Iraqis underestimated U.S. ability in urban warfare

As the United States developed its war plan, it was clear that it would have to take Baghdad to have a decisive victory. The armed forces' ability for urban warfare was a seen as a possible weakness, with their difficulties in the past in Mogadishu fresh in the minds of both the armed forces and the Iraqis.

From talking to you and a number of people, it seems clear to me the Iraqis were keen to spread confusion about who was a combatant and who was a civilian ... [to] exploit American reluctance to kill civilians. But a lot of the tactics are actually fairly conventional military tactics.

Yes, it was a conventional military [tactic] mixed with that. I think they were betting this aversion to the U.S. fighting upfront and close in the city -- that we wouldn't do it. I think they did not expect us to come rolling into the city, because all the pundits said, "Well, we only do deserts. We don't do cities. It'll be another Stalingrad. You lose 10,000 people in a city block." They saw the pictures of Mogadishu and Somalia, and so they saw us as being vulnerable. So I think they underestimated our ability to come in right into the city and go block by block.

I think they thought that [the Iraqis] could bloody our nose enough on the outside of the city -- "The American soldiers are not tough enough to take it to them in the streets" -- that we just would not push through block by block, or that if we did it, it would be very methodical. We take this block and then we take the next block, and next block, so they would defend like that. ... They were planning for that. They weren't planning for this very heavy armored thrust busting right through, coming in the city. They just weren't prepared.

I think they thought we would not come into the city like that. In fact, we had this one-star general that we captured when we attacked [Baghdad] on April 5. He said he never thought he'd see American tanks running through Baghdad -- that we couldn't do it, or we wouldn't do it. ...

As the 3rd Infantry took Saddam International Airport on April 3 and April 4, the 2nd Brigade, under Col. Perkins's command, was dispatched to fight what was left of the Medina Division, a key unit of the Republican Guard. It had been largely bypassed in the Army's charge towards Baghdad. But Army leadership felt the skilled army needed to be dealt with before American forces could take the city.

The original plan was a big left hook, and your men [were] to encircle the Medina. Talk me through what happened.

Yes. The original plan was the cavalry squadron would come up from the south and fix [on] Medina, and that I would come up from the north and come down on top of the Medina from north to south, into their rear.

So we went into Objective Saints. Objective Saints is the intersection of Routes 8 and 1, which are the main north-south routes through Iraq and into Baghdad. So if you control Objective Saints -- it's one of these three-tiered intersection bridges -- you control the ability to get in and out of Baghdad from the south. You also control routes heading to the south.

The Medina Division was south of that, because they were defending south, thinking we're going to attack up [Routes] 8 and 1. ... In the meantime, we'll go out here and come in behind the Medina, which is, in effect, what happened.

The only thing is, the cavalry squadron never went to the south to fix them. But in the end, it was unnecessary, because I think mentally [the Medina] were fixed that we were coming to the south anyways.

We're heading to Objective Saints. We're going along Route 8, which is not a very good road. When we crossed at the bridge there at Karbala and Objective Peach, we crossed that. Then we head to Saints -- not a very good road and very heavily armed, very heavily defended [with] a lot of little military garrisons along the way. We had armored vehicles along the way -- RPG[s], crusert weapons, et cetera.

...The lead tank in the lead company which is the lead brigade-- Sgt. 1st Class Pyle was in his tank. He was leading the attack down Route 8 to Objective Saints, [a]cross the river and [into resistance] right there -- a lot of dismounted threats up there, dug-ins. So he's engaging with his coaxial machine gun -- it's a machine gun mounted in a turret with the tank. [He] basically uses over 2,000 rounds of machine gun ammo, and runs out of ammunition for that machine gun. So then he's firing with a 50-caliber machine gun to engage the dismounted troops, and ends up running out of 50-caliber ammunition.

In the meantime, he is shot twice, once in the shoulder and once the arm. In fact, he tells me [later] he didn't even know he was shot in the arm until he saw the blood running out of his [suit] -- we still had our chemical suits on.

So he is shot twice. He's now out of machine gun ammo, but in the meantime his tank is engaged with RPGs. At the back of his tank, there's an APU -- it's like a small generator, our auxiliary power unit that's on the bustle rack. That is hit, and it basically explodes in fire. There's other machine gun ammo on the back of the turret; it catches on fire. So the back of his tank is on fire.

So he's still driving down the road, basically having expended all of his machine gun ammo; he has been shot twice; the back of his tank is on fire. They still have a lot of [enemy] dismounts. They have to start engaging them with the main gun of the tank. It's the only ammunition they have left over, the main gun tank rounds. So he's using those to engage these RPGs and machine gun positions.

The tank behind him calls up and says, "Hey, you're on fire. You need to stop. Pull over." He says, "Negative, I'm going to continue the attack," and he's the lead vehicle on the attack. So we're continuing to push down this road. His tank's on fire; he's shot; [he's] out of machine gun ammunition. Finally, what happens is the fuel leaking out of this auxiliary power unit is on fire. It gets sucked in to his engine intake and the tank aborts, because now he's got the fire in the engine compartment.

We evacuate the crew off the tank. He's wounded, obviously, but still doing well. Eventually we recover the tank, pull it to Objective Saints after we destroy all the enemy on the route in. Sergeant Pyle's biggest concern is that he needs a new tank so he can continue on the fight. He still has not been [evacuated] yet, so he still has a bullet in his arm.

