The Infamous WMD Search: A View From the Inside - An Interview with Douglas Hanson

Douglas Hanson was a US Army cavalry reconnaissance officer for 20 years, and is a Gulf War I combat veteran. He has a background in radiation biology and physiology, and was an Atomic Demolitions Munitions (ADM) Security Officer, and a Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense Officer. As a civilian analyst, he has worked on stability and support operations in Bosnia, and helped develop a multi-service medical treatment manual for nuclear and radiological casualties. He was initially an operations officer in the operations/intelligence cell of the Requirements Coordination Office of the CPA, and was later assigned as the Chief of Staff of the Ministry of Science and Technology.

DH: I think it was the right thing. Keep in mind that the document exploitation center in Qatar still has a ton of papers to process, and a few ISG advisors will remain in Iraq. Duelfer’s report pretty much covered all of the key findings, including the oil-for-food scandal paper trail, which, if the Coalition had not intervened, would have put Saddam on the fast track to a robust WMD capability. Cost vs. benefit had already been exceeded, so they were correct in withdrawing most of their people.

I might add that contrary to major press reports, WMD were found. 155mm artillery projectiles with Sarin and mustard agent, and battlefield rockets with CW were found. These finds are ignored because they were old munitions from GW I. But the real issue is that they were still not accounted for in contravention of UN resolutions.

Duelfer’s report also confirms my analysis that Saddam retained an extensive regeneration capability in all areas of WMD - Chem, Bio, and Nuke. He was just waiting for inspections to end. Even David Kay said he was more dangerous then we thought.

RM: Why is it you focus on the suspicious nature of finds such as "pesticides" hidden in underground bunkers but Kay and Duelfer did not?

DH: I don’t know why they did not think it was significant. With the exception of one report, all of the encounters with these pesticides in ammo dumps were public knowledge. It doesn’t take a super-genius to figure out that this was more than coincidence. In fact, both the CIA and the DIA had arrived at the same conclusion in the 90s that Saddam continued to manufacture precursors under the guise of legitimate agricultural and industrial enterprises. This is just a guess, but perhaps they felt confident that they would stumble on the “big one” and so these finds were initially thought to be insignificant.

The other issue is that at virtually every one of these encounters, it seemed as if the Army and Marine chemical detection gear, including mass spectrometers, under the control of trained specialists, were showing positive for agents, while the ISG tests were showing negative. It’s possible, though highly unlikely, that the entire US ground force training regimen and equipment were at fault. That is, until the Danes found Iraqi mortar shells with a mysterious liquid in them that tested positive for mustard agent. Later, US “experts” said that it was not mustard agent. The Danish Army was at a loss in explaining this little discrepancy. Hey! Join the club!

Bottom line is that ultimately we found the mechanisms and materials to regenerate his WMD capability, and this confirms now-retired General Tommy Franks view on Saddam’s WMD. Franks describes it as having a disassembled pistol on the table with the magazine and ammo sitting next to it. All Saddam had to do was assemble it, load it, and then pull the trigger. It was only a matter of time, not the lack of means.

RM: Is there any good information indicating that Iraq's weapons of mass destruction are in Syria, Iran or Libya?

DH: There are reports with satellite photos out there somewhere that show truck convoys going into Syria. I certainly haven’t seen the photos, but it does make sense. Both the previous Iraqi regime and the current Syrian regime are Baathist, and we know that former Iraqi Baathist leaders are having a grand old time in Damascus with bucket loads of blood money. Of course, both nations were client states of the former Soviet Union, and when the Al-Qaqaa “missing” explosives story came up, it didn’t take long to remind the American people that evidence showed Russian advisors had seemingly assisted Saddam in moving the high explosives and WMD.

RM: How come the Duelfer and Kay Reports don't seem to make much of these reports? Wouldn't you think the Bush Administration would love to note these suspicious findings or to note intelligence indicating WMDs were moved outside of Iraq?

DH: Again, I’m speculating, but here are my thoughts. As far as the administration is concerned they have not been very good at communicating, or refuting, as the case may be, any of these reports even if they could possibly reinforce their case. But I would caution that the war has a very significant information operation aspect to it. So I wouldn’t jump to conclusions about any public disclosures by the Administration, Kay, or Duelfer. On the other hand, the reticence on everybody’s part may be due to the feelings that they all got burned to some degree on the usefulness of pre-war information.

