Sattler would not confirm that high-power microwave (HPM) devices are being used to pre-detonate IEDs, but the Pentagon and aerospace industry officials acknowledge that such technology has been developed and tested in the U.S. "The intimidation of pre-detonation will shut [bombers] down many notches," he predicts. "There is some pre-detonation on the battlefield now. I will also say there are some sharp people . . . increasing that capability."
Current technologies for finding IEDs have topped out in their ability to locate these devices at about 50%. Most U.S. casualties continue to be from IEDs or automobile-borne bombs, some of them used in suicide missions.
Alliant Techsystems developed an HPM system that last fall exploded 75% of the mines planted in a range near Yuma, Ariz. Support for the technology from the Air Force Research Laboratory indicates that it may be destined for use from aircraft. It's the first HPM system ruggedized for transport. Raytheon also has developed and fielded an adjunct system that uses an uncooled infrared sensor powerful enough to detect buried mines but light enough to be carried by unmanned aircraft. It also was to have been deployed to Iraq this summer.
Another approach to mitigating the danger of IEDs involves correlating large amounts of intelligence and surveillance data to determine the time of day and locations where such weapons are often planted. Observers monitor those sectors from aircraft or hidden sniper posts with fast-reaction forces standing by. In one new, specialized project, researchers have begun targeting enemy planners, organizers, suppliers and bomb makers in their homes and workshops before attacks can be launched. The effort is based on fusing intelligence to the basic building blocks of ground moving-target indicator data gathered by Joint Stars, U-2 and other aircraft. The data can be played backward to see where the bombers and vehicles came from.
SATTLER BECAME a target for critics when he said the battle of Falluja last year broke the back of the Iraqi insurgency. He stands behind his proclamation by pointing to the elimination of the city as a safe haven for insurgents and remnants of the former regime of Saddam Hussein. Sattler points to the end there of the production of vehicle-borne improvised explosives and the training and equipping of suicide bombers. He also notes they found up to 600 caches of weapons, bomb-making materials and chambers where torture was being filmed. After the town was cleaned up, the Marines noticed that the effectiveness and number of insurgent attacks declined because "the A-team and trainers are gone," Sattler says. However, he admits the insurgents are making the attempt to regain some presence.
The measures of success in Iraq have grown more sophisticated as the conflict goes on, Sattler asserts. About the time of the Falluja offensive, he wrongly thought success was the "number of Iraqi security forces in uniform standing in formation in the morning," Sattler says. "The metric was how many do we have. We weren't focusing on capability at that point. When the fighting started in April in the first Falluja fight, we [had] not set them up for success [with proper training and equipment]. They were a brand-new force. As anybody who was pragmatic would do, they said this is not going to work and they laid their weapons down and evaporated."
The Marines have since established standards for equipment, training and leadership. In some cases, they had to disband units (particularly Iraqi National Guard) because the loyalties of locally recruited soldiers were first to the family, the tribe, friends and only then to the rule of law, he says. As a result, Iraqi soldiers and policemen are now stationed outside their home province. A second effort was a counter-intimidation program so that officials and their families aren't constantly under threat of assassination. The concern is to "intimidate the intimidators" while still meeting moral and legal standards, says Sattler.
Marine detachments now team with and mentor Iraqi security forces, provide them with logistics, artillery and close air support, and support them in counter-insurgency operations. "Nor do they put them into battle before they are ready," he says. Other initiatives being thrown into the fight include: *Biometric devices such as retina scans so that Iraqis can be positively identified (and the information transferred from city to city).
"A second effort was a counter-intimidation program so that officials and their families aren't constantly under threat of assassination. The concern is to "intimidate the intimidators" while still meeting moral and legal standards, says Sattler. "
Oh yeah. Reading between the lines, they are going after the families of the killers.