I'm talking to him there at Objective Saints. He's relaying how this happened, and his main concern was not for his arm, but [that] he needs another tank, so he can continue the attack to Baghdad. Just one example of many heroic actions out there. ...

Then on April 4, we still have to go down and continue the destruction of the Medina Division, which is south of Saints. So what happens is 164 continues the attack down Route 8, 464 Armor continues the attack down Route 1, and 115 stays at Objective Saints and secures that. We attack down to about the 4-0 or 5-0 east-west gridline.

As we attacked on, the other 10th and the 2nd Brigade are the two brigades that are on those roads from the Medina Division. We come in contact literally with hundreds of armored vehicles, artillery, air defense, et cetera. Most of them are oriented south, so they still believe that we're going to attack from the south, rather than from the north.

The tanks and some of the BMPs you can see start to pull out of their fighting positions and turn around, as they see that we're coming to engage [them] from the north. But they obviously were caught by surprise, and so they were destroyed fairly quickly. ...

Word was the Medina Division had been degraded by 80 percent. You got through and found this wasn't true at all.

80 percent of their vehicles were still there at least. No, we did not see one destroyed vehicle before we got there. ... They were not out in any of the revetments or any of the battle positions. They were all in these palm groves or in the towns. We saw them next to mosques. They were in alleyways, they were in little garages. They had dispersed all their vehicles.

They'd learnt their lessons from Desert Storm. So I could see where it could be a very deliberate thing, that they would dig these fighting positions in what would be a normal dispersion of armored vehicles and a very typical defense to draw fire. In fact, all their vehicles were in the towns next to mosques and palm groves. They were dispersed and hidden, so as not to be seen from the air. ...

If in fact the enemy had [not] been destroyed from there, why didn't we then have the mother of all battles?

I think the fact that we were able to come in behind him really provided a huge advantage to us. Like I've said before, we have found that their weaknesses -- They are not very agile. They can't adjust their formations and react to developing situations on the battlefield.

So when we came in behind them with an armored brigade, it's a lot of combat power. We came down both [Routes] 8 and 1 simultaneously, so we engage both of his brigades simultaneously. I think we just overwhelmed them with the speed and firepower that we brought, as [the enemy commander] basically became paralyzed and was not able to command and control and move his forces.

So what you'd have is individual tanks responding, or individual vehicles, but it wasn't this coordinated effort, to bring the artillery in and all that. They were just hit so hard and so quickly that he just couldn't react to it.

To what degree had the Medina [Division] been debilitated as well by desertions? Do you think, "OK, the vehicles were still there; how many of the troops were still there?"

I really can't tell, because even in the middle of us getting in contact with them, the psychological impact was such that we would see a pile of clothing or boots right there on the road. In other words, [as] we're killing this tank, the guy half-mile down the road is saying, "OK, that's it, I'm out." I think the desertion was occurring as we're fighting, because we would see literally piles of clothing, like a platoon's worth of clothing, just piled, and guys [are] gone. ...

We'd see a lot of middle-aged males walking away from battlefield areas. Some of them would have army boots on, but then they would have civilian undergarment[s]. It was obvious that they probably had just taken their uniform off and just walked away. If they did that, in most cases, we just let them go. Our intent was not to kill or even capture an excess amount of Iraqis. It was just to cause their military and their command structure to implode and cause the regime to collapse. ...

Even when we went into Baghdad, [we engaged in] very tenacious fighting [with individuals]. But [the problem was] they just couldn't bring it together. Warfare is just very complicated stuff. When our brigade just came upon them in three different areas, we were spread out over 50 miles. We just came upon them [with] close air support and artillery. I'm sure it was just more than they could even imagine. It just develops so quickly, and our tanks, our Bradleys are just going through their formation so quickly, that it just becomes obvious that it's hopeless for them. So I'm sure their leadership just basically gave up at that point.

On April 5, Col. Perkins led a charge of 761 soldiers to sweep in and out of Baghdad to test out enemy capabilities, and send them a signal that the U.S. forces were prepared to come into the capital city. It is estimated that between 1,000 and 3,000 Iraqis were killed.

...To create as much confusion as I can inside the city, because I had found that my soldiers or my units can react to chaos much better than [the enemy] can. So it was an attempt to create as much chaos as quickly as I can throughout as wide an area as I can, because our guys are so well trained and disciplined as they can deal with it. ...

If you can break through their defenses and just fight on through and don't be overly methodical there-- … You get into some key places in the city, you grab key things. Then you turn around and start fighting back out, taking the city from the inside out. They just can't react to that. ...

When we attack on April 5 to the airport, the we attacked right up Route 8 with an armored tank battalion, one battalion. We didn't take any real support vehicles, because we had found that the gauntlet of fire you get is so great that the wheeled vehicle just can't survive. ...

What we start to find out is that, the key terrain as we go up there are these intersections with the overhead passes. ... As we come to the overpasses, what we found [was], one, just as [the Iraqi military commander] had put his vehicles under the palm groves to prevent observation and attack from the air, he had put vehicles underneath the overpasses. So he would have tanks and BMPs under the overpasses, so that you couldn't see [his troops] from the air and therefore engage them from the air.

He also would dig fighting positions, foxholes, and bunkers under the overpasses. Then when you would drive through, they would engage you from between the bridge abutments. The challenge with that is, as we're moving and as we try to re-engage him, we're having to shoot between these bridge abutments, and so it does create a problem. So he's kind of got these keyhole shots at a vehicle when it comes through the bridge abutments, and it's harder to return fire. ...

