Russian PRshchiki: Snapshots from Two Regions ("Russian" Elections Still Rigged by Soviets)

...Political consultants in Russia generally have broader job descriptions than their counterparts in the West. Most of the firms engaged in “political technologies” in Russia offer a wide range of services from conducting focus groups and organizing opinion polling to producing paid political advertisements and designing media strategies for campaigns.

Also involved in the mix can be a variety of "dirty" and "not-so-dirty" tricks ranging from digging up dirt on rival candidates and organizing the transportation to the polls for elderly voters to registering "double" candidates (people with the same or similar name as a rival) to issuing counterfeit campaign materials under a rival candidate's name. In a practice that is regarded as strictly unethical in Western democracies, political consultants are often hired specifically to work against a particular candidate . The self-identification of “tekhnolog,” or consultant, can be fairly broad and include people who do radically different things day to day. Similarly, the term, public relations, is often used in Russia as a more general term for a number of techniques that would not usually be included in a strict classification of public relations in the West.

In addition to the term “tekhnolog” in Russian, there is also the moniker “prshchik.” This term generally has a negative connotation and is used to describe people who conduct “black public relations.” The terms "black public relations" and "dirty technologies" are used more or less interchangeably to describe a broad range of dirty tricks from very simple ones, such as pasting leaflets of opposing candidates on voters' car windshields with hard-to-remove glue to more complex and elaborate hoaxes such as creating websites containing compromising materials about rival candidates. Few consultants ever refer to themselves as "prshchiks," although the term is much bandied about in the press. Maksim Dianov of the Institute for Regional Issues -- an academic who is also a political consultant -- offered a definition of the two terms that avoids value judgments. He believes that a “prshchik” is primarily concerned with the image of the client in a narrow sense, while a “tekhnolog” employs a broader array of tools for accomplishing defined tasks for his clients. These can range from raising a client’s public profile in local political circles to winning an election.10

Who are the consultants? Many leaders of the political consulting profession spring from the Moscow-based, Soviet-era political elite. They were part of that section of the intelligentsia that performed "services," such as political consulting and image making for the elite.11 A random sampling of the backgrounds of some of the best known figures shows how some members of the old elite adapted themselves quickly to the new world of elections and multiple political parties.

Take, for example, Igor Mintusov and Yekaterina Yegorova, the founders of the Nikkolo M consulting agency. They worked at the Moscow-based USA and Canada Institute. In the 1980s, Yegorova reportedly prepared background information about American political leaders for the Communist Party apparatus.12 In 1995, Yegorova and Mintusov reportedly established a relationship with Aleksandr Kazakov, who was then the head of the presidential administration’s territorial department. This relationship resulted in the firm gaining important clients and contracts.13 Although Nikkolo M was founded in 1992, Mintusov did not officially resign from the Institute until 1996. Kazakov went on to become first deputy head of the presidential staff under Anatolii Chubais. And it was Chubais, who ran Russian President Boris Yeltsin's successful 1996 presidential campaign.

Another leader in the field, Vyacheslav Nikonov, the head of the Politika foundation, is also former member of the Communist Party elite and grandson of former Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov. Nikonov was a top speechwriter at the Central Committee in the late 1980s where he wrote speeches for Mikhail Gorbachev and former KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov.14 He founded the Politika foundation in 1993 together with Yeltsin-era adviser Georgii Satarov, who now heads the INDEM foundation. The same year, he was elected to the State Duma on the Party of Unity and Accord party list. In 1996, he was co-chairman of Yeltsin's re-election committee. He is also the author of "From Eisenhower to Nixon: From the History of the Republican Party" and "The Republicans: From Nixon to Reagan," among other books and articles.

Aleksei Koshmarov is another former member of the Soviet Communist Party elite who spent the bulk of his early professional life working at the Moscow-based Committee for Youth Organizations.15 Koshmarov likes to joke that his firm is close to the Kremlin, because Novokom’s office is located just a few kilometers from Red Square. In an interview in 2002, he admitted that he maintains close ties to deputy head of the presidential administration Aleksandr Abramov, ties that were established during their Komsomol days.16 He became general director of Novokom in 1992. According to "Moskovskie novosti," Koshmarov boasted at a conference in 2000 that he created the populist image of the notoriously anti-Semitic former Krasnodar Krai Governor Nikolai Kondratenko.

