NOTE ALSO SEN D'AMATO'S DISCUSSION RE THE SENATE'S ROLE IN CONFIRMATION HEARINGS!
From the senate confirmation hearings of Robert Gates to be director of CIA (November 5 1991)
Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, I rise today to express my strong support for the confirmation of Robert M. Gates as Director of Central Intelligence. I believe he is fully qualified for the position and will perform superbly as Director of Central Intelligence.
Having listened to the floor debate on this nomination both yesterday and today, I am moved to return to the basis for this body's judgment. On this point, I want to restate my views from the beginning of the Intelligence Committee's hearings on Bob Gates:
As Senators, we again face the question of what standard to employ to decide whether or not a President deserves confirmation of his nominee to a very important post in his Administration. In my view, the proper standard is that a nominee should be confirmed if he or she is qualified for the position for which he or she is nominated. The question of qualification should be decided upon the basis of the nominee's character, integrity, experience education, and past performance. A nominee should not be confirmed if substantial, credible disqualifying information is found.
What does this mean? Disqualifying information is not proof that the nominee holds policy or ideological positions contrary to mine. Neither is it evidence of small errors of judgment in personal or professional matters. It certainly is not evidence that a nominee took controversial positions in good faith on certain issues.
Disqualifying information is negative information that bears upon a nominee's character, integrity, or competence so strongly that, when weighed against the totality of the nominee's personality, career, and accomplishments, it casts serious doubt on the nominee's ability successfully to perform the duties of the office to which he has been nominated.
This is the standard I applied to the information the committee developed before, during, and after the hearings. I believe it is the correct standard to apply to any Presidential nomination.
So far in the debate on this nomination on the floor, I have heard many colleagues in opposition to Mr. Gates' confirmation implicitly put themselves in President Bush's shoes. With all due respect to my colleagues and friends who oppose this nomination, none of them are the President of the United States.
Article II, clause 2 of the United States Constitution provides that the President `* * * shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint * * * Officers of the United States. * * * The scope of the Senate's role has been clear since the early years of the Republic.
An 1837 opinion of the Attorney General states that `[t]he Senate cannot originate an appointment. Its constitutional action is confined to the simple affirmation or rejection of the President's nomination, and such nominations fail whenever it rejects them.' (3 Opps. Atty. Gen. 188)
My colleagues who oppose Bob Gates are free, and are entirely within their rights, to vote to reject him. However, when they advance arguments against him that, when reduced to their essential elements, consist of a personal or political judgment that they would not chose him to be DCI, they have crossed the line and usurped a role that the Constitution reserves to the President.
Mr. President, I believe that fairly applying the proper test leads to the clear conclusion that Bob Gates deserves the full support of this body. I call upon my colleagues to give Mr. Gates that support.
Now, I want to turn to one part of the controversy surrounding Mr. Gates' nomination on which I have special experience and expertise. That is the question of whether or not Bob Gates slanted the intelligence assessments concerning the May 1981 attempt by Mehmet Ali Agca to kill Pope John Paul II.
The question presented to the committee was not who was behind Agca's attempt to kill the Pope. The question was much more narrow: what involvement did Bob Gates have in the production of the 1983 and 1985 intelligence assessments?
On the broader, fundamental question, I remain convinced that Bulgaria ran the operation and that the Soviet Union provided, at the minimum, the instigation for the attack on the Pope. I came to that conclusion after personally traveling to Italy on several occasions and meeting with people who were at the forefront of the working investigations into the assassination attempt.
In February 1983 I traveled to Rome and met in person with the investigating magistrate, Ilario Martella. To my knowledge, no other U.S. official had such a meeting before me. I met with an Italian counterpart of mine who served on the parliamentary committee charged with oversight of the Italian intelligence services. I also met with a large number of other investigating magistrates, senior Italian officials, and United States officials at the Embassy in Rome.
I came away from this trip and my previous trips convinced that the CIA was officially ignoring, to a very large extent, the attempt on the Pope's life. Indeed, various CIA officers were telling the United States and international press that Agca was a crazed, lone gunman, or an enforcer for drug runners, or an assassin for the Turkish Grey Wolves, but that there was no evidence that he was working for the Bulgarians, much less the Soviets.