Once you get on that road, you're on that road. So he could mass all of his fires on that road, which is, in fact, what he did. So that road is going to be a gauntlet from beginning to end. You're just going to come on to continual fire, because he knows you're going to be on that road.

Then the other thing we've found is that along the road there were these multi-story buildings, rooftops and palm groves around some of these intersections, that they would -- In defending all the palm groves, on the roofs, they would put RPGs. They had air defense artillery now as we're getting into Baghdad, these rings of ADA around Baghdad. A lot of them were up on roofs, high ground, so that they [could] get good observation at the aircraft.

But then what they would do is turn these air defense assets down on top of us from the buildings. So you had to be wary that air defense assets, which were put on top of buildings to shoot down airplanes, could also be used in the direct fire mode on the ground. So that was another phenomena that we saw a lot.

Then obviously they would take their civilianized weaponized vehicles and then intersperse them amongst civilian traffic, so that they would be behind a school bus or something, and then pull up behind it, and come into you with a suicide car or something. So this is where you really get that mixing of military and civilian as you come into Baghdad. ...

As we attacked up on Route 8 that day, it's definitely the most intense fighting we had seen yet, because we had this gauntlet of overpasses and buildings and roads and fighting positions that we'd fight through. We learned that what you've got to do is maintain momentum. You've got to be able to pass targets off from one vehicle from one company to another, because you have to keep moving. ...

You had this continual three-dimensional threat in completely different distances of threats that guys were working on all the time. Again, we found the key to success was continuing to pass these targets off. So you had to have continual conversation from tank to tank to tank or, "Look, there's guys up to your right. I'm going to engage it. Just know I'm behind you, and I'm going to shoot a main tank round right to your left to take this off."

It is very challenging to coordinate direct fires like that, because basically this whole unit's [on] one road behind each other, and otherwise the only vehicle that could fire is the lead vehicle, and that's just not going to put on enough fire power.

Every vehicle is firing, but you're having to coordinate with the guy in front of you, so that you don't engage him, or if you use a weapon or a weapon system that's going to have a collateral effect-- ...

How complicated is the issue of civilian casualties in this situation? Because the Iraqis have been told you're still a hundred miles to the south. How difficult a problem is that for you?

A news crew happened to be in my vehicle during this attack. I was with 164, and they [the news crew] could hear the command net and everything. The one thing they were amazed at is how much of the command, that time was spent talking about which vehicles to engage, which not to engage. We're attacking up the northbound route, so the southbound route had vehicles coming down and [were talking] constantly, "OK, there's a blue van, it's civilian, don't engage it. OK, behind him are two white vans, they just shot at Alpha Company, you need to engage them." So constantly, "Don't shoot blue van, get the white van, there's an old man over here, don't shoot him, shoot him."

I mean, 80 percent of the conversation on the command net was trying to discriminate between a non-combatant and a combatant. I just knew that that was required, and that's what we did. ...

I will tell you, in more cases than not, military vehicles got by because guys would default on the case of, "Make sure we don't engage a civilian vehicle." So in many cases, I would see a vehicle drive by and then all of a sudden the guy would open up with an AK-47; you'd already said, "Don't shoot him, I think he's not." Then all of a sudden, he opens with an AK, so you'd made a bad call. I know two instances where I personally said, "Don't shoot at that vehicle," and then it turns out that they had weapons and opened up. Eventually we engaged them and killed them. But in more cases than not, we didn't engage; in more cases than not, we let vehicles get by that we probably should have engaged. ...

You get to the airport. Describe to me the sort of scene, the emotions, the reactions at the end of the mission.

Definitely one of the most welcome sights that I've seen was that 1st Brigade Commander Will Grimsley was there. We are coming in. We had built these racks on the sides of our vehicles to carry more supplies. The other benefit we found out is those racks would detonate the RPGs before they got to the vehicle. The good thing was the shake charge would be malformed; it wouldn't have as much penetrating power. The bad thing was we put all our sleeping bags and rucksacks and duffel bags in these racks. So when the RPGs would hit them, they would catch them on fire.

When our vehicles pulled into the airport, the great majority of them were on fire on the outside of them. It was all our duffel bags and that had all be[en] shot up. The vehicle itself was intact, but all our stuff on the outside was burning up. The tops of our vehicles were just covered with spent machine gun cartridges and links and all that.

So you see this force come rolling in the airport on fire. We had some casualties we're [evacuating them]. Helicopters were right there. ... [It was] a safe haven for us to go into to get re-armed and re-fit. Talking to those that were there, I think it was kind of traumatic, to kind of see us rolling in on fire and [with] machine gun spent cartridges, vehicles with holes in them [that] had [been] hit by RPGs and stuff like that. So I think it was a great reunion for us, but I think also somewhat of a traumatic sight as we drove onto that airfield there. ...

Perkins was again sent into Baghdad on April 7, this time to take the city if he could. With a key reinforcement of supplies at the crucial hour, Perkins decided to remain in Baghdad, staying the night at one of Saddam Hussein's palaces.

The news media was becoming this battleground for who's in the city, who's in charge, et cetera. We had to make sure that in no uncertain terms that people knew the city had fallen and we were in charge of it, because then I think that would end the resistance. Then we would save a lot of lives on both sides.

When the requirement came up for a raid, I started taking a look at it, and said we probably ought to come up with a plan that meets the initial requirement that I can do a raid. But then I can offer options to my higher commanders that if the condition's right, I can stay the night, because if I can stay the night, I can stay forever. If I'm in the city and I stay there, the war's over.

