Dresden was a lot of things. For example they had a lot of wounded soldiers there. For another, they had a lot of POWs there. For another, they had a lot of civilian refugees there.
Bomber Harris had his motives ~ and he kept them to himself.
Some analysts suggest bombing Dresden was a total waste of resources that could have been better used in taking out some of the railroads that led to the Nazi death camps.
Guess a lot of this stuff depends on your concerns.
Frankly, if we'd simply held off D-Day for a year, we'd had atom bombs and there'd been no need for an invasion. I have several relatives who'd have lived quite long lives without D-Day.
I suggest you read this official Air Force inquiry into the bombing of Dresden. It's short and very worthwhile.
https://www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/PopTopics/dresden.htm
It's conclusions:
- Dresden was a legitimate military target.
- Strategic objectives, of mutual importance to the Allies and the Russians, underlay the bombings of Dresden.
- The Russians requested that the Dresden area be bombed by Allied air forces.
- The Supreme Allied Commander, his Deputy Supreme Commander, and the key British and American operational air authorities recommended and ordered the bombing of Dresden.
- The Russians were officially informed by the Allies concerning the intended date of and the forces to be committed to the bombing of Dresden.
- The RAF Bomber Command employed 772 heavy bombers, 1477.7 tons of high explosive and 1181.6 tons of incendiary bombs, and American Eighth Air Force employed a total of 527 heavy bombers, 953.3 tons of high explosive and 294.3 tons of incendiary bombs, in the 14-15 February bombings of Dresden.
- The specific target objectives in the Dresden bombings were, for the RAF Bomber Command, the Dresden city area, including industrial plants, communications, military installations, and for the American Eighth Air Force, the Dresden Marshalling Yards and railway facilities.
- The immediate and actual consequences of the Dresden bombings were destruction or severe damage to at least 23 per cent of the city’s industrial buildings; severe damage to at least 56 per cent of the city’s non-industrial buildings (exclusive of dwellings); destruction or severe damage to at least 50 percent of the residential units in the city’s non-industrial buildings (exclusive of dwellings); destruction or severe damage to at least 50 percent of the residential units in the city, and at least some damage to 80 per cent of the city’s dwellings; the total disruption of the city as a major communications center, in consequence of destruction and damage inflicted on its railway facilities; and death to probably 25,000 persons and serious injury to probably 30,000 others, virtually all of these casualties being the result of the RAF area raid.
- The Dresden bombings were in no way a deviation from established bombing policies set forth in official bombing directives.
- The specific forces and means employed in the Dresden bombings were in keeping with the forces and means employed by the Allies in other aerial attacks on comparable targets in Germany.
- The Dresden bombings achieved the strategic objectives that underlay the attack and were of mutual importance to the Allies and the Russians.