The Italian authorities asked me why the CIA was `beclouding' their investigation. That is the term they used, `beclouding,' and they meant that the CIA was casting doubt on the integrity, seriousness, and purpose of their efforts to get to the bottom of the issue.
I developed a number of hypotheses as to why this was happening, but until Mel Goodman testified, I did not fully appreciate the will to disbelieve evidence of Bulgarian and Soviet involvement that existed in the Directorate of Intelligence at the CIA. Mel Goodman came forward and charged Bob Gates with slanting intelligence on the papal assassination attempt. What he showed me, through his testimony and his responses to the testimony of persons who were actually involved in the production of the 1985 assessment, is that he represented a rock-hard core of people in the Directorate of Intelligence who refused to consider evidence that was contrary to their personal perspective on the Soviet Union.
Mr. President, at this point I ask unanimous consent that an op-ed by Claire Sterling that was published on page A18 in the Tuesday, November 5, 1991, edition of the Wall Street Journal, entitled `At CIA, Nobody Cares Who Shot the Pope,' be printed in the Record. This op-ed succinctly recounts the outside picture of the CIA's approach to the papal assassination attempt as seen by the person who is generally recognized as the preeminent scholar on this subject.
There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: [Page: S15945]
From the Wall Street Journal, Nov. 5, 1991 [FROM THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, NOV. 5, 1991]
At the CIA, Nobody Cares Who Shot the Pope (BY CLAIRE STERLING)
Before voting to confirm him as head of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Senate Intelligence Committee aired charges that Robert Gates forced the CIA to investigate allegations that the Soviet Union was responsible for the shooting of Pope John Paul II in 1981. I can reassure the committee that, if he tried, Mr. Gates was entirely unsuccessful.
Three Italian courts have expressed their moral conviction that Bulgaria's secret service was behind the Papal shooting: the Rome Court of Assizes in 1986, the Court of Appeals in 1987, and the Court of Cassation--Italy's Supreme Court--in 1988. The courts did not pronounce the three Bulgarian defendants guilty, but would not pronounce them innocent either. (They were acquitted `for insufficient evidence,' meaning anything but innocence in Italy. Whether through indifference or contempt, the CIA showed no interest in these proceedings from the start.)
The agency did not bother to get a copy of Mehmet Ali Agca's earliest confession (as its Rome station chief told Sen. Alfonse D'Amato, R., N.Y., in 1982). It did not try to obtain a later confession leading to the arrest of three Bulgarians. It did not call on investigating magistrate Ilario Martella to ask for or volunteer information of any sort. Nor, to my personal knowledge, did it rush to get a copy of the Italian prosecutor's report on Judge Martella's 20-month investigation--the first official document to reveal what the judge had found.
Well over a year before the Martella report appeared in 1984, the CIA had produced what purported to be a careful study of the case, concluding that there was no reason to believe the Russians were involved.
Its next careful study, in 1985, concluded that the Russians were involved after all, through their Bulgarian surrogates. But that had nothing to do with Judge Martella's lengthy indictment, or testimony in the spectacular trial getting under way by then. The grounds were said to be new information from a secret Italian agent, contradicting old information from a secret Bulgarian agent who had said the Bulgarians didn't do it.
The CIA's performance throughout the case was bewildering. Officially, the CIA wanted no part of it. The papal shooting was `an Italian matter, and it would be inappropriate for the United States to interfere,' a senior intelligence officer told the New York Times in February 1983. But the CIA did interfere, with repeated and distinctly inappropriate efforts to get Bulgaria off the hook.
Its leaks to the press from Washington and Rome began just weeks after the three Bulgarians' arrest. `On the basis of the evidence, the Bulgarian-Soviet link (to Agca) cannot be proved,' an unnamed intelligence analyst told the New York Times in December 1982, when nobody knew what the evidence was. Efforts to exonerate Bulgaria and the Russian followed in rapid succession, approaching the preposterous.
Unnamed intelligence analysts suggested that `the Bulgarian secret service hired [Agca] as an assassin or drug-trade enforcer, in an arrangement that had nothing to do with the pope or the Soviet Union.' Later, this suggestion ran, `when Mr. Agca found himself in Rome on a mission for the Bulgarian secret service, he independently plotted to kill the pope, without the support or knowledge of the Bulgarian authorities.'
