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Posted on 06/02/2005 9:27:09 PM PDT by nwctwx
Have a great Independence Day, AD.
Enjoy yourself.
Perhaps cowboy equates to those dastardly Minutemen (cowboys or vigilantes, same difference) and since there is no acknowledged problem with illegals or aliens, those words would not be on the list (the problem exists only to the citizens - not the politicians who cave to big business) and who welcome them with open arms and borders.
Note: The following text is an exact quote:
===
http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/tw/tw_920.html
Travel Warning
United States Department of State
Bureau of Consular Affairs
Washington, DC 20520
This information is current as of today, Thu Jun 30 2005 15:32:39 GMT-0700.
IRAN
June 30, 2005
The Department of State continues to warn U.S. citizens to carefully consider the risks of travel to Iran. Due to ongoing tensions, particularly along the border with Iraq, U.S. citizens may be at risk of harassment or kidnapping. This Warning is being reissued to update security information, provide information on travel registration on the Internet and supersedes the Travel Warning for Iran issued November 22, 2004.
Tensions generated by the current situation in Iraq have increased the potential threat to U.S. citizens and interests abroad posed by those who oppose U.S. policy. Some elements of the Iranian government and population remain hostile to the U.S. American citizens may be subject to harassment or kidnapping. Some areas of the country, including the Baluchistan border area near Pakistan and Afghanistan, the Kurdish northwest of the country, and areas near the Iraqi border, are not considered safe.
Large-scale demonstrations have taken place in various regions throughout Iran over the past several years as a result of a sometimes volatile political climate. U.S. citizens who travel to Iran despite this Travel Warning should exercise caution.
The U.S. government does not currently have diplomatic or consular relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran and therefore cannot provide protection or routine consular services to American citizens in Iran. The Swiss government, acting through its Embassy in Tehran, serves as protecting power for U.S. interests in Iran. Neither U.S. passports nor visas to the United States are issued in Tehran. The Iranian Government does not recognize dual citizenship and generally does not permit the Swiss to provide protective services for U.S. citizens who are also Iranian nationals. In addition, U.S. citizens of Iranian origin who are considered by Iran to be Iranian citizens have been detained and harassed by Iranian authorities. Former Muslims who have converted to other religions, as well as persons who encourage Muslims to convert, are subject to arrest and prosecution.
Americans who travel or reside in Iran despite the Travel Warning are strongly encouraged to register through the State Department's travel registration website, https://travelregistration.state.gov.
U.S. citizens should also consult the Department of State’s Consular Information Sheet for Iran, the current Worldwide Caution and the Middle East and North Africa Public Announcements, which are located on the Department’s Internet web site at http://travel.state.gov. American citizens may also obtain updated information on travel and security conditions by calling 1-888-407-4747 toll-free in the United States or Canada, or, from overseas, 1-202-501-4444.
LOL, I saw a google in your post to me, couldn't resist it.
Groups is worth a quick look, I was in there and had to go
down for a nap, but take time to look at it , both reg and by date.
http://www.google.com/search?client=googlet&q=Iran%2C%20Russia%2C%20North%20Korea%20and%20China%20are%20all%20considered%0D%0Asleeping%20rogue%20giants
NOTE: The following text is an exact quote:
===
http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/tw/tw_921.html
Travel Warning
United States Department of State
Bureau of Consular Affairs
Washington, DC 20520
This information is current as of today, Thu Jun 30 2005 15:35:29 GMT-0700.
IRAQ
June 28, 2005
This Travel Warning reiterates the dangers of the use of civilian aircraft and road travel within Iraq. This supersedes the Travel Warning of October 20, 2004.
The Department of State continues to strongly warn U.S. citizens against travel to Iraq, which remains very dangerous. Remnants of the former Baath regime, transnational terrorists, and criminal elements remain active. Attacks against military and civilian targets throughout Iraq continue, including in the International (or “Green”) Zone. Targets include hotels, restaurants, police stations, checkpoints, foreign diplomatic missions, and international organizations and other locations with expatriate personnel. These attacks have resulted in deaths and injuries of American citizens, including those doing humanitarian work. In addition, there have been planned and random killings, as well as extortions and kidnappings. U.S. citizens have been kidnapped and several were subsequently murdered by terrorists in Iraq. U.S. citizens and other foreigners continue to be targeted by insurgent groups for kidnapping and murder. Military operations continue. There are daily attacks against Multinational Forces - Iraq (MNF-I) throughout the country.
There is credible information that terrorists are targeting civil aviation. Civilian and military aircraft arriving in and departing from Baghdad International Airport have been subjected to small arms and missiles. Civilian aircraft do not generally possess systems, such as those found on military aircraft, capable of defeating man-portable, surface-to-air missiles (MANPADS). Anyone choosing to utilize civilian aircraft to enter or depart Iraq should be aware of this potential threat, as well as the extremely high risk to road transportation described below. Official U.S. Government (USG) personnel are strongly encouraged to use U.S. military or other USG aircraft when entering and departing Iraq due to concerns about security of civilian aircraft servicing Iraq. Due to safety and security concerns, U.S. government personnel are not authorized to travel commercially on Iraqi Airways. Currently, U.S. government personnel are only authorized to travel commercially on Royal Jordanian Airlines.
All vehicular travel in Iraq is extremely dangerous. There have been numerous attacks on civilian vehicles, as well as military convoys. Attacks occur throughout the day, but travel at night is exceptionally dangerous. Travel in or through Ramadi and Fallujah, travel between al-Hillah and Baghdad, and travel between the International Zone and Baghdad International Airport is particularly dangerous. Occasionally, U.S. Government personnel are prohibited from traveling to select areas depending on prevailing security conditions. There continues to be heavy use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and/or mines on roads, particularly in plastic bags, soda cans, and dead animals. Grenades and explosives have been thrown into vehicles from overpasses, particularly in crowded areas. Overland travel should be undertaken only when absolutely necessary and with the appropriate security.
