Maybe living the period through newspapers, magazines, and manuscripts, to which I immersed myself for three years?
The tariff was the primary issue of 1912.
As for the electoral vote count, your math is wrong. The TR/Taft votes (electoral and popular) added up to what TR and Taft got in 08 and 04, respectively, and the Wilson votes added up to what Parker and Bryan got in those same years, averaged out. In other words, Republicans voted for either Taft or TR, and Democrats voted for Wilson. Sure, there were crossovers, but they canceled each other out.
I won't comment on your assessment of the 1970s, etc. I will only repeat that you give the tariff too much value in history. The tariff mattered politically far more than it ever meant to economics. We'll have to disagree on this. Nevertheless, you, who worships the "American System" ought to recognize this: in the 19th and early 20th centuries, the tariff was THE political issue and dividing point, slavery excepted.
1900s Progressivism was built on the railroads and labor conditions. The market took care of both. Meanwhile, the tariff kept pace as THE electoral dividing line. That doesn't mean that it really mattered as an economic instrument, but it sure as sh*t mattered politically.
Sure, there were other important issues in 1912. Indeed, Roosevelt's "direct democracy" was hugely important, and Taft went after him and it with the express purpose to defeat both, even if it meant Wilson winning the election. But for all the meaning of progressivism, it was the tariff that was the most identifiable issue with the voters. Not one in ten voters of 1912 could give you any cogent description of progressivism. It's only historians who can do that. To the average voter, it was party identification and the tariff that mattered, and how the candidates fit that mix. The remaining voters who really understood what it all meant voted for Taft... lol!
x, I'll bother you on this post, for it's my essential interpretation of the 1912 election.
What's amazing about the Wilson presidency is that his first term was more Taft's 2nd term than his own.
Really? I thought Taft was the good guy and Wilson the bad one. You'll have to explain.
And when you say "Taft" are you talking about the man's own inclinations or the things he had to do to hold his party together and keep Congress in line? Would Taft really have kept the income tax out, or would the pressure to impose it once the Constitution had been amended prove too much? The income tax could well have been the price of tariff reform.
Taft's problem may have been that he was trying to drive a wagon with horses that wanted to go in different directions -- the conservatives and the progressives. Roosevelt could manage, but Taft couldn't, and maybe Roosevelt's example or encouragement of the progressives was part of the problem.
The era had a lot to do with that. Usually, when you get bitter ideological conflicts eventually things sort out so that each party is on a different side of the conflict, and the party rallies around one side of the issues, rather than tear itself apart, as happened in 1912.
But could the fact that Taft really didn't relish politics also have had an effect? A real "player," somebody who loves the game of politics, can really screw up the country, but isn't likely to get torn apart between party factions in quite the same way. Taft wasn't a Hoover or Carter, still less was he an LBJ.
Could you draw a parallel between Taft and Ford or Bush's father? They lived through some real changes in the GOP and weren't great campaigners or lovers of the game. Eventually these presidents got caught in-between factions of their own party. Johnson did too put is personality and his role in the unravelling were quite different.
About the tariff. It clearly was very much an issue in 1912. Wilson spoke about it a lot. A lot of it had to do with the idea that the tariff was the "mother of trusts" -- that it stifled competition and promoted monopolies. It was very convenient: Wilson could imply a lot about tariffs by talking about competition and a lot about tariffs by discussing competition, without going very much into details. He could signal where he stood and avoid talking about where revenues would come from or how to break up the trusts.
Without polling data, it's hard to know which were the key issues that most effected swing voters. In this case, it looks a lot like Wilson won without winning many net swing voters. 43% was a losing percentage for Bryan in 1908, but it was enough for Wilson to win against a divided Republican Party. The tariff -- understood as a question of competition -- won Wilson some votes, but it didn't need to, since he only had to hold his base.
It looks like the Republicans could count on 51% of the electorate a century ago. That's what McKinley and Taft both got against Bryan (Bryan's share was different in each election because of the third party vote). The Democrats controlled the South and could win votes in the (more conservative) East as Cleveland did or in the (populist, progressive, insurgent) West as Bryan did, but probably not both. That's why splitting the GOP was so crucial to Wilson's win. It meant a chance to win states in all regions without actual having a majority of votes outside the South. It probably also didn't hurt that Wilson was a dark horse who could be different things to different voting blocs.
Wilson did about as well as Bryan in the popular vote nationwide, but you might want to take a look at the state totals. In some strongly Republican states, Wilson's percentage was higher than Bryan's. I'm thinking the "Mugwumps" made the difference -- wealthy liberal Republicans from academic or professional backgrounds, who disliked the regular Republican party machines and wanted lower tariffs, but who were put off by demagoguery, which they associated with Bryan and Roosevelt. Also some LaFollette voters most likely held a grudge against Roosevelt for blocking their man's aspirations. They probably pulled the lever for Wilson as a result.
In a few Northern states where Democrats did better, Wilson's winning percentage was actually lower than what Bryan got when he lost. In this case, it may be that some ordinary farmers or city dwellers who might have voted for Bryan or not at all in 1908 were inspired by TR to vote Progressive. Wilson didn't have much personal magnetism, and was less appealing to ethnic voters than Roosevelt.
PS. I think this guy could use a few hundred extra pounds and a handlebar moustache.