SOURCE: Albert Taylor Bledsoe, Is Davis a Traitor?, 1866, Reprint 1907, pp. 194-204. (Also printed as The War Between the States in 1915)
The embargo and non-intercourse laws, which were designed to bring England to terms without the dire necessity of war, augmented the already great dissatisfaction of New England; because they affected her commercial interests, and thereby "touched her in by the most sensitive portion of her frame. She cried aloud for war! She cried, down with all your embargo and non-intercourse laws, and up with the flag of armed resistance! Impatient at the slow movements of the South, she taunted her with cowardice, and courteously as well as elegantly declared, that the South could not be "kicked into a war with England. But she was mistaken; she did not fully comprehend the South: the South is, perhaps, too easily "kicked into a war with England." It is certain, that the South in the persons of her two young, ardent, enthusiastic, and chivalrous representatives, Henry Clay, of Kentucky, and John C. Calhoun, of South Carolina, responded to the loud, vehement war-cry of New England. Their eloquence shook the nation. The spirit of armed resistance was roused; and the war with Great Britain proclaimed. But, alas! this did not help the commerce of New England. The remedy proved worse than the evil. Her ravenous pockets, instead of being filled with gold and satisfied, became still more and more alive to the dreadful state of things, and, thereupon, she endeavored to "kick the Southout of the war with Great Britain. In this, the dark hour of her agony and distress, she suddenly discovered that war is; at best, a most unholy and unchristian thing: not to be entered on lightly, or without counting the cost. She also discovered, that, after all, the number of her seamen, impressed by the tyranny of Great Britain, had been greatly exaggerated (by whom?): and that consequently the cause of quarrel was far too small to justify so unholy and so unchristian, that is to say, so unprofitable a war.
In the dark hour of her distress, the glorious rights of the States came out, and showered down their radiance on all New England, like the stars at night. The sovereignty of her own beloved Massachusetts, indeed, then totally eclipsed the full moon of the once "glorious Union;" just as completely as if Massachusetts had been "the whole earth." I speak from the record; from that secret, silent record of the Hartford Convention, in which all the profound dissatisfaction of New England with the Union culminated; and into which her sons, in spite of all their prying curiosity, have no desire whatever to look. Mr. Webster, for example, in his great debate with Mr. Hayne, of South Carolina, in 1830, solemnly declared that he had never read the proceedings of that famous Convention. No wonder!
Where ignorance is bliss, 'tis folly to be wise.
"Events may prove, says the Journal of the Hartford Convention, January 4th, 1815, "that the causes of our calamities are deep and permanent. They may be found to proceed, not merely from blindness of prejudice, pride of opinion, violence of party spirit, or the confusion of the times; but they may be traced to implacable combinations of individuals, OR OF STATES, to monopolize power and office, and to trample without remorse upon the rights and interests of the commercial sections of the Union." [1] Now, if we only substitute the term agricultural for commercial in the above passage; how admirably will it express the complaint of the South, which, for long years of endurance, was treated with such imperial scorn and implacable contempt by the States of New England!
"Whenever it shall appear," continues the Journal, "that these causes are radical and permanent, a separation by equitable arrangement, will be preferable to an ALLIANCE BY CONSTRAINT, AMONG NOMINAL FRIENDS, BUT REAL ENEMIES, INFLAMED BY MUTUAL HATRED AND JEALOUSIES, AND INVITING, BY INTESTINE DIVISIONS, CONTEMPT AND AGGRESSIONS from ABROAD. [2] Precisely thus, and not otherwise, reasoned the South in 1861; and asked for a separation by equitable arrangement," instead of an alliance by contrast with "nominal friends, but real enemies, inflamed by mutual hatred and jealousies. But the great boon was contemptuously refused; because the sentiments of New England had undergone a radical and total revolution. The reason is, that those were the sentiments of New England in the minority, and these the sentiments of New England in the majority. Holy indeed was her horror of an alliance by constraint,when she was the party in danger of being constrained; but no sooner had she acquired the power to constrain, than such an alliance appeared altogether pure and just in her unselfish eyes!
