European Dreams and the Soviet Legacy (Ukrainian flames)

Mykola Riabchuk is a Ukrainian writer and publicist, co-founder and co-editor of the Kyiv-based "Krytyka" monthly.

Mikhail Gorbachev, the last president of the USSR and, at the time, a strong opponent of Ukrainian independence, has compared recently the Ukrainian "orange revolution" to the fall of the Berlin Wall. Volodymyr Lytvyn, the head of Ukrainian parliament, has defined the event as the definite end of the Soviet Empire, its final and irreversible break-up.

All the lofty rhetoric aside, the both politicians are essentially right. The crumbling of the formidable Communist Empire, unleashed by the Gorbachev's perestroika, resulted in an impressive chain of democratic revolutions in Central East Europe in 1989. But the processes stopped short at the Soviet border. Only three, the least Sovietized, Baltic nations managed not only get independence in 1991, as the Soviet Union collapsed, but also get rid of the local nomenklatura and thoroughly and profoundly change their political systems.

Today, all those developments can be understood as an uprising of the new-born civil society against the senile authoritarian state. In the Baltics, like in Central East Europe, society proved to be strong enough to take over the state and transform it in a Western-style liberal democracy based on the rule of law. In Central Asia, where civil society was very weak or even non-existent, the late Soviet authoritarianism had just mutated into peculiar forms of local despotism. Yet, in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova neither state nor society were strong enough to get upper hand. The unstable equilibrium of the essentially opposite forces had been perceived initially, in the early 90s, as a sort of a "young," "immature" democracy - "democracy in transition." It created at least some political pluralism, a semblance of democratic procedures and an independent media.

The authoritarian state of the Leninist type had not been however changed in its main structures, habits, political practices that stem from the Soviet political culture; nor the ruling elite called "nomenklatura" had ever been substantially replaced. Instead, it created a weird symbiosis with the criminal world, known today as "oligarchy." In the mid-90s, the state resumed its offense on civil society. First in Belarus and the Transcaucasian republics, then in Moldova, and lately in Russia, a full-fledged authoritarianism was re-established, while independent society was oppressed and marginalized. In Ukraine, however, the growing authoritarian pressure encountered growing resistance from society. The tension climaxed in late November, as the authorities brutally falsified the results of the presidential elections on behalf of the pro-government candidate, and caused unexpectedly mass protests in Kyiv and all over Ukraine.

Within just three weeks, Ukrainians proved to be as mature in civic terms as their Central East European neighbours, scoring at least three dazzling achievements. First, they gave a significant majority of votes to the opposition candidate - despite the smear Goebbels-style propagandistic campaign carried out against him by the pro-government media, despite an enormous administrative pressure, bribery, blackmail, and all sorts of provocations. Second, they set on the streets to defend their choice, their civic rights, within 17 frosty days and nights, without a single act of violence, and despite the real threat from the coercive government and little, if any, hope for the solidarity from the Putinophile West. And thirdly, they managed to skillfully negotiate and to peacefully settle a conflict that might otherwise lead to bloodshed if not civil war and break-up of the country. Why Ukrainians, who had not been much different, in Western eyes, from Russians and other "Soviets", managed to be, in actuality, so profoundly and unexpectedly different?

The simplest albeit a bit simplistic answer would be that Ukraine, besides the Baltics, had always been the most Westernized part of the former USSR. In spite of widespread stereotypes, it had little to do with Russia (or, rather, Muscovy at the time) until the end of the 18th century when the bulk of Ukrainian territories - the "Right Bank" Ukraine - was incorporated in Russian Empire after the partition of Poland. The "Left Bank" Ukraine went under Moscow auspices a bit earlier, in mid-17th century, but still it enjoyed a huge autonomy (a sort of "Cossack Republic" modeled on the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth) that had been only eventually shrunk and ultimately abolished at the end of the 18th century. Despite the acute tensions with the dominant Poles (or, rather, Catholics), Ukrainians had been exposed to the whole set of European influences within the Polish-Lithuanian "Rzeczpospolita." Most of them had been rather unusual for a largely oriental, at the time, Muscovy - high literacy, a developed judiciary, elected self-government, Magdeburg law, medieval collegiums and universities. Even the Orthodox Church played in Ukraine a very different role: it had never been etatized like in Russia, never became a part of state apparatus but, rather, remained a vibrant element of civil society.

