Posted on 01/07/2005 2:44:37 PM PST by Tailgunner Joe
In the past, Ukrainians often referred to Western democracies as “civilized,” with the inherent implication that post-Soviet Ukraine was not. The “Orange Revolution,” which led, on 26 December, to the victory of the opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko in rerun elections has opened the door for Ukrainians to a new, “civilized” future.
The results suggested, though, that many Ukrainians do not accept either that the West is civilized or that the Ukraine of President Leonid Kuchma was uncivilized (or both). The preliminary results in the final round showed Ukraine almost as deeply divided as the fraud-marred earlier rounds had suggested. Yushchenko won 51.99 percent of the vote compared with 44.19 percent for Viktor Yanukovych, the serving prime minister and Kuchma’s hand-picked successor.
Still, the divide is significantly narrower than it appeared after the second round. With a new election law in place, Yushchenko made gains in practically every deep eastern and southern region, areas that had in previous rounds looked deep blue, the campaign color of his rival, Viktor Yanukovych. (The exception was the Sumy oblast, Yushchenko’s home region, which he won in both the second round and the rerun.) These gains may not have been dramatic (ranging from 0.4 percentage points in Zaporizhiya to more than two points in Dnipropetrovsk) but they alone were large enough to overturn Yanukovych’s second-round “victory.” They were especially significant given that there was little time to enact the amendments to the electoral law and that other aspects of the regional structures of power and influence remained unaffected.
In only two regions was Yushchenko trounced: in Donetsk, where he won a mere 4.21 percent, and in the neighboring region of Luhansk, where his return was just 6.21 percent. Both are areas where political, economic, and media life is dominated by Yanukovych and Renat Akhmetov, the businessman who did most to bankroll Yanukovych’s presidential bid.
Yushchenko is, then, the president of a Ukraine that is less divided than many thought. He is also the convincing victor. Compare, for example, his results with those of Kuchma in 1999. In 1999, Kuchma’s lowest vote counts were 17.11 percent (in Vinnytsia) and 19.57 percent (in Poltava). But he won 50 percent in only six of Ukraine’s 27 regions, even through he faced a much weaker challenge. By contrast, Yushchenko won over 50 percent in 18 oblasts and over 60 percent in 17. (Exit polls were higher than the actual results, indicating Yushchenko leading by 15 to 20 percent.)
Still, that these elections have polarized the country is hardly surprising, given Yushchenko’s pro-reform and pro-Western agenda and Yanukovych’s pro-status quo and overtly pro-Russian agenda. The elections have emphasized almost exactly, in votes cast, the extent to which Ukraine is still not sure about which course to follow.
Yushchenko now enters a murky period of uncertainty, knowing that he carries the burden of huge expectations from the majority of the population, that he must neutralize the suspicion and anxieties of many in the east, and—since this was a revolution and therefore a challenge to the established order—that he needs to break the old system.
A STUBBORN, AND LONELY, LOSER
Divisive the elections may have been, but Yushchenko’s victory and the old system’s defeat could, at first glance, look decisive. Though not overwhelming, Yushchenko’s margin of victory is large. He has won legitimacy, as international observers have recognized the 26 December vote as legitimate (or, in the words of the 1,370-member OSCE observer team, it brought “Ukraine substantially closer to meeting international standards”). With one exception, no major politician in Ukraine has disputed the election results in public. Parliamentary speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn, a former close aide to Kuchma, congratulated Yushchenko on his win. Supporters of Yanukovych are now trying to accommodate themselves to the new realities of power. Several pillars of the Kuchma establishment have committed “suicide.” (On 27 December, Transport Minister Heorhiy Kirpa was found dead at his country house. Kirpa, who was at one time viewed as a presidential contender, had been suspected of siphoning off hundreds of millions of dollars from the state. Three weeks earlier, Yuriy Liakh, the chairman of the Ukrainian Credit Bank, apparently cut his own throat with a letter opener, leaving a suicide note. Liakh was a close business partner of Kuchma’s right-hand man, Viktor Medvedchuk.)
The one exception is, of course, Viktor Yanukovych himself. Yanukovych has refused to accept the decision overturning his second-round “victory” by 2.85 percentage points, alleging that the greatest day of fraud in the elections was not in the second round on 21 November but in the third round on 26 December. Yanukovych has not only refused to recognize the election results; for a time, he also tried to hold on to his seat as prime minister and call cabinet meetings. He failed. Opposition supporters blockaded the government building, and even erstwhile supporters such as Lytvyn spoke out against him. He resigned two days later, on 31 December (though Kuchma accepted his resignation only on 5 January).
But the real worry is that Ukraine’s institutions will not be transformed but simply change their coats. Disturbing signs of that can be seen in the manner in which the Central Election Commission and the Supreme Court rejected the 14 complaints filed by Yanukovych. Most were denied on technical grounds because the complaints were filed too late. One complaint—that residents of the “tent city” erected by opposition supporters in central Kyiv engaged in illegal campaign activity on election day since pro-Yushchenko slogans were prominent in the area—was rejected, in somewhat sophistic fashion, because there was a lack of evidence that these slogans were distributed on election day, as opposed to merely being in place. (The practice in previous rounds and elections had been to bring down placards and banners, and the presence of hundreds of tent-city dwellers in central Kyiv could be viewed as a rally.) In addition, Ukraine’s supreme court refused to review four complaints because of procedural defects, such as unclear demands and late submission.