The U.S. Embassy is located in the International Zone. The Embassy can provide only limited emergency services to U.S. citizens in Iraq. At present travel to and from the International Zone is extremely limited. The U.S. Embassy does not provide visa services to the general public. American citizens who choose to visit or reside in Iraq despite this Travel Warning are urged to pay close attention to their personal security, avoid crowds, especially rallies or demonstrations and to inform the U.S. Embassy of their presence in Iraq. All Americans in Baghdad are strongly encouraged to register with the Embassy at the following website: https://travelregistration.state.gov/ibrs/home.asp.
American citizens may obtain the latest security information or other information about iraq by calling the u.s. embassy, located in the international zone, at: 1-240-553-0584 x5340 or x5635, or iraqna cellular phones - 7901-732-134 and 07901-168-383 or by e-mail: usconsulbaghdad@state.gov or via the u.s. embassy's website: http//iraq.usembassy.gov. Their after-hours number in case of extreme emergency is 1-914-822-5493.
Updated information on travel and security in Iraq may be obtained from the Department of state by calling 1-888-407-4747 within the United States, or, from overseas, 1-202-501-4444. For further information, please consult the Consular Information Sheet for Iraq, the current Worldwide Caution and the Middle East and North Africa Public Announcements, all of which are available on the Bureau of Consular Affairs Internet website at http://travel.state.gov.
OPINION: A lot of anti-American, jihad sites, etc. call Bush a cowboy or the cownboy.
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1433746/posts
"Daily Terrorist Round-up 6/30/05"
6/30/05
Posted on 06/30/2005 5:14:44 AM PDT by Straight Vermonter
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1433659/posts
"New terror 'faces' emerge"
KUWAIT TIMES ^ | 30th of June 2005 | KUWAIT TIMES
Posted on 06/29/2005 11:15:02 PM PDT by mdittmar
Note: The following text is an exact quote:
===
http://www.centcom.mil/CENTCOMNews/News_Release.asp?NewsRelease=20050624.txt
NEWS RELEASE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
7115 South Boundary Boulevard
MacDill AFB, Fla. 33621-5101
Phone: (813) 827-5894; FAX: (813) 827-2211; DSN 651-5894
June 30, 2005
Release Number: 05-06-24
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
WEAPONS CACHE FOUND
KIRKUK AIR BASE, Iraq – Iraqi citizens assisted Coalition forces in finding more than 4,000 pounds of high explosives, near Kirkuk Air Base over the past two days in two separate incidents.
Officials received a tip from a local Iraqi about buried explosives June 29. Explosive Ordnance Disposal Airmen assigned here found a cache of 400 artillery projectiles buried approximately 12 km south of the base.
In response to another tip June 30, EOD recovered an ammunition cache of approximately 270 artillery projectiles approximately 7 km north of the base.
More than 670 potentially dangerous munitions have been destroyed due to the efforts of Iraqi citizens coming forward with this information.
FOR MORE INFORMATION OR TO REQUEST PHOTOS OF THE CACHES, CONTACT U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND AIR FORCES FORWARD PUBLIC AFFAIRS AT PAO@AUAB.CENTAF.AF.MIL
-30-
Note: The following text is an exact quote:
===
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2005/20050630_1911.html
Terror Suspects Captured in Iraq; Operation Sword Continues
American Forces Press Service
WASHINGTON, June 30, 2005 – Iraqi security forces detained eight suspected terrorists June 29 in eastern Baghdad during combined operations, military officials in Iraq reported.
Seven of the suspects were found with material used for the production and emplacement of roadside bombs. One had false Palestinian documents.
Elsewhere, an Iraqi army unit captured five suspected terrorists June 28 after an Iraqi citizen told the soldiers about a terrorist safe house in northern Baghdad's Rabi district. The Iraqi soldiers found two rocket-propelled grenade launchers and two RPG rounds in addition to the five suspects. The five terror suspects were taken into custody for questioning.
"The Iraqi people are tiring of the insurgency. Both hotline and in-person tips have increased greatly," said Lt. Col. Clifford Kent, a Task Force Baghdad spokesman. "A big reason for the increase in tips is because of the Iraqi soldiers taking the lead during raids and operations. The Iraqis will talk to their own soldiers much more readily than to coalition forces."
In other combat operations June 28, a Task Force Baghdad patrol in south Baghdad struck a roadside bomb at around 10:55 a.m. No one was injured in the attack, and no equipment was damaged. After securing the area, the soldiers noticed detonation cord leading from the bomb and followed the cord to a house about 200 yards away. When the unit arrived at the house, they found seven people acting suspiciously. The soldiers took them into custody for questioning.
Earlier in the day, a task force patrol working in northeastern Baghdad's Thawra district also struck a roadside bomb. No one was injured in the attack, and another coalition unit operating nearby helped secure the area and search for the attacker. The soldiers caught a man near the blast site with $1,000 in sequential U.S. bills and took him into custody for questioning.
In other news from Iraq, Marines, sailors and soldiers from Regimental Combat Team 2, composed of elements of 2nd Marine Regiment and 2nd Brigade Combat Team of the 2nd Marine Division, continue conducting security operations along with Iraq security forces along the Euphrates River between the cities of Haditha and Hit.