Koshmarov played a leading role in the successful 1996 campaign of Vladimir Yakovlev to become governor of St. Petersburg, and in 1998 he spearheaded a highly controversial effort to elect a pro-Yakovlev majority to the St. Petersburg Legislative Assembly, an effort that included a wide range of dirty tricks including the widespread use of "double" candidates. He remains an adviser to Yakovlev. He also headed the unsuccessful 1996 campaign of Volgograd Mayor Yurii Chekhov to become governor of Volgograd Oblast. Communist Nikolai Maksyuta won that race, despite the Kremlin's support of Chekhov. Image-Contact President Aleksei Sitnikov -- who is younger than Nikonov, Yegorova, or Mintusov -- hails from Novosibirsk and was initially a bit of an outsider in Moscow politics. But he was able to capitalize on his ties with fellow Novosibirsk native and former Railways Minister Nikolai Aksenenko. In an interview, Sitnikov acknowledged having a warm personal relationship with Aksenenko and said that “one of the great events in his life was helping [Aksenenko] to create the Unity party.” However, Sitnikov insisted that his firm was awarded business and contracts based on its merit, noting that it won a contract to reorganize the Railways Ministry together with two Western firms in an open tender and after Aksenenko had left office.

Sitnikov founded Image-Contact in 1989 and, according to his website, the company has conducted more than 300 election campaigns at all levels, including unspecified participation in the 1996 and 2000 presidential elections. Some of Sitnikov's colleagues have alleged that he enjoyed close ties with former Kremlin powerbroker Boris Berezovskii, but Sitnikov denies this. However, he admits that he organized Berezovskii’s winning campaign for the Duma in Karachaevo-Cherkessia in 1999 and that he has met with the tycoon in London during business trips, in addition to his role in the creation of Unity, which is widely seen as a Berezovskii inspired and funded project 17

While many leading political consultants got their starts in the business around the beginning of competitive elections in 1989, the profession itself is considered to have really begun in Russia in 1993. “Before [seven or eight years ago], there was no profession such as political technology," Dianov said, "and no one knew what public relations was or they thought it was some kind of swear word.”18 It was not until 1993 that the application of so-called “election technologies” became widespread.19 Many of consultants entered the profession of election management more by accident than design. They joined election campaigns through friends or acquaintances and those who proved successful at this activity stuck with it. Many political consultancies grew more through informal, personal contacts than through more formal means of seeking new clients such as advertising. For example, Novokom's Koshmarov explained that his firm got its first big campaign -- representing Yakovlev in the 1996 St. Petersburg gubernatorial race -- through a referral by “friends.” 20 Later business flowed to the firm from its good contacts with Aleksandr Abramov, deputy head of the presidential administration under Putin. Sitnikov explained that he was hired to manage Sergei Darkin’s successful 2001 campaign for the governorship of Primorskii Krai because he was an old acquaintance of Darkin’s from their days as leaders in the Komsomol. 21 Koshmarov and Sitnikov locked horns in Primorskii Krai race, with Sitnikov emerging triumphant. But before turning to that battle, I will relate the earlier saga of the Ryazan gubernatorial election of 2000. The outcome of this race unlike the gubernatorial elections of later years was not easily predictable. And like the race in Primorskii Krai, voters had a real choice.

Excerpt: Phony "Collapse" of Communism predicted by KGB defector Anatoly Golitysn in his **1984** book "New Lies For Old." Here are a few relavent passages:

Pages 340-342: “The dissident movement is now being prepared for the most important aspect of its strategic role, which will be to persuade the West of the authenticity of Soviet ‘liberalization’ when it comes. Further high-level defectors, or ‘official émigrés’, may well make their appearance in the West before the switch in policy occurs.

The prediction of Soviet compliance with the Helsinki agreements is based on the fact that it was the Warsaw Pact countries and a Soviet [agent of influence] who initiated and pressed for the [negotiations]…

‘Liberalization’ in Eastern Europe would probably involve the return to power in Czechoslovakia of Dubcek and his associates. If it should be extended to East Germany, demolition of the Berlin Wall might even be contemplated…

Western acceptance of the new ‘liberalization’ as genuine would create favorable conditions for the fulfillment of Communist strategy for the United States, Western Europe, and even, perhaps, Japan… Euro-Communism would be revived. The pressure for united fronts between Communist and socialist parties and trade unions at the national and international level would be intensified.