It's obvious Baghdad's the center of gravity, and if the city is fallen then all hope is lost. [That's] the direction I gave to the planners. We sat and came up together [with] a plan that would allow us to attack into Baghdad, into the center of Baghdad, and stay the night and occupy the key pieces of terrain that obviously had symbolic significance that we basically were in charge of the country now.

As we thought about that, [we decided] there had to be a series of things that had to occur. One, we had to tactically win the fight to get in the city. Two, we had to be able to occupy terrain that was defensible. ...

We started developing the plan. As we took a look [at] some timelines, [it] started coming out that I would have to make big decisions. The first timeline is, are we going to stay in the city or come back out of the city? The governing factor on that was fuel [because] we were not going to take any wheeled vehicles in initially, so I [could] only go with one tank of fuel on the tanks.

The issue with the tank is its rate of consumption is determined by [the number of hours it runs]. It consumes 56 gallons an hour, really whether you're moving or not. So a full tank of gas on a tank is only going to last you eight to 10 hours, and then you're going to be empty. So let's plan on eight hours for a planning factor; [that] gives you a couple of hours. That means that at hour four, I have to decide whether we're going to continue the attack or pull back out of the city. ...

There were three major overhead passes that went into Baghdad, which became Objectives Moe, Larry and Curly. Those are infantry-type objectives, because there's a lot of buildings around them. There's the wooded areas around them, so you need dismounts. I have one infantry battalion and two tank battalions, so we give the infantry battalion those three objectives -- to secure those overpasses so that I can own that road, so I can drive in and out of the city. ...

The direction I gave was that we will lead with the tank battalion first, and they will attack up Route 8, and they will not stop for anything. The infantry battalion will come back behind, secure those overpasses and police up anything else in behind it, because we learned before when a vehicle becomes disabled, if you stop behind it, you then become a target.

So the guide that's given [to] the tank battalions [is], "You get on that road and you attack as fast as you can, and push right through to the center of the city. If a vehicle becomes disabled due to enemy fire, you immediately take the crew off, put them on another vehicle, and you just leave it. ... If you see enemy, you engage as much as you can, but keep moving. Then you keep passing that off to the guy behind you. He'll pass off to the guy behind you. But don't stop and kill every last person and then move, because it's too deliberate, and then they'll just keep coming back at us."...

Now I would like to say this is well-planned, synchronized chaos. But we came barrelling into the city, split two tank battalions in half, attack[ed] with two tank battalions going through the center of the city, and quickly started grabbing bridges and intersections. We'd get to one and then start splitting off and going to other ones. So we fix as many Iraqis as we could, and kind of seal the city, so that [the Iraqi army] couldn't move any amongst [the civilians].

Simultaneously, [as] that's going on, the infantry battalion is coming up and starts seizing Moe, Larry and Curly behind us, so we can move our two packages, which is refuel and re-arm these thin-skinned vehicles which we have pre-positioned down at Saints, where the brigade operation center was. When we got the word when it was clear, we would run those up to the city. Or if we couldn't get [them] to the city, we'd pull out of the city, refuel, and come back up.

So this fight's going on. The two tank battalions are attacking in the city; 315 is working this part here. It's starting to approach hour four. So I go down to the center of the city, have the two battalion commanders meet me. We get on the ground and say, "OK, what's going on?" "OK, I'm here, I got this bridge," "I got this, there's fighting still going all over." They said, "You know, we can win this. We're going to be able to get the key intersections. We'll close our ranks and form a cordon, so there's no gaps between the battalions. We'll have this cordon in the center of the city with this one road going out for our supplies, so that we can come [in]. Then we can work the cordons, and we have good interior lines in and out of the city."...

It was now about the fourth hour, and so I was getting to the point where I'm going to have to make a decision, but really we had expended so much capital getting in there. It would have been not only a tactical loss, but I think a strategic loss if we pulled out the city, because then the Iraqis could spin it [as], "They came in the city, we defeated them, we pushed them out, we kicked them out," et cetera.

The last resort was to pull out of the city. So I talked to the battalion commanders, and again the main requirement is a fuel requirement, and the tanks are the big problem. The direction that I gave them was to put the tanks where we need heavy armor -- the key bridges, key intersections. We don't want to move them, and they shut their engines off. If you shut their engines off, every hour that the engine is shut off, it's another hour of decision time I have to make.

Now generally, [it's] not a good plan when you're in an enemy city surrounded by 6 million people to shut your engines off, but you can still operate the tank on battery power, and you just have to continually charge it up. ...

Things are getting a little tenuous at about hour four, because now we have the tanks shut off. [The northern company is] almost out of ammo, [so I] call back to the brigade [executive officer], Lt. Col. Westly, doing a great job back there with the operation center. They're working the close air support, artillery. I'm talking to him on the phone, and all of a sudden, this static comes over almost like the phone goes dead. He comes back and he says, "Hey, sir, we've been hit."

Our operation center had been hit a couple of times [in the past] with artillery and mortar, and a couple of guys get a little shrapnel and stuff like that, but nothing major. I figured that's what it was. I said, "OK, go do an assessment and come back with me." He comes back about 20 minutes later on a satellite phone. He says, "Hey, sir, it's pretty significant." He says we have about 5 KIA, 4 MIA, about 20 casualties and about 20 vehicles [and] pieces of equipment destroyed. It appeared a missile came and landed right in the center and basically destroyed the operation center. It's a miracle, actually, more people weren't killed or vehicles destroyed. ...

