When losers are winners (Iraqi Elections Analysis)

Asia Times ^ | 15 Feb 2005 | Ehsan Ahrari

[Cornpone]

The less-than-spectacular victory of the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), which received 48% of provisional votes in the Iraqi elections of January 30, creates some problems for the expected dominant role of the Shi'ites in forming the transitional government. The Kurdish coalition, which received 26% of provisional votes, has demonstrated an impressive show of unity, but might suffer a setback because of its unrealistic demands for independence. Sunni participation has been low. In Anbar province, for example, turnout was reported to be less than 2%. Interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi's group garnered 13% of the vote. Still, the real "provisional" winners appear to be Sunni Arabs and insurgents, for different reasons. Now the ball is very much in the court of the UIA, not only to construct a unity government, but also to disallow the insurgents - the true enemies of democracy - from becoming victorious through bloodshed and mayhem.

The 8.5 million votes for the UIA is somewhat of a disappointing number. Even if the final tally were to raise that number by half a million or so votes, that alliance must think imaginatively about offering the other victors - the Kurds, the Allawi plank and even Sunni Arabs - a share in power. It will be some time before the modalities of Kurdish demands will finally emerge. In the meanwhile, a possible UIA and Allawi power-sharing arrangement would definitely mean that the Islamist demands of assigning Islam primacy in the new Iraq would either have to be lowered, or considerably neutralized.

Allawi is operating under two most discernable drives. The first is his own personal will to become prime minister in the new government, or at least be offered the position of foreign minister or defense minister. If he does not become premier, he will have to implement the policies of an Islamist-leaning prime minister. That would make it difficult for him to keep his own group intact. In addition, after serving as prime minister under the interim Iraqi government, he might find it difficult to remain a minor actor in terms of carrying out the policies of the new prime minister, even after obtaining the portfolio of either the defense or foreign ministry. The second drive that will be working on Allawi is from the American Embassy in Iraq, which will ceaselessly push him in the direction of secular policies.

Even after the expected emergence of the UIA as the dominant governing party, the administration of US President George W Bush will not give up its own drive to lower the potentials of the emergence of Islam as a primary force in the new Iraq. Despite the willingness of Allawi to remain the likely source of pushing the American agenda, by calling it his own, there are limitations on America's capabilities to influence him. At some point, he will have to recalibrate his association with the US, especially if he were to perceive it as an obstacle in the way of his political ambitions. For that reason alone, he will have to show at least some palpable semblance of independence from American influence in the coming months.

Another complication that the UIA will face is the growing maneuverability of Ahmad Chalabi. He was the golden boy of the Pentagon before and during the US invasion of Iraq. As such, he was successful in feeding a lot of lies and exaggerations to his American interlocutors about the purported weapons of mass destruction-related capabilities of Saddam Hussein, and the fictitious linkages between the Iraqi dictator and al-Qaeda prior to the US's invasion of Iraq. Even though it might never be proven conclusively whether Chalabi was fooling the neo-conservatives of the Bush administration or was merely telling them what they wanted to hear, so that some semblance of rationale could be developed for invading Iraq, Chalabi lost his credibility with the Americans because of his connections with Iran. In fact, as a remarkable demonstration of falling out, American forces raided his house last May, with the public explanation that they were seeking evidence of his alleged complicity in the leaking of secret information to Iran. Now, he is being courted once again by the Americans. Even that reality underscores how none of them - the UIA, the Americans, Allawi or Chalabi - are certain about their future courses of action in Iraq. The sad irony related to the awesome decision of the Bush administration to topple Saddam is that, today, America's choices are reduced to the UIA, Allawi, and Chalabi.

Let no one forget the Kurds and their role in the future of Iraq. However, even after winning 26% of provisional votes, their maneuverability might be limited, for at least two reasons. First, despite their perfunctory denials to the contrary, the Kurds really want an independent Kurdistan, which no other parties in Iraq - nor any Iraqi neighbors - want. That very reality limits their clout in Iraq, since no one wants its dismemberment solely to fulfill the parochial aspirations of the Kurds for a homeland. Second, now Kurds are reportedly posturing for the presidency, a position the UIA has every intention to use as a bargaining chip for re-engaging the Sunni Arabs.

The less-than-spectacular victory of the UIA might materialize into a reality that should be welcomed by the Americans. That reality would be assigning a lesser significance to the Sharia (Islamic) laws as a bargaining chip on the part of the UIA to engage the Kurdish and Allawi planks. Both groups would be happy if there is a palpable separation of religion and politics for the same reason. They want it because, aside from agreeing with such an arrangement, they envisage it as a means of remaining influential, especially if the Americans were to remain engaged in the post-election Iraq. Besides, as Chalabi and Allawi exhaust their respective capital by outmaneuvering each other to gain a major post in the new government, the Kurds envision themselves as a real power that the UIA must reckon with in order to establish a government.

Finally, the Sunni Arabs and insurgents have their own reasons to continue to believe the great American "philosopher" Yogi Berra's immortal words of wisdom: "It ain't over until it's over." The UIA is likely to remain focused on fully engaging the Sunni Arabs, both in writing the constitution and in governing Iraq, by offering them the presidency. At some point in the near future, it is possible that the Sunni Arabs will reconcile themselves with the less significant political role in the post-Saddam Iraq and start their own maneuverability for increased political power. The most visible side-effect of such a maneuvering might, once again, be the enhanced role of Islam in the future governance of Iraq, a variable that the Americans will be warily watching.

The unknown factor, at least for now, remains the role of Shi'ite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. He has let it be known that he will support whoever emerges as the dominant party in Iraq. The unstated assumption is that he is only thinking in terms of supporting the Shi'ite group. Still, Chalabi and the UIA are actively courting him. The litmus test for gaining Muqtada's support will be the willingness of the receiving party to be visibly anti-American. Chalabi might be attempting to persuade him in that regard behind-the-scenes; however, the UIA is likely to have an advantage over him as long as it maintains its visible pro-Islamic credentials.

In the meantime, the insurgency will continue its long-standing strategy of spreading chaos through a campaign of murder and mayhem. As nefarious as its activities are, now it will add another equally disgusting wrinkle of nullifying the will of the Iraqi people by attempting to assassinate elected officials. The most effective way to undermine this campaign is for the UIA to engage the Sunni Arabs as quickly and as meaningfully as possible. In this sense, even by not participating in the elections, the Sunnis of Iraq have not lost their important political status. If they are engaged, Iraq still has a decent chance of emerging as a moderate Islamic democracy.

Ehsan Ahrari, PhD, is an Alexandria, Virginia, US-based independent strategic analyst.

[jolie560]

imo--it's time for Allawi to step aside for awhile.