Questions should be asked about the judge’s motivations. They may have been loath to anger the demonstrators; the judges may have felt that the people’s demands should be met or at least very seriously considered. They may also have been loath to offer any help to Yanukovych, a man with the reputation of a gangster (he served two terms in prison as a youngster) and well-known for not being gentle, to put it mildly, in his treatment of judges in the Donetsk region. (Tapes secretly recorded by a former Kuchma bodyguard, Mykola Melnychenko, capture Yanukovych threatening, for instance, to “hang up for a night, by his balls” Oleksandr Tupytskiy, a judge in the Donetsk region.)
Yanukovych’s reputation on this front has not improved since 26 December. According to Yushchenko representatives, Yanukovych supporters reportedly approached several judges, threatening them or offering them bribes. Some judges have also apparently asked for visas for family members, fearing for their safety.
WHAT TO DO WITH THE OLD GUARD?
The alleged bribes and threats are symptomatic of a broader attempt by members of the old system to protect themselves from possible prosecution. There are suggestions, for example, that the “suicides” of Kirpa and Liakh were attempts to remove witnesses to corruption. Some are making conspicuous attempts to jump ship and fly under Yushchenko’s flag or to put themselves in a stronger bargaining position. Acting Prime Minister Mykola Azarov, the deputy chairman of the Party of Regions, the political front for the Donetsk clan, has said he is not sure that he will oppose Yushchenko and seemed to hint at his readiness to stay in government. Azarov even appeared on Independence Square, known nationwide simply as " the Maidan" (The Square) since the Orange Revolution, on New Year’s Eve with Yushchenko, Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili, key Yushchenko ally Yulia Tymoshenko, and several leaders of Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine faction.
Even in Donetsk, Ukraine’s new leaders are getting air time. On 30 December, Tymoshenko appeared on the television channel Ukrayina, the only TV outlet that had, until then, refused to show any opposition representatives. Ukrayina is owned by Akhmetov, Yanukovych’s key business ally. Akhmetov himself met with Tymoshenko.
The hope of the old guard is clear: to retain as much power, money, and influence as possible. But will Yushchenko allow them to? Though the figurehead for reform and a new Ukraine, Yushchenko’s campaign platform was largely limited to very general slogans such as “providing everyone with a high standard of living” or “It will be comfortable and peaceful for everyone.” Yushchenko’s action plan, Ten Steps Toward the People, is barely more specific, including general promises to create 5 million new jobs, boost social programs, lower taxes, fight corruption, and so on.
On the critical questions of corruption and privatization, it is unclear whether Yushchenko, like his Georgian colleague and friend, Saakashvili, will go after those who became filthy rich thanks to their connections with the old regime. Yushchenko has largely limited himself to unclear statements such as “some pages will be turned,” which seems to suggest that some questionable privatization deals will be reviewed and others not.
One deal that Yushchenko has repeatedly mentioned specifically is the privatization of Kryvorizhstal, which produces 20 percent of all metal manufactured in Ukraine. It was sold just three months before the presidential elections to a consortium, the Investment Metallurgical Union, owned jointly by Akhmetov and Viktor Pinchuk, Kuchma’s son-in-law. The winning bid ($800 million) was only slightly higher than the starting price and much lower than the several-billion-dollar sale-price estimate made by experts. Potential international investors, which included U.S. Steel, India’s Tata Steel, and U.K.-registered LNM Group--which said it was ready to pay $3 billion--cried foul when the tender rules were changed to effectively exclude foreign investors.
Though a reforming prime minister in 2000 and the leader of a revolution now, Yushchenko comes to the presidency with a political history largely characterized by indecisiveness. And, though he clearly inspired the fear and loathing of many in the pro-Kuchma camp during the presidential elections, that may have been partly because Yushchenko-- indecisive, mild, religious, and honest--appealed to a wide range of Ukrainians. After the elections, this selling point could turn into a liability. In short, paradoxical as it may seem in the wake of such a titanic election battle, doubts persist about Yushchenko’s resolve. But tough choices await him, and no decision will amount to a choice.
How resolute Yushchenko is may depend on who joins his new government. Some among his supporters, such as the crime-fighting MP Heorhiy Omelchenko, would like to pursue the oligarchs, the tycoons with close connections to the outgoing government. Tymoshenko has said publicly that all privatization deals are potentially subject to review. But there are also those, like former prime minister Anatoly Kinakh, who may favor a “live and let live” philosophy.
The key political leaders who backed Yushchenko are now trying to form a majority government. Tymoshenko and Petro Poroshenko, one of the leaders of Our Ukraine, are the prime contenders to become prime minister, but both will have difficulty winning the support of more than 225 members in the 450-seat parliament. If they are unsuccessful, Kinakh stands a good chance of returning to a post he has already held because, as a former member of the pro-Kuchma majority, he is not viewed with the level of distrust generated by Tymoshenko.
