Iraqis lament a call for help

BAGHDAD - When foreign fighters poured into villages with jihad on their minds and weapons in their hands, some Iraqi tribesmen in western desert towns fought back.

They set up checkpoints to filter out the foreigners. They burned down suspected insurgent safe houses. They called their fellow tribesmen in Baghdad and other urban areas for backup. And when they still could not uproot the fighters streaming in from Syria, tribal leaders said, they took a most unusual step: They asked the Americans for help.

While the U.S. military hailed last week's Operation Matador as a success that killed more than 125 insurgents, local tribesmen said it was a disaster for their communities. They now say they are leery of ever again assisting U.S. or Iraqi forces.

In interviews, influential tribal leaders and many residents of the remote border towns said the 1,000 U.S. troops who swept into their territories in the weeklong campaign that ended over the weekend did not distinguish between the Iraqis who supported the United States and the fighters battling it.

"The Americans were bombing whole villages and saying they were only after the foreigners,' " said Fasal al-Goud, a former governor of Anbar province who said he asked U.S. forces for help on behalf of the tribes. "An AK-47 can't distinguish between a terrorist and a tribesman, so how could a missile or tank?"

Goud was the only tribal leader who spoke on the record. Two others reached by phone in western villages expressed similar views but said they did not want their names published because the foreign insurgents were still holding some of their tribespeople hostage.

Long before the U.S. offensive, trouble had been brewing in and around the town of Qaim. Two Iraqi tribes, the Albu Mahal and the Albu Nimr, resented the flood of foreign Islamic extremists who were crossing the border and trying to turn their lands into an insurgent fiefdom.

Like the fighters in the formerly insurgent-controlled city of Fallujah, also in troubled Anbar province, the foreigners brought a puritanical brand of Islam and began intimidating villagers who refused to follow their commands, residents said. The foreign fighters found followers among some members of another large tribe in the area, the Karabla.

Although there were small-scale clashes among the tribes for months, the killing of a popular soldier from the Albu Mahal tribe early this month escalated the violence, according to several accounts of the unrest that preceded Operation Matador.

The Albu Mahal, with the help of the larger Albu Nimr, formed a vigilante group called the Hamza Forces to help keep the foreign fighters at bay. Those forces, which included some men suspected of attacking U.S. troops in the past, began battling the religious radicals known as Salafis, who were allied with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian leader of the group al-Qaeda in Iraq.

The overwhelmed tribal villagers were at a loss to defeat the better-armed and better-funded foreigners and their allies from the Karabla. With nowhere else to turn, tribal leaders decided to call the Iraqi Defense Ministry.

That is when Goud, the former Anbar governor and a sheikh of the Albu Nimr, said he called American officials at the Marine base Camp Fallujah to ask for help. Goud had met the officials during the siege of Fallujah, he said.

Bruska Nouri Shaways, Iraq's deputy defense minister, at first could not believe the request for help from the traditionally rebellious province. Shaways, who took several calls from tribal sheikhs, said he immediately alerted the U.S military about their willingness to share information on Zarqawi followers.

Operation Matador began with the Marines sweeping into the Qaim area in armored vehicles, backed up by helicopter gunships. They pummeled suspected insurgent safe houses, flattening parts of the villages and killing armed men. Nine Marines died in combat and 40 were wounded, according to the military.

When the offensive ended, angry residents returned to find blocks of destruction. Men who had stayed behind to help were found dead in shot-up houses. Tribal leaders have not counted their dead; several families had not yet returned to the area.

"We ran away because you didn't know who was fighting who," said Ahmed Mohammed, who works at a hospital north of Qaim. "Americans were fighting. The Albu Mahal were fighting. And Tawhid and Jihad [Zarqawi's group] were fighting."

Capt. Jeff Pool, a Marine spokesman in Iraq, confirmed that Iraqi informants contributed to intelligence-gathering for Matador but said there was no effort by the U.S. military to incorporate local tribes in its assault plans.

"We have no knowledge of any local efforts" to reach out to the military before the operation, he said in an e-mail response to questions.

Pool and other military spokesmen did not respond to questions about whether U.S. troops had tried to contact any of the area's feuding forces.

Deputy Defense Minister Shaways said it was extremely difficult to distinguish friend from foe in the midst of battle. He called Operation Matador a success but acknowledged that some tribal leaders were upset by it. He said tribal leaders were expected to travel to Baghdad this week to discuss the aftermath of the campaign.

Still, he said, vigilante justice does not fit into the new Iraq. He said the Defense Ministry would try to recruit the tribesmen for Iraq's security forces.

"We cannot allow anyone who feels he's not secure to just set up checkpoints and kidnap people," Shaways said. "This is not the Wild West."

The biggest mistake we are making is that we should have turned this over to the Iraqi military. I'm sure that there are some of the units that are ready. We could have provided backup, but the learning experience of the Iraqi forces is badly needed.

"The biggest mistake we are making is that we should have turned this over to the Iraqi military. I'm sure that there are some of the units that are ready. We could have provided backup, but the learning experience of the Iraqi forces is badly needed."
What you say makes perfect sense. And surely if there where adeqate Iraqi forces not needed elsewhere, it could have been another feather in their cap. Both our Army and Marines have been saying for some time, e.g. six months or so, this is the plan. It is working out nicely in eastern Al Anbar and north of the capital based on some stuff we are reading. Hopefully another couple Bn's worth of SOC Iraqi forces will be avalaible soon. As usual though, due to the source, I am not sure I want to believe the whole story. The Philadelphia Inquirer is about as far left as they come, plus the two reporters, hmmmmm. Lastly, how can anyone expect those Marines or any SOP unit to politely walk up to each house and knock on the door when they where firing RPG and 50 cals at the Marines as soon as they came in range.
Always goes back to these urban SASO not being so easy to conduct without innocents taking it, and damage to infrastructure. Where does one draw the line?

Today Hawaii played host to a Marine 4 star General. Tomorrow the Carrier Nimitz comes into Pearl on it's way east. There is an aura of "action" in the air. I urge anyone who reads this to "take ten" and look at the US's potentials for further actions, there are many, Korea, China, Syria to name just a couple. Then there are the many possible actions against the US.

Talk about "living on the edge!" Thank God we have President Bush as our leader.

The biggest mistake we are making is that we should have turned this over to the Iraqi military.

I wondered where the IM was when this battle first started as well. I later read they were stretched in Baghdad and other parts of Iraq. What are the latest numbers? Some 500 Iraqis killed bombings/attacks in 3 weeks...they're very busy.

I also believe this story is true, I've read the same from other embeds. Miscommunication....it happens. Didn't the French/American soldiers fight and kill each other in battles in WWII.

It's not all our fault. Why didn't the tribemen tell us they would be fighting with us or wearing armbands or something to help distinguish them. Why didn't the families leave like they did in Fallujah. It's not all that bad, there were some tribesmen that survived the battle and more importantly. We killed the enemy.

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