Posted on 06/30/2005 8:24:35 AM PDT by Santiago de la Vega
There is only one country missing from the list of nations: India.
Where the hell is India?
India is close, powerful, interested, and capable.
Now that their colonial hangover has passed, they are ready for their new responsibilities.
I'm willing to predict that India joins the coalition before the year is out.
Any takers?
http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/06/30/opinion/edchellaney.php
India can be America's best friend
Brahma Chellaney
FRIDAY, JULY 1, 2005
NEW DELHI At a time when anti-Americanism has spread across the globe, a new poll shows that more people in India have a positive view of the United States than in any other nation surveyed. The poll, conducted by the Pew Global Attitudes Project, raises a larger question: How long will it be before the courtship between India and the United States leads to a strategic partnership?
Despite a congruence of vital national interests and a shared political goal to build a long-term strategic relationship, the United States has yet to forge a true partnership with India.
To be sure, there have been important shifts in U.S. thinking, largely on account of India's rising geopolitical importance, its abundant market opportunities and its role in ensuring power equilibrium in Asia.
The United States and India are discussing cooperation on missile defense, nuclear energy, space and high technology. The two have also opened a quiet dialogue on India's largest neighbor, China, whose rise is likely to pose the single biggest challenge to world security in the years to come.
U.S. public pronouncements on India, however, have yet to progress from statements of good intent to tangible policy changes. And it is not clear whether President George W. Bush - weighed down by Iraq and domestic policy discords - can give sufficient priority to India to help mold a dramatic new turn in bilateral relations.
If Washington really wants to "help India become a major world power in the 21st century," as a background briefing in Washington stated the very day Bush made public his controversial decision to sell F-16 fighter jets to Pakistan, it should be willing to demonstrate that this is not just an attempt to mollify India over the rearming of Pakistan.
At the global level, the United States can easily translate such commitment into action by bringing India (and China) into the G-8 and by supporting India's inclusion as a permanent member of the UN Security Council.
For a strategic partnership to emerge, Washington and New Delhi need to resolve their differences on two key issues - stringent technology controls against India, many dating back to the 1970s when India conducted its first nuclear test, and Bush's coddling of the military-mullah complex that runs Pakistan.
The supply of major combat systems and multibillion-dollar aid encourages Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf not to dismantle the terror infrastructure that his military maintains against India.
The F-16 decision comes on top of the action to arm Islamabad with the P-3C Orion maritime reconnaissance aircraft, TOW anti-tank missiles and Phalanx defense systems - all hardware that can be used against India.
Although the United States has come to accept India as a de facto nuclear-weapons state, the bilateral process to find ways to ease the U.S. technology-export restrictions has become a slow, drawn-out affair involving bureaucratic haggle.
If the White House were to order a liberal interpretation of existing U.S. laws and guidelines, it would throw open for export to India many high-tech items currently barred.
During the Cold War, America relaxed tough national laws when it suited its strategic interests.
A number of influential Americans have suggested important policy changes relating to India, including an end to technology controls; broad, long-term space collaboration; the sale of commercial nuclear-power reactors, and India's assimilation into the nonproliferation regime as a friendly nuclear-weapons state.
The next three weeks of senior-level bilateral meetings leading up to the Indian prime minister's meeting with Bush at the White House on July 18 may determine whether the U.S.-Indian relationship will continue to progress incrementally or be dramatically transformed as a durable strategic partnership.
The Indian defense minister's talks in Washington this week, for example, could decide whether the United States will become a reliable long-term supplier of advanced weaponry to one of the world's largest buyers of arms.
At issue is whether India will emerge as an independent power or as a U.S. strategic ally. The choice will profoundly shape Asian and international geopolitics.
(Brahma Chellaney is a professor of strategic studies at the Center for Policy Research in New Delhi.)
NEW DELHI At a time when anti-Americanism has spread across the globe, a new poll shows that more people in India have a positive view of the United States than in any other nation surveyed. The poll, conducted by the Pew Global Attitudes Project, raises a larger question: How long will it be before the courtship between India and the United States leads to a strategic partnership?