An alternative theory, offered straightfaced to the Los Angeles Times, conceded on the CIA's behalf that the three Bulgarians were `known intelligence agents,' and that `officials of the Bulgarian government had advance knowledge of the assassination attempt.' While this was `a 99% certainty,' however, `the CIA is also convinced that neither the Bulgarians nor the Soviet Union instigated the attack,' the sources said
What seems to have stumped CIA analysts in all these years was an inability to comprehend why the Russians would want the pope dead. One faction apparently could think of no plausible motive (1983), while the possible motive finally offered in a revised policy paper (1985) strains belief. `The Soviets were reluctant to invade Poland' in 1981, `so they decided to demoralize [the Polish} opposition by killing the Polish pope,' was how it read.
Any Pole in Warsaw or Cracow could do better than that--and not just a Pole. The Kremlin's urgent need to be rid of this pope was unmistakenly clear by the time Agca set out from Bulgaria on his mission. He left Sofia on Aug. 31, 1981: the day Poland's communist rulers signed a formal contract with Solidarity in Gdansk. It was the first agreement in the history of worldwide communism to legitimize a free trade union and, seen in retrospect, the beginning of the dissolution of the Soviet empire.
There was no mistaking who was held responsible by the Kremlin. The pope had been a menace since his first visit to Poland in 1979, when he told a delirious crowd of 6 million that `No country should ever develop at the cost of enslavement, conquest, outrage, exploitation and death.' Solidarity was born in the Gdansk shipyards that winter, just six months after John Paul's unforgettable visit.
The Vatican was committing `innumerable acts of ideological sabotage'; was `training and sending propaganda specialists. . . and smuggling subversive literature' into socialist countries on a `vast scale'; had `inspired subversive activities in Poland' and furthered `the aggressive aims of imperialism' declared the Soviet review Polititcheskoye Samboobrazovanie. `Solidarity was not born of the disorders in the summer of 1980, but in the lap of the Church,' and the Soviet news agency Tass.
Discrening a motive here, so difficult for the CIA, was no problem for Italian judges in three successive courts. Though obliged to acquit `for lack of sufficient evidence,' the Appeals Court noted in its 150-page sentence `the fears induced by the election of a Slavic Pope; the social tensions in his native country; the recognition--for the first time in the contemporary history of the East European states--of a free Solidarity. . . . How can we rule out that [such factors] would induce certain forces to maintain that the assassination of His Holiness could block a political situation in evident, dreaded evolution?'
Upholding that sentence, Italy's supreme court said bluntly that the shooting was `planned for political ends by the Bulgarian secret services.'
It is probably too late for some senator to ask why Mr. Gates didn't mention this verdict in his own defense. [Page: S15946]
Mr. D'AMATO. Now, I want to take a few minutes to go through the charges against Mr. Gates concerning the papal assassination attempt intelligence assessments on a point-by-point basis. I hope this will assist my colleagues in understanding how thoroughly the attacks on Mr. Gates on this subject have been refuted.
Let me begin by refreshing everyone's recollection about the background of this issue:
[The following material was prepared by the committee's staff, whom I want to recognize for their tremendous efforts on this nomination:]
As DDI, Bob Gates approved the dissemination of an assessment in 1983 which concluded that attempt on the Pope's life `was probably not at the direct behest or with the foreknowledge of either the Soviets or Bulgarians.'
In December 1984, the CIA published another assessment related to this issue. The so-called `Cowey Report,' which is one of the `in-house' studies Mr. Goodman refers to states:
`Everyone involved in producing the third paper, `Bulgaria: Coping with the Papal Assassination Scandal' recalls that the explicit marching orders from the Office and DI level were to remain strictly neutral on the question of whether or not the Soviets or Bulgarians were involved. The paper does this scrupulously, dealing only with how the controversy is likely to affect Sophia's relations with the West and Moscow.'
By 1985 a variety of new information had come to light. A decision was therefore made to examine the hypothesis of Soviet involvement. The question which was then asked, quite legitimately, was `How plausible is the case for Soviet involvement in light of this new information?' That is the question the analysts were asked to examine in 1985 and that is the message explicitly conveyed in the title of the report `Agca's attempt to kill the Pope: The Case for Soviet Involvement.'