The differences proved to be even stronger in the westernmost part of the country, which had never been ruled from Moscow until WWII, since it went, after the 18th-century partition of Poland, to the Austrian Habsburgs. The only part of contemporary Ukraine which had been never exposed to other than Russian (and Soviet) civilization, is a vast steppe zone in the south-east of the country that stretches approximately from the city of Kharkiv to the city Odesa along the north Black Sea coast. Historically, it was a no-man land, loosely controlled by the Crimean Khanate until the end of the 18th century and eventually colonized by the Russian Empire. It is little surprise that the political map of Ukraine largely reflects these historic divisions. Regions where the democratic opposition won the parliamentary elections in 2002 and presidential elections in 2004 roughly coincide with the historic reaches of Rzeczpospolita at its highest points. Regions where the pro-government and/or Sovietophile parties won the 2002 elections and where their presidential candidate succeeded in 2004, had never, in fact, existed beyond Russia's rule until 1991, and had therefore deeply internalized Soviet values and patterns of civic or, rather, uncivic behaviour.

It is very important to understand these differences since many foreigners still believe that Ukraine is divided primarily by ethnicity and/or language. True, one may find certain correlations between, say, ethnicity and political preferences: e.g., only 20% of Russians supported Yushchenko, and only 30% of Ukrainians supported Yanukovych. But apparently this is a far cry from rigid determinism, ethnic schism and an insurmountable ethnic fault-line. Especially, if one takes a look at the correlations between political preferences and people's education and age. The higher the education the stronger support goes to Yushchenko, from both Ukrainians and Russians. The older the people are, the greater sympathy they express for Soviet-style Yanukovych. These correlations are, in fact, more important than the ethnic ones because they reflect much more viable and prospective tendency: both Ukrainians and Russians are typically more pro-Western, pro-democratic, and pro-Ukrainian (in civic terms) if they are better informed (through education) and less exposed to Soviet stereotypes (because of their younger age).

True, the "Westerners" predominate in the centre and in the West, while the "Sovietophiles" predominate in the South-East. But the picture is not that black-and-white (or blue-and-orange). It would suffice to notice that Yanukovych has scored 20-30% in many "Yushchenko's" regions while Yushchenko scored 20-30% in many regions of "Yanukovych's" south-east. It is also true that the South-East speaks mostly Russian while the West and the Centre speak mostly Ukrainian. But again, the fault-line is not determined by language but, rather, by linguistic (and other) tolerance. You may easily survive with Russian in the allegedly "nationalistic" West, but you would certainly be assaulted a great many times in the allegedly "internationalist" East if you dare to speak Ukrainian in public. On the surface, the city of Kyiv is nearly as much Russian-speaking as the city of Donetsk. But in Kyiv, Ukrainian is tolerated, like Russian in Lviv, and many people can speak both languages, while in Donetsk the old Soviet stereotype prevails: Ukrainian is a "nationalistic" language and therefore should be eliminated.

The everlasting Soviet legacy, rather than ethnic division, is the major problem the new Ukrainian government would face. It would certainly compromise with Sovietophile regions giving them some economic, administrative, and perhaps cultural/linguistic concessions. But it seems impossible to compromise in values - to reconcile a western-style democracy with Russian-style authoritarianism, the rule of law with semi-feudal paternalism, European openness with neo-Soviet intolerance, freedom of information with virtual censorship.

The local nomenklatura-turned-mafia in Donbas seems to be deeply entrenched in the region and would certainly play people's grievances and old biases against any reform-minded government in heavily demonized Kyiv. Secessionism looks unlikely - the idea lacks not just political legitimacy but also economical viability and grass-root support. As a recent opinion poll shows, even in the South-East the idea is favoured only by less than a quarter of the respondents. Another quarter remain undecided, while more than 50% opposes the risky adventure. Nonetheless, the idea is mused by the local authorities with a clear aim to blackmail Kyiv and to ultimately avoid very probable persecutions for rampant corruption and electoral fraud.