Despite a congruence of vital national interests and a shared political goal to build a long-term strategic relationship, the United States has yet to forge a true partnership with India.
To be sure, there have been important shifts in U.S. thinking, largely on account of India's rising geopolitical importance, its abundant market opportunities and its role in ensuring power equilibrium in Asia.
The United States and India are discussing cooperation on missile defense, nuclear energy, space and high technology. The two have also opened a quiet dialogue on India's largest neighbor, China, whose rise is likely to pose the single biggest challenge to world security in the years to come.
U.S. public pronouncements on India, however, have yet to progress from statements of good intent to tangible policy changes. And it is not clear whether President George W. Bush - weighed down by Iraq and domestic policy discords - can give sufficient priority to India to help mold a dramatic new turn in bilateral relations.
If Washington really wants to "help India become a major world power in the 21st century," as a background briefing in Washington stated the very day Bush made public his controversial decision to sell F-16 fighter jets to Pakistan, it should be willing to demonstrate that this is not just an attempt to mollify India over the rearming of Pakistan.
At the global level, the United States can easily translate such commitment into action by bringing India (and China) into the G-8 and by supporting India's inclusion as a permanent member of the UN Security Council.
For a strategic partnership to emerge, Washington and New Delhi need to resolve their differences on two key issues - stringent technology controls against India, many dating back to the 1970s when India conducted its first nuclear test, and Bush's coddling of the military-mullah complex that runs Pakistan.
The supply of major combat systems and multibillion-dollar aid encourages Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf not to dismantle the terror infrastructure that his military maintains against India.
The F-16 decision comes on top of the action to arm Islamabad with the P-3C Orion maritime reconnaissance aircraft, TOW anti-tank missiles and Phalanx defense systems - all hardware that can be used against India.
Although the United States has come to accept India as a de facto nuclear-weapons state, the bilateral process to find ways to ease the U.S. technology-export restrictions has become a slow, drawn-out affair involving bureaucratic haggle.
If the White House were to order a liberal interpretation of existing U.S. laws and guidelines, it would throw open for export to India many high-tech items currently barred.
During the Cold War, America relaxed tough national laws when it suited its strategic interests.
A number of influential Americans have suggested important policy changes relating to India, including an end to technology controls; broad, long-term space collaboration; the sale of commercial nuclear-power reactors, and India's assimilation into the nonproliferation regime as a friendly nuclear-weapons state.
The next three weeks of senior-level bilateral meetings leading up to the Indian prime minister's meeting with Bush at the White House on July 18 may determine whether the U.S.-Indian relationship will continue to progress incrementally or be dramatically transformed as a durable strategic partnership.
The Indian defense minister's talks in Washington this week, for example, could decide whether the United States will become a reliable long-term supplier of advanced weaponry to one of the world's largest buyers of arms.
At issue is whether India will emerge as an independent power or as a U.S. strategic ally. The choice will profoundly shape Asian and international geopolitics.
(Brahma Chellaney is a professor of strategic studies at the Center for Policy Research in New Delhi.)
http://www.dawn.com/2005/06/30/top12.htm
US, India sign 10-year pact
WASHINGTON, June 29: The United States and India have signed a 10-year agreement to strengthen defence ties between the two countries. The landmark agreement will help facilitate joint weapons production, co-operation on missile defence and the transfer of technology.
The agreement came after intense negotiations hours before the formal meeting of Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee and his US counterpart Donald Rumsfeld. The agreement formalizes the different strands of the defence relationship which has grown faster than other parts of the bilateral relations.
“The United States and India have entered a new era,” said a joint statement issued after the signing of the agreement in Washington. “We are transforming our relationship to reflect our common principles and shared national interests.”
The statement said that the two nations had advanced to ‘unprecedented” levels of cooperation. “Today, we agree on a new framework that builds on past successes, seizes new opportunities and charts a course for the US-India defence relationship for the next 10 years,” it added. After singing the pact, Mr Mukherjee declared his first visit to the US since assuming power ‘successful’. He said the agreement also covers interests of both countries — American interests in joint operations and Indian desire for high technology.