To the extent that there were any legitimate problems with this assessment, the blame is far more plausibly placed at the feet of Bill Casey. Bill Casey often spoke with the analysts involved; he reviewed drafts and commented on them. It was no secret that he was obsessed with the issue.
Mr. Goodman was not involved in the preparation of this assessment, so the only basis for his allegations is hearsay.
Now, let us go through the allegations, one by one:
(1) The assessment was `abominable.'
(-) `The assessment was abominable. The scenario that the drafters came up with was absurd.'
(+) The Cowey report states:
`The 1985 IA, a joint effort by OGI and SOVA, is the Agency's most comprehensive look at the case to date. By any standard, it is an impressive compilation of the facts and marshaling of the evidence and reasoning for Soviet involvement.'
(2) Gates pressured the analysts to implicate the Soviets
(-) `But I'll say one thing for the analysts. They did not give Bob Gates everything he wanted. In fact one of the three writers on this particular paper once said I tried my hardest to give Gates what he wanted and it still wasn't enough . . .'
(+) All of the individuals involved have submitted sworn statements indicating that Mr. Gates did not try to manipulate or pressure them in any way. For example on pg 112 of the report, Elizabeth Seeger, the principal author of the assessment, who is now a homemaker in Virginia, states:
`Mr. Gates never attempted to manipulate me or my analysis on the Papal case. He never told me what or how to investigate the case, nor did he tell me what to write or what conclusions to reach. He never expressed or even hinted at his own personal view on the question of alleged Soviet involvement, frequently characterizing himself as `agnostic' on the case . . . I can recall instances when Mr. Gates made specific efforts to ensure that the analysis was not misrepresented in any way. Prior to publication, for example, an individual on the seventh floor [probably Casey] urged that the paper's title be altered to strengthen the link between the assassination attempt and the Kremlin. Mr. Gates refused to change it. He clearly did not want the title to go beyond what the paper could honestly say.'
(3) The assessment was prepared in secret
(-) `But they were told to prepare this study in camera. In other words, this was secret analysis in the CIA.'
(+) Relevant excerpts from sworn statements in the Committee report refute this allegation:
David Cohen (pg 114): `It was not prepared in secret--or in camera--as alleged in earlier testimony . . . Normal procedures for review and coordination were observed.'
Kay Oliver (pg 113): `I would point out that it is not unusual for a paper dealing with sensitive reporting to be held closely.'
Elizabeth Seeger (pg 113): `Assertions by Mr. Goodman to the contrary, the study was not prepared secretly.'
Bob Gates (pg 113 of the transcript of Oct. 3, in response to a question on this issue from Senator Deconcini):
`I put a limit on the number of people that should be involved. I just told MacEachin to handle it on a close-hold basis. And that didn't indicate that people who should be involved should be excluded in any way, and those who were directly involved in the process have testified . . . that they went through the regular process of coordination.'
In addition, during his testimony Doug MacEachin identified valid reasons for trying to handle the issue discreetly: a) the human source reporting was extremely sensitive; and b) the US government wanted to avoid the appearance of trying to influence Agca's ongoing trial in Italy.
(4) Gates rewrote the key judgments and summary
(-) `So what did Bob Gates do? Bob Gates rewrote the key judgments. Bob Gates rewrote the summary.'
(+) Excerpts from sworn statements in the report:
Lance Haus (page 114):
`. . . Mr. Gates made no changes to the draft submitted to him other than fairly minor editorial ones. Indeed, I believe he also added a few additional caveats. His concern, if I remember correctly, was that we not go beyond where the intelligence information would carry us . . . Mr. Gates did not draft or redraft the key judgments--I did with help from Beth Seeger and Kay Oliver.'
Dave Cohen (page 114): `It has also been alleged that Mr. Gates rewrote the key judgments, rewrote the summary, and added his own cover not that no one saw. All of these allegations are false.'
(5) Gates dropped the scope note
(-) `Bob Gates dropped a very interesting scope note that said, in trying to explain the methodology, that we only looked at the case for involvement. We didn't look at any of the evidence--and I might add very good evidence from very sensitive sources--that would have explained the Soviets were not involved. He dropped that scope note.'
