Overall picture on War Fronts 2. SWPA forces 3. Weather in SWPA 4. Fighter Sector orientation 5. Air Sea rescue 6. Escape and evasion 7. Zones of action 8. Friendly ground situation 9. Support Air Party Flying training started until May 17, due to bad weather the previous days. The 201st Squadron used P-47s on loan from the 58th Fighter Group units. Flight training included: 1. Familiarization and orientation 2. Fighter tactics and technics 3. Simulated combat missions 4. Combat missions Advanced flight training finished on June 3, and the 201st Squadron was ready for combat in the SWPA.
The pilots had started missions integrated to US formations, increasing the number of Mexican pilots until the formation was completely from the 201st Squadron. However, during most operations of the Mexican Squadron one liaison American pilot was included. In addition, the Squadron flew some more training missions in the SWPA, especially in the air to air arena..21
The Equipment The Lend-Lease agreement permitted the Mexican Squadron to use airplanes, equipment, instructors, and training facilities, in the US. It also contemplated the equipment of the unit overseas, in the same manner that an American unit. Initially the unit received in the Philippines used aircraft and other equipment on loan.
The 201st Squadron?s aircraft had US markings in addition to the Mexican marks, and they also have a white band painted in the nose. The 201st Squadron flew the P-47 aircraft, officially known as Thunderbolt, but nicknamed "Jug" due to its bulky shape that resembled a milk jug. It was a big and heavy airplane, weighting almost 7 tons, but powerful and fast.
There were many series of this aircraft, of which 15,682 were built. Initially it was used as an air superiority fighter, a role later taken by the P-51 Mustang, an aircraft with better endurance and range. The P-47 could carry up to two 1,000 lb. bombs, and with its eight 0.50" cal. machine guns, it was an excellent aircraft for Close Air Support and air to ground missions in general, specially at short range.
The unit started operations with fifteen P-47 D aircraft, and was able to maintain around twelve operational aircraft at all times. Adequate training and integration in the US logistical system contributed to these numbers, in spite of losses. Spare parts were available and the 58th Fighter Group retained the P-47 aircraft, while other units changed to the P-51. Access to higher level maintenance facilities, also contributed to the Squadron operational status. However, there were some limitations..23
The Limiting Factors Several factors affected the training. The time necessary for preparation and the language barrier were critical. Weather in the US and in the SWPA was a factor that caused delays and imposed restrictions. The equipment of the unit as a whole also required a great amount of effort. After the 201st Squadron program started, time for training was critical if the unit was to be sent to combat. The original training plan contemplated that the Squadron would be ready in November 1944; however, more realistic estimates indicated five months of training. It took over seven months before the unit was ready to leave the US, and the training was not completed as established in the program, due mainly to weather.
Weather played an important role in the delay of the MEAF training. The Squadron suspended unit training in Pocatello, Idaho due to weather; it had to move, together with the American classes training at Pocatello, to Majors Field, TX. Weather also affected gunnery training at Brownsville Field, TX. Even in the SWPA flying training was delayed because of weather. Language was probably the biggest barrier for pilots and ground personnel, and English classes were added to the training program.
The instructors of Section "I" agreed that "The chief difficulty in the training of Mexican personnel was the language difference. This was a particular handicap in the on-the-job training program. Results were not completely satisfactory when the Mexican mechanics were put to work with the base mechanics." The interpreters of Section "I" at Pocatello and Majors Field were a great help. "Some considered that training at Farmingdale (Republic Aviation Corp.) was not as.24 beneficial as training on the line, due to inability of interpreters to speak sufficient Spanish."
The language difference also affected pilot training, and probably flight safety. One fatal training accident in the US was probably due to communication problems. A pilot died during a take-off accident, when after receiving clearance to use the runway attempted to get airborne on a short taxiway. The tail wheel and the big engine on the P-47 difficulted forward visibility on the ground. One pilot was eliminated during unit training for his limited knowledge of the English language; a problem that could not be solved completely even with bilingual instructors.
