Not quite. We are certainly trying to improve our ability to fight OIF type conflicts...that is the root of the whole Rumsfeld transformation and the development of strategically mobile medium forces. And while we have not completely stopped preparing for bigger fights, I am worried we aren't necessarily doing the right things to prepare for that. I guess you could sum my objections in two ways: One, that we are putting too much emphasis on OIF type fights at the expense of bigger possible fights, and Two, that the things we are doing to prepare for the bigger fights are not necessarily the best things.
"willing to just get shaped"
Fair enough. They don't want to get shaped, but they are not designed equipped and prepared to fight an information age war. They weren't 'willing' to just get shaped, but they were almost completely helpless to stop it or to shape us.
I guess I could make the case that they were 'willing' to get shaped because they weren't willing to do the things at the procurement and developmental levels to stop it. That is not quite fair to the Iraqis because they really never did or could have developed that capability. Future opponents may have that capability, and they may avail themselves of it.
You talked about the Afghans (it is worth noting that the Taliban was not the Mujahadin...they didn't exist until both the Soviets and Afghan Communists fell) and the Iraqis and Iranians. None of those opponents fought an information age war. It is not at all surprising that an information age military can get inside and stay inside the OODA loop of militaries not designed for that fight. The Iran Iraq war more closely resembled WWII, or even WWI, than the way we fought against Iraq. It was more about weight of numbers and material to much greater extent than anything we would do today. We were able to simply manipulate things by giving the Iraqis intel about where the Iranians were massing for human waves attack, and selling Iranians some effective anti-tank missiles. They may have had some modern equipment and other trappings of modernity, but there was nothing truly modern about the way they fought. Either each other, or us.
You are right that we have demonstrated the ability to adapt what we do to very different circumstances. But we have not demonstrated our ability to fight someone else fighting our style of info-war. Nor have we thought long and hard about how we would fight a very different style of info-war.
Let me offer you a little better insight into my perspective.
I don't think I said we were sitting on our laurels doing nothing. I questioned whether we're doing the right things. For instance you talked about training against 3 to 1 Su-27s using western tactics. Are you training three to one because that is the most we can handle, or because that is what we really expect? Are western tactics really the best for the situation? Have the Chinese developed better tactics for numerical superiority?
Now, I am out of my league, but if I were the PLAAF I would not settle for 3-1. I would probably take a cue from the Soviets turning the tide in the air during WWII...some places and times would be denuded of air power, and other places at times would have massive numerical superiority. Fight the fights you can win, and don't fight the ones you can't. My understanding is that the Soviets had a similar plan for the air. Sometimes there wouldn't be much at all and other times they would surge huge numbers. I am not the expert to say that is the best way to do it, but my gut reaction would be that on 9 out of ten sorties I wouldn't give you anything to fight, and on that tenth flight, you'd face 12 or 15 to one. I know in Europe we tankers trained to fight 3 to 1 up to 5 to 1 in tank battles. The problems was that we were outnumbered 10 to 1.
I'm very interested in what happens when our air force faces Aegis quality SAMs. It will be indiciative of which needs the most improvement. But while Aegis is good, is that the way our enemies will fight?
Again, I am not expert, but it seems to me that AWACS play a tremendously important role in how we fight in the air. What are all the different ways they could try to blind us and screw up our coordination, and what do we do about it?
Excerpt to freepmail:
do you see any way we could defeat the Chinese military in a conventional conflict?
Yes. But it depends on how you define conventional. If we fight a material fight against their material fight we would lose. If we fight an info age war against their material fight, I think we would win. If we fight an info age war against their info age war...then it is a huge 'dunno' and that is probably the most likely scenario because we aren't going to fight the first, and they aren't going to fight the second.
I am getting the impression that the Army is envisioning massive troop movements as we engage the Chinese.
Yes. We may very well have to. Take a different scenario, the 'resource' war with PRC attacking north to seize the oil and other resources as well as 'lebensraum' of Siberia. We're helping the Russians (for whatever reason). If you have grand plans of stopping them with air power without large ground forces, I think you'll find an enemy tank on your runway long before you finish killing them all.
