Thanks. I didn't know that.
I'm just glad I didn't ask anyone why he couldn't see the mountain through the window. :-)
(Replica of a mid-19th-century wooden submarine)
Posted on 02/13/2005 10:23:15 AM PST by NCSteve
The captain of a submarine that hit a seamount Jan. 8 in the western Pacific Ocean, killing one crewman and seriously injuring 23 others, has been found guilty of operating the submarine unsafely and has been issued a letter of reprimand, effectively ending his career.
Cmdr. Kevin Mooney, the captain of the USS San Francisco, was permanently relieved as skipper after an administrative proceeding known as an admiral's mast. The proceeding was convened by an order of the commander of the Seventh Fleet, Vice Adm. Jonathan Greenert.
Cmdr. Ike N. Skelton, a spokesman for the Seventh Fleet in Yokosuka, Japan, said late Friday night that Greenert determined during the investigation that Mooney failed to follow “several critical navigational and voyage planning” standards.
“By not ensuring those standards were followed, Mooney hazarded the vessel,” Skelton said, reading from a statement issued by Greenert.
The mast concluded that Mooney's crew had access to charts that showed there might have been an underwater obstruction in the area, and that a sounding taken just minutes before the accident did not correlate with the charts that were in use at the time, which should have prompted him to be more cautious.
The news stunned several Navy sources who have been following the accident investigation, particularly because Mooney's actions after the accident were characterized as heroic by everyone familiar with the situation. Despite extensive damage to the ship, he and his crew got it to the surface and kept it floating long enough to limp back to its homeport of Apra Harbor, Guam.
The San Francisco was heading to Australia when it came to periscope depth a little more than 400 miles southwest of Guam to fix its position accurately. Minutes after diving, and while traveling at a high rate of speed, the submarine slammed into a seamount in an area where official Navy charts list 6,000 feet of water.
Other charts of the area, however, show muddy water in the area, which normally indicates shallowness, and other government agency charts show evidence of the seamount less than 150 feet below the surface. The grounding destroyed three of the four ballast tanks in the submarine's bow, shattered the sonar dome and smashed the sonar sphere. In addition, a bulkhead at the front end of the ship was buckled.
Machinist Mate 3rd Class Joseph Ashley was killed when he was thrown more than 20 feet and struck his head on a large pump. Almost two-dozen others were injured so badly they could not perform their duties, though they have all since been treated and released from the hospital in Guam. Seventy-five others received less severe injuries.
The crew saved the ship by constantly running a low pressure blower meant for only intermittent use to force water out of the badly damaged forward ballast tanks, as well as using exhaust from the ship's diesel motor to augment the blower.
Despite the force of the blow, the nuclear reactor and the ship's turbine generators continued to operate normally, and even sensitive electronic and navigation gear continued to function.
On Jan. 20, Mooney was reassigned to Submarine Squadron 15 in Guam, pending the results of an investigation to determine the cause of the sub's grounding. Cmdr. Andrew Hale, the squadron's deputy commander, assumed duties as captain of the San Francisco.
The mast means that Mooney will not face a more serious proceeding known as a court martial, but the letter of reprimand and the decision to relieve him of command “for cause” means that his promising career is over, the Navy sources said.
In a related development, Lt. Cmdr. Jeff A. Davis, a spokesman for the Pacific submarine force commander, said late Friday night that assessment of the damage to the San Francisco is proceeding and that shipyard workers in Guam are planning to make temporary repairs to the bow of the ship so it can be moved under its own power to a shipyard where it can be repaired.
Although the location where it will be repaired has not been determined, Navy sources said it would likely be Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, or Bangor, Wash.
“These temporary repairs will be engineered to ensure a successful transit,” Davis said. “As part of having on-hand materials for potential use in these temporary repairs, a large steel dome about 20 feet high and 20 feet in diameter will be arriving at Guam in the next few days. As of now, no decisions have been made about when USS San Francisco will depart Guam, where it will go, or what her final disposition will be.”
Other Navy sources said that if the assessment determines it makes sense to repair rather than scrap the San Francisco, the Navy will likely use the entire bow section from the recently decommissioned USS Atlanta to replace the badly damaged bow of the San Francisco.
Yes, it helps a lot. Thanks.
Attack subs never run on active in the open ocean (nor do boomers).
and what you point out from the article:
...a sounding taken just minutes before the accident did not correlate with the charts that were in use at the time,
Do not necessarily contradict. The other part of the statement about taking the sounding states:
The San Francisco was heading to Australia when it came to periscope depth a little more than 400 miles southwest of Guam to fix its position accurately.
at the point it took the sounding (yes, probably using sonar) it was not "running" but was at periscope depth, likely going very slowly or even at a dead stop for the position fix. (One ping only, Vasily).