(+) Sworn statements in the Committee report refute the allegation:
Dave Cohen (pg 114): `The so-called scope note was an introductory paragraph appended to the SOVA contribution to the paper. Ms. Oliver for SOVA and Mr. Haus for OGI agreed between themselves that a scope note was not needed given the title of the paper.'
Lance Haus (pg 114): `Mr. Gates did not drop any scope note--I doubt he ever saw the prefatory paragraph eliminated after consultation with Kay Oliver, during my first review of the paper . . .'
(6) Gates falsely portrayed the study as `comprehensive'
(-) `The cover note, signed by Gates, termed the paper `comprehensive' but there was no reference in the cover note, the key judgments, or the summary that there were inconsistencies or anomalies in the argument.'
(+) The Cowey report states:
`The 1985 IA, a joint effort by OGI and SOVA, is the Agency's most comprehensive look at the case to date.'
Further, Kay Oliver points out in her rebuttal to the Hibbits report that the key judgments and summary do identify anomalies and `puzzling' questions:
`Key Judgments, p. iv: `Some elements of Agca's own testimony, Martella's evidence, and information provided by [deleted] remain inconsistent and open to alternative interpretations, and many questions may never be conclusively resolved.'
`Summary, p. viii: `A variety of gaps and inconsistencies in the available data remain, and some important pieces of information remain open to more than one interpretation.'
`This observation is preceded in the summary by a brief discussion of the Orlandi kidnaping and Agca's recantations--two of the anomalies that appear in the main test (see pages 20-21).'
Finally, it should be noted that Mr. Gates did not draft the cover note--although he did sign it. Lance Haus' statement acknowledging his authorship of the cover appears on pg 114 of the Committee report:
`Mr. Gates did not draft the transmittal notes--although he certainly reviewed them. Again, I did.'
(7) The Cowey report says Gates `manipulated' the analysts
(-) `Fortunately, two in-house studies were done . . . It concluded that the analysts were manipulated by Bob Gates.'
(+) Nowhere does the Cowey report (or any other report) accuse Mr. Gates of manipulating analysts or the process. There is a reference to the perception on the part of some in the DO that the authors were manipulated, but the validity of that allegation is not established and Bob Gates is not alleged to have been the culprit. In fact, the Cowey report says on pg 19:
`. . . despite the DDI's best efforts, there was a perception among analysts of upper level direction, which became more pronounced after the new evidence of Soviet complicity was acquired. In the event, however our interviews suggested that it was not so much DCI or DDI direction as it was an effort on the part of some DI managers at the next one or two layers down to be responsive to perceived DCI and DDI desires.'
(8) Gates added a misleading cover note
(-) `And what did he do. He added his own cover note that no on saw . . . This note said, and I quote, `this is the best balanced and most comprehensive work we have ever done on this subject.'
(+) The committee has obtained two copies of the cover memo, one addressed to Anne Armstrong of the PFIAB, and another addressed to the Vice President. The language is identical in both and the sentence quoted by Mr. Goodman is not present.
(9) Gates must have had a guilty conscience regarding the paper since within a few weeks of its dissemination he asked Mr. MacEachin to prepare a rebuttal and then subsequently established the Cowey panel to review the process.
(-) `Also, his motivation for an in-house study only several weeks after releasing the paper to the president (sic), vice president (sic), secretary of state (sic), secretary of defense (sic), and national security adviser (sic) remains open to questioning. Was Gates trying to prevent Casey from releasing the paper to others? Did Gates realize he was vulnerable about releasing such a polemical work? . . . Finally, why in the world would a controversial assessment that Gates had problems with be sent to such an influential audience?'
(+) It is important to note that the Cowey report was not an examination of the 1985 assessment--it was an examination of the entire analytical and reporting process from 1981 to 1985. This included an examination of two hardcover publications as well as the articles on the subject that appeared in serial publications.
In response to a question from Senator DeConcini pg 118 of the transcript of Oct. 3, Gates states:
`My problem was more on the overall agency handling of the attempted assassination and that's why the Cowey report really addressed, to a considerable extent, all of the work the Agency had done since 1981.'