DH: Technically they were very good, but outside of a small number of experienced field operators, I viewed the ones I encountered as being inside the beltway analytical types who were all of a sudden called out to prove their theories. Intelligence analysis for the sake of academic “what if” discussions and navigating the wickets to produce a strategic predictive product is all very necessary and has its place. But doing the field work while having to answer to an operational commander is quite a different animal. This is not meant to denigrate their efforts - a number of them lost their lives in service to their country. I think a better method would have been to attach ISG personnel to the combat divisions and regiments. In this way, the ISG could have made use of the units’ knowledge of their operational areas - the terrain, the enemy, the locals, the facilities, etc. Once suspected sites needed to be searched, or people questioned, then the units’ could provide the skills of Soldiers and Marines who actually do reconnaissance for a living. Once the search or interrogation was completed, then the intell cycle would continue and build upon previously gathered information.

RM: What issue do you feel is most important for the public to know about the inner politics and working of the Iraq Survey Group?

DH: I can’t comment on the internal politics, because I don’t know what they were. All I can do is comment on the group’s behavior and operations. My two articles on the actions of the ISG pretty well cover my observations. The only thing I can add is the comment of one of the other people in the Ministry of Science and Technology several months after I had left. It went something like: We should have been asking questions of the ISG, not the other way around. In other words, they appeared to be stepping into a situation that they had not prepared for in even a rudimentary fashion.

An example of their lack of planning and resident expertise was when they were forced to contract out for required personnel over nine months after the fall of Baghdad. One online defense related jobs service advertised in January of 2004 for the following positions in Iraq in a “potentially hostile environment:”

Biologist/BW Analyst Chemist/CW Analyst Research Analyst Senior Intel Analyst Underground Facilities Analyst

In the meantime, it was entirely possible that more biological seed agents, precursors, and dual use equipment was being moved out of, or within Iraq, or secured in a secret facility. In addition to this belated effort to obtain the required skills to conduct a rigorous search, the document exploitation center in Qatar was still getting its feet on the ground. I also have it on good authority that the multi-million dollar center was using an outmoded database system and was staffed with people not well-versed in document exploitation.

RM: Do you feel that the CIA is making a mistake by dismissing virtually all defectors even remotely connected to the Iraqi National Congress?

DH: That’s an excellent question, and extremely good timing given the latest adventures with Ahmad Chalabi. I don’t know the numbers they listened to, and the numbers they dismissed, but the CIA’s opposition to Chalabi and the INC goes back to the 90s in my opinion.

Back when the US was financing the INC in the Kurdish Northern No-fly Zone there was a distinct apathy to defectors with knowledge of WMD; Dr. Khidhir Hamza’s frustrating experience with them is a case in point. Another is that the CIA’s attempt to overthrow Saddam with the aid of a loose alliance of the INC, the Iraqi National Accord, and Kurdish rebels in 1995-6 had been thoroughly infiltrated by Saddam’s intelligence services. The attempt was defeated before it got off the ground, and while the CIA agents were bugging out, Saddam’s tanks rolled over our Kurdish allies without so much as a spitball thrown at them by US aircraft. CIA sour grapes? CIA bungling, so blame it on the INC? The CIA paying debts to their buddies in the INA? All very strange.

Fast forward to the reconstruction after the war, and the CIA was still dropping bones to discredit Chalabi. Just within the last few days, the New York Sun reported that Chalabi’s political life had been rejuvenated and he was in a position to be elected to an important leadership position. Just a few days later, however, a Reuters report says that the Iraqi interim defense minister will arrest Chalabi on the charge of “maligning the defense ministry.” Navigating the Byzantine world of Middle East politics and their tribal medieval honor system is very tough. I think the CIA basically made friends with the wrong people over a period of decades, and then got their ass kicked in 1996 by Saddam, and then the blame-game lasted into the next century. Again, that’s my opinion only.

RM: What was the attitude of the Iraqi people towards the Coalition when you were there?

DH: My experiences were generally that they were positive towards us or a neutral acceptance of our presence. However, this was before the full rise of the Baathist die-hards and Iranian mercenaries and other foreign terrorists. That’s not to say it was all hunky-dory. We were sustaining casualties virtually everyday, and the sad thing was that there seemed to be no coordinated effort at the Corps operational level to synthesize the intell and then go on the offense to root these guys out.

RM: What do you think of the theory that the intelligence provided by defectors was planted by Iran?

DH: I don’t think much of the theory, although it wouldn’t surprise me if that was the case since Iran has been outmaneuvering the US in the Central Region for over a decade. This theory, however, doesn’t make sense in the long run. Iran wanting Saddam taken out is one thing, but ending up with the Coalition on your back and front doorsteps presents them with another set of problems.

