FWIW, there is no mention anywhere in the opinion of the concept "fair market value".
Some powerful comments in O'Connor and Thomas. See excerpts from the opinion:
JUSTICE O'CONNOR:
In moving away from our decisions sanctioning the condemnation of harmful property use, the Court today significantly expands the meaning of public use.
It holds that the sovereign may take private property currently put to ordinary private use, and give it over for new, ordinary private use, so long as the new use is predicted to generate some secondary benefit for the public -- such as increased tax revenue, more jobs, maybe even aesthetic pleasure. But nearly any lawful use of real private property can be said to generate some incidental benefit to the public. Thus, if predicted (or even guaranteed) positive side-effects are enough to render transfer from one private party to another constitutional, then the words "for public use" do not realistically exclude any takings, and thus do not exert any constraint on the eminent domain power.
The logic of today's decision is that eminent domain may only be used to upgrade -- not downgrade -- property. At best this makes the Public Use Clause redundant with the Due Process Clause, which already prohibits irrational government action. See Lingle, 544 U. S. __.
CUT CUT
For who among us can say she already makes the most productive or attractive possible use of her property? The specter of condemnation hangs over all property.
Nothing is to prevent the State from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping mall, or any farm with a factory.
If legislative prognostications about the secondary public benefits of a new use can legitimate a taking, there is nothing in the Court's rule or in JUSTICE KENNEDY's gloss on that rule to prohibit property transfers generated with less care, that are less comprehensive, that happen to result from less elaborate process, whose only projected advantage is the incidence of higher taxes, or that hope to transform an already prosperous city into an even more prosperous one.
For all these reasons, I would revisit our Public Use Clause cases and consider returning to the original meaning of the Public Use Clause: that the government may take property only if it actually uses or gives the public a legal right to use the property.
JUSTICE THOMAS:
The Court relies almost exclusively on this Court's prior cases to derive today's far-reaching, and dangerous, result.
CUT CUT
When faced with a clash of constitutional principle and a line of unreasoned cases wholly divorced from the text, history, and structure of our founding document, we should not hesitate to resolve the tension in favor of the Constitution's original meaning.
The consequences of today's decision are not difficult to predict, and promise to be harmful. So-called "urban renewal" programs provide some compensation for the properties they take, but no compensation is possible for the subjective value of these lands to the individuals displaced and the indignity inflicted by uprooting them from their homes. Allowing the government to take property solely for public purposes is bad enough, but extending the concept of public purpose to encompass any economically beneficial goal guarantees that these losses will fall disproportionately on poor communities. Those communities are not only systematically less likely to put their lands to the highest and best social use, but are also the least politically powerful.
For the reasons I have given, and for the reasons given in JUSTICE O'CONNOR's dissent, the conflict of principle raised by this boundless use of the eminent domain power should be resolved in petitioners' favor. I would reverse the judgment of the Connecticut Supreme Court.
Good point. But "just compensation" typcially the govt. means, "fair market value," at least - that's my understanding.
Thanks for your post!!!