Iran politics: US shifts ground in nuclear row

US hints of incentives for Iran to drop its nuclear development plans have, predictably, received short shrift in Tehran. However, the change in tone from the US indicates that Washington is prepared at least to give the European negotiations with Iran a chance to succeed, offering the prospect of an eventual reduction in US-Iranian tensions.

It is possible that Iran has already made up its mind to develop a nuclear weapons capability and no diplomatic approach can prevent it. However, there seems to be little chance that Iran will be swayed from its current course by sheer US threats. Direct US-Iranian political engagement may prove to be more productive.

For this to succeed requires, above all, the US to address Iran’s security concerns. Yet offering Iran security guarantees would require enormous political courage on the part of the Bush administration given the history of antagonism between the two countries over the past quarter of a century and powerful lobbies that would strongly oppose such a move. It would also require a reversal of the no-compromise approach to international affairs that has been a central feature of George W Bush’s presidency. Even if the US were to break taboos by offering a limited rapprochement stemming from security guarantees, there is no certainty that Iran would accept. The Iranian regime’s suspicions at US motives is deeply entrenched and the US’s word may well be an insufficient guarantee. The regime would also fear that giving up what it has repeatedly stated is an inalienable right would be seen as a sign weakness, both domestically (where it is unpopular) and abroad.

The Iranian regime would be better able to effect a dignified climb-down if a broad deal were offered. The so-called "grand bargain" envisages the US and Iran addressing all of the issues that blight their bilateral relations. Iran would give up its nuclear fuel programme, provide assurances that it will play a constructive role in Iraq and take steps to improve ties with Israel. In return the US would abolish bilateral trading sanctions as well as sanctions on foreign companies investing in Iran’s hydrocarbons industry, drop "regime change" from its lexicon with regard to Iran and, eventually, restore diplomatic relations.

This approach is at once bold and radical, but may appeal to Mr Bush for exactly that reason—that it would make his name in history, in the same way that President Richard Nixon oversaw rapprochement with China. But this gambit would be highly risky (essentially it would be seen as giving in), fraught with difficulties (it may fall through), and would be anathema to many of Mr Bush’s senior officials. Iran is reported to have made a proposal of this nature to the US in May 2003, but the administration never replied.

The Europeans, recognising their inability to resolve the crisis alone, have repeatedly appealed to the US to join the EU-Iranian negotiations. In late February, following President Bush’s first tour to Europe after his re-election, the US for the first time indicated it may alter its "stick only" approach when White House spokesman Scott McClellan said that President Bush was considering offering Iran incentives. It has emerged that the US has suggested that it would lift its objections to Iran beginning accession talks to the World Trade Organisation and would take small steps to ease the plight of Iran’s domestic air fleet, stricken by years of US sanctions.

There is little to indicate that this marks a fundamental change of US strategy. The incentives being discussed seem far too small to appeal to Iran. Instead, the decision may mark little more than a nod in the direction of improved transatlantic ties. The Europeans will have pressed the point to Mr Bush that there is some chance that Iran may soften its line on the nuclear issue following the presidential election in June--at which there is a substantial chance that former president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani will prevail. If anyone is able to moderate Iran’s stance it is the powerful yet pragmatic Mr Rafsanjani.

Small gestures of this kind made by the US may do enough to keep talks alive until the election--despite Iran’s assertion that it plans to resume uranium enrichment by June even if talks with the Europeans go well. The longer the dispute remains unresolved, though, the greater the US’s nervousness. There is no consensus on how far away Iran is from nuclear capability. Western intelligence agencies reportedly assess that Iran is some three to five years away from being able to develop nuclear warheads--provided it receives no external assistance. Israeli foreign minister Silvan Shalom in February put Iran at only six months away from acquiring the knowledge to put together a bomb. In the absence of proper knowledge, US government assessments are likely to err on the shorter rather than longer side.

If Iran goes for broke, the US will be left with two highly unattractive choices: taking direct pre-emptive action, or allowing Iran to become a nuclear power. There are three ways the US could take pre-emptive action: by supporting opposition elements and taking other covert steps to destabilise the regime; by military strikes targeting Iran’s nuclear programme; or by full-scale invasion. The first option would take too long to yield results, and may in any case prove ineffectual. The third seems highly unlikely as it would involve significant loss of US life and another major long-term military commitment in the region. Even if this were the administration’s favoured option, it would be difficult to effect in the near term given US military commitments elsewhere. If the US opts for pre-emptive action this would most likely centre around an aerial bombing campaign against Iran’s nuclear facilities. Yet this may well only delay rather than destroy Iran’s programme. Iran’s facilities are widely spread and some are buried deep underground. Whether the US could identify all aspects of the programme is also questionable, as intelligence may well be incomplete.

