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Theft of nuclear materials.

This is G o o g l e's cache of http://www.mindfully.org/Nucs/Stolen-Nuclear-Material8mar02.htm as retrieved on Jun 3, 2005 12:25:29 GMT.

Data shows world awash in stolen nuclear material

Andrew Quinn / Reuters 8mar02

SAN FRANCISCO - International researchers have compiled what they say is the
world's most complete database of lost, stolen and misplaced nuclear material -
depicting a world awash in weapons-grade uranium and plutonium that nobody
can account for. "It truly is frightening," Lyudmila Zaitseva, a visiting fellow at
Stanford University's Institute for International Studies, said this week. "I think
this is the tip of the iceberg."

Stanford announced its database as U.S. senators held a hearing in Washington
to assess the threat of "dirty bombs," or radioactive material dispersed by
conventional explosives.

The Stanford program, dubbed the Database on Nuclear Smuggling, Theft and
Orphan Radiation Sources, is intended to help governments and international
agencies track wayward nuclear material worldwide, supplementing existing
national programs that often fail to share information.

The project took on added urgency following the Sept. 11 attacks on New York
and Washington, which spurred fears that extremists might seek to use nuclear
weapons in the future.

"It blows the mind, the lack of information," said George Bunn, a veteran arms
control negotiator and a member of the database group. "What we're trying to
say is: 'What are the facts?'"

CHILLING FACTS

The facts, even on cursory examination, are chilling.

Zaitseva said that, over the past 10 years, at least 88 pounds (40 kg) of
weapons-usable uranium and plutonium had been stolen from poorly protected
nuclear facilities in the former Soviet Union. While most of this material
subsequently was retrieved, at least 4.4 pounds (2 kg) of highly enriched uranium
stolen from a reactor in Georgia remains missing.

Other thefts have included several fuel rods that disappeared from a research
reactor in the Congo in the mid-1990s. While one of these fuel rods later
resurfaced in Italy - reportedly in the hands of the Mafia - the other has not been
found.

The Stanford group, led by nuclear physicist and arms control researcher Friedrich
Steinhausler, decided to form its database after becoming alarmed over the
patchy nature of most of the available information.

Combining data from two existing unclassified databases and adding new
information from sources ranging from government agencies to local media
reports, the team has evaluated each entry for accuracy and probability.

An expert at the Federation of American Scientists, the oldest U.S. arms control
group, welcomed the establishment of the database, saying it could play a
crucial role in helping governments ascertain the real level of nuclear threat.

"This is a smart step," said Michael Levi, director of the group's Strategic Security
Project. "Knowing what's out there is the first step to bringing it back in."

'ORPHAN' RADIATION ALSO A THREAT

The database includes illicitly obtained weapons-grade nuclear material as well
as "orphaned" radiation sources - scientific or medical material that may have
been lost, misplaced or simply thrown away but which still poses a health and
security threat.

Steinhausler said the database would be open only to approved researchers, and
that the Stanford group was beginning to contact government agencies in the
United States and Europe about sharing information to build more effective
international supervision of nuclear material.

"We cannot supply the means to improve the situation," Steinhausler said in a
statement. "We're pinpointing weaknesses and loopholes and saying, 'Do
something about it.'"

Zaitseva, visiting Stanford from the Kazakhstan National Nuclear Center, said the
database was helping to build a dim picture of the market for stolen uranium,
plutonium, and other dangerous materials.

But she added that while in many cases those behind nuclear thefts can be
identified, the ultimate destination of the nuclear material has remained a
mystery.

"We haven't found a single occasion in which the actual end users have been
caught," Zaitseva told Reuters.

"We can only guess by the routes where the material is going. We can't say for
sure if it is Iraq, Iran, North Korea, al Qaeda or Hezbollah. We can only make
assumptions."

She added that the dangers of an unsupervised, underground market in nuclear
material were likely to grow, noting that a U.S.-sponsored program to secure
nuclear components in the former Soviet Union thus far had only locked up about
a third of an estimated 600 tons of weapons-usable material.

"It's just not protected," she said. "This is hot stuff. If you steal 20 kilograms of
that material, you can build a nuclear weapon."

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This is about the American muslim bomber that was caught,
Padilla.

This is G o o g l e's cache of http://www.conservativemonitor.com/opinion04/75.shtml as retrieved on May 18, 2005 12:54:47

On the web since 1997

June 16, 2004 at 09:01:08 | Page 1 | Opinion | Finance | Book Reviews |
Society | Letters | Humor

Dirty Bombs Don’t
Kill People, Dirty
People Do...Maybe

Marcus Goldman / NewsWithViews --
Who is afraid of Uranium? We should not
be, or so important physicists are telling
us. It looks as if alleged dirty bomber
Jose Padilla’s defense team is up and
running-opponents of the war on terror
will no doubt relish the news. In noting
Uranium’s benign, almost fun nature, a
London based American scientist, Peter
D. Zimmerman, recently told the AP that
he had used a 20-pound brick of
Uranium as a doorstop in his office.
Zimmerman noted that the government’s
announcement of Padilla’s plans to
detonate a Uranium-laden explosive was
“extremely disturbing” because the risk of
spreading radioactivity was insignificant.
Whew! What a relief-instead of murder by
radiation, Mr. Padilla’s explosion probably
would have only killed, mutilated and
maimed a few dozen. Still, should we be
afraid?