Gates also said on pg 116 of the Oct. 3 hearing:
`And also I think I had probably picked up some of the unhappiness that there had been about some of the aspects of the coordination of the paper. So I asked them to go back and take a look at the whole thing and our whole treatment of the issue.'
It is much to Mr. Gates credit that he choose to confront and investigate these perceptions.
We do not know why Mr. Gates asked for the critique produced by Mr. Hibbits. It may have been because he heard some rumblings about the paper due to the polarization within the agency on this issue.
(10) The paper was improperly coordinated.
(-) The Cowey report strongly criticizes the 1985 assessment and states on page 14:
`As it turns out, the coordination process was essentially circumvented--in both the DI and the DO--by either the press of time or by actual circumvention of the chain of command. (In the case of the DO, the paper ended up being coordinated with the DDO [Clair George], and the SOVA analysts who reviewed the draft saw only the SOV input.'
(+) It may well be true that there were irregularities in the coordination process. There is no reason to conclude, however, that Gates was aware of these problems at the time the report was disseminated, however. In response to a question by Senator Boren, Gates says on page 76 of the transcript of Oct. 3:
`* * * I would add to that that when the paper came to me it was certainly represented as being fully coordinated within the Agency. So it would have represented the Agency's best view. Coordinated with the Directorate of Operations, coordinated with other offices in the Directorate of Intelligence. So when the paper came to me I was told that it was coordinated, I had every reason to believe that it did in fact represent the corporate view of the Agency.'
In addition, in their sworn statements, those most directly involved in the assessment dispute the Cowey report and maintain that the paper was properly coordinated. The following excerpts appear in the Committee report beginning on pg 113:
Beth Seeger: `No relevant offices or analysts were excluded from participating in the examination of the case or in the preparation of the final report * * *.'
Kay Oliver: `I can assure the Committee that the paper was coordinated by the Chief of the Regional Issue Group on OVA, and I believe by the Third World Division. Contrary to his claim, I do not believe that Mel Goodman himself was in a job that would have made him a natural person with whom to coordinate.'
Lance Haus: `* * * the paper was fully coordinated.'
(11) Gates should have sent the Cowey report to recipients of the 1985 assessment on the Pope.
(-) Opponents have suggested that after receiving the Cowey report, which was in some respects highly critical of the 1985 assessment on the attempt on the Pope's life, Gates should have either sent a copy of this document or some sort of disclaimer to those who had received the assessment on Soviet involvement in the attempt on the Pope's life.
(+) Gates makes clear in his responses to questions from Senator DeConcini, pages 116-131 of the transcript of Oct. 3, that he thought the 1985 assessment was a good report but that he was troubled by the process that had been in place for handling the issue since 1981. Hence, since he thought it was a solid report (which many others involved did as well--and do to this day) he had no reason to try to contact the recipients. At the same time, because of his concerns regarding the procedural problems highlighted in the Cowey report, Mr. Gates sent a copy of the report to the office directors involved and asked for their comments.
Q. `And then a month later [after dissemination] you decided you don't have that confidence I guess?'
Gates: `I had concerns about the process Senator.' (e.g. not the quality of the product)
Gates (also pg 121/Oct. 3): `I sent it to the office directors of the offices that had been involved in the preparation of the paper. I asked for their comments on it. And we addressed the problems of process that had been identified as being deficient. But the Cowey report also said, as I recall, that it was the most comprehensive effort on the problem yet done.'
McLaughlin (member of Cowey panel/from affidavit/pg 3):
`4. We gave our study to Mr. Gates on 12 July. He thanked us and praised the effort after reading it. I did not speak to Mr. Gates personally about the report, but one of my colleagues recalls him registering some shock at the extent of the problems we reported.'
`5. Mr. Gates sent the report to the three relevant Office Directors for comment. He also forwarded it to Mr. Casey and, I believe, to the Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.'
Seeger (pg 112 of the report): `The final report was a thorough and honest treatment of the subject. Indeed, even critics agreed it was well-done and comprehensive.'
Cohen (affidavit/pg 5): `The analysts were asked to assess the evidence of Soviet involvement in the assassination attempt and they did a terrific job.'