There would also be a high risk of Iranian retaliation and therefore escalation. Iran may respond directly against US interests in the region. To pre-empt this the US may be tempted to neutralise the Iranian airforce and missile capabilities during its original onslaught. Yet this would immediately be seen as an act of wider aggression, putting the conflict on a higher plane from the outset. Iran could also retaliate indirectly, via Hizbullah against Israel and by using its influence among elements of the Shia leadership in Iraq to foment unrest. Iran’s influence in Afghanistan is also considerable. Besides this, Iran has a considerable economic card to play: it may cut off oil exports, or even try to block the passage of oil out of the Gulf sending already high oil prices rocketing. This measure would clearly hurt Iran, but the regime may be prepared to gamble that the international community would blink first.

If the US concludes that these risks are too great, it will have to accept a nuclear-armed Iran. Iran would hope that, as with India and Pakistan, the matter would eventually fade, but the US would be loath to allow this. Instead it would probably exert considerable effort to isolate the Iranian regime economically--in particular by concerted efforts to target the vital hydrocarbons industry which accounts for about 80% of Iran’s exports and 50% of government revenue--and politically.

The US may support anti-regime elements and in general press for destabilisation in the hope that a popular movement eventually overthrows the regime and establishes a more accommodating government. Such efforts may only prove partially successful. Asian oil consumers are seeking to invest in Iran’s hydrocarbons industry as part of efforts to tie down long-term supply contracts. Even European and other states harbouring concerns about Iran’s ambitions may have a limited appetite for ostracising Iran--with oil prices high it is in the interests of all consuming countries to see output increase.

The US now appears to have come out more clearly in support of the EU efforts to negotiate a settlement that would entail Iran giving up its nuclear fuel activities and submitting to stringent verification. This remains an outside possibility. However, as the negotiations progress, Iran will have to make a careful calculation of the consequences should the talks break down. The next formal step would be referral to the UN Security Council. If this happens, it could mark the end of any chance for a negotiated settlement. Alternatively it could provide a last-ditch opportunity to achieve a diplomatic solution.

Despite the major attendant risks, US military action remains a distinct possibility if all other avenues appear to be exhausted. This outcome includes the possibility of Israel taking military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities should the US shy away from such action itself. Israel would face a difficult task logistically--while a US assault could be launched from nearby, Israeli aircraft would have to travel far further and their approach would be complicated by having to fly over Arab countries or Turkey, none of which would want to be seen supporting such a venture. Given the extensive nature of Iran’s programme, significant numbers of aircraft would be required, making it difficult to avoid detection--a feat the Israeli airforce achieved when it destroyed Iraq’s nuclear facilities at Osirak in 1981. In addition, so closely are the two states held in popular perceptions in the region that the US would probably be seen as complicit in any Israeli strikes--so if the US had decided on restraint, it would probably urge the same from its ally. Nonetheless, an Israeli strike remains possible. Israel feels existentially threatened by Iran, taking at face value Iran’s oft-repeated commitment to oppose the existence of the state of Israel.

The actual outcome might entail the US and the rest of the international community accepting that Iran will indeed become a nuclear power. It is based on the premise that the US will be unable or unwilling to deter Iran from pursuing its fuel programme through diplomatic means, but will judge that military action is too reckless a course. Iran would hope the matter would be quietly dropped from the international agenda. However, that is unlikely to occur. The US would push for Iran’s isolation politically and economically, support opposition elements and take any other steps that it thought could lead to a popular overthrow of the regime.

Actually, the analysis isn't bad except for the fact that it leaves out China's deal with Iran. China will buy Iran's oil no matter what kind of pressure we put on. It's a significant factor that I am surprised the Economist left out.

While I don't think the analysis is bad, I do think it is wrong: "It is based on the premise that the US will be unable or unwilling to deter Iran from pursuing its fuel programme through diplomatic means, but will judge that military action is too reckless a course."

To me, the far more reckless course is to allow the madmen running Iran to have nuclear weapons: I think we will take military action, and it will be sooner rather than later (but I have been saying this for months, so I have been wrong about the timing for a while now.)

"To me, the far more reckless course is to allow the madmen running Iran to have nuclear weapons: I think we will take military action, and it will be sooner rather than later (but I have been saying this for months, so I have been wrong about the timing for a while now.)"

When I hear about OPEC meetings this morning held in Iran it makes me doubt we will attack at all because of the direct and indirect effects it will have on our economy and our allies.

It is possible that Iran has already made up its mind to develop a nuclear weapons capability and no diplomatic approach can prevent it.

I'd give that about a 95% chance, myself.

The actual outcome might entail the US and the rest of the international community accepting that Iran will indeed become a nuclear power.

An approach consisting of "we'll buy you off while you continue your programs and then we'll accept the outcome later" is doomed to failure. And that does sum up the European approach.

To me, the far more reckless course is to allow the madmen running Iran to have nuclear weapons: I think we will take military action, and it will be sooner rather than later

I agree with your thoughts. It's at the forefront now. IMHO, as things continue to improve in Iraq and we still have our firepower there, we can continue the CIA's role of destablizing the regime there while fine-tuning the attack plans. Besides, we probably need to produce more "bunker busters" for this operation.

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