The "check sheet" for the ground training in the SWPA recommended: "Since only about 40% of the 201st Squadron personnel are English speaking, the use of posters, photos, maps and other visual aids is indicated. An interpreter will also be present to assist you in presenting your material."
Most pilots agree that the P-47 was not an easy plane to fly. Marvin Bledsoe, a P-47 fighter pilot, mentions in his book Thunderbolt that several inexperienced pilots were killed in this aircraft, while others asked for transfers. In addition to that, the very nature of combat training increases risk. One pilot died on air to air gunnery training, when the aircraft went out of control right after he made a firing pass on the target. It was never known if something hit him, but that is a possible cause. Another pilot died in the SWPA during combat training, attempting to recover a high speed stall after a dive bombing pass.
Maintenance during training was excellent, but the war requirements imposed sometimes to operate barely within safety margins. It is natural for a unit engaged in combat to retain the best aircraft, and give away war weary equipment. This is one.25 possible explanation for some of the accidents in P-47s "loaned" to the 201st Squadron in the SWPA. Three forced landings because of engine malfunctions happened from 21 to 24 May 1945. Flights stopped for a maintenance inspection, and some aircraft were replaced, reducing the accident rate. Sometimes it was necessary to use "alternate procedures" to accomplished the mission, such as wood boxes or oil drums on top of dollies for loading bombs.
During take-off and landing training of Mexican pilots at Napier Field, Alabama, it was necessary during the summer to water spray the old P-40 engines before take-off to allow sufficient cooling. These limitations highlight the operational performance of the MEAF.
Operational Performance Que los miembros de la Fuerza A?a Expedicionaria Mexicana no olviden nunca el ejemplo de nuestros h?es. Que, en las pruebas que les reserva la guerra, sientan latir?al un?no con los suyos?los corazones de todos los mexicanos. Y que la bandera que les env?vuelva con ellos, desgarrada tal vez por las balas del enemigo, pero con gloria. ** ?
President Manuel Avila Camacho The MEAF and the 201st Squadron were a force representing in the battlefield to the Mexican military; they represented them well. It was a small force that combated during a relatively short period of time. "But considering that the 201st was new to combat their record compares favorably with that of the veteran pilots of the 58th Group." 1
The 201st Squadron flew fifty-nine combat missions in Luzon and Formosa, and several ferry flights in the SWPA. 2 There were inevitable losses; that was the price to pay for the honor of Mexico. The Concept of Operations Tactical and Operational concepts in the SWPA are unique in many ways. General MacArthur and General Kenney established a working relationship that enhanced the capabilities of ground, air, and maritime components in an unprecedented form among.28 Allied forces. Their success in integrating air and land forces? operations is comparable to the German?s "Blitzkrieg" operational concept.
The Allied Strategy to defeat Japan required the reduction of the defense perimeter, expanded after the Japanese offensive in 1942. This strategy made unnecessary to recapture all the terrain in Japanese hands. Isolation of forces and use of forward operational bases were better in terms of cost and effectiveness. From these forward bases it was possible to employ tactical air power, to negate Japan its lines of communication.
The pattern has been generally like this: An Allied air blockade is first spread out from our most advanced base. Japanese shipping is attacked with persistence until the enemy strong-points within the blockade area are sealed from their major feeder lines. Simultaneously our fighters seek out enemy planes wherever they are, particularly over the latter?s bases and destroy them. Importunate, well rehearsed bomber missions follow into these bases and shoot for ships and airplanes. This continues until the enemy?s capacity for air retaliation to a landing is minimized.