Operation Sword, known as "Saif" in Arabic, began early June 28 and focuses on clearing insurgents and foreign fighters from the city of Hit. Thirteen men suspected of having insurgent ties have been detained.
Several hundred mortar and artillery rounds have been discovered, as well as explosives, rifles, a machine gun and various bomb-making materials. Troops also found two hidden and operable roadside bombs in Hit.
No major battles or air strikes have occurred. Basic utilities have not been disrupted, nor has access to medical treatment for Hit's citizens, officials said.
In other developments, Iraqi and U.S. soldiers worked together to secure the area around an oil pipeline that caught fire in southwestern Baghdad June 28 until Iraqi police and firefighters arrived to fight the blaze.
The fire occurred after Task Force Baghdad soldiers manning an observation point nearby heard three loud explosions.
No one was injured in the fire. The Iraqi Ministry of Oil has shut down the pipeline and is working to assess the damage. The incident is under investigation to determine the cause of the fire.
(Compiled from Multinational Force Iraq and Task Force Baghdad news releases.)
Related Site:
Multinational Force Iraq
Note: The following text is an exact quote:
===
===
http://www.jihadwatch.org/archives/2005/06/006885print.html
June 30, 2005
Hostage Roeder: "Ahmadinejad Threatened to Kidnap My Son"
More on Iran's thuggish new President from Spiegel Online, with thanks to Simon:
The newly elected president of Iran has been accused of being involved in the 1980 American hostage crisis. Former hostage David Roeder, 66, told SPIEGEL ONLINE, that Ahmadinejad threatened to kidnap his son and cut off his fingers and toes. "You don't forget someone like that," the former Assistant Air Force Attache says. SPIEGEL ONLINE: You are claiming that the newly elected president of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, was one of those involved in taking and holding you hostage in Iran from November 1979 to January 1981. How can you be sure?
Roeder: He was present at at least a third of my personal interrogations, which took place nightly for a little over a month early on in the hostage-taking situation. He seemed to be calling the shots, but from the background. The interrogators would ask a question and it would then be translated from Farsi into English by a woman interpreter.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: Did they try to exert force on you to answer the questions or did you cooperate freely?
Roeder: I decided that initially I wasn't going to respond in any way, shape or form. They had me handcuffed to a chair and at least during the first few sessions, blindfolded as well. But once the blindfold came off, they had developed a plan that Ahmadinejad was instigating. Because I was not cooperating, they threatened that they were going to kidnap my handicapped son and send various pieces of him -- fingers and toes is what they mentioned -- to my wife if I didn't start cooperating. You don't forget somebody who is involved in something like that....
SPIEGEL ONLINE: You don't think you could have forgotten him after all these years?
Roeder: No, absolutely not. Not when he was involved in threatening my son.
Posted at June 30, 2005 05:02 PM
Not all of the report:
This is G o o g l e's cache of http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/july_dec2003.htm as retrieved on Jun 18, 2005 09:11:00 GMT.
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considered
Attachment A
Unclassified Report to Congress
on the Acquisition of Technology
Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction
and Advanced Conventional Munitions,
1 July Through 31 December 2003
Acrobat® PDF Version
Scope Note
Acquisition by Country:
Iran
Iraq
Libya
North Korea
Syria
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
Terrorism
Key Suppliers:
Russia
North Korea
China
Other Countries
Emerging State and Non State Suppliers
Scope Note
The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) hereby submits this report in
response to a congressionally directed action in Section 721 of the FY
1997 Intelligence Authorization Act, which states:
"(a) Reports
The Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to Congress an annual
report on -
(1) The acquisition by foreign countries during the preceding 6
months of dual-use and other technology useful for the
development or production of weapons of mass destruction
(including nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and biological
weapons) and advanced conventional munitions; and
(2) Trends in the acquisition of such technology by such
countries."
(b) Submittal dates
(1) The report required by subsection (a) of this section shall
be submitted each year to the congressional intelligence
committees and the congressional leadership on an annual
basis on the dates provided in section 415b of this title.
(2) In this subsection:
(A) The term "congressional intelligence committees
has the meaning given that term in section 401a of this
title.
(B) The term "congressional leadership" means the
Speaker and the minority leader of the House of
Representative and the majority leader and the
minority leader of the Senate.
(c) Form of reports
Each report submitted under subsection (a) of this section shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex."
At the DCI's request, the DCI Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation,
and Arms Control Center (WINPAC) drafted this report and
coordinated it throughout the Intelligence Community (IC). As directed
by Section 721, subsection (c) of the Act, it is unclassified. As such,
the report does not present the details of the IC's assessments of
weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional munitions
programs that are available in other classified reports and briefings for
the Congress.
Acquisition by Country
As required by Section 721 of the FY 1997 Intelligence Authorization
Act, the following are country summaries of acquisition activities
(solicitations, negotiations, contracts, and deliveries) related to
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and advanced conventional
weapons (ACW) that occurred from 1 July through 31 December 2003.
We have excluded countries that already have established WMD and
ACW programs, as well as countries that demonstrated little WMD
acquisition activity of concern.
Iran
Iran continued to vigorously pursue indigenous programs to produce
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Iran is also working to
improve delivery systems as well as ACW. To this end, Iran continued
to seek foreign materials, training, equipment, and know-how. During
the reporting period, Iran still focused particularly on entities in
Russia, China, North Korea, and Europe. Iran's nuclear program
received significant assistance in the past from the proliferation
network headed by Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan.
Nuclear. The United States remains convinced that Tehran has been
pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons program, in contradiction to
its obligations as a party to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty
(NPT). During 2003, Iran continued to pursue an indigenous nuclear
fuel cycle ostensibly for civilian purposes but with clear weapons
potential. International scrutiny and International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) inspections and safeguards will most likely prevent
Tehran from using facilities declared to the IAEA directly for its
weapons program as long as Tehran remains a party to the NPT.