The agreement promises to expand ‘two-way defence trade’, not only for weapons sales but for strengthening India’s security and opens new venues for technology transfer, joint research and even expanding collaboration in missile defence.
One of the most interesting aspects is India dropping its demand for a UN cover for joint military operations. The two defence establishments will “collaborate in multinational operations when it is in their common interest.”
Where's India? Hard to say. United States policy after WW II was to ally ourselves with India against China and the USSR. But India refused to stay allied, preferring to work more closely with the USSR while pretending to be neutral. So, faut de mieux, we allied with Pakistan instead.
Now it's a new ball game. But it's still not clear which way India will go. They would make a good counterbalance to Communist China, and they have a long history of conflict with China, but it's very unclear where they will come down on that issue as well.
They live in a dangerous neighborhood. But if they want our backing, then they need to make up their minds whether, in Bush's words, they are for us or against us.
> If India is serious about joining the UN Security council, they have an opportunity to show it by providing troops for the peacekeeping operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
That may be ok with Mush, but it won't go over well with the Paki Islamist element...which may be a major consideration.
sorry but the USA tied itself to Islamabad by the mid 50s, before Nehru went to Moscow.
Wouldn't the US be able to keep embassies open in both countries at the same time? It can't be all that hard to do. After all, the US has embassies in both France and England.
There's another explanation going about like this. After the India-China border dispute in the early 60s, India until then used largely British- and American-made weaponry. When India sent its officials to Britain to seek additional weaponry, especially airplanes, they were denied this. And worst of all, American pressure was the reason for this denial (it may have had something to do with America not wanting to antagonise China, so that they may be used against the Soviets ). At about the same time, Russia, thinking it can pull in India into its sphere, toured the officials through its military-industry complexes, and offered India the very latest of Soviet weaponry. Indo-US ties have been on a steep downslide after this, plateaued a bit during the Reagan years, and began to climb during the final days of the Clinton years, and most importantly, the early days of the Bush Administration.
One important point worth a mention, though, is that the Russians were never given any basing rights within Indian territory, nor did they have access to Indian military bases.
The most important question about the vital Anglosphere is, will the UK follow Canada and New Zealand out of it, or will they stay in?
Embassies is one thing. Military alliances is another.
Sure. You know, the war is hardly started. Many of us expect what has gone on since WTC911 is comparable to the preliminary moves of a real war. It would be very difficult to know which direction the real war would go and making major commitments now might be a fatal mistake. The US military uses mobility as its main strategy rather than various hard points around the globe, a result of the nuclear age. Any important bases would disappear in a flash. As long as the war is conventional, the idea of bases makes sense, but ultimate survival means to be elsewhere.
About a few years ago (you can count this on the fingers of your hands), America imposed sanctions on India in an attempt to cripple its research programmes (but in ways more than many, backfired). Besides essential spares for the Indian Harriers and Sea King(?) helicopters which were originally made by the British, but now sourced from the US, were denied under American pressure on the British.
A repeat of this happening, if India were to buy large numbers of American planes, as it had done so before, is the primary concern in Indian defence circles, to go against buying American weaponry.
However, the way things seem to be moving, this issue may be sorted after all.
That makes since a little bit. I almost forgot about that (wasn't this during the Democrat's pro-China Clinton administration?). I wonder if the government of India still believe that will happen even after the relations between India and US improved once again.
That is why I assume any deals with the USA will include joint venture production centers in India, utilising Indian talent much as the software telecoms outfits are doing.
India should rightly be very very very concerned about the US tendency to impose sanctions. A diminishing concern, to be sure, but one that can be used as a strong bargaining chip.
>>Russians were never given any basing rights within Indian territory, nor did they have access to Indian military bases.
However India allowed base usage for US flights from the East during Desert Storm and more importantly, offered the US full use of bases and ports after 911 if Bush had chosen to deal decisively and effectively with the jihad threat by dealing with Pakistan.
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