Meanwhile only one or two of the numerous enemy coastal bases within the blockade area are selected for invasion. The Air Force is switched to ground support and turns its full fury on the infantry?s target. Then comes the landing with the ground troops aiming for the airstrips. Engineers and malarial control units begin work immediately. Our Air Force moves forward and the process is then ready for repetition to the next limit of our fighters? reach, while by-passed bastions in the rear are kept impotent by isolation. 3
In World War II, it was already accepted that Air Superiority was the initial task of air power. After it was achieved, some believed that strategic bombardment of "moral" or material objectives followed; others thought that isolation of the battlefield and support to ground forces was next. The characteristics of the SWPA favored the latter, that is, tactical air power was necessary, either to contribute in the destruction of the Japanese fielded forces to attain victory, or to permit forward bases for strategic air operations..29
The Allied Strategy required a great degree of cooperation at the operational level. Not considering maritime forces, most of the time it was air power who supported ground forces, but also ground forces helped air power providing and defending air bases closer to the diffuse battle front in the Pacific islands. This was the concept that permitted tactical development in air-ground operations, and allowed an early invasion of the Philippines in Leyte Gulf, on October 20, 1944. When the MEAF arrived to the Philippines, Japanese forces still occupied an extensive part of Luzon and Mindanao.
The Allied ground forces were in pursuit of the Japanese troops, but they were still a formidable force that continued fighting until the surrender of Japan. Enemy air activity over Luzon was very limited, but there were some isolated reports of hostile aircraft over Manila Bay in June. This was the general situation when the MEAF initiated combat missions on 4 June 1945.
The Luzon Operations The 201st Squadron conducted 53 combat missions in Luzon, supporting Allied ground forces, from 4 June to 4 July 1945. Many operations were pre-planned missions to attack enemy concentrations or provide Close Air Support, but others were immediate missions from air or ground alert. Forty-five missions were effective, with a high percentage of bomb impacts in the target area.
Many reports indicated good and excellent results. Eight of these missions were not effective due to different reasons. The History of the 58th Fighter Group mentions: "From the 7th to the 25th of June, the 201st flew 31 missions with the 58th Fighter Group. The results of the various missions ran the scale.30 from good to excellent, with the results of some missions not reported by SAP." Appendix C contains mission information.
Coordination with ground forces was essential for this type of missions. The Support Air Party (SAP) concept in use for Allied forces in the SWPA was a refined aspect of the Air-Ground operations. It had evolved from experiences in previous operations, and all the general components of a modern CAS system were present. The 201st Squadron conducted many missions under SAP control, most of them with good results. Weather was the most common cause for ineffective missions.
Weather conditions in the Philippines during summertime are unpredictable. In general, there is a direct relationship observed between accuracy of impacts and weather conditions.
However, sometimes the 201st Squadron attained good results dropping bombs in close formation due to bad weather. Occasionally, an alternate target was attacked due to weather conditions around the main target. Target identification was also a factor for ineffective missions. Forests in the Philippines sometimes prevented target identification.
Clearance was a requirement for attack, and it would only be granted after identification of the target. The available and unclassified mission reports of the V Fighter Command, 58th Fighter Group, and the 201st Squadron, do not indicate cases of fratricide during the Mexican missions.
However, Lt. Col Sandoval Castarrica wrote that on one occasion the SAP and the L-5 pilot (Forward Air Controller) designated the target with white smoke bombs and cleared the attack, indicating satisfactory results with all bombs observed impacting the objective area; later the V Fighter Command notified the attack affected American troops. The next two.31 flying days, pilots from the 58th Fighter Group replaced the American liaison pilots, and accompanied the Squadron?s flights.
To facilitate target identification, a liaison aircraft (L-5) or ground controllers directed the attacking force. Lack of communication with these elements also added to non effective missions. These personnel gave mission results, and when foliage or distance did not interfere scoring most results were confirmed on target. When the Squadron aborted a mission for any reason, the pilots dropped their bombs on safety areas, usually over the sea. Effective strafing required visual contact with the target.