However, Iran could use the same technology at other, covert
locations for military applications.
Iran continues to use its civilian nuclear energy program to justify its
efforts to establish domestically or otherwise acquire the entire
nuclear fuel cycle. Iran claims that this fuel cycle would be used to
produce fuel for nuclear power reactors, such as the 1,000-megawatt
light-water reactor that Russia is continuing to build at the southern
port city of Bushehr. However, Iran does not need to produce its own
fuel for this reactor because Russia has pledged to provide the fuel
throughout the operating lifetime of the reactor and is negotiating with
Iran to take back the irradiated spent fuel. An Iranian opposition
group, beginning in August of 2002, revealed several previously
undisclosed Iranian nuclear facilities, sparking numerous IAEA
inspections since February 2003. Subsequent reports by the IAEA
Director General revealed numerous failures by Iran to disclose
facilities and activities, which run contrary to its IAEA safeguards
obligations. Before the reporting period, the A. Q. Khan network
provided Iran with designs for Pakistan's older centrifuges, as well as
designs for more advanced and efficient models, and components.
The November 2003 report of the IAEA Director General (DG) to the
Board of Governors describes a pattern of Iranian safeguards
breaches, including the failure to: report the import and chemical
conversion of uranium compounds, report the separation of plutonium
from irradiated uranium targets, report the enrichment of uranium
using both centrifuges and lasers, and provide design information for
numerous fuel cycle facilities. In October 2003, Iran sent a report to
the DG providing additional detail on its nuclear program and signed
an agreement with the United Kingdom, France, and Germany that
included an Iranian promise to suspend all enrichment and
reprocessing efforts. On 18 December 2003, Iran signed the
Additional Protocol (AP) to its IAEA Safeguards Agreement but took no
steps to ratify the Protocol during this reporting period.
Ballistic Missile. Ballistic missile-related cooperation from entities in
the former Soviet Union, North Korea, and China over the years has
helped Iran move toward its goal of becoming self-sufficient in the
production of ballistic missiles. Such assistance during 2003 continued
to include equipment, technology, and expertise. Iran's ballistic
missile inventory is among the largest in the Middle East and includes
some 1,300-km-range Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missiles
(MRBMs) and a few hundred short-range ballistic missiles
(SRBMs)-including the Shahab-1 (Scud-B), Shahab-2 (Scud C), and
Tondar-69 (CSS-8)-as well as a variety of large unguided rockets.
Already producing Scud SRBMs, Iran announced that it had begun
production of the Shahab-3 MRBM and a new solid-propellant SRBM,
the Fateh-110. In addition, Iran publicly acknowledged the
development of follow-on versions of the Shahab-3. It originally said
that another version, the Shahab-4, was a more capable ballistic
missile than its predecessor but later characterized it as solely a space
launch vehicle with no military applications. Iran is also pursuing
longer-range ballistic missiles.
Chemical. Iran is a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC). Nevertheless, during the reporting period it continued to seek
production technology, training, and expertise from foreign entities
that could further Tehran's efforts to achieve an indigenous capability
to produce nerve agents. Iran may have already stockpiled blister,
blood, choking, and possibly nerve agents-and the bombs and artillery
shells to deliver them-which it previously had manufactured.
Biological. Even though Iran is part of the Biological Weapons
Convention (BWC), Tehran probably maintained an offensive BW
program. Iran continued to seek dual-use biotechnical materials,
equipment, and expertise that could be used in Tehran's BW program.
Iran probably has the capability to produce at least small quantities of
BW agents.
Advanced Conventional Weapons. Iran continued to seek and
acquire conventional weapons and production technologies, primarily
from Russia, China, and North Korea. Tehran also sought
high-quality products, particularly weapons components and dual-use
items, or products that proved difficult to acquire through normal
governmental channels.
Iraq
In March of 2003, coalition forces took action under Operation Iraqi
Freedom to remove the Saddam Hussein regime from power in Iraq. A
large-scale effort has been under way to find the answers to the many
outstanding questions about Iraq's WMD and delivery systems. We are
not yet at the point where we can draw comprehensive or final
conclusions about the extent of Iraq's prewar WMD program.
Libya
In March 2003, Libya approached the United Kingdom and United
States expressing interest in coming clean about its WMD programs.
In the course of discussions and visits, the Libyans made significant
disclosures about their nuclear, chemical, and missile-related
activities and minor disclosures about biological-related activities. A
team of US and UK experts traveled to Libya in October and early
December to receive detailed presentations and to visit a number of
Libyan facilities. After extensive discussion during the three weeks of
meetings, our experts were shown covert facilities and equipment and
were told of years of Libyan efforts to develop weapons capabilities. In
late December, the Libyan Government announced its intention to
eliminate its nuclear and chemical weapons programs and MTCR class
missiles as part of an effort to rejoin the community of nations.
Progress with the Libyans was made in four strategic areas:
Nuclear. Libya admitted to nuclear fuel cycle projects that were
ultimately intended to support a nuclear weapons program, including
uranium processing and enrichment. The team was given access to
more than 10 sites connected to Libya's nuclear activities and
examined a large amount of specialized nuclear equipment. Libya
pledged to voluntarily eliminate its nuclear weapons program, abide
by its IAEA safeguards agreement, as required by the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and to act as though the Additional
Protocol was in force, which requires adherents to provide information
about, and the right of access to, all aspects of a Member State's
nuclear fuel cycle activities and facilities. Libya's disclosures revealed
that the A. Q. Khan network had provided Libya with designs for
Pakistan's older centrifuges, as well as designs for more advanced and
efficient models, and components.