[Now] what we have for a situation is, we have the tanks in the city shut down to conserve fuel. The northern company is almost out of ammo. The first R-2 package that has been sent forward has been ambushed, lost five vehicles there and the brigade operations center has been destroyed. So one would think that probably you don't have the best of situations right now to deal with. If you laid out a decision-making chart, it probably would have said, "You need to get out now."...

Personally, I was just so adamant that we've got to be able to figure a way to stay in the city, that if we pull out now we will have done a lot of this for naught. It would just be turned on us as a giant loss, both tactically and strategically.

So we just continued to fight that fight, and at every level, from the lowest private up to everyone that was in the assault CP to the brigade CP. ... You have privates and special forces getting in these other ammunition and fuellers that were still viable, to get them up to that northern company. ...

What they did, in fact -- That evening I went and saw one of the hemits. His whole windshield was shot out by machine gun bullets. So I went to the driver and I said, "How did you survive?" When you look at it, you think no one can survive.

This kid is on 2,500 gallons of fuel in an aluminum truck. He said, "I knew the fuel had to get there. I just got behind the wheel, ducked down behind the dashboard, stuck my M-16 out the window and started shooting, and stepped on the gas. We're going about 50 miles an hour. We just drove straight through it."... They're coming under a hail of fire, tires being shot out, windshields being shot out. But guys were up there with the 50-caliber [guns], shooting back, shooting with the M-16s [and] 9 mm [guns] to get these supply vehicles into the center of Baghdad.

In the meantime, the battle of Baghdad still continued to rage on. But we're securing these areas which we can defend throughout the night. We've moved mortars now into the city, and we're shooting direct fire with our mortars into the city. A lot of rooftops they had weaponized with snipers, and they had put their artillery and mortars on the roof. So we were firing direct fire with our mortars on the rooftops to their mortars.

Just as dusk was falling, the lead elements of R-2 packages of the two tank battalions started making it into the city with our armed escorts, and by nightfall, both tank battalions had gotten their ammunition and fuellers in. We didn't lose any of those vehicles. A lot of them were shot up, tires shot out [along with the] windshields, but all of the vehicles made it into the city.

As darkness fell, I knew that we were able to secure an adequate base and support in the city, because I now had another whole day's load of ammunition and fuel. I could then continue to save myself, and the next day I knew we wouldn't be travelling as much as we had the first day, because we were in the city. We'll just be expanding out, so I had probably plenty of fuel. Then with the additional ammo that I had, I knew that the tide had turned on this war.

In other words, we were in Baghdad, and there was probably no way that they could kick us out of the city. [The enemy] would just not be able to generate enough combat power to push us out of the city.

We continued to have fights for the next couple of days, but not at the magnitude they could push us out. The fighting out on Route 8 continued for the next couple of days.

As I said, I got on the radio to the British commander -- this is on April 7 -- I said, "If I can spend a night in Baghdad, then this war is over." I think it turned out to be so that that was the big turning point of the war, because if you look now in hindsight, they're saying, "You know, April 7, the day we came in, is the day that Saddam fled Baghdad out to the west, and east, I guess, towards Jordan."

Here is the summation of Boy's theory:

DESTRUCTION AND CREATION

John R. Boyd

September 3, 1976

Hyperlinks to Chuck Spinney's Commentary Abstract

To comprehend and cope with our environment we develop mental patterns or concepts of meaning. The purpose of this paper is to sketch out how we destroy and create these patterns to permit us to both shape and be shaped by a changing environment. In this sense, the discussion also literally shows why we cannot avoid this kind of activity if we intend to survive on our own terms. The activity is dialectic in nature generating both disorder and order that emerges as a changing and expanding universe of mental concepts matched to a changing and expanding universe of observed reality.

Goal
Studies of human behavior reveal that the actions we undertake as individuals are closely related to survival, more importantly, survival on our own terms. Naturally, such a notion implies that we should be able to act relatively free or independent of any debilitating external influences—otherwise that very survival might be in jeopardy. In viewing the instinct for survival in this manner we imply that a basic aim or goal, as individuals, is to improve our capacity for independent action. The degree to which we cooperate, or compete, with others is driven by the need to satisfy this basic goal. If we believe that it is not possible to satisfy it alone, without help from others, history shows us that we will agree to constraints upon our independent action—in order to collectively pool skills and talents in the form of nations, corporations, labor unions, mafias, etc.—so that obstacles standing in the way of the basic goal can either be removed or overcome. On the other hand, if the group cannot or does not attempt to overcome obstacles deemed important to many (or possibly any) of its individual members, the group must risk losing these alienated members. Under these circumstances, the alienated members may dissolve their relationship and remain independent, form a group of their own, or join another collective body in order to improve their capacity for independent action.

Environment
In a real world of limited resources and skills, individuals and groups form, dissolve and reform their cooperative or competitive postures in a continuous struggle to remove or overcome physical and social environmental obstacles (11,13) In a cooperative sense, where skills and talents are pooled, the removal or overcoming of obstacles represents an improved capacity for independent action for all concerned. In a competitive sense, where individuals and groups compete for scarce resources and skills, an improved capacity for independent action achieved by some individuals or groups constrains that capacity for other individuals or groups. Naturally, such a combination of real world scarcity and goal striving to overcome this scarcity intensifies the struggle of individuals and groups to cope with both their physical and social environments (11,13).