A TIME FOR DECISIVENESS
Yushchenko may not fully comprehend the force of the expectations that he has helped bring to the fore. The Orange Revolution, in which hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians braved the cold and even risked violent confrontation with the authorities, swept like a wildfire through the tinder bush of a society tired of watching the games politicians play and tired of bearing the brunt of an inefficient and corrupt economy. Ukrainians became politicized as never before. Now they expect change for the better, real change that they can recognize with their five senses. Yushchenko will find himself under immense public pressure to deliver more change. One of the key mobilizing forces in the Orange Revolution, the youth movement Pora (“Enough” in Ukrainian and Russian), has intimated that it expects Yushchenko’s government to act against the former regime’s members and supporters. Otherwise, says one of Pora’s leaders, Mykhaylo Svystovych, the organization may go into opposition to Yushchenko himself.
He will also have to act, lest some of Ukraine’s problems so visible in this election re-emerge. The threat of separatism that emerged during the weeks of turmoil was never a serious possibility. It was, instead, a desperate response to the Orange Revolution by local satraps, enmeshed in a closed and highly lucrative system of corruption. Ultimately, the tactic backfired. The calls lacked public support; there were no demonstrations to back them. Polls indicated that over 85 percent of the population opposed any change to Ukraine’s unitary structure. And, in response, as local authorities, the media, and intellectuals across the country were brought together in the face of a largely imaginary threat of secession, the Orange Revolution was strengthened. Even the regional leaders who pushed the issue onto the national agenda backed down within days.
But a precedent has been set. However brief, transient, and self-serving, separatist calls--for autonomy, a federation, or even outright secession--were heard on the national stage for the first time since the mid-1990s, when the president of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Yuriy Meshkov, set about trying to unite the peninsula with Russia. (He rapidly lost popular support and was removed from office, and the post of president of the Crimea was abolished.) If things go badly in a Yushchenko presidency, separatist calls may again be heard.
Yushchenko’s ability to convey his message to eastern Ukraine will be critical. The campaign proved a landmark, with journalists effectively overturning the editorial policy of their owners in state and pro-government media. Since then, most radio and TV, including that in the hands of the oligarchs, has remained relatively objective. But, like that of the courts, the media’s newly discovered independence is relative and fragile. Most newspapers remain political servants of their owners. (Perhaps the most extreme turnaround was at Era TV, which switched sides to support Yushchenko because of an apparent conflict of interest between the company’s owner, oligarch Andriy Derkach, and Yanukovych. It switched sides so swiftly that it did not find time to present a line of thinking other than that of the opposition.) When the next political crisis occurs, the media may revert to old form and take sides without any regard for even formal impartiality. This is all the more disturbing given the ownership structure of the Ukrainian media. Just one man, Viktor Pinchuk, who supported Yanukovych, controls three national TV channels, and two others are controlled by Viktor Medvedchuk’s Social Democrats. The notion of public-service broadcasting has been discussed for at least four years but is far from reality. To entrench press freedom, Yushchenko must reform existing legislation and restructure media holdings.
This highlights a third reason for decisive action: although the former government’s leaders and backers are in a state of shock and disarray today, they will not remain so for long. Though Yushchenko overcame a united front of Ukraine’s richest oligarchs, including Akhmetov, Pinchuk, and the clan around Medvedchuk and businessman and football federation chief Hryhoriy Surkis, the media, money, and power wielded by these groups remain largely in place. Replacing regional and local government officials will not make a big dent in the power and wealth of the clans; it will merely stall their expansion. If they are to survive and continue to support the vast pyramid of people who serve their needs, they need to expand their business interests; whatever Yushchenko does, these powerful forces will come back to haunt him. Strong, impartial measures will probably be needed to ensure respect for the law and for Yushchenko.
AN UNCHANGED SOCIETY, READY FOR CHANGE
But while the battle between Yushchenko and the oligarchs may be replayed, a new actor has emerged on the scene: the Ukrainian public.
Arguably the best feature of this extraordinary time was the good humor among the nearly 1 million Ukrainians who came out onto the streets to demonstrate, often not understood and thereby often disregarded by Western observers. And there was good reason for that: for ordinary Ukrainians, mistrustful of everyone yet easy prey for government machinations, the revolution proved an exciting, uplifting, and transforming time that showed them that ordinary people can change the political scene or, as the revolutionary refrain went, “We are together, there are many of us and we will not be overcome!”
From this new determination springs the hope that Yushchenko realizes that Ukrainians now expect their politicians not to rule, but to serve. If Yushchenko forgets this, he would do well to remember one joke heard these days in Kyiv: “What is the difference between Yushchenko and God?’ “God doesn’t think he’s Yushchenko.”
"areas that had in previous rounds looked deep blue, the campaign color of his rival, Viktor Yanukovych"
hmm, wonder why that was....
After watching Ruslana dance her dance, I became a friend of Ukraine.
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