Chemical. The Libyans showed us a significant quantity of sulfur
mustard that was produced at the Pharma 150 plant near Rabta more
than a decade ago, as well as aerial bombs designed to be filled with
sulfur mustard agent. Libya also showed us equipment in storage that
could be used to outfit a second CW production facility and dual-use
chemical precursors that could be used to produce mustard and nerve
agent. Libya reiterated its commitment to complete its accession to
the Chemical Weapons Convention and requested assistance in
destroying chemical warfare stockpiles.
Biological. Libya disclosed past intentions to acquire equipment and
develop capabilities related to biological warfare, but it remains
unclear if these activities were offensive or defensive in nature. At the
team's request, Libya took us to a number of civilian medical-,
biotechnical- and agricultural- related research centers that have a
"dual-use" potential to support BW-related work. The team was given
access to scientists at these facilities.
Ballistic Missile. Libya provided extensive information on its Scud
missile inventory, its efforts to develop longer-range missiles, and the
assistance it obtained from North Korea and other sources.
North Korea
Nuclear. After announcing in early 2003 its withdrawal from the
Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the NPT Treaty) and
its intention to resume operation of nuclear facilities at Yongbyon,
which had been frozen under the terms of the 1994 US-North Korea
Agreed Framework, North Korea announced in early October 2003
that at the end of June it had completed reprocessing all of the 8,000
spent fuel rods previously under IAEA safeguards. They also said that
all the plutonium derived from that reprocessing (an estimated 25 to
30 kilograms) was being used for increasing the size of its nuclear
deterrent force. After announcing in early 2003 that the 5 Mwe reactor
at Yongbyon had resumed operation, in October 2003 the North said
that future spent fuel from the reactor will be reprocessed.
In late April 2003 during the Six Party Talks in Beijing, North Korea
privately threatened to "transfer" or "demonstrate" its nuclear
weapons. North Korea repeated these threats at the Six Party Talks
in August 2003. In December 2003, North Korea proposed freezing
its nuclear activities, including not exporting nuclear weapons, in
exchange for rewards. We continued to monitor and assess North
Korea's nuclear weapons efforts amidst diplomatic efforts to arrange
a second round of Six Party Talks.
Ballistic Missile. North Korea is nearly self-sufficient in developing
and producing ballistic missiles and continues to procure needed raw
materials and components from various foreign sources. In the second
half of 2003, North Korea continued to abide by its voluntary
moratorium on flight tests adopted in 1998 but announced it may
reconsider its September 2002 offer to continue the moratorium
beyond 2003. The multiple-stage Taepo Dong-2- potentially capable
of reaching parts of the United States with a nuclear-weapon-sized
payload-may be ready for flight-testing. North Korea has
demonstrated a willingness to sell complete ballistic missile systems
and components that have enabled other states to acquire
longer-range capabilities earlier than would otherwise have been
possible and to acquire the basis for domestic development efforts.
Chemical. North Korea is not a party to the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC). During the reporting period, Pyongyang continued
to acquire dual-use chemicals that could potentially be used to
support Pyongyang's long-standing CW program. North Korea's CW
capabilities included the ability to produce bulk quantities of nerve,
blister, choking, and blood agent, using its sizable, although aging,
chemical industry. North Korea may possess a stockpile of unknown
size of these agents and weapons, which it could employ in a variety
of delivery means.
Biological. North Korea has acceded to the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention but nonetheless has pursued BW capabilities
since the 1960s. Pyongyang acquired dual-use biotechnical
equipment, supplies, and reagents that could be used to support
North Korea's BW program. North Korea is believed to possess a
munitions production infrastructure that would have allowed it to
weaponize BW agents and may have some such weapons available for
use.
Syria
Nuclear. Syria-an NPT signatory with full-scope IAEA safeguards-has
a nuclear research center at Dayr Al Hajar. Russia and Syria have
continued their long-standing agreements on cooperation regarding
nuclear energy, although specific assistance has not yet materialized.
Broader access to foreign expertise provides opportunities to expand
its indigenous capabilities, and we are monitoring Syrian nuclear
intentions with concern.
Ballistic Missile. During 2003, Damascus continued to seek help from
abroad to establish a solid-propellant rocket motor development and
production capability. Syria's liquid-propellant missile program
continued to depend on essential foreign equipment and
assistance-primarily from North Korean entities. Damascus also
continued to manufacture liquid-propellant Scud missiles. In addition,
Syria was developing longer-range missile programs, such as a Scud
D, and possibly other variants with assistance from North Korea and
Iran.
Chemical and Biological. Syria continued to seek CW-related
technology from foreign sources during the reporting period.
Damascus already held a stockpile of the nerve agent sarin, but
apparently has tried to develop more toxic and persistent nerve
agents. Syria remained dependent on foreign sources for key
elements of its CW program, including precursor chemicals and key
production equipment. Syria probably also continued to develop a BW
capability.
Advanced Conventional Weapons. Damascus's Soviet-era debt to
Moscow and inability to fund large purchases continued to hamper
efforts to purchase the large quantity of equipment Syria requires to
replace its aging weapons inventory.
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
Terrorism
The threat of terrorists using chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear (CBRN) materials remained high. Many of the 33 designated
foreign terrorist organizations and other nonstate actors worldwide
have expressed interest in using CBRN; however, most attacks
probably will be small-scale, incorporating improvised delivery means
and easily produced or obtained chemicals, toxins, or radiological
substances. Although terrorist groups probably will continue to favor
long-proven conventional tactics, such as bombings and shootings, the
arrest of ricin plotters in London in January 2003 indicated that
international mujahidin terrorists were actively plotting to conduct
chemical and biological attacks.