This time, the socialists might finally fall into the trap. United front governments under strong Communist influence might well come to power in France, Italy, and possibly other countries. Elsewhere the fortunes and influence of Communist Parties would be much revived. The bulk of Europe might well turn to left-wing socialism, leaving only a few pockets of conservative resistance.

Pressure could well grow for a solution of the German problem in which some form of confederation between East and West Germany would be combined with neutralization of the whole and a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union. France and Italy, under united front governments, would throw in their lot with Germany and the Soviet Union. Britain would be confronted with a choice between a neutral Europe and the United States.

NATO could hardly survive this process. The Czechoslovaks, in contrast with their performance in 1968, might well take the initiative, along with the Romanians and Yugoslavs, in proposing (in the Helsinki context) the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in return for the dissolution of NATO.

The disappearance of the Warsaw Pact would have little effect on the coordination of the Communist bloc, but the dissolution of NATO could well mean the departure of American forces from the European continent and a closer European alignment with a ‘liberalized’ Soviet Bloc. Perhaps in the long run, a similar process might affect the relationship between the United States and Japan leading to abrogation of the security pact between them.

The EEC [EU] on present lines, even if enlarged, would not be a barrier to the neutralization of Europe and the withdrawal of American troops. It might even accelerate the process. The acceptance of the EEC by Eurocommunist parties in the 1970s, following a period of opposition in the 1960s, suggests that this view is shared by the communist strategists. The efforts by the Yugoslavs and Romanians to create stronger links with the EEC should be seen, not as inimical to Soviet interests, but as the first step in laying the foundations for the merger between EEC and COMECON. The European Parliament might become an all-European socialist parliament with representation from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. ‘Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals’ would turn out to be a neutral, socialist Europe.

The United States, betrayed by her former European allies, would tend to withdraw into fortress America or, with the few remaining conservative countries, including perhaps Japan, would seek and alliance with China as the only counterweight to Soviet power.”

Page 348: “The timing of the release of the Solidarity leader and the news of the appointment of Adropov confirm… that the ‘liberalization’ will not be limited to the USSR, but will be expanded to Eastern Europe and particularly Poland. The experiment with ‘renewal’ in Poland will be repeated again.

This time, however, it will be with full strategic initiatives and implications against Western Europe and NATO. The appointment of Andropov, the release of the Solidarity leader, and the invitation to the Pope to visit Poland in June 1983, made by the Polish government, all indicate that the Communist strategists are probably planning the re-emergence of Solidarity and the creation of a quasi-social democratic government in Poland (a coalition of the Communist Party, the trade unions, and the churches) and political and economic reforms in the USSR for 1984 and afterward.”

Pages 349-350: “How will the Western German social democrats respond when the Communist regimes begin their ‘liberalization’ by making concessions on human rights, such as easing emigration, granting amnesty for the dissidents, or removing the Berlin Wall? One can expect that the Soviet agents of influence in Western Europe, drawing on these developments, will become more active.

It is more than likely that these cosmetic steps will be taken as genuine by the West and will trigger a reunification and neutralization of Western Germany and further collapse of NATO. The pressure on the United States for concessions on disarmament and accommodation with the Soviets will increase.

During this period there might be an extensive display of the fictional struggle for power in the Soviet leadership. One cannot exclude that at the next Party Congress or earlier, Andropov will be replaced by a younger leader with a more liberal image who will continue the so-called ‘liberalization’ more intensively…

In is not inconceivable that the Soviets will make concessions on Afghanistan in order to gain new strategic advantages.”

‘PERESTROIKA’, THE FINAL PHASE: ITS MAIN OBJECTIVES

‘The new method sees ‘perestroika’, not as a surprising and spontaneous change, but as the logical result of thirty years of preparation and as the next and final phase of the strategy: it sees it in a broader context than Soviet ‘openness’ has revealed.’

‘It sees it, not only as a renewal of Soviet society, but as a global strategic design for ‘restructuring’ the entire capitalist world.’

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Golitsyn further elaborates on overall Soviet/Red Chinese strategy in his book "Perestroika Deception" (1995):

‘The following strategic objectives of ‘perestroika’ may be distinguished:

For the USSR (a) ‘Restructuring’ and revitalization of the Soviet socialist economy through the incorporation of some elements of the market economy. (b) ‘Restructuring’ of the Stalinist regime into a form of ‘Communist democracy’ with an appearance of political pluralism [= ‘democratism’, or false democracy]. (c) ‘Reconsructing’ a repressive regime with a brutal face into an attractive socialist model with a human façade and seeming similarity to the Swedish social democratic system.’

