Experts: Putin's Ukrainian dilemma

UPI ^ | December 03, 2004 | Peter Lavelle

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MOSCOW, Dec. 3 (UPI) -- UPI's Russia analyst Peter Lavelle engages experts Nicolai N. Petro, Donald Jensen, Vlad Sobell, Janusz Bugajski, Dale Herspring, Patrick Armstrong and Ira Straus concerning the impact of Ukraine's political crisis on the Kremlin's geopolitical interests in the region.

UPI: It has been widely observed Russian President Vladimir Putin has experienced a tremendous public relations setback for his strong support of Viktor Yanukovych in Ukraine's presidential runoff election of Nov. 21. With each passing day, events in Ukraine favor opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko and the likelihood Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma will look for another regime candidate, dropping Yanukovych, to run in an extraordinary third vote.

Can Putin recover from what has almost universally been called the Kremlin's clumsy involvement in Ukraine's politics? On the one hand, Putin has made it clear Russia will recognize any candidate eventually elected. On the other, we see political luminaries such Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov in eastern Ukraine whipping up calls for greater regional autonomy. Are these elements of a duel strategy covering all bets depending in the outcome of Ukraine's political crisis?

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Nicolai N. Petro, professor of political science at the University of Rhode Island

The geopolitical realities of Ukraine are these: Three-quarters of Ukraine's gross domestic product growth comes from its eastern regions. Eight percent of Ukraine's oil and natural gas come from Russia. Most Ukrainians speaks Russian and retain a profound cultural and historical affinity with and sympathy for the Russian people.

The West's sudden interest in the outcome of these elections is driven by a media frenzy that is concerned far more with Putin than it is with Ukrainian reforms and democracy. How else does one explain that, while 90 percent voter tallies in the eastern Ukraine are portrayed as vote tampering, 90 percent voter tallies in the western Ukraine are treated with the circumspection of Caesar's wife who, as the saying goes, must remain above suspicion at all costs. The resultant hype and emotionalism seems to have blinded many analysts to the inescapable geopolitical realities.

So now what? Not having learned anything in Iraq, we seem to be once again running afoul of the Powell doctrine -- "if you break it, you bought it" -- because the West in fact has no intention of fulfilling its implicit promises.

There is no Western strategy for weaning the Ukrainian economy from its dependence on Russia. There is no serious prospect of Ukraine's joining NATO. There is, in fact, not even a serious prospect of continuing Ukraine's economic recovery except through closer economic integration with other Commonwealth of Independent States countries because the EU has no intention whatsoever of opening its well-guarded markets to cheap Ukrainian products and labor.

The Ukrainian electorate may not find this out in time to affect the current election, but it will certainly dawn on them later. Then, alas, in the wake of unfulfilled expectations will come the same bitter disillusionment with casual Western braggadocio that we are now witnessing in Russia.

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Donald Jensen, director of communications at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

The Ukraine crisis has dealt Vladimir Putin a seriously political blow, not just a public relations setback. Russia openly interfered in the internal affairs of a neighboring state by backing its preferred candidate in the Ukrainian elections -- Yanukovych, who is seen by most voters as opposed to democracy and the creation of a clear Ukrainian identity. Worse yet for the Kremlin, its man lost. Finally, Putin's support for Yanukovych publicly waffled after the exposure of the massive electoral fraud.

These events make Putin look weak, indecisive, and out of touch. It is not the first time that Russia has sought to export "managed democracy," but the first time it has so publicly backfired. (Russia's role in Ukraine, by the way, shows quite clearly the link between Russian domestic politics and its international behavior.)

Internationally, the crisis is a serious blow to Russian foreign policy. It has strained ties with the European Community and prompted new EU members such as Poland to lead the opposition to the Kremlin. There are signs that democratic opposition groups in Central Asia, where legislative election are scheduled in the coming months, will step up their opposition to the authoritarian regimes in that region. (Several Central Asian strongmen have close ties to the Kremlin.) In the United States, Russian interference in Ukraine has sharpened criticism of Putin in Congress, the media and the foreign policy establishment.