Increased publicity surrounding the anthrax incidents since the
September 11 attacks has highlighted the vulnerability of civilian and
government targets to CBRN attacks.
One of our highest concerns is al-Qa'ida's stated readiness to attempt
unconventional attacks against us. As early as 1998, Usama Bin Ladin
publicly declared that acquiring unconventional weapons was "a
religious duty." In 2003, an extremist cleric who supports al-Qa'ida
issued a fatwa that purports to provide a religious justification for the
use of WMD against the United States.
Al-Qa'ida and associated extremist groups have a wide variety of
potential agents and delivery means to choose from for CBRN attacks.
The success of any al-Qa'ida attacks and the number of ensuing
casualties would depend on many factors, including the technical
expertise of those involved, but most scenarios could cause panic and
disruption.
Several groups of mujahidin associated with al-Qa'ida have
planned "poison plot" attacks in Europe with easily produced
chemicals and toxins best suited to assassination and small-scale
scenarios. These agents could cause hundreds of casualties and
widespread panic if used in multiple simultaneous attacks.
Analysis of an al-Qa'ida document recovered in Afghanistan in the
summer of 2002 indicates the group has crude procedures for
making mustard agent, sarin, and VX.
Both 11 September attack leader Mohammad Atta and Zacharias
Moussaoui-arrested by the FBI before the 11 September
attacks-expressed interest in crop dusters, raising our concern
that al-Qa'ida has considered using aircraft to disseminate BW
agents.
Al-Qa'ida is interested in radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) or
"dirty bombs." Construction of an RDD is well within its capabilities
as radiological materials are relatively easy to acquire from
industrial or medical sources.
Documents and equipment recovered from al-Qa'ida facilities in
Afghanistan show that al-Qa'ida had conducted research on biological
agents. We believe al-Qa'ida's BW program is primarily focused on
anthrax for mass casualty attacks, although the group most likely will
pursue opportunities to produce and use other biological agents in
smaller-scale attacks.
Information from 2003 details the construction of a terrorist
cyanide-based chemical weapon that can be made with easily
available items, requiring little or no training to assemble and deploy.
The plans are widely available to any terrorist. Such a device could
produce a lethal concentration of poisonous gases in an enclosed
area.
Usama Bin Ladin and other al-Qa'ida leaders have stated that
al-Qa'ida has a religious duty to acquire nuclear weapons. Documents
recovered in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom show
that al-Qa'ida was engaged in rudimentary nuclear research, although
the extent of its indigenous program is unclear. Outside experts, such
as Pakistani nuclear engineer Bashir al-Din Mahmood may have
provided some assistance to al-Qa'ida's program. Bashir, who
reportedly met with Bin Ladin, discussed information concerning
nuclear weapons. Al-Qa'ida has been seeking nuclear material since
the early 1990s, according to the testimony of a government
witness-Jamal Ahmad Fadl-during the 2001 trail on the al-Qa'ida
bombings of the American Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya. Fadl
claimed that al-Qa'ida pursued the sale of what they believed was
enriched uranium in Sudan in the early 1990s. This effort may have
been a "scam" operation, and there is no credible evidence al-Qa'ida
actually acquired the uranium. Al-Qa'ida has been the victim of other
nuclear "scams" in the past, but it probably has become sensitized to
such operations in recent years, in part due to media coverage of
nuclear smuggling and scam operations.
In addition, we are alert to the very real possibility that al-Qa'ida or
other terrorist groups might also try to launch conventional attacks
against the chemical or nuclear industrial infrastructure of the United
States to cause panic and economic disruption. In a video aired by
Al-Jazirah in September 2002, senior al-Qa'ida members said they
had contemplated striking nuclear power plants early in their decision
making on targets but dropped the idea for fear it would "get out of
control."
Key Suppliers:
Russia
During 2003, Russia's struggling defense, biotechnology, chemical,
aerospace, and nuclear industries continued to be eager to raise funds
via exports and transfers. Some Russian universities and scientific
institutes also showed a willingness to earn funds by providing WMD
or missile-related teaching and training for foreign students. The
Russian Government's efforts to stem proliferation remained an
important element of US bilateral dialogue with Russia.
Nuclear. Russia continues to play a key role in constructing
light-water nuclear power reactors in Iran, China, and India. Moscow
has pledged to supply fuel to the Bushehr reactor in Iran for the life of
the reactor and is negotiating with Iran to sign an agreement on the
return of the irradiated spent fuel to Russia.
Ballistic Missile. Russian entities during the reporting period
continued to supply a variety of ballistic missile-related goods and
technical know-how to countries such as Iran, India, and China.
Iran's earlier success in gaining technology and materials from
Russian entities helped accelerate Iranian development of the
Shahab-3 MRBM, and continuing Russian entity assistance has
supported Iranian efforts to develop new missiles and increase
Tehran's self-sufficiency in missile production.
Chemical and Biological. During the second half of 2003, Russian
entities remained a key source of dual-use biotechnology equipment,
chemicals, and related expertise for countries of concern with active
CBW programs. Russia's well-known biological and chemical
expertise made it an attractive target for countries seeking assistance
in areas with CBW applications.
