Posted on 07/31/2005 11:33:20 AM PDT by datura
"streptococcus suis" is completely fictional.
The genetics of this are a cross between Ebola SZ and H5N1. From the sounds of it, the "splicing" is rather crudely done, but it functions.
It is the human polymorphism in the H5N1 that gives it the additional lethality in mammals, and now with the swine recombination it transmits easier.
After this is all said and done, I think we need to take the chemistry/biology tools away from the ChiComs. They don't appear to be trustworthy with their toys.
"They CAN'T let the real numbers out. But can they stop it? I don't think so"
That's were the 50,000 immunity professionals come in, aka "Cleaners" you know what I mean?
I wonder if the immune professionals are inmates from their prisons???
Big time. That's what's so all fire scary. If they are that frieghtened...how bad must it really be?
Thanks for posting that link. Here's another article from Recombinomics - look at the date, and what we're talking about!
Commentary
Pandemic Influenza as a Bioweapon
Recombinomics Commentary
February 23, 2005
>> "Anyone who is honest about this has to admit that if al Qaeda launches a spectacular biological attack which could cause contagious disease to be spread, no entity in the world is prepared for it," Noble said. "Not the U.S., not Europe, not Asia, not Africa." <<
Since the WSN/33 situation in Korea provides some valuable insight into detection and reporting of bird or human flu, and wire services are carrying stories about biologic attacks by terrorists causing a contagious disease, it is worth reviewing some of the lessons learned from the swine WSN/33 infections.
If pandemic flu is the contagious disease of choice, selection of WSN/33 at this time would offer some advantages. It is already transmissible from human-to-human, has been shown to be lethal in mice, has mutations in NA and PB2 that increase lethality, is widely available, and could be used without genetic manipulation.
As has been seen in Korea, introduction of the agent into pigs would allow it to spread almost undetected. Verification of its spread (or existence) has proven to be exceedingly difficult. Movement from swine to humans has not been reported and all reported isolates are missing the PB2 mutation. This may be due to a survival selection offered by recombining or reassorting with prevalent H9N2 subtypes. Most of the swine isolates have an avian PB2, but even the isolates that have half of a human PB2 have the 3' half of the human gene replaced with avian sequences. Thus, the results from the Korean swine may indicate that starting with a very lethal virus has disadvantages in that a less lethal virus will emerge virtually undetected.
A second choice would be the H5N1 currently causing the high case fatality rate in Vietnam, Thailand, and Cambodia. This version would be even more available, since it is excreted in large amounts by asymptomatic ducks, and is present in multiple organs in fatal infections. Although human-to-human transmission of H5N1 is limited, infecting a few international travelers would generate worldwide panic if these passengers became ill outside of areas with indigenous H5N1. Use of infected currency as a vector for transmission has been widely discussed.
A third approach would involve genetic manipulation. Creating an efficiently transmitted H5N1 would be relatively easy. Swapping a human receptor binding domain from a human flu virus into an H5 backbone would improve transmission efficiency and such an agent would quickly disseminate worldwide. Of course such an agent would be hard to control, and most unvaccinated people would be at risk. Since influenza evolves via recombination, implementation of an efficient laboratiry strain might be eclipsed by a natural version, and there would be uncertainty over the origins of such an agent.
Thus, like WSN/33 in Korean swine, taking credit for such a biologic attack may be difficult, since most countries appear to be unable to even determine if such an attack has happened.
Transmission of these exotic diseases seems to be pigs, birds, mosquitoes. Some are human to human transmission...Air-born???
An eight year old girl dies in Indonesia of Avian flu today. Here's the story.
"They don't appear to be trustworthy with their toys."
Ditto that.
Streptococcus suis
Streptococcus suis, an important pathogen of pigs, is endemic in most pig-rearing countries of the world, including the UK. The organism is carried in the tonsils of pigs, and pig-to-pig spread is mainly by nose-to-nose contact or by aerosol over short distances. Human infection with Streptococcus suis is rarely reported and only about 150 cases have been reported from the world literature. Two serotypes have been implicated in human infections; S. suis type 2, an established zoonotic human pathogen and more recently S. suis type 14. Human infection may be severe, with meningitis, septicaemia, endocarditis, and deafness. People in direct contact with pigs or pig products are considered at risk. Asplenic patients are known to be at greater risk from the disease. Human infection is thought to occur mainly via cuts or abrasions when handling infected carcasses.
So how did it happen that we have infected people in these numbers all of a sudden?
Granted - it's not fictional - but damned rare. Seldom lethal to humans. Much different that this current outbreak. Bacterial infections such as this are easily taken care of with soap and water.
The ChiComs went fishing for a disease to blame this on, and came up with a lame one.
That new staph infection here in the US is also said to cause severe bleeding under the skin - but I haven't heard much about that lately.
And what are the REAL numbers, if they sent 50,000 "specialists"? (That number still amazes the Hell out of me.)
I keep forgetting that in China, if you're one in a million, there's a million of you.
* 27 February 2004 "After the worldwide alarm triggered by 2003's SARS outbreak, it might seem reckless to set about creating a potentially far more devastating virus in the lab. But that is what is being attempted by some researchers, who argue that the dangers of doing nothing are even greater. We already know that the H5N1 bird flu virus ravaging poultry farms in Asia can be lethal on the rare occasions when it infects people. Now a team is tinkering with its genes to see if it can turn into a strain capable of spreading from human to human. If they manage this, they will have created a virus that could kill tens of millions if it got out of the lab." Learn more about how scientists are experimenting with deadly strains of the flu virus--and why some question the wisdom of this behavior at New Scientist.
Has it gotten out? Did China let it escape?
Apparently it does.
A plane packed with hundreds of tourist infected with the virus could spread our over the entire world.
China isn't playing nice.
ping
Sounds to me like a commie euphemism for military.
The ChiComs aren't known for quality control. For some reason, I think a good fume hood in a lab would qualify Bio Level 3 containment. (Even with a dirt floor.)
For China to admit - openly - that they had to send 50,000 people to contain this speaks volumes about the severity of the problem. Plus they are denying access to WHO.
I sure wish we knew more.
It does to me as well.
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