The Journal of this Convention has much to say about "the constitutional compact;" and hence, if it had only been read by Mr. Webster, he must have been familiar with this mode of expression, which so seriously offended him in the resolutions of Mr. Calhoun in 1833, and called forth his fine burst of eloquence in defence of the rights of that noun substantive, the Constitution. He must have discovered also, that in the opinion of Massachusetts in 1815. the rights of sovereign States are at least as important as those of any noun substantive in the language. For, in the words of that Convention, the power of conscription is "not delegated to Congress by the Constiution, and the exercise of it would not be less dangerous to their liberties, THAN HOSTILE TO THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE STATES." [3]........ It must be the duty of the State to watch over the rights reserved, as of the United States to exercise the powers which were delegated. [4]
The Hartford Convention, towering in the strength of its State rights sentiments, continues thus: "That acts of Congress in violation of the Constitution are absolutely void, is an undeniable position. It does not, however, consist with the respect from a CONFEDERATE STATE towards the General Government, to fly to open resistance upon every infraction of the Constitution. The mode and the energy of the opposition should always conform to the nature of the violation, the intention of the authors, the extent of the evil inflicted, the determination manifested to persist in it, and the danger of delay. But in cases of deliberate, dangerous, and palpable infractions of the Constitution, AFFECTING THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE STATE, and liberties of the people: it is not only the right, but the duty, of such State to interpose its authority for their protection, in the manner best calculated to secure that end. When emergencies occur which are either beyond the reach of judicial tribunals, or too pressing to admit of delay incident to their forms, States, which HAVE NO COMMON UMPIRE, MUST BE THEIR OWN JUDGES, AND EXECUTE THEIR OWN DECISIONS." [5] Now, if possible, this comes more directly and plainly to the point, than the Resolutions of '98. It not only sets forth the great doctrine, it sometimes employs the very language of those Resolutions.
Having finished its work, and appointed commissioners to lay the complaints of New England before the Government of the United States., the Convention resolved, that "if these should fail,it would be the duty of the New England States to hold another Convention at Boston, on the 3d Thursday of June, with such powers and instructions as so momentous a crisis may require, [6] No such Convention ever assembled at Boston, or elsewhere; for, in the meantime, the great trouble had come to an end. How, or by what means? Mr. Webster, though he confesses ignorance as to the proceedings of the Hartford Convention, is nevertheless perfectly ready with an answer to this question. In his. senatorial debate with Mr. Hayne. in 1830, he tells the world, that Massachusetts gave up all opposition as soon as the Supreme Court of the United States decided the laws of 'which she complained to be constitutional; thus showing her loyalty under the most severe and trying circumstances! This was, perhaps, a thrust at South Carolina; who, as Mr. Webster supposed, stood far apart from Massachusetts in the heresy, that, in great and trying emergencies, "the States, who have no common umpire, are to be their own judges, and to execute their own decisions." How little he knew the history of his own State! Hence, he could fondly imagine, that Massachusetts had always been willing and ready to bow to the Supreme Court as the common umpire between the States, and proudly pointed to her conduct in 1815, bending and groaning under the burden of the laws, and yet loyally submitting to the high tribunal by whom it was fastened upon her shoulders! The truth is, as we have just seen, that Massachusetts had resolved to take that very emergency into her own hands: to be her own judge, and to execute her own decision. She cared indeed as little for the Supreme Court, in such an emergency, as she did for the other Courts of the Union; whose decisions had been repeatedly treated with contempt, and resisted with impunity, by her very loyal citizens during the great trouble of the war.
Why, then, did Massachusetts submit at last? Why did so great a change come over the spirit of her dream? The answer is a very simple one. It is told in the printed proceedings of the Hartford Convention. The story is certainly not so well adapted to the purposes of poetry, or of oratory, as the fine fiction invented by Mr. Webster; but it has, at least, the homehmerit of truth. Harrison Gray Otis, T.H.. Perkins, and W. Sullivan, the commissioners appointed by the Convention to lay the grievances of New England before the Government of the United States, reported that they had declined to do so, "because they found, on their arrival at Washington, that peace lead been concluded:" [7] That was the secret of the submission of Massachusetts. The war with Great Britain was at an end; the embargo and non-intercourse would, of course, no longer vex her righteous soul: she could unfurl the wings of her commerce to every breeze, and bring in harvests of gold from every quarter of the globe. That was the secret of her great-hearted loyalty and submission. She no longer had anything to submit to!