Need for Decisions
Against such a background, actions and decisions become critically important. Actions must be taken over and over again and in many different ways. Decisions must be rendered to monitor and determine the precise nature of the actions needed that will be compatible with the goal. To make these timely decisions implies that we must be able to form mental concepts of observed reality, as we perceive it, and be able to change these concepts as reality itself appears to change. The concepts can then be used as decision-models for improving our capacity for independent action. Such a demand for decisions that literally impact our survival causes one to wonder: How do we generate or create the mental concepts to support this decision-making activity?

Creating Concepts
There are two ways in which we can develop and manipulate mental concepts to represent observed reality: We can start from a comprehensive whole and break it down to its particulars or we can start with the particulars and build towards a comprehensive whole. (28/24) Saying it another way, but in a related sense, we can go from the general-to-specific or from the specific-to- general. A little reflection here reveals that deduction is related to proceeding from the general-to-specific while induction is related to proceeding from the specific-to-general. In following this line of thought can we think of other activities that are related to these two opposing ideas? Is not analysis related to proceeding from the general-to-specific? Is not synthesis, the opposite of analysis related to proceeding from the specific-to-general? Putting all this together: Can we not say that general-to-specific is related to both deduction and analysis, while specific-to-general is related to induction and synthesis? Now, can we think of some examples to fit with these two opposing ideas? We need not look far. The differential calculus proceeds from the general-to-specific—from a function to its derivative. Hence is not the use or application of the differential Calculus related to deduction and analysis? The integral calculus, on the other hand, proceeds in the opposite direction—from a derivative to a general function. Hence, is not the use or application of the integral calculus related to induction and synthesis? Summing up, we can see that: general- to-specific is related to deduction, analysis, and differentiation, while, specific-to-general is related to induction, synthesis, and integration.

Now keeping these two opposing idea chains in mind let us move on a somewhat different tack. Imagine, if you will, a domain (a comprehensive whole) and its constituent elements or parts. Now, imagine another domain and its constituent parts. Once again, imagine even another domain and its constituent parts. Repeating this idea over and over again we can imagine any number of domains and the parts corresponding to each. Naturally, as we go through life we develop concepts of meaning (with included constituents) to represent observed reality. Can we not liken these concepts and their related constituents to the domains and constituents that we have formed in our imagination? Naturally, we can. Keeping this relationship in mind, suppose we shatter the correspondence of each domain or concept with its constituent elements. In other words, we imagine the existence of the parts but pretend that the domains or concepts they were previously associated with do not exist. Result: We have many constituents, or particulars, swimming around in a sea of anarchy. We have uncertainty and disorder in place of meaning and order. Further, we can see that such an unstructuring or destruction of many domains—to break the correspondence of each with its respective constituents—is related to deduction, analysis, and differentiation. We call this kind of unstructuring a destructive deduction.

Faced with such disorder or chaos, how can we reconstruct order and meaning? Going back to the idea chain of specific-to-general, induction, synthesis, and integration the thought occurs that a new domain or concept can be formed if we can find some common qualities, attributes, or operations among some or many of these constituents swimming in this sea of anarchy. Through such connecting threads (that produce meaning) we synthesize constituents from, hence across, the domains we have just shattered.(24) Linking particulars together in this manner we can form a new domain or concept—providing, of course, we do not inadvertently use only those "bits and pieces" in the same arrangement that we associated with one of the domains purged from our imagination. Clearly, such a synthesis would indicate we have generated something new and different from what previously existed. Going back to our idea chain, it follows that creativity is related to induction, synthesis, and integration since we proceeded from unstructured bits and pieces to a new general pattern or concept. We call such action a creative or constructive induction. It is important to note that the crucial or key step that permits this creative induction is the separation of the particulars from their previous domains by the destructive deduction. Without this unstructuring the creation of a new structure cannot proceed—since the bits and pieces are still tied together as meaning within unchallenged domains or concepts.

Recalling that we use concepts or mental patterns to represent reality, it follows that the unstructuring and restructuring just shown reveals a way of changing our perception of reality.(28) Naturally, such a notion implies that the emerging pattern of ideas and interactions must be internally consistent and match-up with reality.(14, 25) To check or verify internal consistency we try to see if we can trace our way back to the original constituents that were used in the creative or constructive induction. If we cannot reverse directions, the ideas and interactions do not go together in this way without contradiction. Hence, they are not internally consistent. However, this does not necessarily mean we reject and throw away the entire structure. Instead, we should attempt to identify those ideas (particulars) and interactions that seem to hold together in a coherent pattern of activity as distinguished from those ideas that do not seem to fit in. In performing this task we check for reversibility as well as check to see which ideas and interactions match-up with our observations of reality. (27,14,15) Using those ideas and interactions that pass this test together with any new ideas (from new destructive deductions) or other promising ideas that popped out of the original destructive deduction we again attempt to find some common qualities, attributes or operations to re-create the concept—or create a new concept. Also, once again, we perform the check for reversibility and match-up with reality. Over and over again this cycle of Destruction and Creation is repeated until we demonstrate internal consistency and match-up with reality. (19,14,15)

Suspicion
When this orderly (and pleasant) state is reached the concept becomes a coherent pattern of ideas and interactions that can be used to describe some aspect of observed reality. As a consequence, there is little, or no, further appeal to alternative ideas and interactions in an effort to either expand, complete, or modify the concept.(19) Instead, the effort is turned inward towards fine tuning the ideas and interactions in order to improve generality and produce a more precise match of the conceptual pattern with reality. (19) Toward this end, the concept—and its internal workings—is tested and compared against observed phenomena over and over again in many different and subtle ways.(19) Such a repeated and inward-oriented effort to explain increasingly more subtle aspects of reality suggests the disturbing idea that perhaps, at some point, ambiguities, uncertainties, anomalies, or apparent inconsistencies may emerge to stifle a more general and precise match-up of concept with observed reality.(19) Why do we suspect this?

