Well its CLEAR that Lord Nelson had a chart that showed this mountain.... bzzzzzzzzzzzt!
No, this does not pass the smell test does it? Seems to me you get one set of maps and those would be the official ones. How many people drive with two or three maps? I dont see how the navy can expect captains to do cartography and drive at the same time.
I also thought that they were running silent. So was there a sounding really or no? If so, did the sounding really show anything?
I have not made my mind up about this, but it does not seem like it should end this guys career.
The unstated risk is that we create a bunch of risk averse general mcclellands when a war breaks out.
"I also thought that they were running silent. So was there a sounding really or no? If so, did the sounding really show anything?"
The boat was reported doing 30 knots...at that speed you will be heard in Moscow; It's called cavitation.. you are not running silent...silent is slow - 8 knots or less...If he was running at speed, I don't think he would have heard the echo of his own sonar....he truely was flying blind and
totally relying on the charts....Two mistakes: relied on the charts (hard not to) and keeping the old ones to be found later........
It is unfortunate, but absolute trust in the captain is critical to Navy ships and their crews. When the soundings didn't agree with the charts, it was time for extra effort and caution. Failing to do this, he let down his crew and cost one man his life. Even if the Admiral's mast had not come to this conclusion, it is doubtful he could have effectively functioned in a command position in the future.
This should not take away from his actions after the fact. He behaved in the finest traditions of the US Navy and is, no doubt, a brave man. However, he knew going in that the job does not, and cannot, suffer mistakes.
I also thought that they were running silent. So was there a sounding really or no? If so, did the sounding really show anything?
I have not made my mind up about this, but it does not seem like it should end this guys career.
The unstated risk is that we create a bunch of risk averse general mcclellands when a war breaks out.
You said everything I was going to - To effectively end this guys career over this is simply wrong (and it encompasses a wrongheaded type philosophy).
He's screwed. The captain always takes the blame right or wrong. The cartographers are truly to blame here (except for the possible sounding which I hadn't heard of till now).
I drive with fifteen maps just in case< /sarcasm>
The charts don't matter (in this case), as long as they were up-to-date. What did him in as I explained in another post was the discrepancy between charted and actual depth.
It's not like the submarine force hasn't 'been there, done that' already! After Pearl Harbor, a few carriers and the Pacific sub force was all we had to prosecute war against Japan until we could rebuild our fleet.
I haven't got the exact figures handy but many sub skippers (maybe 30% or more?) were so risk-adverse they were canned or voluntarily gave up command for not being willing to risk their boats in attacking the enemy! Additionally torpedoes were so valuable (and scarce) at the time that they hadn't been thoroughly tested under war-like conditions. The guys there on the frontlines knoew the damn things weren't working properly and complained, but were ignored by the REMFs... until a commander on-scene made several test shots and proved they were faulty.
As an ex-sub sailor I'm afraid that we've returned to 'those far gone days of yesteryear' with regards to our present day nuke fleet. No skipper will be willing to think outside the box, because that'll be the end of his career. Pretty sad, because I think Kevin Mooney was one of our best.