most publicized worries were not about terrorism but about computer breakdowns--the Y2K scare. Some gover nment officials were concerned that terrorists would take advantage of such breakdowns.
6.1 THE MILLENNIUM CRISIS
"Bodies Will Pile Up in Sacks"
On November 30, 1999, Jordanian intelligence intercepted a telephone call between Abu Zubaydah, a longtime ally of Bin Ladin, and Khadr Abu Hoshar, a Palestinian extremist. Abu Zubaydah said, "The time for training is over."
(snip)
The CIA worked hard with foreign security services to detain or at least keep an eye on suspected Bin Ladin associates.Tenet spoke to 20 of his foreign counter parts. Disruption and arrest operations were mounted against terrorists in eight countries.
In mid-December, President Clinton signed a Memorandum of Notification (MON) giving the CIA broader authority to use foreign proxies to detain Bin Ladin lieutenants, without having to transfer them to U.S. custody. The authority was to capture, not kill, though lethal force might be used if necessary. Tenet would later send a message to all CIA personnel overseas, saying, "The threat could not be more real. . . . Do whatever is necessary to disrupt UBL's plans. . . . The American people are counting on you and me to take every appropriate step to protect them during this period."The State Department issued a worldwide threat advisory to its posts overseas.
Then, on December 14, an Algerian jihadist was caught bringing a load of explosives into the United States.
That's a great resource you found because I've always thought the major drawback of the book was the lack of an index.
Clinton can lie all he wants about his "concern" about terrorism. But just today I saw a post, with direct quotes, that when the Cole was bombed, Richard Clarke was recommending bombing terrorist camps. Everyone around Clinton's table said no, for various and ridiculous reasons.
Albright's reason was that it would interfere with the Palestinian/Israeli peace talks.
Many thanks for the ping and all of your scut work! This info, which has been buried, for so long, is shocking.
Weldon is on Sean Hannity's show right now and he is on fire!