Advanced Conventional Weapons. Russia continued to be a major
supplier of conventional arms. In 2003, Russia was an important
source of ACW for China, Iran, Libya, Sudan, Syria and India. Russia
continued to be the main supplier of technology and equipment to
India's and China's naval nuclear propulsion programs. Moscow
continued negotiations with New Delhi for a package deal, which
includes a refurbished aircraft carrier with a MiG-29K air wing, as well
as a lease of Tu-22M Backfire bombers and at least one Akula-class
nuclear attack submarine. During 2003, Russia continued work with
India on the PJ-10 antiship/land-attack cruise missile.
Export Controls. Despite progress in creating a legal and
bureaucratic framework for Russia's export controls, lax enforcement
remains a serious concern. To reduce the outward flow of WMD and
missile-related materials, technology, and expertise, top Russian
officials must make a sustained effort to convince exporting entities-as
well as the bureaucracy whose job it is to oversee them-that
nonproliferation is a top priority and that those who violate the law will
be prosecuted.
North Korea
Nuclear. In late April 2003 during trilateral talks in Beijing, North
Korea privately threatened to "transfer" or "demonstrate" its nuclear
weapons. It repeated these threats in August 2003 at the Six Party
Talks. In December 2003, North Korea proposed to "freeze" its
nuclear activities, including not transferring nuclear weapons, in
exchange for rewards.
Ballistic Missile. Throughout the second half of 2003, North Korea
continued to export significant ballistic missile-related equipment,
components, materials, and technical expertise to the Middle East,
South Asia, and North Africa. Pyongyang attached high priority to the
development and sale of ballistic missiles, equipment, and related
technology. Exports of ballistic missiles and related technology were
one of the North's major sources of hard currency, which supported
ongoing missile development and production.
China
Over the past several years, Beijing improved its nonproliferation
posture through commitments to multilateral nonproliferation regimes,
promulgation of expanded export controls, and strengthened oversight
mechanisms, but the proliferation behavior of Chinese companies
remains of great concern.
Nuclear. China has taken some positive steps during the reporting
period. In September 2003, China stopped at the China-North
Korea border a shipment of chemicals that could have been used in
North Korea's nuclear program. China also decided in late 2003 that
it would apply for membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG),
indicating that it intends to embrace the policy of full scope safeguards
(FSS)-which is required for NSG membership-as a condition of nuclear
supply to non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS).
Ballistic Missile. China is not a member of the MTCR, but in October
1994 it pledged not to sell MTCR Category I ground-to-ground
missiles.
Although Beijing continues to take some steps to educate firms and
individuals on the new missile-related export regulations - offering an
export control seminar in September 2003 for officials and companies
from China and other countries - Chinese entities continued to work
with Pakistan and Iran on ballistic missile-related projects during the
second half of 2003. Chinese entity assistance has helped Pakistan
move toward domestic serial production of solid-propellant SRBMs and
has supported Pakistan's development of solid-propellant MRBMs.
Chinese-entity ballistic missile-related assistance helped Iran move
toward its goal of becoming self-sufficient in the production of ballistic
missiles. In addition, firms in China provided dual-use missile-related
items, raw materials, and/or assistance to several other countries of
proliferation concern-such as Iran, Libya, and North Korea.
The United States imposed sanctions on a number of Chinese entities
during the reporting period, including the China North Industries
Corporation (NORINCO) and the China Precision Machinery
Import/Export Corporation (CPMIEC).
Chemical. Evidence during the current reporting period showed that
Chinese firms still provided dual-use CW-related production
equipment and technology to Iran.
Advanced Conventional Weapons. During 2003, China remained a
primary supplier of advanced conventional weapons to Pakistan
Muslim nations vow to help end Iraqi insurgency
Islamic States - no outright condemnation of terrorism
Simplot ends production and sales of fertilizer used in explosives
There is no such thing as an experienced suicide bomber
America needs a strong Patriot Act
Balance of CIA report 2003.
Check out the reports link at the bottom of the page, it is full of Clinton era reports, I am not up to reading them today, but one of these days.
http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/index.html
I know this is long, but it also is the latest one on the site that I found and covers all that we have questions on, came from a google on Pez's words, so blame him...LOL
http://www.google.com/search?client=googlet&q=Iran%2C%20Russia%2C%20North%20Korea%20and%20China%20are%20all%20considered
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The United States imposed sanctions on a number of Chinese entities
during the reporting period, including the China North Industries
Corporation (NORINCO) and the China Precision Machinery
Import/Export Corporation (CPMIEC).
Chemical. Evidence during the current reporting period showed that
Chinese firms still provided dual-use CW-related production
equipment and technology to Iran.
Advanced Conventional Weapons. During 2003, China remained a
primary supplier of advanced conventional weapons to Pakistan,
Sudan, and Iran. Islamabad also continued to negotiate with Beijing
for China to build frigates for Pakistan's Navy and to cooperate in
developing the FC-1 fighter aircraft.
Other Countries
Countries of proliferation concern continued to approach entities in
Western Europe, South Asia, and the United States to provide needed
acquisitions for their WMD and missile programs. Proliferators and
associated networks continued to seek machine tools, spare parts for
dual-use equipment, and widely available materials, scientific
equipment, and specialty metals. Although West European countries
strove to tighten export control regulations, Iran continued to
successfully procure dual-use goods and materials from Europe. In
addition, several West European countries remained willing to
negotiate ACW sales to India, Pakistan, and other countries in order to
preserve their domestic defense industries. North Korea approached
Western European entities to obtain acquisitions for its uranium
enrichment program. A shipment of aluminum tubing-enough for
4,000 centrifuge tubes-was halted by German authorities.
Some West European entities remained an important source for the
proliferation of WMD- and missile-related information and training.
The relatively advanced research of European institutes, the
availability of relevant dual-use studies and information, the
enthusiasm of scientists for sharing their research, and the availability
of dual-use training and education may have shortened development
time for some WMD and missile programs.