On one hand, we realize that facts, perceptions, ideas, impressions, interactions, etc. separated from previous observations and thought patterns have been linked together to create a new conceptual pattern. On the other hand, we suspect that refined observations now underway will eventually exhibit either more or a different kind of precision and subtlety than the previous observations and thought patterns. Clearly, any anticipated difference, or differences, suggests we should expect a mismatch between the new observations and the anticipated concept description of these observations. To assume otherwise would be tantamount to admitting that previous constituents and interactions would produce the same synthesis as any newer constituents and interactions that exhibit either more or a different kind of precision and subtlety. This would be like admitting one equals two. To avoid such a discomforting position implies that we should anticipate a mismatch between phenomena observation and concept description of that observation. Such a notion is not new and is indicated by the discoveries of Kurt Gödel and Werner Heisenberg.

Incompleteness and Consistency
In 1931 Kurt Gödel created a stir in the World of Mathematics and Logic when he revealed that it was impossible to embrace mathematics within a single system of logic. (12,23) He accomplished this by proving, first, that any consistent system that includes the arithmetic of whole numbers is incomplete. In other words, there are true statements or concepts within the system that cannot be deduced from the postulates that make-up the system. Next, he proved even though such a system is consistent, its consistency cannot be demonstrated within the system.

Such a result does not imply that it is impossible to prove the consistency of a system. It only means that such a proof cannot be accomplished inside the system. As a matter of fact since Gödel, Gerhard Gentzen and others have shown that a consistency proof of arithmetic can be found by appealing to systems outside that arithmetic. Thus, Gödel's Proof indirectly shows that in order to determine the consistency of any new system we must construct or uncover another system beyond it (29,27). Over and over this cycle must be repeated to determine the consistency of more and more elaborate systems.(29,27)

Keeping this process in mind, let us see how Gödel's results impact the effort to improve the match-up of concept with observed reality. To do this we will consider two kinds of consistency: The consistency of the concept and the consistency of the match-up between observed reality and concept description of reality. In this sense, if we assume—as a result of previous destructive deduction and creative induction efforts—that we have a consistent concept and consistent match-up, we should see no differences between observation and concept description. Yet, as we have seen, on one hand, we use observations to shape or formulate a concept; while on the other hand, we use a concept to shape the nature of future inquiries or observations of reality. Back and forth, over and over again, we use observations to sharpen a concept and a concept to sharpen observations. Under these circumstances, a concept must be incomplete since we depend upon an ever-changing array of observations to shape or formulate it. Likewise, our observations of reality must be incomplete since we depend upon a changing concept to shape or formulate the nature of new inquiries and observations. Therefore, when we probe back and forth with more precision and subtlety, we must admit that we can have differences between observation and concept description; hence, we cannot determine the consistency of the system—in terms of its concept, and match-up with observed reality—within itself.

Furthermore, the consistency cannot be determined even when the precision and subtlety of observed phenomena approaches the precision and subtlety of the observer—who is employing the ideas and interactions that play together in the conceptual pattern. This aspect of consistency is accounted for not only by Gödel 's Proof but also by the Heisenberg Uncertainty or Indeterminacy Principle.

Indeterminacy and Uncertainty

The Indeterminacy Principle uncovered by Werner Heisenberg in 1927 showed that one could not simultaneously fix or determine precisely the velocity and position of a particle or body.(14,9) Specifically he showed, due to the presence and influence of an observer, that the product of the velocity and position uncertainties is equal to or greater than a small number (Planck's Constant) divided by the mass of the particle or body being investigated. In other words,

Where

is velocity uncertainty

is position uncertainty and

is Planck's constant (h) divided by observed mass (m).

Examination of Heisenberg's Principle reveals that as mass becomes exceedingly small the uncertainty or indeterminacy, becomes exceedingly large. Now—in accordance with this relation—when the precision, or mass, of phenomena being observed is little, or no different than the precision, or mass, of the observing phenomena the uncertainty values become as large as, or larger than, the velocity and size frame-of-reference associated with the bodies being observed.(9) In other words, when the intended distinction between observer and observed begins to disappear (3), the uncertainty values hide or mask phenomena behavior; or put another way, the observer perceives uncertain or erratic behavior that bounces all over in accordance with the indeterminacy relation. Under these circumstances, the uncertainty values represent the inability to determine the character or nature (consistency) of a system within itself. On the other hand, if the precision and subtlety of the observed phenomena is much less than the precision and subtlety of the observing phenomena, the uncertainty values become much smaller than the velocity and size values of the bodies being observed.(9) Under these circumstances, the character or nature of a system can be determined—although not exactly—since the uncertainty values do not hide or mask observed phenomena behavior nor indicate significant erratic behavior.