Sidney Smith complains of exegesis,that it spoils so many line sermons; not allowing the preacher to ramble in his rhetoric, or to flourish at random, without regard to the real sense of his text. The same complaint may be urged against the simple truth of history. How many splendid orations, and grand soaring flights of rhetoric, will it not spoil for the people of New England! How many self-flattering and glorious illusions will it not dispel! That their object was, said Mr. John Quincy Adams, "and had been for several years, a dissolution of the Union, and the establishment of a separate Confederation, he knew from unequivocal evidence, although not provable in a court of law: and that in case of a civil war, the aid of Great Britain to effect that purpose would be assuredly resorted to, as it would be indispensably necessary to their design." [8]
This design, says Mr. Adams, he had communicated to Mr. Jefferson, in 1809. Again, while President of the United States, Mr. Adams said: "That project, I repeat, had gone to the length of fixing upon a military leader for its execution: and although the circumstances of the times never admitted of its execution, nor even of its full development. I had no doubt in 1808 and 1809, and have no doubt at this time, that it is the key of all the great movements of the Federal Party in New England, [and that party was then in the ascendency in New England,] from that time forward till its final catastrophe in the Hartford Convention. [9]
It is but fair to observe, says Mr. Buchanan, that these statements were denied by the parties implicated, but were still adhered to and again reaffirmed by Mr. Adams. [10] True, it is but fair that their denial should be known: and estimated at its true value. But who could expect any men to acknowledge their complicity in such a design? If in the dark hour of their country's trial, engaged in a war with the greatest nation upon earth,. they could conceive the idea of deserting her standard, and even of invoking the aid and the arms of her powerful enemy to make their desertion good, is it to be supposed that, after the scheme had failed or blown over, they would have pleaded guilty to such a design? Nor is this all. What did they mean by appointing another Convention to be held at Boston? Did they mean nothing? Or if they had any honorable design, -- any design which need not shrink from the light of day, -- why has it never been avowed by them? The truth is, if any one shall carefully examine the proceedings of the Hartford Convention, and the previous history of New England which culminated in that Convention, he can hardly fail to perceive, that the positive testimony of John Quiney Adams, is most powerfully corroborated by circumstances. The conclusion of Mr. Buchanan appears perfectly true; "that this body [the Hartford Convention] manifested their purpose to dissolve the Union, should Congress refuse to redress the grievances of which they complained."
Four years before the date of the Hartford Convention, Mr. Josiah Quiney, an influential member of Congress from Massachusetts, publicly declared the right of seces sion. The extract from his speech on the 14th January, 1811, is hackneyed; but it is, nevertheless, significant of what was then passing in the mind of Massachusetts. It is also exceedingly significant; because it was uttered in opposition to the admission of Louisiana into the Union as a State. If this bill passes, said he, "it is my deliberate opinion that it is virtually a dissolution of the Union; that it will free the States from their moral obligation and, as it will be the right of all, so it will be the duty of some, definitely to prepare for separation, amicably if they can, violently if they must." Nay, upon the purchase of Louisiana in 1803, the Legislature of Massachusetts passed the following resolution: Resolved, That the annexation of Louisiana to the Union, transcends the Constitutional power of the Government of the United States. It formed a new Confederacy to which the States united by the for mer compact, are not bound to adhere. Thus, as we have seen, Massachusetts from the foundation of the Federal Government down to 1815, held the Constitution to be a compact between the States, and the Union to be a Confede racy. In her ordinance of ratification in 1788; in her reply to the Resolutions of '98; in her own resolution of 1803-4; she most distinctly announced this doctrine. Hence, it seems impossible to doubt the statement of John Quincy Adams, [11] that the Hartford Convention deduced the right of secession from the fact, that the Constitution was a compact between the States of the Confederacy. This was a clearly legal inference. Rawle, Story, and Webster all admit it to be such. Thus the fathers, one and all, laid down the great premise or postulate of the doctrine of secession at the very foundation of the Union; and the New England States, in 1815, deliberately drew the inference, and asserted the right of secession. Yet these States, in 1861, took the lead of all others in the fierceness and the bitterness of their denunciation of secession as treason and rebellion! The first to assert for themselves, and vet the first to persecute in others, this great right!
