Posted on 02/07/2005 1:17:58 PM PST by Lukasz
MOSCOW. (Sergei Markedonov, an expert of the Institute of Political and Military Analysis, for RIA Novosti.)
Parliamentary elections are due in Moldova on March 6, 2005. In the wake of the "battle for Ukraine", the export of the "orange revolution" to Moldova tops the political agenda of Europe's poorest nation.
Only a month ago, Moldova's leading opposition party, the Christian Democrats (the former People's Front), made orange the color of its election campaign. Moldovan voters can get posters, calendars and photos featuring Yuri Roshka, the leader of the Christian-Democratic People's Party, with Viktor Yushchenko. Both Yuri Roshka and his close associates have announced their willingness to tread the Ukrainian path if the current authorities attempt to exert administrative pressure.
According to Igor Botsan, the director of the Moldovan association For Participatory Democracy, "the opposition parties realized quickly how symbols mobilize voters and borrowed this experience." The orange symbols of Christian Democrats have aroused the serious concern and irritation of the current regime. Vladimir Voronin, the republic's president, has already described the Christian Democrats' campaign as "an orange epidemic."
At first glance, all the signs of "a revolutionary situation" are evident in Moldova. As in other former Soviet republics that have experienced velvet revolutions, the main political battle line has been drawn between former Communists and National Democrats. However, the political palette of the republic is far more colorful and is not confined to the tough confrontation between the National Democrats and former Communists alone, unlike in Georgia and Ukraine. The centrists have real power in Moldova (the Democratic Moldova bloc), and are led by such influential politicians as Chisinau Mayor Serafim Urechean and a former prime minister, Dumitru Bragis. Their banners bear appeals to secede from the CIS. At the same time, they do notbelong to "Romanian patriots" either. Moreover, the centrists are far more prepared to put the Soviet past behind them than the Communist Party, which is currently in power.
Moldova is a parliamentary republic, and therefore its political struggle will not be so obviously bipolar as the case was in other former Soviet republics. Consequently, the revolution in Moldova will unfold within officials' offices, negotiations, and agreements rather than on the streets. In Chisinau, a compromise will mean far more than at the presidential elections in Ukraine. Political scientists might even think of an orange and lemon revolution (lemon is the color of the Moldova's centrists).
Unlike in Ukraine, Moldova has no pro-Russian forces. The Equality movement, which includes the Congress of Moldova's Russian Communities, is absolutely marginal. Hence, no confrontation between Russia and the West should be expected. The Kremlin does not have its own people in Moldova. It has long given up on Mr. Voronin as a pro-Russian politician. In 2001, the Communists won parliamentary elections after campaigning for a socially responsible policy, integration with Russia and leaving behind the extremes of the ethno-national self-determination period of the early 1990s. However, Mr. Voronin and the Communist Party leaders soon launched the nationalization process. Moldovan Communists quickly developed into sovereignty promoters defending national territorial integrity and ended up torpedoing the Russian plan for the Transdniester settlement (Dmitry Kozak's initiative).
Some statements and moves made by the Voronin team in relation to Transdniester are far more radical than the early 1990s slogans of the Moldovan People's Front. Mr. Voronin actively adheres to European integration and restraint of Russia's imperial ambitions (that are rather virtual in the case of Moldova). The Moldovan president is a consistent supporter of an international post-conflict settlement on the left bank of the Dniester. Hence, the EU and the US do not see Mr. Voronin as an enfant terrible like Leonid Kuchma or Alexander Lukashenko. The candidacy of Mr. Roshka who exploits nationalistic phraseology and promotes Anschluss with Romania, is not as pleasing for the West as Viktor Yushchenko was. As for the ethnic conflict on the Dniester, Mr. Voronin proceeds like a velvet revolutionary. Therefore, parliamentary elections will become a dispute between several pro-Westerners. Yet, Mr. Voronin's past is his main liability in the struggle for power.
Parliamentary elections as a way to form the authorities have led to the establishment of a political pendulum in Moldova. Four years later, the slogans of the Communist Party 2001 campaign are no longer popular. Therefore, anti-Communist forces may win due to the political pendulum's reverse movement rather than a revolution. The Voronin team has failed to live up to society's expectations. The time has come for other political forces. But it does not mean that a revolution should be expected.
All the political forces of the republic have managed to reach a consensus on the main Moldovan issue - the Transdniester problem. Communist Voronin, National Democrat Roshka, and centrist Urechean all see the future in a united Moldova with European peacekeepers, which means that both revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries will be fairly predictable after their triumph in March 2005.
March 6, 2005 will rather see a change of decorations than a revolution in Moldova. The republic made its civilized choice before the expected revolution, which is why an orange revolution in Chisinau is not politically motivated. The pro-Westerner Voronin will give way to the pro-Westerner Roshka (or pro-Westerner Urechean).
There are other objective reasons for Mr. Voronin's departure. Firstly, the young and nationalizing electorate wants to see a man who has no whiff of a communist past. Secondly, the law of a political pendulum that is rapidly swinging to the right dictates this. In these circumstances, it is important for the Voronin team to avoid the fatal mistake of interfering with the objective developments. If they do not interfere, the Communist leaders will oversee a civilized transfer of power through parliamentary elections. If not, the change of political decorations will be presented as a revolution. Whether it will be an orange or an orange-and-lemon revolution remains to be seen.
Moldova is the Paraguay of Eastern Europe. No Reason to exist except as a landlocked buffer state and so hopelessly insignificant noone really cares what kind of government they have.
Just a memory ping for how Lukasz and his EU troop supported a color revolution in Moldova, until the Communists became their friends...then it was off to steal an election.
Man you are really a joke. Lukasz says clearly in his own comment #1 that beating the communists is desirable, just like beating the Russians invaders out. Your every post is a lie and a smear.
Lukasz changed his tune rather quickly after the elections...another one of those facts you ignore.
Weren't you poo pooing Ria Novosti yesterday?
He also said Ria Novosti was propaganda, and then posted from it.
No, I know very well that this is state owned news agency. I think that if one has a brain, then he can use different kind of sources (not openly fascist or communist). Yesterday I exposed your hypocrisy. RIA Novosti it is good source, you can always Kremlin’s position.
Better to search the writier in such instances. If you feel the publication could be suspect.
Sergei Markedonov writes for a lot of places actually including Radio Free Europe occastionally.
I support letter FREEPERS know who put the news together when it was done with partial or full state backing.
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