"Our greatest enemy is complacency." I can't vouch for the Army, but the assumption of the Air Force is that the enemy is good and getting better.
And I would call that complacency about our improvement. ;-)~
The assumption of the Navy prior to Pearl Harbor was that the Navy with the most powerful battleships would win.
Historical note...that isn't fair to the USN. There were definitely both BB and CX advocates in our navy. Indeed, the same thing in the Japanese Imperial navy. It is worth noting that the Japanese were the ones with the biggest battleships. It was a theoretical question that could really only be finally resolved in battle.
If the Army's game plan is ... with its current force structure (or with its current force structure times 2, or 3)
Well, I think that is the point of info-war. It allows us to punch very much above our material weight...so long as we win the info war. But I think there is a valid point there. I think the Army needs to carefully consider how it would scale itself up quickly and effectively. Again, history offers a model, although not an answer. During the early stages of its rearmament when Germany was still operating under caps of the Versailles treaty, it was both very effective as a small scale force, and ended up being very effective as a cadre for rapid expansion.
I can understand that, but take a look at what an OIF type fight entails. Before we crossed into Iraq, we had no certain idea of how the Iraqis would fight. We assumed they would use chemical or biological warfare, and perhaps even nuclear. We knew they had several divisions of very well trained and equipped Republican Guards, with some dug into defensive positions and others prepped for rapid transportation. We knew they had a well developed integrated air defense that protected their key cities. We knew they possessed an unknown number of long range ballistic missiles that could be fitted with a verity of warheads. And we knew that we had a limited timeline to accomplish our objectives before we lost what little support we were receiving from Arab states. In summary, on the drawing board, OIF was no cakewalk. If we use the same threat we faced in Iraq as the baseline for the threat we will face in future conflicts, we will cover almost every contingency out there with the exception of China or Korea. More on that later....
"they are not designed equipped and prepared to fight an information age war."
I agree completely. And now we are speaking the same language. Information age warfare implies something other than massive movements of industrial age weaponry. In its purest form, an information age war would be waged without firing a single shot. That implies an Army of technonerds sitting at computer consoles. Not vast numbers of armored vehicles or fighter aircraft.
"Are you training three to one because that is the most we can handle, or because that is what we really expect?"
For now, both.
"I were the PLAAF I would not settle for 3-1. I would probably take a cue from the Soviets turning the tide "
But I think you've shifted out of the mindset of information aged warfare here. You are back to industrial aged warfare. We are the world's leading information aged power. That is the strength we need to exploit. We have to assume the Chinese will always outnumber us, and we need to work around that. Not by trying to blow up all their weapons. That's old school. We need a system that renders them irrelevant. In Iraq, we shattered the communications network of an army that absolutely required a top down flow of communication to function. China has a similar Achilles heal to exploit.
"I'm very interested in what happens when our air force faces Aegis quality SAMs."
Here's a prediction...we die wholesale. And in an actual war we wouldn't be tasked to take out an Aegis quality cruiser. But in training, we need to simulate what the guys on the ships might see.
"If we fight an info age war against their material fight, I think we would win."
I agree completely.
"Take a different scenario, the 'resource' war with PRC attacking north to seize the oil and other resources as well as 'lebensraum' of Siberia."
Isn't there a book similar to that?
"If you have grand plans of stopping them with air power without large ground forces, I think you'll find an enemy tank on your runway long before you finish killing them all."
What if our airpower is hundreds of small, autonomously controlled, robotic aircraft that spread thousands of sensor fused munitions that are programed to seek out and destroy vehicles with a specific acoustic signature? That would certainly be more useful than 500 or 1000 F-22's.
If you haven't already read it, I highly recommend the book "War and Antiwar". It is written by the foremost experts (Alvin and Heidi Toffler) in the whole concept of information age warfare (they call it third wave warfare). It is an incredibly interesting book.