For Eastern Europe

‘Economic and political ‘restructuring’ of the existing regimes into pseudo-social democratic models while preserving specific national historical features such as the strong Catholic Socialist tradition in Poland and the pre-war democratic tradition in Czechoslovakia.’

For Western Europe

(a) ‘Bringing about a new political alliance between the pseudo-social democratic regimes in the USSR and Eastern Europe and the Euro-Communist parties and genuine social democratic parties in Western Europe. (b) ‘Restructuring’ political and military blocs—NATO and the Warsaw Pact—and the creation of a singe ‘Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals’ incorporating a reunited, neutral Germany.’

For the main US alliances

(a) ‘Splitting the United States, Western Europe and Japan. (b) Dissolution of NATO and the US-Japan security pact, and the withdrawal of US troops from Western Europe and Japan.’

For Third World countries

‘The introduction and promotion of a new Soviet model with a mixed economy and a human face in Latin America, Africa and Asia through a joint campaign by the pseudo-social democratic regimes of the USSR and Eastern Europe and the genuine social democrats of Western Europe led by the Socialist International.’

For the United States

(a) ‘To neutralize the influence of the anti-Communist political right in the American political parties and to create favourable conditions for a victory of the radical left in the 1992 US presidential elections (In this context, Clinton’s stay with top Communists in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union during the latter part of the Vietnam war has profound and disturbing implications—TTS). (b) To ‘restructure’ the American military, political, economic and social status quo to accommodate greater convergence between the Soviet and American systems and the eventual creation of a single World Government.’

The paramount global objective

‘The paramount global objective of the strategy of ‘perestroika’ is to weaken and neutralize anti-Communist ideology and the influence of anti-Communists in political life in the United States, Western Europe and elsewhere—presenting them as anachronistic survivors of the Cold War, reactionaries and obstacles to ‘restructuring’ and peace. Anyone who warns about Moscow’s true objectives is automatically branded a ‘Cold Warrior’, even by people who have doubts about Moscow’s motives.’

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THE WORLDWIDE COMMUNIST FEDERATION (should they succeed…taken from Golitsyn’s book "New Lies For Old," 1984)

‘Integration of the Communist Bloc would follow the lines envisaged by Lenin when the Third Communist International was founded. That is to say, the Soviet Union and China would not absorb one another or other Communist states. All the countries of the European and Asiatic Communist zones, together with new Communist states in Europe and the Third World, would join a supranational economic and political Communist federation (this is precisely what the Soviets have in mind for the impending EU collective—TTS). Soviet-Albanian, Soviet-Yugoslav, and Soviet-Romanian disputes and ‘differences’ would be resolved in the wake, or possibly in advance of, Sino-Soviet reconciliation (Golitsyn goes to great lengths in previous chapters to show how the split between the Soviets and the Chinese was completely healed immediately after Stalin’s death…however, they continued the illusion of a split to dupe the West into backing alternating sides, depending on circumstances—TTS). The political, economic, military, diplomatic, and ideological cooperation between all the Communist states, at present partially concealed, would become clearly visible. There might even be public acknowledgment that the splits and disputes were long-term disinformation operations that had successfully deceived the “imperialist” powers. The effect on Western morale can be imagined’ (the Soviets have employed this tactic on numerous occasions—TTS).

‘In the new worldwide Communist federation the present different brands of Communism would disappear, to be replaced by a uniform, rigorous brand of Leninism. The process would be painful. Concessions made in the name of economic and political reform would be withdrawn. Religious and intellectual dissent would be suppressed. Nationalism and all other forms of genuine oppositions would be crushed. Those who had taken advantage of détente to establish friendly Western contacts would be rebuked or persecuted like those Soviet officers who worked with the Allies during the Second World War. In new Communist states—for example, in France, Italy, and the Third World—the “alienated classes” would be reeducated. Show trials of “imperialist agents” would be staged. Action would be taken against nationalist and social democratic leaders, party activists, former civil servants, officers, and priests. The last vestiges of private enterprise and ownership would be obliterated. Nationalization of industry, finance, and agriculture would be completed. In fact, all the totalitarian features familiar from the early stages of the Soviet revolution and the postwar Stalinist years in Eastern Europe might be expected to reappear, especially in those countries newly won for Communism. Unchallenged and unchallengeable, a true Communist monolith would dominate the world.’

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