Should we fear the alleged bomber’s
intent? Who cares about intent!
Obviously, Mr. Padilla was either too
stupid to realize that a Uranium bomb
would not be as devastating as he had
hoped or was unable to obtain Cesium or
Cobalt-the real stuff of dirty bombs. Even
a physicist agrees! ''If that's what he
planned,'' Ivan Oelrich of the Federation
of American Scientists said of Padilla, ''it
shows he doesn't know what he's talking
about...'' Abu Zubaydah, an al-Qaida
operative who reportedly encouraged
Padilla to use a uranium device to attack
the United States, claimed that the dirty
bomb was ''not as easy to do as they
thought.'' So, the explosion never
happened-so much for intent.

Should we fear the alleged bomber’s
bomb? It would not really have been
much of a bomb-a real dud. Just the
usual shrapnel, fire and body parts. I
suppose that by extension, none of us
should fear an unarmed or under-armed
terrorist. It seems only fair that terror
suspects use the “dirty bomb”
defense-“the gun contained only 2 or 3
rounds, the AK-47 jammed after the
fourth kill, the shoe bomb never went
off, the box cutter was dull,” and so forth.
What a great precedent!

Should we fear the alleged bomber’s
legal team? Who would?! Padilla, who is
being held as an enemy combatant,
nonetheless has legal representation.
Padilla's lawyer, Donna Newman, noted
that U.S. authorities “should have known
that dirty bomb allegations were
“nonsense.'' Newman went on to state
that “When they frightened everybody,
what were they trying to do, if they knew
better? To show the administration is on
top of things?'' She is pro-government
indictment of her client-''Maybe the
problem is the evidence is so weak, it's
laughable,'' she said. No fear here. She
seems friendly enough.

Should we fear the psychology of alleged
bombers in our midst? Well, psychology
can be a pretty powerful weapon in itself.
Indeed, ''Just saying the word 'uranium,'
the public automatically assumes, 'Oh, it
sounds bad,''' said physicist Charles
Ferguson of the Washington office of
California's Monterey Institute of
International Studies. ''Granted, it
(uranium) could have a psychological
effect'' because of “unfounded fears,”
said physicist Ferguson. So the
psychological weapon would not really be
a big deal. Besides, according to
statements attributed to Padilla, he was
never really planning to go through with
any attacks anyway. It is better if we
simply accept the premise that principled
terrorists are here to stay. We can always
seek out counseling if the psychological
weapon is more devastating than an
actual explosion.

Should we fear the man and what he
represents? If the bomb was incapable of
spreading devastating radiation, would
have essentially acted as a conventional
explosive and if the alleged bomber has
legal representation, the facts imply an
absence of serious threat. All that is left
over is the gleeful ideology of one lone
ex-gang member, a naive innocent,
unjustly held. Who cares what Padilla, a
Muslim who trained in terror camps in
Afghanistan, represents.

What are the real fears? Uranium is
“laughable”, it is nothing more than a
“doorstop.” One real issue is the
dismissive attitude-a sigh of relief that
the alleged bomb would have been only
a “regular” bomb. The notion that a
Uranium-laden bomb, or a
chocolate-laden bomb, or a rubber
duck-laden bomb or a psychology-laden
bomb would have consequences any less
intense is not to be believed. Normalizing
evil intent by downplaying its seriousness
is akin to condoning terror-it is
incomprehensible...unless the true goal is
to undermine and devalue the
government’s efforts to crush terror in
our midst. Attorney General John Ashcroft
maintains that Padilla planned a dirty
bomb that could result in “mass death
and injury.'' Ashcroft was absolutely
correct-what bomb does not? Those that
despise the war on terror should re-think
their strategy. What of Padilla‘s alleged
Uranium bomb plans? According to
physicist Oelrich, “If that's what he
planned, it shows....he...hasn't done
even rudimentary homework.'' The
homework was done, the message is
clear-dirty bombs don’t kill people, dirty
people do.

Marcus J.Goldman, M.D. is a Harvard
trained psychiatrist and author of three
books including "The Joy of Fatherhood"
(Crown) and Kleptomania (New Horizon).
He has appeared on Larry King Live, Bill
O'Reilly and in dozens of popular
magazines including Time and People. His
political works have appeared in The
Washington Times, Tech Central Station
and The Boston Herald. Dr. Goldman is a
Guest Writer for OpinionEditorials.com
and NewsWithViews.com. He is married
and has 5 children.

Copyright - W. J. Rayment, 1997 - 2005