FYI, FWIW:
http://www.freeman.org/m_online/bodansky/beijing.htm
* The Strait of Malacca is one of the world's hottest and most crucial strategic choke points. It is considered by experts to be one of the ten most vulnerable objectives which neutralization by hostile forces not only will cause tremendous harm to the well being, perhaps very existence, of the economy of the West, but is also very easy to accomplish. Controlling the Strait of Malacca is presently a key strategic objective of the PRC to the point of risking armed conflict with the regional states and even the US.
* The Strait of Malacca dominates more than the commercial and economic life lines into and out of the rapidly expanding economies of East Asia. The global strategic growth and expansion of aspiring powers can be contained and regulated through the mere control over the movement of their naval forces through the Strait of Malacca.
* The case of the Islamist terrorism in and around the Strait of Malacca is extremely important not just because of the strategic ramification of the distabilization of such countries as the Philippines and Thailand. Taken together, this terrorism campaign is a classic case of the true meaning of state-sponsored terrorism. In this specific case, the Islamist subversion of several countries is intensified because of the strategic interests of a third party -- the PRC -- and, to a lesser extent, of its close allies. However, it is the close allies -- Pakistan and Iran -- who bear the brunt of the sponsorship of, and support for the terrorist escalation. They do so more because of the strategic calculations concerning the PRC than having vital interests in the Far East.
* The mere presence of operatives and terrorists of the sponsoring states in the ranks of the local organizations legitimizes and sanctifies the close cooperation in what is essentially the furthering of the global strategic interest of the PRC and the Trans-Asian Axis (of which the Islamists are a major component). As will be discussed below, one of the outcomes of this state-sponsored escalation is the consolidation of a major forward base for exporting Islamist terrorism into the United States itself.
* The younger "Fourth Generation" of Chinese leaders come to power assertive and self-confident about a very strong China. They are committed to "renewing China," which, according to Wang Jisi of the Chinese Academy of Social Science, means building "a politically, economically and culturally unified nation-state when foreign and largely Western influences are seen as eroding the nation-state's very foundation." The young leaders are preoccupied with finding for their China the appropriate place at the top of world affairs -- a dominant power leading the Trans Asian Axis on land and surging into the southern oceans. These up and coming military leaders have already defined their political theories justifying China's inevitable expansionist surge. "The military has no interest in war, but they have an interest in a permanent state of instability in the region" if only "for ensuring their irrefutable place in the power structure," argues a former Beijing-based diplomat. Indeed, in early November 1995, Hong Kong based experts warn that "China's neighbours fear a growing assertiveness on territorial claims, especially in the South China Sea."
* These are not unfounded fears. Back in early 1995, Lt.Col. Cui Yu Chen at the Research Office of the Chengdu Military Region authored a book called A New Scramble for Soft Frontiers which reflects the thinking of the PLA's elite about the PRC's national interests and spheres of influence. Lt.Col. Cui Yu Chen distinguishes between the reaches of a state's hegemony and influence -- which he defines as "soft frontiers" -- and the limits of state sovereignty by "geographic frontiers." He stresses the difference between the two concepts. "Expansion of frontiers is the driving force of human history. Changes in soft frontiers often precede achievements in technology, culture and other areas. While geographic frontiers are fixed, soft frontiers are variable." What Cui means is that before the PRC can leap forward technologically, economically and culturally to become the global power it deserves to be, it must expand its "soft frontiers" through a hegemonic surge.
* The younger leaders in Beijing are convinced that the near future provides a historic window of opportunity for such an expansionist and hegemony-consolidating surge. In the spring of 1995, in a conference in Bangkok, a Chinese scholar named Chen Qimao delivered a paper that amounted to presenting Beijing's view of the strategic future of the Asia-Pacific region. Chen explained that the "relative decline of America's economic strength" means that the "heyday of US hegemony has gone."
* By the summer of 1995, Beijing already resigned itself to the fact that irrespective of the posture of Sino-US economic relations and political rhetoric, the respective national and vital strategic interests were conflicting and essentially irreconcilable. Therefore, there is no escape from continued deterioration of US-Sino relations to the point of adverse impact on national security posture. Beijing resolved to center the overt component of Sino-US relations on economic issues for as long as it is advisable to postpone confrontation. Li Zhongcheng, a leading Chinese expert on US-Sino relations explained the inherent contradiction in this approach:
** "The Sino-US relations have entered a new phase where economics holds the central stage and where the bilateral relationship moves in a zigzag pattern as the two countries desire cooperation with one another and, at the same time, tend to antagonize each other. The bilateral relationship, however, will face a new period of difficulties in the future. On the one hand, the United States of America is now the only superpower in the world; on the other, China is emerging to be the largest developing country. Having completely different social systems, even though the two countries share common economic, political, and security interests, they also differ in their policy goals, which leads to a complicated situation where the two countries want dialogue and cooperation with one another but also tend to contradict and antagonize each other."
* The multitude of potential threats and the lingering possibility of an active US resistance to the PRC's global ascent convinced Beijing that only a proactive strategy might ensure the PRC's ability to realize its national potential and prevail in the next 15 years. Beijing's approach to the post-cold war security strategy stresses active confrontation with a US-inspired containment strategy. "The rapid expansion of China's overall power after the Cold War has caused widespread concern around the world. For their own respective reasons, politicians everywhere have been pondering a single question: Will a resurgent China adopt an expansionist foreign policy? Since 1992 the 'China peril' theory has gained currency among China hands world-wide." At the same time, Beijing stresses that there are unique opportunities for the PRC to surge strategically. "It [Russia] has neither the will nor the power to expand its sphere of influence in Asia. As for the United States, its power has declined in relative terms and isolationism is on the upswing at home where political forces opposed to US involvement in overseas military conflicts are getting stronger by the day." It is therefore imperative for Beijing to overcome its apprehensions about growing external threats and self-restraining circumstances, and act resolutely and boldly.
* What the PRC now calls "the active defense strategy" amounts to a spread of regional hegemony based on the presence of military might, long-range military intervention and power projection capabilities, and the creation of conducive political environment, namely, the eviction of hostile Western powers, mainly the US, from East Asia.
* In October 1995, Beijing returned to examining the role and position of the United States in this vision of the future. Beijing concluded that while the US will remain a central and focal player in the evolving strategic dynamics, there is a limit to what the US could do to the PRC even in cases of a major strategic setback for the US. Beijing's threat analysis now stressed that "the United States does not have the power to encircle and contain China." The main challenge ahead, Beijing reasoned, is the Sino-US struggle for regional hegemony. "If US relations with China deteriorate and Washington adopts Cold War tactics to contain Beijing, both China and the United States will have to seek supporters from Asia to start a fierce diplomatic contention, and it is not certain that the United States will be the victor!"
* Consequently, Beijing is increasingly tempted to assume the middle way -- conduct an incremental, though resolute, escalation; to sustain the strategic push through a myriad of means short of a major war -- terrorism, subversion, raw pressure, etc. The aggregate impact of such a posture can be of global strategic significance. Moreover, Beijing is convinced that by the time the PRC is in a position to exert real pressure for tangible strategic gains, the countries surrounding the Strait of Malacca will have been either overtaken by, or thoroughly subverted and terrorized by, the PRC's Islamist allies. Incapable of calling in on the US to save them, for fear of untenable domestic ramifications, these governments will succumb to Beijing's pressure and the PRC will be in a position to consolidate its hegemony even through the use of incomplete and somewhat backward military forces.
YUP.