The new government would inevitably have to find a particular combination of sticks and carrots for its regional policy, and to define a thin line between possible compromises with the ancient regime and an inadmissible betrayal of fundamental values, ideals and strategic goals. The main key to a good regional policy is, however, a good national policy, which means vigorous and coherent reforms - legal, political, economic, administrative.

Yushchenko seems to be very firm on three interdependent issues: to separate business and power, to ensure a fair jurisdiction, and to fight the corruption that has infiltrated the state and government. He suggested that some, the most scandalous, privatization deals will be reconsidered but no redistribution of property would follow. Some oligarchs would just have to pay the remainder to the state coffer. He promised also to lower taxes but to make everybody paying them. This was a clear hint at numerous privileges and loopholes that the government-connected oligarchs used to pillage the economy.

Yushchenko's previous record from 2000-2001, when he was a prime minister, proves that he can be skillfull and firm in cleaning up the economy, and that such a policy can bring immediate positive results. But the long-term goal is to attract substantial investments and to reconstruct the outdated albeit not so backward economy. To achieve this, the legal reform is a must, and Yushchenko seems to understand that the whole business climate depends primarily on the rule of law, not just a momentary anti-corruption campaign.

From 2006 on, as the new Ukrainian parliament is elected on a purely proportional basis (from the national party list), the president will have limited powers - ceding substantial parts of them to the parliament and prime minister. This is a part of the constitutional deal signed by the authorities and opposition on December 8. The reform undoubtedly introduces a better balance of powers, encourages party-building and makes the Ukrainian political system better structured and more transparent. It stipulates also a substantial administrative reform that gives much power (and responsibility) to the regions, both administrative and financial, albeit stops short at the federalization of the country.

In 2005, however, Yushchenko will still enjoy huge presidential powers inherited from his predecessor and guaranteed by the 1996 constitution. He would certainly do his best to introduce radical changes within the country and, at the same time, avoid any sharp reorientations in foreign policy. He has sent a reconcilatory message to Putin, saying that Russia remains Ukraine's major strategic partner and that he would like to make his first visit as president to Moscow. And he confirmed Ukraine's strategic goal to join the EU and NATO but recognized that it is far beyond today's national agenda. The primary goal is to reform the country, and to make it a reliable and predictable partner for both European and Russian neighbours.

Twelve years ago, an American public intellectual called Ukraine an "unwanted step-child of Soviet perestroika." The step-child grew up now, and is about to launch its own perestroika that might substantially influence both step-parents.

"ORANGE CHALLENGE FOR CIS COUNTRIES"

OPINION: The Messenger, Georgia's English Language Daily
Tbilisi, Georgia, Wednesday, January 5, 2005

President Mikheil Saakashvili made the unexpected move on the last day
of 2004 of leaving for Ukraine to ring in the New Year with Ukrainian
President-elect Viktor Yushchenko. Despite opposition criticism,
Saakashvili did not back down and spent the first few days of 2005 in
Ukraine.

The two presidents held several informal meetings, discussing mutual
problems and prospects for the development of their countries. One major
challenge for the two post-revolutionary states in 2005 is integration into
the European Union. Both countries have declared EU membership as an
official priority, though both have a long way to go in order to achieve
this goal.

Before his departure, Saakashvili again underscored the importance of the
Orange opposition victory in Ukraine and named this event as the most
significant of 2004. In an interview with Kviris Palitra, the president
mentioned that he had predicted such developments long ago. "I know
Ukraine very well and although many people insisted that no parallels could
be drawn between Georgia and Ukraine, I saw it differently and stated at all
official meetings that it is impossible to stop democracy."

Georgia's Rose Revolution was the most important event in the former Soviet
Union in 2003, and many considered it a fluke and thought it impossible
that such events could be repeated elsewhere in the CIS. But the Orange
opposition's victory at the end of 2004 proved that Georgia's peaceful
revolution was not an isolated event.

After coming to power, Saakashvili visited Ukraine almost immediately where
he openly supported the local opposition. Many criticized him and accused
him of having "Che Guevara syndrome," in trying to export revolution to
Ukraine. At the time, critics warned that this could undermine
Georgian-Ukrainian relations. The rule of President Leonid Kuchma seemed
strong at the time and at first glance a pro-western opposition victory in
Ukraine seemed unimaginable.