Keeping in mind that the Heisenberg Principle implicitly depends upon the indeterminate presence and influence of an observer,(14) we can now see—as revealed by the two examples just cited—that the magnitude of the uncertainty values represent the degree of intrusion by the observer upon the observed. When intrusion is total (that is, when the intended distinction between observer and observed essentially disappears,(3) the uncertainty values indicate erratic behavior. When intrusion is low the uncertainty values do not hide or mask observed phenomena behavior, nor indicate significant erratic behavior. In other words, the uncertainty values not only represent the degree of intrusion by the observer upon the observed but also the degree of confusion and disorder perceived by that observer.

Entropy and the Second Law of Thermodynamics
Confusion and disorder are also related to the notion of entropy and the Second Law of Thermodynamics (11,20) Entropy is a concept that represents the potential for doing work, the capacity for taking action, or the degree of confusion and disorder associated with any physical or information activity. High entropy implies a low potential for doing work, a low capacity for taking action or a high degree of confusion an disorder. Low entropy implies just the opposite. Viewed in this context, the Second Law of Thermodynamics states that all observed natural processes generate entropy.(20) From this law it follows that entropy must increase in any closed system—or, for that matter, in any system that cannot communicate in an ordered fashion with other systems or environments external to itself.(20) Accordingly, whenever we attempt to do work or take action inside such a system—a concept and its match-up with reality—we should anticipate an increase in entropy hence an increase in confusion and disorder. Naturally, this means we cannot determine the character or nature (consistency) of such a system within itself, since the system is moving irreversibly toward a higher, yet unknown, state of confusion and disorder.

Destruction and Creation

What an interesting outcome! According to Gödel we cannot— in general—determine the consistency, hence the character or nature, of an abstract system within itself. According to Heisenberg and the Second Law of Thermodynamics any attempt to do so in the real world will expose uncertainty and generate disorder. Taken together, these three notions support the idea that any inward-oriented and continued effort to improve the match-up of concept with observed reality will only increase the degree of mismatch. Naturally, in this environment, uncertainty and disorder will increase as previously indicated by the Heisenberg Indeterminacy Principle and the Second Law of Thermodynamics, respectively. Put another way, we can expect unexplained and disturbing ambiguities, uncertainties, anomalies, or apparent inconsistencies to emerge more and more often. Furthermore, unless some kind of relief is available, we can expect confusion to increase until disorder approaches chaos— death

Fortunately, there is a way out. Remember, as previously shown, we can forge a new concept by applying the destructive deduction and creative induction mental operations. Also, remember, in order to perform these dialectic mental operations we must first shatter the rigid conceptual pattern, or patterns, firmly established in our mind. (This should not be too difficult since the rising confusion and disorder is already helping us to undermine any patterns). Next, we must find some common qualities, attributes, or operations to link isolated facts, perceptions, ideas, impressions, interactions, observations, etc. together as possible concepts to represent the real world. Finally, we must repeat this unstructuring and restructuring until we develop a concept that begins to match-up with reality. By doing this—in accordance with Gödel, Heisenberg and the Second Law of Thermodynamics—we find that the uncertainty and disorder generated by an inward-oriented system talking to itself can be offset by going outside and creating a new system. Simply stated, uncertainty and related disorder can be diminished by the direct artifice of creating a higher and broader more general concept to represent reality.

However, once again, when we begin to turn inward and use the new concept—within its own pattern of ideas and interactions—to produce a finer grain match with observed reality we note that the new concept and its match-up with observed reality begins to self-destruct just as before. Accordingly, the dialectic cycle of destruction and creation begins to repeat itself once again. In other words, as suggested by Gödel's Proof of Incompleteness, we imply that the process of Structure, Unstructure, Restructure, Unstructure, Restructure is repeated endlessly in moving to higher and broader levels of elaboration. In this unfolding drama, the alternating cycle of entropy increase toward more and more disorder and the entropy decrease toward more and more order appears to be one part of a control mechanism that literally seems to drive and regulate this alternating cycle of destruction and creation toward higher and broader levels of elaboration. Now, in relating this deductive/inductive activity to the basic goal discussed in the beginning, I believe we have uncovered a Dialectic Engine that permits the construction of decision models needed by individuals and societies for determining and monitoring actions in an effort to improve their capacity for independent action.

Furthermore, since this engine is directed toward satisfying this basic aim or goal, it follows that the goal seeking effort itself appears to be the other side of a control mechanism that seems also to drive and regulate the alternating cycle of destruction and creation toward higher and broader levels of elaboration. In this context, when acting within a rigid or essentially a closed system, the goal seeking effort of individuals and societies to improve their capacity for independent action tends to produce disorder towards randomness and death. On the other hand, as already shown, the increasing disorder generated by the increasing mismatch of the system concept with observed reality opens or unstructures the system. As the unstructuring or, as we'll call it, the destructive deduction unfolds it shifts toward a creative induction to stop the trend toward disorder and chaos to satisfy a goal-oriented need for increased order.

Paradoxically, then, an entropy increase permits both the destruction or unstructuring of a closed system and the creation of a new system to nullify the march toward randomness and death. Taken together, the entropy notion associated with the Second Law of Thermodynamics and the basic goal of individuals and societies seem to work in dialectic harmony driving and regulating the destructive/creative, or deductive/inductive, action—that we have described herein as a dialectic engine. The result is a changing and expanding universe of mental concepts matched to a changing and expanding universe of observed reality.(28,27) As indicated earlier, these mental concepts are employed as decision models by individuals and societies for determining and monitoring actions needed to cope with their environment—or to improve their capacity for independent action.

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