In Russia, the consequences appear mixed. On the one hand, the ferocity of the Kremlin's support for Yanukovych shows the extent to which it is concerned that the contagion of democracy will spread to Russia itself. On the other hand, popular passivity and the Kremlin's tight control of the media, among other factors, ensure that for now at least, no "Russian Yushchenko" is on the horizon to challenge Putin's rule.

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Vlad Sobell, senior economist at Daiwa Institute of Research, United Kingdom

Putin's involvement in Ukraine has been clumsy and counterproductive. Whatever reservations one has about Yushchenko, his camp has triggered a spontaneous, snowballing movement toward a more mature democracy, a popular revolt against both the oligarchic and Putin-style "managed" system.

This revolt is not directed against Russia, nor is it necessarily pro-Western, as Ukraine will not change its ethnic makeup and geography. It is above all an act of people empowerment, the product of Ukrainian political culture maturing along the European lines. Furthermore, the movement's dynamics are unifying rather than divisive: The intensified focus on Ukraine's ethnic and geographic fault line will likely have an unexpected by-product -- the assertion of the Ukrainians' common statehood.

Putin should have been shrewd enough to ally himself with this movement -- or at least remain neutral -- rather than actively opposing it. That might not have gone down well with Russia's nationalists, and it might have cost him some domestic support. But this is the only realistic strategy as his managerial methods and his paternalistic system will be rejected by most Ukrainians, even by some of the ethnic Russians.

Furthermore, one could argue that, insofar as Putin's regime is anti-oligarch, siding with a similarly minded Yushchenko movement would have been smarter than opposing this tide at any costs. Russia's prestige within the CIS and the West is best promoted by supporting the development of democracy, not by working against it.

Nevertheless, I am convinced that Putin's blunder is due not so much to his alleged authoritarian or neo-imperialist designs (as his critics conclude), as sheer inability to see through the fog of change. I see the explanation in stupidity, rather than devilish conspiracy. Putin's Kremlin has got most things right. But this time it has committed a costly and completely unnecessary mistake.

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Janusz Bugajski, director of the East Europe Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington

Moscow's central objective in Ukraine is to ensure a proxy government that will follow the Kremlin's foreign policy direction. Putin has several contingencies to achieve this goal. The first contingency failed dismally. Putin openly supported Yanukovych, calculating that the incumbent prime minister was more accommodating to Russia and more resistant to Western institutions. When it became obvious that Yanukovych's cohorts had defrauded the ballot and public protests escalated, Putin's agents employed a second option, the separatist ploy.

Kremlin envoys, including the mayor of Moscow, participated in meetings with regional leaders to raise the specter of partition. Anti-American propaganda funded by Russian advisers to Yanukovych is intended to divide Ukrainian society in preparation for a possible fracture similar to the Moldavian model. Transnistria's separatist war demonstrated that majority support or constitutional provisions are unnecessary to secede if local leaders possess key political, economic, media, and military instruments and are backed by a stronger neighbor. This strategy is designed to coerce Kiev while enabling Moscow to assume the role of mediator and ultimate guarantor of Ukrainian integrity and security.

In the third contingency, used in tandem with the separatist threat, Putin is seeking a completely new election that would disqualify Yushchenko and allow time for further political manipulation. If the opposition remains determined and the second round is rerun with Yushchenko victorious, Moscow may seek a tactical truce with Kiev. Through its political, economic, energy and security instruments Putin will calculate that sufficient control over the new Ukrainian government can be assured while steadily undercutting Yushchenko's Western aspirations.

Moscow would also maintain the threat of partition in reserve in case other pressures prove insufficient. The battle for Ukraine will then disappear from television screens but will continue in different guises. In his great power calculations, Putin will not easily surrender Ukraine to the West as he would then lose his credentials as the restorer of Russia's international power.

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Dale Herspring is professor of political science at Kansas State University and retired career diplomat

I think presenting Putin's domestic situation as a dichotomy between him and his opponents is a bit misleading. It is not a question of "either/or." The situation is much more complex. There is no doubt that many in Russia are upset about the situation in Ukraine, especially if it leads to the presidency of someone who is not clearly pro-Russian as was the case with Kuchma.

However, I would not overemphasize the importance of this purported opposition. With an approval rate hovering around 72 percent, I think Putin will survive the situation just as he has the movement away from the heavily socialized sector of human services to a more "pay as you go" approach.