Emerging State and Non-State Suppliers
As nuclear, biological, chemical, and ballistic missile-applicable
technologies continued to be more available around the world, new
sources of supply have emerged that made the challenge of stemming
WMD and missile proliferation even more complex and difficult.
Nuclear fuel-cycle and weapons-related technologies have spread to
the point that, from a technical view, additional states may be able to
produce sufficient fissile material and to develop the capability to
weaponize it. As developing countries expanded their chemical
industries into pesticide production, they also advanced toward at
least latent chemical warfare capability. Likewise, additional nonstate
actors became more interested in the potential of using biological
warfare as a relatively inexpensive way to inflict serious damage. The
proliferation of increasingly capable ballistic missile designs and
technology posed the threat of more countries of concern developing
longer-range missiles and imposing greater risks to regional stability.
In this context, there was a growing concern that additional states,
that have traditionally been recipients of WMD and missile-related
technology, might have followed North Korea's practice of supplying
specific WMD-related technology and expertise to other countries or
by going one step further to supply such expertise to nonstate actors.
Even in cases where states took action to stem such transfers,
knowledgeable individuals or non-state purveyors of WMD- and
missile-related materials and technology could act outside
government constraints. The exposure of the A. Q. Khan network and
its role in supplying nuclear technology to Libya, Iran, and North
Korea illustrate one form of this threat, but commercial purveyors of
dual-use technologies who routinely seek to circumvent international
export control regimes to deliver WMD-related equipment and
material to WMD-aspirant countries are of grave concern as well.
Reports Page | CIA Homepage
Thanks for the link, my eyes could not see any sign of an
UFO......
I know they exist, as I have watched the tests on one, over the bombing range that is out of Yuma, Arizona. It came out 5 nights a week, and had 2 Air Force pilots.
About 2000, the reports on it were front cover of the Popular Mechanics Magazine.
My brother says it was tested in Alaska around 1960 and we
saw it in Calif. about 1965. He was Air Force.
When one considers the number of foreign spies in our test
departments, it isn't surprising that the Gov. keeps the new
test planes hidden.
This one was housed in a hollowed out mountain out of Dome,
Arizona, all of a sudden, a fence went up and we could no
longer prospect there.
A friend delived Propane to the site, under armed military
guards, who met him at the fence and never let him move away
from his truck. I did have a rock from there that Harold brought to me.
I watched it leave the mountain every evening at dusk, it
then flew over my place on the adjoining property to the
bombing range.
In this was my time for milking several goats, so it was well known........
Hence, I don't expect any little men to be in an UFO, but
could still admire a sharp Air Force pilot.......LOL
Thanks to Deetes for the ping:
===
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1434132/posts
"26 Pounds Of Dynamite Stolen, Detonation Cord Stolen"
The Denver Channel ^
Posted on 06/30/2005 1:20:49 PM PDT by Millee
ARTICLE SNIPPET: "DURANGO, Colo. -- Authorities said someone stole about 26 pounds of dynamite and detonation cord from a Durango & Silverton Narrow Gauge Railroad facility.
The material disappeared Tuesday from a storage building at Rockwood, said Dan Bender, spokesman for the La Plata County Sheriff's Office."
Thanks to Velveeta for pointing to this on a prior post:
===
To: All
Explosives stolen from train's Rockwood storage building
http://durangoherald.com/asp-bin/article_generation.asp?article_type=news&article_path=/news/05/news050630_5.htm
2,563 posted on 06/30/2005 8:50:04 AM PDT by Velveeta (www.takebackthememorial.org)
Pez, Rense list has too many words for me to google today,
LOL......I did find this, expect it to come to America soon, if they make it work in Britan.......
Topic in soc.culture.iranian
Start a new topic - Subscribe to this group - About this group
Conference
urges
integration of
Muslim
students in
Britain
Only 1 message in topic - view as tree
Faris Jawad
Jun 30, 6:59 pm show
options
Conference urges integration of Muslim students in
Britain
6/30/2005 4:30:00 PM GMT
Source: BBC
The Federation of Student Islamic Societies (Fosis) will
hold a conference
on Thursday to discuss discrimination at British
universities as well as the
ways in which Muslims can integrate better into
society.
The conference will also discuss the welfare of Muslim
students on campus,
such as difficulties accommodating dietary needs, a
lack of prayer rooms and
problems observing religious holidays.
About 500 delegates and Muslim academics will attend
the three-day
conference which will be held at Leicester University.
Fosis spokesman Azam Bakeer Markar said that
Muslims faced more suspicion on
campus since the September 11, 2001 attacks on the
United States.
But he noted that Britain's 9,000 Muslim students
should be encouraged to do
more to show that they "had nothing to hide".
"Muslim students are very active on campus and now
there's always people
questioning their various gatherings," Markar said.
"In the climate of fear after 9/11 we consider it's best
to engage more
rather than withdraw into our shell."
The president of the National Union of Students Kat
Fletcher will also
attend the conference. Her presence marks a
reconciliation between the NUS
and Fosis, which had accused the national student
body of insensitivity on
Muslim issues.
Fletcher said the NUS respected good relations with
student faith groups.
"We are really pleased that our relationship with Fosis
has developed this
year.
"At NUS we will continue our good work with Fosis over
the next year and
beyond to ensure that all Muslim students can
continue to play an integral
part in their national union," she said.
http://islamonline.com/cgi-bin
/news_service/world_full_story .asp?serv...
The liberals and communists, as well as the muslims who hate us call President Bush "Cowboy"......
a very common word in their hate mongering posts.
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