It can be said that the velvet revolutions in Eastern Europe have featured
opposition forces with liberal values overcoming undemocratic regimes
composed largely of former communists. However attitudes towards the
Georgia and Ukraine revolutions are not uniform. Some see at the heart of
theses revolutions American dirty tricks aimed at bringing forces loyal to
their interests into power in the former Soviet Union.

Indeed, foreign influence on local elections has played a significant role
in both countries - both the West and Russia were active in the Ukrainian
elections. But no outside involvement can be decisive: in the end it is the
will of the people themselves and the overall situation in the country that
matters.

The failure of the pro-Russian Ukrainian presidential candidate Yanukovich
and his forces has dealt a serious blow to Russia and its position in post
Soviet space. Several analysts now predict that the Ukrainian example could
prove significant for neighboring Moldova and Belarus. The leaders of the
Central Asian republics are also seriously concerned. The Russian newspaper
Nezavisimaya Gazeta wrote that "the events in Georgia and especially
Ukraine have caused the leadership of these countries to lose their fearful
respect of Moscow. It makes no difference to these countries why Russia
lost - due to a lack of wise strategy or to poor political technologies."

In any case, the success of the Ukrainian revolution is of greatest
importance to Georgian geopolitical strategy. Georgia now has a partner
with very similar domestic and foreign policy challenges aimed in the long
run at integration into NATO and the European Union.

This could well be the groundwork for very close cooperation between the
two countries. Their collaboration is very important, for the velvet
revolutions are only the beginning and both states have major challenges
ahead. In Ukraine, in particular, the strongly pro-Russian sentiment that
exists in the eastern part of the country will mean the new president, who
will face a strong opposition in the local parliament, the Rada, will have
to work hard to keep the unity of the nation and proceed with democratic
changes.

For Georgia, too, many challenges lie ahead. Closer ties with a supportive,
like-minded Ukraine will make overcoming these challenges easier.

"EYE ON EURASIA: DROPPING BIG BROTHER"
Ukrainians are looking at Russia and Russians in a new way

By Paul Goble, for United Press International (UPI)
Tartu, Estonia, Tuesday, January 4, 2005

TARTU, Estonia, -- Recent statements by Ukrainians and even
by ethnic Russians living in Ukraine cast doubt on suggestions by senior
Russian Federation officials that ever more non-Russians in the post-Soviet
states are again looking to the Russians as their "elder brother" as Moscow
commentators routinely claimed in the past.

Instead, these comments from Ukraine suggest that Russian actions there
have so alienated the citizens of non-Russian countries that Moscow will
not be able to draw on the kind of residual loyalty it had felt it had in
the decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union and may be driven either
to cede its interests in other former Soviet republics or employ other
means to advance them.

The statements of Ukrainians and ethnic Russians living in Ukraine were
posted on a Russian nationalist website last week and do not even purport
to be a representative sample.
(http://www.apn.ru/?chapter_name=print_advert&data_id=321&do=view_single)
But their observations are not inconsistent with other reporting and thus
merit close attention.

One Ukrainian said that earlier Russia had been for him a "brother,"
even if not "an elder one." But because of Moscow's intervention in the
Ukrainian elections, he said he wanted to say that he no longer liked
Russia or Russians, something for which the Russians had only themselves
to blame.

Another Ukrainian said that "the revolution in Ukraine had revealed the
real attitude of Russians to Ukrainians" and that as a result, most of his
"Russian friends had passed into the camp of enemies." Russians, he added,
do not want to understand that "before God, all are equal" and that "sooner
or later all empires, however great, collapse."

A third said that she had always written "Russian" on the nationality
line of various forms, but now "when remembering that, [she] felt a sense
of shame." And she added that while she had never had any illusions about
the attitudes of the Russian state toward non-Russians, she had been
shocked in recent weeks by the "aggressive" attitudes of ordinary Russians
toward Ukrainians.

Yet a fourth said that relations between Ukraine and Russia "will never
be the same." Rather, he suggested, Ukrainians in the future will look on
Russians in the same way Russians have looked on Ukrainians. That marks
a big change. Earlier, he said, he had wished Russia and its people well
because he felt "they were ours." Now, he said, they are "simply ,they.'"