I also think that those who suggest that Putin will lose Western support underestimate his diplomatic abilities. There is no doubt that the West and Russia are on different sides, and there is no question that Putin would prefer a pro-Russian, authoritarian leader if that is what it takes to keep Ukraine close to Russia. However, his past actions suggest that he will be careful to avoid a confrontation.

I need only recall the way he handled Russian-U.S. relations over Iraq, but also Moscow's ties to Germany and France. He made it clear to Bush that he opposed the Iraq war -- but unlike the French, he did not try to undercut American policy. Furthermore, while keeping good relations with the United States, he also maintained very good relations with Paris and Bonn. I have no doubt that he will work overtime to move Ukraine in a direction more favorable to Russia, coming up with one approach after another, but he will avoid a confrontation. If that means living with Yushchenko, I suspect that is what he will do.

Indeed, I have no doubt that as soon as Yushchenko is sworn in, he will be invited to visit Moscow, as Putin tries to make the best of a difficult situation. When it comes to diplomacy, we should have learned that Putin is far more sophisticated than his predecessors in pushing Russian national interests.

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Patrick Armstrong, defense analyst for the Canadian government

All statesmen eventually become trapped in a morass of sycophancy and tiredness and reach the limit of their possibilities. Whether one did or didn't like about what Putin did, one had to agree that he used to be pretty competent doing it. In his first term, he hardly put a foot wrong. But now we see a level of incompetence with the Yukos mess, the election in Abkhazia and the election in Ukraine. So something has changed: Either he has lost his former abilities or his advisers have changed.

Perhaps there is a parallel with his position on the Iraq war. His advisers evidently told him that the coalition attack would bog down, that Baghdad would be another Stalingrad and the attack would fail and Moscow would then be able to bail Washington out of the mess. All this stuff was visible on the Web site iraqwar.ru, which clearly was a GRU (Main Intelligence Department of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces) or ex-GRU construct. He seems to have come to understand that this was dud advice and "Argumenty i fakty" on April 15, 2003, reported that he had expressed displeasure over the General Staff's faulty forecasting.

Or maybe the Beslan atrocity reawakened his fears that Russia would be torn apart and those of his advisers who have always pushed the line that Russia is surrounded by enemies are able to play on his fears.

Or maybe he's now completely surrounded by toadies who tell him what they think he wants to hear.

Whatever the reason for this series of stumbles may be, it is to be hoped that this latest experience will make him turn away from advisers who drop him into a hole out of which he must then excavate himself.

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Ira Straus, U.S. coordinator of the Committee on Eastern Europe and Russia on NATO

Luzhkov has for years been free-lancing as an ethno-territorial nationalist. He is emotional about it, and has done things embarrassing to the government under Yeltsin as well. His support for the eastern Ukrainian secessionists reflects a suicidal Russian sentimentalism, probably not Putin policy.

While Yushchenko has to stick around to fight the central battles for a free election, Yanukovych and his followers seem free to run around the country organizing for secession. This is not clean stuff. In a democracy, one is supposed to be loyal to the results. Failing to congratulate the winner is considered extreme, not to mention falsifying the results, attempting coups, or threatening secession.

In 1860-1861, while Lincoln was taking over the White House peacefully, the outgoing Democratic administration seemed to be letting the southern secessionists get a start on organizing independent states politically and militarily. Kuchma and Yanukovych are doing the same, except they are actively participating in the effort, even while they formally oppose the idea of secession.

This risks civil war that would be terrible for Russia as well. Ukrainians see it as treason and see Russia as fueling it.

Putin has been on the wrong side of the issue in Ukraine and has been much too slow in backing off and switching horses. Perhaps he still hopes for Kuchma and Yaunkovych to triumph or force some kind of murky compromise on Yushchenko. He does not seem to realize how much resentment Russia is reaping for this, and how long it will have to pay for it. The policy has diminished Russian influence in Ukraine and strengthened every other influence, Polish included.

To save itself in Ukraine, Russia needs to take a dramatic, decisive new course: Make a deal directly with Yushchenko and pull the plug on Kuchma.