Posted on 04/09/2005 12:23:55 PM PDT by quidnunc
An Oversimplified Overview of Undersea Cable Systems
Power on repeatered cables When repeaters are needed they must be powered. The standard approach is to send a constant current of about 1A from one end of the cable to the other, along a copper sheath, which lies outside the Fibers and inside the armour (if present). Each km of cable offers a resistance of some 0.7 ohm, and the voltage drop across each repeater is typically 40V (on four Fiber-pair cable), leading to a requirement of close to 10 KV across a typical 7500 km transatlantic crossing with 100 repeaters. In branched cable systems the power management becomes somewhat more complex, and the branching units incorporate very high reliability relays to cope with the power reconfiguration needed in case of repairs.
In a slightly different take, while moving and storing data rapidly is necessary, it is not sufficient. Where we fall very short is in the analysis end, where collected data often sits for days / month / years wanting for analysis and interpretation.
Can you imagine sorting through a data base of every cell phone call in a day in a metropolitan area. Given my reaction to being forced to listen to one unwanted cell phone call, I would go stark-raving mad trying to listen to a whole cities worth.
For that matter, I don't think one taps a fiber line like a conventional phone line. You can cut and splice fiber, but you can't apply a 'T' tap.
We've concentrated on tapping undersea cables for some time.
We used to take subs inshore to spy on cable transmissions as far back as when the USSR was still in existance.
Here's a short description of the USS Jimmy Carter and its capabilities, insofar as they're known publically.
http://www.deagel.com/pandora/?p=pm00116002
Within the same sheath. Parallel right next to the fiber itself.
Sad...but probably true.
Look at Paracel. Look at Mercury. Now think of how many BILLIONS the NSA can afford to spend on toys even more advanced than these. General-purpose speaker-independent speech recognition and sophisticated filtering are probably applied to EVERY phone call into and out of the Middle East.
"We" were also going to mine manganese nodules off the sea floor. I'm sure you know what they were actually fishing for.
The "noise" is not a problem wihen it comes to conventional voice calls. There are only so many international calls live at any one time. I have no inside information on how the NSA does it, but an educated guess would be:
Speaker recognition to identify calls by people they want to listen to. This eliminates the need for tapping specific lines (that's for those lAm3rz at FBI, at the NSA, they listen to wholesale quantities of traffic).
Speech recognition to turn calls into transcripts. They can apply many times the power of the most powerful PC to this task.
Lots of sophisticated filtering to find the interesting transcripts.
Lots of sophisticated filtering to find the interesting transcripts.
I saw a CIA analyst on a news show a few years ago. He explained that the problem almost always requires human interpretation. Evil people will never talk openly about their plans. They'll use ever-changing "street" lingo or say simple things like "did you receive your order as promised?" Stuff we all do every day. Plus for voice recognition, we'd need a sample. Do we even know what Zarqawi sounds like? I don't mean some scratchy tape, but well enough to feed a sample for voice-recognition over a 4kHz limited voice line? And you can bet Bin-Laden isn't giving direct orders. Ultra-heavy processing power is a great assist to those who need to protect us, but it still requires the "man on the ground" to keep the system fed with up to date information.
For speaker ID, you need a sample. For speech recognition, you don't.
There are not an overwhelming number of international calls. I'd bet there are no more than couple hundred lines in and out of Afghanistan - if that. Perhaps a couple thousand in and out of Iraq. We probably p0wneD Iraq's voice and data networks a few months before the war started, and we probably still monitor those networks closely.
Satellites have much lower capacity than the terrestrial phone network, and can be comprehensively tapped at the downlinks. VOIP calls are probably hard to monitor, and encrypted IMs are probably quite hard. But conventional voice calls between countries and within a few interesting countries are not too much to monitor.
this is, of course, known as "jimmying" the cable
The cables carry electricity to power repeaters.
Technology isn't good enough to shine the light in on one side of the ocean and see it on the other side without amplification in between.
Would you even need to "splice into" the electronics directly? Wouldn't there be enough RF leakage to pick it up just by parking an appropriate antenna next to the repeater?
If I had to lay money on it, I'd still bet that Bin-Laden was vaporized early in the war, and the CIA has been giving out orders in his name as a "sock puppet" in order to sucker in more terrorists. "Abdul, meet your contact at 123 Falafel Street at 11:00pm". Then poor Abdul "just happens" to get nabbed by the Marines as he pulls up to the parking lot. Of course, we have to put out a "Bin Laden" tape every few months to keep up appearances.
The body of the repeater is pretty heavy-duty metal, and any RFI that could be used to pick up the signal on the cable won't travel through salt water. Possibly possibly the power conductor in the cable could pick this up and carry it out of the repeater. Maybe something could be glued onto the cable?
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