I always thought the suspicious trucks that were found, that exactly matched the mobile bioweapons labs in Secretary Powell's presentation to the UN, were never seriously followed up. The explanation that these were used for generating hydrogen for weather and barrage balloons was as preposterous as alleging they were ice cream trucks. Particularly suspicious was that when found these trucks had been recently thoroughly scoured with powerful disinfectants.

Key Quote:

Just found this thread. It was posted Friday, and while this weekend was dominated by other major news out of Iraq, I'm surprised there hasn't been more discussion on this thread. Mine is only the tenth comment.

I'm wondering....While I believe the whole story of the fate of Saddam's WMDs hasn't been told, I get the impression that most people, including those who support our effort in Iraq, have moved on. We were incessantly told by the Democrats, and their echo chamber in the mainstream media, that "Bush lied!" about the existence and hence the threat of Saddam's WMDs. They claimed that our inability to find "stockpiles" of WMDs in Iraq means that our rationale for going to war to topple Saddam was false. I strongly disagree with the naysayers, whom I believe are engaging in some unrefutted propaganda, but it increasingly appears that their objectives, even though false, are increasingly becoming irrelevant.

While I still think there is a major shoe to drop on the WMD issue, it looks like Saddam divested himself of all of his WMDs in advance of, and because of, our impending invasion. He could have saved himself a lot of grief had he told us this in advance of "Operation Iraqi Freedom."

But seeing those lines at the polling places in Iraq, seeing Iraqis dancing in the streets, seeing tears of joy on the faces of many, I'm inclined to say, "To heck with the WMDs" -- THIS is the reason we liberated Iraq. The biggest threat to this nation and the western world was not Saddam's WMDs, but the despair of people in the Middle East having to live under the jackboot of a fascistic oppressor. It's that hopelessness that has bred terror. Bush is right -- the best guarantee of the security of the US is the spread of freedom into the dark corners of the world.

I suspect there are still some major revelations yet to come regarding Saddam's WMDs. But in the end, they may be secondary to what we witnessed in Iraq this past weekend.

I don't recall that at all and I listen pretty carefully.

That being said, I don't picture any venue where the president could imply the weapons went to Syria or any other country. The press would be asking for proof and of course, aside from those videos, we have none.

Also, he's moved on. He'd like to find them and we have other sources to do that. But he's not going to let Syria or any other country know that we're hunting for them...in their country(ies).

I havne't found the Bush quote and have to leave for an appointment. However, by way of extension, this one is from Secretary Rice:
Rice: No Evidence Iraq Moved WMD to Syria
By Associated Press - January 9, 2004

WASHINGTON -- The United States has no credible evidence that Iraq moved weapons of mass destruction into Syria early last year before the U.S.-led war that drove Saddam Hussein from power, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice said Friday.

I recall posting on some recent thread that the most likely explanation for the President not pointing the finger at Syria (and likely not also pointing a finger at Russia for reports of its special forces helping to pack WMDs and related material for transit out of Iraq) is that the US is not prepared for the consequences of "outing" Syria. To make a claim that based upon intelligence (the reputation of which, right now, is in tatters, but that's another issue) we know that Syria received Saddam's WMDs, we'd better be prepared to do something about it. And maybe we've leveled that charge and the corresponding threat to Syria through private channels, rather than publicly. Perhaps we haven't come out with a public pronouncement because we have covert operations going on in Syria, and we don't want to blow that cover. Besides, as with the report of Russian cooperation to spirit away Saddam's WMDs, and as evidenced by Libya's abandonment of its nuclear weapons program (which may have been in cooperation with Saddam), there may be a whole rat's nest of connections between Syria and Saddam's WMD program and stockpile -- a rat's nest we're still in the process of assessing...we pull on one thread, and something else gets revealed.

There have been too many rumors (none of which have been formally rejected by the Administration) that Saddam's WMDs were moved out of Iraq before Operation Iraqi Freedom to indicate that there isn't something too these rumors. We have some tantalizing snippets of information about all of this, but nothing official or definitive. I believe that some day, the truth will out....and Bush will be vindicated. But as I posted earlier in this thread, the best validation for our policy in Iraq is what happened this past weekend. In many regards, all parties have kind of moved beyond the debate over WMDs, which is too bad, but it seems to be the fact.

That's an interesting quote from Condi, but the operative term there is "credible evidence." Her statement is a year old, and perhaps by now, we do have credible evidence, or are looking for it. At the very least, her comment doesn't acquit Syria or anyone else from the suspicion that they received WMDs from Saddam. I wouldn't be surprised if, inspite of Condi's comment, we've been looking for credible evidence.

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