Not all missions involved strafing, but when it happened, results were also good. Some mission results mention secondary explosions and silenced machine gun nests. One daily report indicated: "The Mexican P-47s bombed and strafed enemy concentrations and motor convoy north of PAYAWAN on route # 4. All bombs were in the target area and two trucks were left burning. Accurate M/G fire holed two A/C." 9
These reports testify the performance of the 201st Squadron in the SWPA. The Formosa Operations In the Philippines there was almost no enemy air activity. Japanese aviation had concentrated in the defense of Japan, and only sporadic flights were seen over the Philippines. There was some enemy air activity over Formosa (Taiwan), and the 201st Squadron received the opportunity to go after it from 6 to 9 July 1945. 10
Four long range operations were launched over Formosa, to conduct Fighter Sweep missions. On two missions the pilots saw unidentified aircraft, possibly adversary, but.32 they were too distant and it was not possible to engage in air combat. On one occasion the enemy planes reversed direction, and both times they climbed into the clouds. 11 Some friendly flights were observed, and on one occasion a submarine was detected. Japanese submarines conducted resupply missions to forces isolated on some islands.
These missions did not destroy enemy adversaries, but allowed training for long range missions. After almost a month of training and aircraft ferry missions, the unit received another mission?to bomb Karenko, Formosa. Eight aircraft launched on 8 August 1945 for a long range mission that almost exceeded the aircraft capabilities. The pilots declared the mission non effective, but they did not have a second chance.
The war ended on 15 August 1945. The last mission of the 201st Squadron was to escort a convoy enroute to Okinawa, and it took place on 26 August 1945. The war was officially terminated, but there was the possibility of Kamikaze aircraft launching from Formosa.
This was the final mission tasked to the 201st Squadron of the MEAF. Operational Factors When the MEAF arrived to the Philippines there was almost no Japanese air opposition, and the ground forces were retreating trying to reorganize. However, the adversary was still capable of inflicting damage, and at least on three missions aircraft were damaged from enemy fire.
The P-47 was a rough airplane and no aircraft were lost due to enemy action. Five Mexican pilots died and several accidents happened in the SWPA during non combat missions.
The first fatal accident overseas happened on June 1, 1945, apparently.33 for a high speed stall after a steep bombing dive. Another pilot died on June 5 when his P-47 crashed because of engine failure after take-off for a functional check flight. Apparently he attempted to avoid a bivouac area. One more fatal accident happened on July 16 during a ferry flight, when the pilot attempted to ditch on the sea after the engine quit due to lack of fuel, while trying to reach friendly territory flying wingman to an American Officer. Another fatal accident occurred in similar conditions on July 19, 1945. A two-ship flight encountered heavy weather and the leader was lost and never found.
The final fatal accident happened on July 21, 1945. In the weather, a pilot flew to the ground in formation with his leader?an American officer. These losses severely affected the operational performance of the unit, and contributed together with other factors to prevent the Squadron from relocating to Okinawa. The short range of the P-47 also affected the operational performance.
When the Squadron flew missions to Formosa, the aircraft limitations imposed severe restrictions. Loiter time in fighter sweep missions with no bombs onboard was about 20 minutes. With the aircraft loaded with bombs, the missions were critical. In the only mission to bomb Formosa, two aircraft had to land in an alternate field due to fuel shortage. Another factor that combined with the others to affect the operational performance was the lack of replacements. They continued training in the US, and it would require more time for them to arrive to the SWPA and be ready for combat. In addition, some losses were leaders and it would require additional training to replace them.
Assessment and Conclusions Fue as?omo dejo de existir la FAEM, una fuerza de modestos efectivos que, con un m?mo costo en sangre y en dinero, en poco tiempo desarroll? una actividad visible en efectos materiales en el frente del Pac?co, haciendo realidad la voz de M?co en defensa de las libertades humanas al lado de las Naciones Unidas. *** ?Tte.Cor. de E.M. Enrique Sandoval Castarrica
To assess the significance of the MEAF and the 201st Squadron, it is necessary to consider more than the simple participation in combat. Several aspects of the Mexican military benefited from the participation of this small but significant military force. Hence, the contributions of the MEAF can even be connected to emerging US-Mexico relations after World War II.
The MEAF Contribution The analysis of the operational data presented in this research paper, gives indications of the overall performance of the MEAF in combat. The number of effective missions is clearly greater than the ineffective ones, and the mission reports indicate accurate bombing and strafing. When assessing the impact of the unit in the war, clearly it was not essential for the Allied victory, but this was never the purpose of the Mexican force.
