Posted on 02/15/2005 3:51:28 PM PST by TigerLikesRooster
Kim rains on 'Sunshine Policy'
By Jaewoo Choo
SEOUL - North Korea's announcement last week that it possesses nuclear weapons has dealt a devastating blow to South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun's government. Ever since entering the Blue House in 2003, Roh has vigorously pursued a lenient, and to an extent benign, policy toward the regime of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, even to the detriment of his own nation's half-century-old alliance with the United States. The South Korean president has on numerous occasions emphasized that his North Korea policy remains in line with that of his predecessor, Kim Dae-jung, known as the "Sunshine Policy" of openness and engagement with the North.
Will this policy shine as brightly for Roh as it as it did for Kim Dae-jung, crowning the latter with the Nobel Peace Prize? Will the continuation of the Sunshine Policy generate its intended consequences, inducing the North to emerge bereft of nuclear weapons, thus leading to the reunification of the two Koreas? Under the current circumstances, the prospects for sunshine for Roh of for the intended results do not seem to be bright at all. So what is causing Roh to pursue such a policy?
'Independent and autonomous'
In terms of strategy, rather than relying on a unilateral approach in inducing Pyongyang to change its position toward the South by pouring in economic and humanitarian aid, Roh's government claims to have adopted a pragmatic approach. Many South Korean people, however, are not too clear about what such an approach actually means. However, based on its endeavors thus far, we can make an educated guess that it means a persistent development of a friendly relationship with Pyongyang regardless of the nature of the troubles inflicted by that regime.
The consequences of Roh's pro-North Korea stance are vividly reflected in the fragility of the current US-South Korea alliance, and a rising lack of confidence and trust in Seoul by Washington. In addition, for the first time in more than a decade, Roh's government succeeded in renouncing North Korea as the "main enemy" in its recently published Defense White Paper. Furthermore, Roh and his aides are still working hard to forge an opportunity for high-level talks and/or a summit meeting with Pyongyang irrespective of what is regarded by many in the region as a "crisis" due to the North's unyielding nuclear ambitions and despite its declaration last week that it does indeed have nukes and is suspending participation in disarmament talks.
All this has been camouflaged by Roh's so-called "independent and autonomous" foreign policy. From this perspective, Roh's North Korea policy went far beyond the scope and range of what the original Sunshine Policy had intended. It shifted the fundamental orientation of the Sunshine Policy, taking sides with the North and China, while diverging from the United States.
Roh's government has struggled to remain consistent with its North-oriented policy. Such efforts have sometimes invited great controversy at home and abroad. En route to Chile to attend the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting last November, for instance, Roh delivered a controversial speech before a US audience in Los Angeles. In his speech, he explicitly stated his understanding that the North was pursuing nuclear weapons and long-range missiles for security reasons, in order to deter threats from the outside. His statement was in total congruence with Pyongyang's recent justification and rationale - security from a hostile United States - when it officially announced last Thursday that it possesses nuclear weapons. In his California speech Roh went further, expressing his opposition to any kind of sanctions against the North, implying his opposition to taking the case to the United Nations Security Council.
Whether his efforts will deflect the US from hardline measures (after official US statements about Pyongyang as an "outpost of tyranny" and the need for regime transformation) remains to be considered.
Despite Roh's recent emphasis on the importance of South Korea's relationship with the US in an attempt to mend the already fragile alliance, his words do not match his deeds. Although he reiterated the success of the six-party talks as a prerequisite of the summit meeting with Kim Jong-il, he is very much preoccupied by the goal of such a summit.
Quest for the summit
In the midst of the current "crisis", Roh's government is searching for every possible way to have Kim Jong-il accept the Russian invitation to attend the 60th anniversary of the Allied victory in World War II to be held in May in St Petersburg. The occasion is widely perceived to provide a natural opportunity for an inter-Korean summit. The prospect for this is very dim, however, because the North would not view the occasion with the same respect as either the South or Russia. The end of World War II is perceived by the North as a victory for the imperialists, in which Korea had no part. In other words, there is a lack of justification for Kim Jong-il to attend such a ceremony.
However, the efforts of Roh's government do not stop there. Last month at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, for instance, the minister of unification in his speech extended an invitation to Kim Jong-il to attend the APEC leaders' meeting to be held in November in Busan, South Korea. This month in Shenyang, China, a couple of South Korean national assemblymen in their roles as representatives of the Korean Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation, a non-governmental organization that was founded in 1998 for improving implementation of the Sunshine Policy, met the Northern representative of the same organization to discuss the possibility of co-hosting a celebration in August of the 60th anniversary of Korea's liberation. Although these national assemblymen were from an opposition party, their intentions and actions are provoking quite a debate in South Korea because their party has yet to join the organization officially, and they acted as individual members. Details of the proposed August event have not been revealed but there is speculation it would include an official meeting at the highest level, including the leaders of the two Koreas.
In addition, Roh's government has indicated continued support for the current inter-Korean economic cooperation, despite the North's rejection of the six-party talks for an indefinite period. Seoul has continued to insist that the current standoff will not affect the economic issues, emphasizing the humanitarian aspect of the South's economic assistance. Furthermore, it pledged continuing operation of South Korean companies in Gaeseong Industrial Complex across the border in North Korea, as well as more visits by South Korean tourists to Mount Geumgang in the North. The government's rhetoric is widely interpreted as indicating its wish to avoid offending Pyongyang, thereby keeping alive its hope to lay the ground for the summit meeting.