It is thus that Josiah Quincy, the Webster of 1815, asserted the fundamental principle or postulate of secession: "Touching the general nature of that instrument called the Constitution of the United States, there is no obscurity; it has no fabled descent, like the palladium of ancient Troy, from the heavens. Its origin is not confused by the mists of time, or hidden by the darkness of past, unexplained ages; it is the fabric of our day. Some now living had a share in its construction; all of us stood by, and saw the rising edifice. There can be no doubt about its' nature. It is a political compact." Is this the same Josiah Quincy, or was it his son, who in 1861, made himself so conspicuous by denouncing secession as treason? It is certainly the same Josiah Quincy, who, in 1811, was called to order in Congress for asserting the right of secession, and voted to be in order. How rapidly the New England world turns upon its political axis! In 1815, as secession was the right of all, so it was the duty of some of the States; and, in 1861, it was treason and rebellion!
Did the South condemn Secession in 1815?
The South, it has been repeatedly asserted, condemned the secession of 1815 as treason, and is, therefore, estopped from complaining of the same sentiment in 1861. "This," it is urged, "may be said to be res adjudicata." All parties are committed against the right of secession."
Now, even if the facts were as alleged, still this would be a one-sided logic. For if the South, in 1815, condemned secession, it was the secession which New England had approved; and if the North, in 1861, denounced secession, it was precisely the right which the South had asserted. Hence, it is just as true, that all parties were committed for, as that all parties were committed against, the right of secession.
If, as is supposed, the minority was, in both instances, in favor of the right of secession, and the majority opposed to it; this would have been nothing very strange or wonderful. It would only have illustrated the saying of Aristotle, which all history confirms, that "the weak always desire what is equal and just; but the powerful pay no regard to it."
But the facts have not been accurately stated. It is true, that the South, as well as other portions of the Union., vehemently condemned the Hartford Convention. No Convention, or assembly, was ever more odious to the great body of the people of the United States. But its proceedings were secret; and till the appearance of Mr. Adams' letter of Dec. 30th, 1828, its precise object or design was not generally known. It may be doubted, indeed, if it was ever condemned by any portion of the South, on the simple ground, that it claimed for the New England States merely the right to secede from the Union, and to be let alone. It was, however, known to the South, that the New England States had insisted on a war with Great Britain in order to defend and secure the rights of their seamen. It was also known, that while the South was engaged in this war, the New England States not only failed to do their duty, but denounced the war they had instigated, and the government by which it was carried on. It is true that, by these proceedings, the wrath of the South was awakened, and that she denounced them as treason: because they gave ''aid and comfort to the enemy. From all that had preceded, how could the South know, indeed, but that the Hartford Convention had formed the dark design of appealing to arms against the Government of the United States, and of joining Great Britain in the war against the people of this country?
Even if the South had known, that New England merely designed, in 1815, to secede from the Union; still her indignation would not have been without just cause. For, having got the South into a war with Great Britain, was that the time for her to desert the standard of her country, and leave the other States exposed to the full brunt of its fury? The clearest right may, indeed, be exercised in such a manner, and under such circumstances, as to render it odious. The right of secession has, no doubt, been made to appear treasonable, by its association with the Hartford Convention of 1815.
Far otherwise was the conduct of the South. She held no secret Conventions. All her proceedings were as open as the day. The United States were at peace with all the world. It was under these circumstances, that the States of the South, each in its own Convention assembled, withdrew from the Union, and asked to be let alone. But the South was not permitted to enjoy the government of her choice. On the contrary, she was subjugated, impoverished, and ruined, with the avowed design to bring her back into the Union; and now that she is knocking at the door of the Union, she is not allowed to enter. What, then, is left to her sons and daughters but to weep over the inconsistency and wickedness of mankind; and, if possible, to pray for their enemies?
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ENDNOTES
[1] Page 5
[2] Page 5.
[3] Page 8.
[4] Page 7.
[5] Pages 10-13.
[6] Page 21.
[7] Proceedings of Hartford Convention, p. 33.
[8] Letter of Dec. 30, 1828 in reply to Harrison Gray Otis and others.
[9] Buchanan's Administration, p. 87.
[10] Letter of Dec. 30, 1828. in reply to H. Gray Otis and others
[11] Letter of Dec. 30, 1828. to H. Gray Otis, &c.
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