A fifth added that there was a clear analogy in this case with
situations in some families. A brother who insults and belittles you is
still a brother, and you love him. But if at some point, he takes out a
knife and kills your favorite cat, "he remains [your] brother. [But only]
technically."

Other observers of the Ukrainian scene have reported similar comments,
and at least one has pointedly noted that even "the majority of Russians in
Ukraine have long ago become Russian-speaking Ukrainians." As a result, the
differences between them and Russian-speaking Ukrainians is not terribly
important. (http://www.rustrana.ru/print.php?nid=4985)

These comments are especially interesting because they contradict
arguments even now being made in Moscow by Russian analysts and officials.
In the current issue of "VVP," an analytic monthly close to the Russian
government and the Orthodox Church, one writer suggests that ever more
non-Russians are again coming to view Russia as "an elder brother," albeit
one less dominant than in Soviet times. (http://2vp.ru/print.php?id=287)

That author, Sergei Il'in, adds that this shift reflects both growing
economic integration in the post-Soviet region and the need to cooperate in
the struggle with international terrorism. That counter-terrorism plays
that role was stressed by several senior Russian Interior Ministry
officials last month. (http://mvdinform.ru/index.php?newsid=4820)

The comments of Ukrainian citizens cited above, however, suggest that
any broader cooperation, any return to a time in which non-Russians will
look up to the Russians as their specially beloved "elder brother" is
probably not in the cards -- if indeed most non-Russians ever really felt
the way that Russians and the Soviet government typically claimed.

Political changes in Georgia and Ukraine have transformed the political
landscape not only in the non-Russian countries but in the Russian
Federation as well -- even if many Russians and especially Russian
officials are not yet prepared to acknowledge the extent of that tectonic
shift.

But both officials and ordinary Russians are likely to have at least one
additional reason in the next few months to recognize that their status in
the post-Soviet states has changed and that the post-Soviet states are in
fact foreign countries.

On Dec. 30, the Russian Foreign Ministry reminded the citizens of the
Russian Federation that in the near future, they will need foreign
passports to travel to all Commonwealth of Independent States countries,
something they have not always needed in the first 13 years since the
collapse of the Soviet Union. (Interfax news agency as cited at
http://www.strana.ru/print/237130.html)
Paul Goble teaches at the Euro-college of the University of Tartu
in Estonia.

A nice piece of never-ending saga about those Oriental (or Asian) totalitarian Russians vs. yet another democratic and free nation :))

<Why Ukrainians, who had not been much different, in Western eyes, from Russians and other "Soviets", managed to be, in actuality, so profoundly and unexpectedly different?

Well, in fact, the only difference is in timing. Ukraine has received its independence in 1991 without actually paying for it. It was the Russians who defeated the communist coup in August 1991. Ukranians watched the 1991 coup on TV. It was the Russians who repeatedly took to the streets in 1988-1991. It was the Russians who elected Boris Yeltsin, at that time an opposition candidate purged by now so vegetarian Gorbachev from the Central Committee, against much heavier hand of all-powerful then Communist Party. It was the Russians who handed completely peacefully independence to all former Soviet republics. Finally, it was the Russians who were largely and utterly betrayed by the West in their drive to democracy. Instead of embracing the new Russia, the West was (and is) still largely thinking in terms of die-hard Cold war cliche. The West has actually never been interested in democratic Russia. Having Russia as enemy is so much more convenient.

Now the West is interested in Ukraine as yet another means to contain Russia. I wholeheartedly support Ukrainians in their desire of better life. I feel sorry for them that they like us will be betrayed and used by others. In a couple of years, or even sooner, the Ukranians will see that the only result of their effort is that yet another group of oligarchs is plundering their country. And the only use the West would have for the Ukranians is to guard the borders of the "civilized world", like ancient Rome had used one barbarian tribe against the others.

We Russians are indeed in some sense an older brother for Ukrainians. Not that we want to rule them or bully them, all that is silly nationalistic cliche. Being older means just that we had been on these ropes before. When I say that I fully understand that I piss against the wind and kids and juniors never appreciate what their elders tell them. It does not affect though the truth of what is said.

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