It was only a small unit representing the Mexican military, and it was immersed in a new combat arena.37 full of technical innovations, but it was fighting among friends and for a noble cause; this was important. In spite of the losses in lives and material, the overall cost of the MEAF was not excessive. Perhaps the lack of combat experience and the conditions in the SWPA contributed to a relatively high amount of casualties and accidents. Probably they could have been avoided with better training, conducted without time constraints.
The MEAF program brought great political value. The people of Mexico united to receive and honor the returning MEAF personnel. Enormous groups of Mexicans gathered in US and Mexican cities to celebrate with the MEAF. They were part of the forces of liberation that fought against the oppressor and attained victory. Mexico?s participation in combat overseas brought international prestige and strengthened US-Mexico relations. Probably in the same way that the war contributed to better US-Mexico relations, the MEAF also contributed to better relations between the military of both countries.
The MEAF program fully developed from start to finish, and it contributed to a greater degree of cooperation among the US and Mexican military. This cooperation contributed significantly to the modernization of the Mexican armed forces. Some of the equipment acquired during World War II remained in the inventory for many years. Some trainer aircraft were still flying almost forty years after the MAF received them through the Lend-Lease agreement. The MAF also received some B-25 bombers after the war. 1 For a country with a reduced military budget, these were very important contributions..38
The training of pilots in the US was another positive result of this cooperation. Some 201st Squadron replacements continued training in twin engine aircraft after the war finished. Many of them would later fly the transport and cargo aircraft of the MAF, fulfilling an important role during peace time. Also, some MAF pilots went on to civilian jobs in airline companies during the following years. This somewhat reduced capabilities of the armed forces but contributed to the development of Mexico?s commercial aviation. The pilots graduated from flight training centers in the US helped to improve the Mexican training programs.
Since 1943 the MAF pursued a reorganization of its training centers. 2 The curricula, organization, and equipment of the Military Aviation School benefited from the coordination through the JMUSDC. The MEAF also contributed personnel to senior leadership positions in the MAF. Colonel Antonio C?enas Rodr?ez and Captain Roberto Salido Beltr?the Commander and A-3 of the MEAF?would later become Chiefs of the MAF. Also, some 201st Squadron and replacement pilots would reach the rank of General. No doubt their combat experience benefited the MAF development. These are some of the contributions of the MEAF. Conclusions The participation of the MEAF in the South West Pacific Area (SWPA) in World War II is an important aspect in the history of Mexico?s Armed Forces.
The organization, equipment, and operations of this force, successful in spite of many obstacles, offer valuable lessons. The development and performance of this force are an example of trust,.39 coordination, commitment, and cooperation between international allies for a worthy cause. This research paper analyzed the organization, training, and operations of the 201st Squadron, and explained some aspects of the operational performance and contributions of the MEAF.
The participation of this force in World War II was not an ordinary accomplishment, especially if we consider that this was the first occasion that Mexico?s government sent forces to fight outside of the country?s territory. It is almost certain that Mexico?s participation in the Second World War against the Axis powers will continue to be seldom mentioned in history books.
Also, the support with raw materials and labor force to the Allied war effort aspect will continue to receive considerably more attention than the actual contribution in combat. A relationship that reflects the perceived overall contribution of the country to the Allied cause in World War II, but that not diminishes the action of Mexico?s only unit participating in combat overseas?the Mexican Expeditionary Air Force (MEAF).
The MEAF ceased to exist on December 1, 1945. This is what Lt. Col Sandoval Castarrica registered about the event in his Historia Oficial de la Fuerza A?a Expedicionaria Mexicana. That is how the MEAF ceased to exist, (it was) a modest force in numbers that, with a minimum cost of blood and money, in a short time performed a visible activity in material effects in the Pacific Front, turning into reality the voice of Mexico in defense of the human liberties together with the United Nations
Another web page on mexico in WW2 is http://www.mexconnect.com/mex_/travel/slenchek/slmexicoww2.html
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