I guess everyone was afraid George Washington would become a King. Unfortunately, it appears he appointed 9 Kings to decree Marbury v. Madison and thereby negate the constitution of the United States the first time the Supreme Court found itself in a bind...
My link for Marbury v. Madison is:
I use all Caps for the link (http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/9.htm) because it is what I consider informative...
So Hamilton, Marshall, Scalia, Bork and over 2 centuries of Constitutional law down the drain then? Again what do you think is meant by the term 'all Judicial Power'?
Very few people alive today have taken the time and trouble to understand the legal mumbo jumbo therein, let alone synthesize its principle.
Based on your opinion that the decsion is awful, I think you are not one of those people.
Unfortunately, it appears he appointed 9 Kings to decree Marbury v. Madison and thereby negate the constitution of the United States the first time the Supreme Court found itself in a bind...
What part do you consider awful? And how do you reconcile what was illustrated in the opinion?
Here's a portion of the end:
Suppose Congress passed a law saying that Senators no longer had to be elected, but could serve for life. Without Marbury vs. Madison no court could overturn such a power grab and Congress could do anything they wanted no matter what prohibition the Constitution imposes on them. The courts have failed us by not limiting Congress when they have exceeded their limited delegated powers (and that they have done many, many times) -- but Marbury vs Madison was the correct decision.The judicial power of the United States is extended to all cases arising under the constitution.
Could it be the intention of those who gave this power, to say that in using it the constitution should not be looked into? That a case arising under the constitution should be decided without examining the instrument under which it arises?
This is too extravagant to be maintained.
In some cases, then, the constitution must be looked into by the judges. And if they can open it at all, what part of it are they forbidden to read or to oey?
There are many other parts of the constitution which serve to illustrate this subject.
It is declared that "no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any state." Suppose a duty on the export of cotton, of tobacco, or of flour; and a suit instituted to recover it. Ought judgment to be rendered in such a case? Ought the judges to close their eyes on the constitution, and only see the law?
The constitution declares that "no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed." If, however, such a bill should be passed, and a person should be prosecuted under it; must the court condemn to death those victims whom the constitution endeavors to preserve?
"No person," says the constitution, "shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court."
Here the language of the constitution is addressed especially to the courts. It prescribes, directly for them, a rule of evidence not to be departed from. If the legislature should change that rule, and declare one witness, or a confession out of court, sufficient for conviction, must the constitutional principle yield to the legislative act?
From these, and many other selections which might be made, it is apparent, that the framers of the constitution contemplated that instrument as a rule for the government of courts, as well as of the legislature. Why otherwise does it direct the judges to take an oath to support it? This oath certainly applies, in an especial manner, to their conduct in their official character. How immoral to impose it on them, if they were to be used as the instruments, and the knowing instruments, for violating what they swear to support!