Haus (affidavit/pg 6): `Third, the analysis was balanced and sound, in my judgment, and anchored in the full body of information available on the case. The report we drafted accurately reflected Beth Seeger and Kay Oliver's best assessment of the facts and informed commentary by earlier analysts of the case . . . Indeed, I found the paper to be true to the information and convincing in its argument.'
(12) The paper did not examine alternative scenarios
(-) The assessment has been criticized for not examining alternative scenarios.
(+) Gates has acknowledged in retrospect that it probably should have. At the same time, the paper was deliberately and legitimately seeking an answer to a specific question: How plausible is the case for Soviet involvement? Based on the new evidence emerging in late 1984, there were compelling reasons to examine this hypothesis.
Cohen (affidavit/pgs 2-3):
`Directly or indirectly the study was initiated as a result of new information that was coming to us in late 1984 and early 1985, including information involving possible foreign involvement in the assassination attempt . . . the cumulative effect of the additional information meant we needed to take stock of what we knew regarding these possibilities.'
`There was a solid consensus among the senior managers as well as first line officers and analysts that the report should examine the plausibility of Soviet involvement in the assassination attempt . . . We agreed not to try to prove or disprove Soviet responsibility; the paper that emerged instead weighed the case for their involvement--what did we know or infer that pointed to their involvement. From my perspective as one of the senior managers in the Directorate of Intelligence responsible at that time for the Agency's analytic work on terrorism, this was a legitimate and responsible question to pursue. The Committee should be aware that at no time in the discussion did I or anyone above my level encourage or pressure anyone implicitly or explicitly to ignore any evidence regarding any aspects of the case.'
(13) Contrary evidence was suppressed
(-) `I might add that we did have evidence that the Soviets were not involved.'
(+) The Committee has never received any information from Mr. Goodman to substantiate this allegation. Further, as the comments from Ms. Seeger and others involved in the process make clear, they were given free rein to examine DO reporting and other sensitive material.
Seeger (Pg 112 of the report): `I wrote the assessment--with contributions from two SOVA analysts--after having examined all of the available evidence, and after levying requirements on the DO for additional information on the case . . .'
Haus (affidavit/pg): `She [Seeger] had access to all the information available in the Agency.'
(14) The assessment did not accurately reflect the views of those in either the DI or the DO
(-) The Cowey report states:
`. . . we found no one at the working level in either the DI or the DO--other than the two primary authors of the paper--who agreed with the thrust of the IA.'
(+)(a) There were very few people with access to the sensitive clandestine reporting that was the basis for the new assessment regarding Soviet complicity in the attempt on the Pope's life;
(b) There were few who had spent much time, as Beth Seeger, Kay Oliver, and Lance Haus had, carefully examining the issue. In fact, Beth Seeger was the official expert in the agency on this issue. She had the account.
(c) The Cowey report indicates that there were many on the other side of the issue who were not adequately willing to consider the possibility of Soviet involvement. Page 16 of the Cowey report states:
`With mindsets playing such a strong if not determining role in people's approach to this problem, we found that few minds changed as new evidence was obtained . . . Although we found no evidence in the DI of a conscious effort to excuse the Soviets or let them `off the hook' in this case, some of those interviewed perceived a reluctance to look at the `seamy underbelly of the (Soviet) beast,'
(d) As noted above at allegation #10, the paper was presented to Bob Gates as having been fully and properly coordinated. It should have reflected a consensus opinion. If it didn't, it at least accurately reflected the views of the Agency's dedicated analyst on the issue. [Page: S15948]
At this point, I want to turn to the issue of how the CIA will treat those who came forward, either in person or through written statements, on either side of this nomination. I said at the closing session of this hearing that it should be very clear that the intelligence community will oversee how these people are treated in the future. For our oversight process to be effective, people must not be subject to retribution--or reward--for the positions they took on this nomination. By coming forward, past and current CIA employees have aided us immeasurably in our work and made possible the full and thorough hearing process that we conducted.
Mr. President, I want to close by again expressing my enthusiastic support for the nominee and by urging my colleagues to give their advice and consent to his nomination.
I yield the floor.
I so miss Senator D'Amato - he was such a typical New Yorker, with his 'can you see through my act?' personality. He pretended to be a clown, that was his 'act,' he really knew his stuff.