For Roh to realize his wish to meet with Kim Jong-il, he needs to find some good reasons and justifications for such a summit. Otherwise, meeting with a man perceived by most of the world as a tyrant - and one who has admitted possessing nuclear weapons to boot - would only backfire and undermine Roh's already low public support, which currently stands in the low-20% range. Roh, therefore, is becoming particularly edgy, as the clock is ticking to his disadvantage - he is already in his third year of a five-year presidency. If he does not handle the situation and his allies adroitly, his wish may never be fulfilled. This is not 2000 - George W Bush is not Bill Clinton and Roh Moo-hyun is simply not Kim Dae-jung.
Jaewoo Choo, PhD, is assistant professor in the School of International Relations and Area Studies, Kyung Hee University, South Korea.
He is a moron trying hard to look clever.
Ping!
They are false friends, and ungrateful to us for helping maintain their freedom.
And in my local Asian/Korean paper there was a big article extolling Roh and blasting Bush & Co for being anti-DPRK and anti-PRC. {sigh}
Are you in LA?
If Kim Il Jung has a Nuclear weapon he should prove it by having a test. I suggest he shove the bomb up his butt and light it off.
Strange, my mother reads the Korean paper where we are (CA) and she's found fairly positive articles on the US.
However, she read an editorial from a guy who visited Japan from Korea. He said he saw the news there in Japan, talking about all these positive stories and praising the US. In Korea, that is basically nonexistent. His view is that the Korean news agencies basically mimic the US ones (barf).
Neville Roh.
It's time to consider whether Kim Jong Il has managed to acquire an 'agent in place' in Seoul, right there in the Blue House. (as Bill Clinton sez "ahhh BLUE House? izzat where all da ho's are dawg? Gimme some of dat SEOUL food!!")
S. Korea is run by 'useful idiots' when she is at a critical juncture in her history. A bad timing.
I hate useful idiots more than hard-core commies.
Many suspects there are some. When Kim Jong-il regime finally falls, we may find out how many. I am betting against the odds that there is none.
I agree. Lets pull our troops out of the south and send the following clear messages:
1. Tell the crazy little squirrel in the north exactly what will happen to his air force and any troops he sends south once we finish with said air force.
2. Tell the crazy little squirrel in the north and his buddies in China exactly what will happen to North Korea if we detect so much as a single ballistic missile rising from the north.
3. Relay this information to our "friends" in the south and politely tell them there will be no ground support from the US and that they better prepare for the worse. Oh, and by the way, GO F**K YOURSELVES SIDEWAYS!
4. Keep a couple or three carrier battle groups in the general area at all times just to let all parties involved "feel the love".
Problem solved!
Well, it did end the Japanese occupation of Korea for one thing. And taking this position at a conference populated by Russians is one really good way to get stomped into a mudhole.
If we pull our troops out-like we ought to (and anchor a few bird farms within striking distance)- he'll meet Kim REAL soon- in SEOUL!
As Americans, we need to announce an acceleration and increased scope of troop withdrawal and redeployment south, in the name of "enhanced strategic and tactical flexibility in the face of North Korea's recent announcement", letting both the North and South Koreans stew about precisely what we mean by that expression.
John Valentine,
I Respectfully disagree. As much as it would be fun to let both parties involved stew in their own juices, I believe that sending a claer and consistent message is more important at this point. See my previous post. Besides, it would be nice, not to mention much cheaper, to redeploy those assets along our southern boarder.
Charlotte, NC. Not sure if the article (page 9, by something called John Feffer, author of "North Korea, South Korea: US Politics at Time of Crisis" -- Feffer is pretty clearly a hard core lefty -- as one Amazon reader put it, "This is an excellent book to read -- if you're starting it convinced that the North Korean government is well-meaning and misunderstood, the US is the Great Satan, and you want your ego stroked") reflects the publisher's view, or what's going on there exactly.
I'm sorry, but I cannot comprehend the significance of the distinction you are trying to draw. My suggestion IS consistent and incremental It is entirely appropriate. And it is not inconsistent with your desire to see these troops redeployed elsewhere.
He's so Roh-nery.
John Valentine,
My Distinction is this. The complete withdrawal of our troop from South Korea within a one year time frame would send two clear messages. The first is proof to the world that we have no interest in invading North Korea. Why they would need any such proof is a testament to the irrationality of the global liberal community.
Second, we would reap the duel benefits of securing our southern border and give us much needed financial relief by transferring the entire support mechanism for the troops brought home to the respective local communities.
The former is a clear message to first and second world nations that we will no longer foot the bill for their physical security. Relatively wealthy countries like South Korea will be forced to pay for their own security.
How is it that a pathetically poor and backward nation like North Korea can threaten their wealthy cousins to the south? I say that it's because we are acting as enablers.
All we really need to do is make it clear to China that we will not allow them to either overtly or covertly to support a military campaign initiated by North Korea. I do believe that we have ample financial leverage to do this.
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.