[mark502inf]

So I see a high ratio of combat casualties ...not as some inherent weakness in and of itself

Agree with what you said. However, I don't think that was Scales's point. He's maintaining that:

1-The infantry is the most vital part of our military in the war on terror.

2-That our infantry, at only 6% of our force, is under-manned.

3-Most of our casualties are in the infantry.

4-That high casualties, constant combat, and consecutive deployments will break our existing infantry units; such as was exemplified in the post-Vietnam "hollow Army".

5-And therefore, we need more infantry units to ensure we can continue what promises to be a very long land-centric campaign in the war on terror.

[XJarhead]

The problem is that bringing additional divisions online and up to strength takes a lot of time. Even if you increase recruitment, you still need the cadre of NCO's and officers to staff it. And it takes years to create those guys.

The real question is whether we anticipate the current need for large numbers of infantrymen to continue for the next several years. Personally, I don't. I'd bet we'll have significantly fewer U.S. troops in Iraq by this time next year, and the number will continue to drop. The current manpower crunch will be easing significantly right about the time the first of those two divisions are coming on line.

[Yasotay]

A side note on Scales article, much of his theme seems to come from the book "A Perspective on Infantry" by a Canadian Infantry Officer named John English .... for the most part Scales is correct except for Desert One .... 'To the Everlasting lasting glory of the Infantry' ....