The Captain was in error and should have noted the discrepancy between what his official Navy charts said and what his sounding told him. That was where he clearly failed to exercise due caution. However, he relied on the official Navy charts and thus ran into the previously unknown sea mount.
He is guilty of the charges against him and I have never questioned that.
He is at fault, but so is the Navy for having provided him faulty navigational charts and, even more so, for failing to acknowledge that fact in this verdict. They don't admit the problem they won't do anything to fix it. Further, they don't acknowledge the exemplary actions of the Captain and his crew following the collision and, thus, deprive the Navy of this man's skills in crew handling. I wouldn't want him running my boat or teaching how to navigate, but I would want him training my crew for handling emergencies.
Well, that's a very good question, too. And I wish I knew.
I understand how the Navy has to make someone responsible for such accidents, but it sure seems a shame that one man takes all the blame. I'd like to know more details about his access to accurate, up-to-date charts, or maps (or whatever the Navy calls them).
I just hope the man isn't taking all the blame if some of that blame should go to any of his higher-ups. He doesn't lose his retirement benefits, does he? I haven't been keeping up with this very well.
The issue of the charts is fairly easy to figure out (as an ex-navigator). On a large area chart you generally lay out your over all track. My guess is that is the one that they were using when they hit. On such a chart, not all hazards to navigation would be noted. But any prudent navigator would check the smaller area charts with the track for the specific areas you are transiting. Those are the charts that show local hazards to navigation and must be checked just for that. It appears they did not check them nor did they have them on the chart table for the CO or the OOD. Otherwise, no collision.
So they had the information, but just figured it to be an easy transit to Australia, and what possibly could be in the way with all that deep water on the large area chart. Also remember that the sub was a basket case and he was sent in to straighten it out. Too often, nuc skippers start with the plant, then ops, weps and admin while nav may be low on the list. Been there, done that.
The Navy did right. The CO got off easy. My guess is there are more axes to fall, especially the navigator.
Disappointed, yes. Stunned, no. Surprised, not at all.
Thanks. I didn't know that.
I'm just glad I didn't ask anyone why he couldn't see the mountain through the window. :-)
(Replica of a mid-19th-century wooden submarine)
Submarines have a number of different sonars, some active some passive. The "main" sonar suite on this particular boat is the AN/BQQ-5D. Pretty much useless for bottom soundings. The fathometer is an entirely separate piece of equipment, the AN/BQN-17.
I know that everything "nuclear" is always built with the highest standards of safety and performance in mind. That said, I am still impressed by how the reactor and propulsion system were still able to operate normally after the ship ran into a mountain doing 30 kts, and it is a testament to how dedicated the Navy is to reactor safety.
Don't they cut subs in half when they re-core the reactors? This shouldn't be all that different. I am somewhat surprised that the Navy doesn't de-comm the ship with the draw-down in the sub force and all. But de-commissioning a nuke vessel ain't cheap, either.
No, they don't cut them in half but it's been done before.
But they do cut into the hull plates, no?
I know that in other maritime construction -- cruise ships for example -- ships have been lengthened by adding a section. Don't mean to compare a nuke sub to a cruise ship, but merely that non-nuke shipyards have done this before.
Yes, they do that. As a matter of fact a submarine in overhaul gets quite a few hull cuts because there are plenty of pieces of equipment that are just too big to unship though a 31" hole.
There was at least one boomer that I know of that was converted into a prototype. Basically, a floating training platform. The missile deck was cut out and the forward and aft sections welded back together. Kinda neat.
Which reminds me, the first "Polaris" boat(s) were basically fast attacks, stretched by adding the missile section behind the sail, and that was in the days before computer-aided design and manufacturing.
A nuke sub runs soundless and undetectable at 30 kts (nearly 35 mph)? At what speed does the nuke sub become detectable? I have limited understanding of sound attenuation on nuke subs...for a number of years I was involved in development & manufacture of a product for the nuke subs that was designed to prevent the transfer of all vibrational "sound" to the hull during operation. Then our subs were quieter and less detectable than anything the Soviets had in their fleet. This is likely still true.
I'm amazed that they were able to get to the surface and then keep it on the surface. They may have been callous in some regards, but the damage control certainly did an outstanding job.
Passive sonar. right.
Why have there not been more incidents like this in 50 years? In blind man's bluff, we know about collisions with russian subs and lost H bombs off the coast of spain.
But nothing like this. The matter of charts should have been settled 30 years ago. There is just something missing here.
At the very least the captain could teach a lessons learned unit. I agree with you on that point.
Best explanation I have seen that makes sense.
I still say he gets his pension and a gig teaching 'dont let this happen to you'
You make good points. 'Decision Traps' is a book that should be read. We can expect more accidents if the navy does not fix its charts.
If it went down this way, then I guess the CO should have been spanked.
This is the post of the week.
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.