But didn't General Snow and General Mud equally hamper military operations on the Russian side? The Russians were not immune to the effects of bad weather.
Just my two cents... but I think victory/defeat had alot to do with how the various combatants used or failed to use those two famous generals strategically.
Operation Barbarossa dragged on until 1943 and was ham-strung by Field Marshal Goering's inability to air-lift sufficient supplies to the German troops. And a frustrated Hitler assumed military command of the 'Russian Front' and made some incredibly bad decisions. Plus, Stalin was receiving information by spies which gave him, among other things, the German battle plans for what became the world's biggest tank battle at Kursk
But in the final analysis, it was the determination of the Russian people to fight back - no matter what - that turned the tide.
As a German officer wrote in his diary:
At Stalingrad, the Wehrmarcht had met its match. The soldiers had an uneasy feeling they were fighting men of nearly superhuman strength and resilience. The wounded Russian rarely cried out. Hoffman, a German officer, confided to his diary that Russian's displayed an "insane stubbornness." He said they are, "fanatics...wild beasts...not men, but some kind of cast iron creatures; they never get tired and are not afraid of fire."
Yes, those untermenschen Slavs took on the German soldiers and tore them apart. click
No, they were not immune but they were well prepared for it.
Hitler arrogantly expected the fighting to be over by winter and the German forces were horribly prepared for Russian winter operations.
When the full brunt of the Russian winter struck, the Germans had to resort to winter clothing collections from German civilians back in Germany, they had not developed fuels that worked effectively at very low temperatures, had troops that were not used to operating in such conditions and had over-stretched supply lines.
By contrast, the Russians had winter gear, winter fuels, much shorter supply lines and Siberian ski troops and cavalry units accustomed to such conditions that targeted supply depots behind German lines at a time when the Luftwaffe and German armor had been rendered ineffective by the winter.
The Germans lost 1 million men that first winter.