Posted on 01/05/2005 7:55:15 AM PST by 1LongTimeLurker
DELMAR, N.Y. – On Christmas Eve 2004, the Russian Strategic Missile Force test fired an advanced SS-27 Topol-M road-mobile intercontinental ballistic Missile (ICBM). This test probably invalidated the entire premise and technology used in the National Missile Defense (NMD) system currently being developed and deployed by the Bush administration, and at the same time called into question the validity of the administration's entire approach to arms control and disarmament.
From 1988 to 1990, I served as one of the American weapons inspectors at the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant in Russia, where the SS-27 and its predecessor, the SS-25, were assembled. When I started my work in Votkinsk, the SS-25 missile was viewed by many in the US intelligence community as the primary ICBM threat facing the United States. A great deal of effort was placed on learning as much as possible about this missile and its capabilities.
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Through the work of the inspectors at Votkinsk, as well as several related inspections where US experts were able to view the SS-25 missile system in its operating bases in Siberia, a great deal of data was collected that assisted the US intelligence community in refining its understanding of how the SS-25 operated. This understanding was translated into several countermissile strategies, including aerial interdiction operations and missile-defense concepts.
The abysmal performance of American counter-SCUD operations during the Gulf War in 1991 highlighted the deficiencies of the US military regarding the aerial interdiction of road-mobile missiles. Iraqi Al-Hussein mobile missiles were virtually impossible to detect and interdict, even with total American air supremacy. Despite all the effort put into counter-SCUD operations during that war, not a single Iraqi mobile missile launcher was destroyed by hostile fire, a fact I can certify not only as a participant in the counter-SCUD effort, but also as a chief inspector in Iraq, where I led the United Nations investigations into the Iraqi missile program.
The rapid collapse of the Soviet Union did not leave much time for reflection on the American counter-mobile missile launcher deficiencies. In mid-1993, the Department of Defense conducted a comprehensive review to select the strategy and force structure for the post-cold war era. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the threat to the US from a deliberate or accidental ballistic missile attack by former Soviet states or by China was judged highly unlikely. In Votkinsk, US inspectors observed a Soviet-era defense industry in decline. SS-25 missiles were produced at a greatly reduced rate, and the next generation missile, a joint Russian-Ukrainian design, was scrapped after a few prototypes were produced, but never launched.
After the resounding Republican victory in the midterm 1994 congressional elections, a new program for missile defense was proposed covering three distinct "threat" capabilities ranging from "unsophisticated threats" (an attack of five single-warhead missiles with simple decoys), to highly sophisticated threats (an attack of 20 single-warhead SS-25 type missiles, each with decoys or other defensive countermeasures). Funding for this program ran to some $10.8 billion from 1993 to 2000.
When President Bush came to power in 2001, there was a dramatic change in posture regarding ballistic missile defense. The administration announced it was withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, clearing away development and operational constraints. At the same time, the administration laid out a comprehensive plan that envisioned a layered missile-defense system. After studying the SS-25 missile for years, the US military believed it finally had a solution in the form of a multitiered antiballistic missile system that focused on boost-phase intercept (firing antimissile missiles that would home in on an ICBM shortly after launch), space-based laser systems designed to knock out a missile in flight, and terminal missile intercept systems, which would destroy a missile as it reentered the earth's atmosphere.
The NMD system being fielded to counter the SS-25, and any similar or less sophisticated threats that may emerge from China, Iran, North Korea, and elsewhere, will probably have cumulative costs between $800 billion and $1.2 trillion by the time it reaches completion in 2015.
However, the Bush administration's dream of a viable NMD has been rendered fantasy by the Russian test of the SS-27 Topol-M. According to the Russians, the Topol-M has high-speed solid-fuel boosters that rapidly lift the missile into the atmosphere, making boost-phase interception impossible unless one is located practically next door to the launcher. The SS-27 has been hardened against laser weapons and has a highly maneuverable post-boost vehicle that can defeat any intercept capability as it dispenses up to three warheads and four sophisticated decoys.
To counter the SS-27 threat, the US will need to start from scratch. And even if a viable defense could be mustered, by that time the Russians may have fielded an even more sophisticated missile, remaining one step ahead of any US countermeasures. The US cannot afford to spend billions of dollars on a missile-defense system that will never achieve the level of defense envisioned. The Bush administration's embrace of technology, and rejection of diplomacy, when it comes to arms control has failed.
If America continues down the current path of trying to field a viable missile-defense system, significant cuts will need to be made in other areas of the defense budget, or funds reallocated from other nonmilitary spending programs. With America already engaged in a costly war in Iraq, and with the possibility of additional conflict with Iran, Syria, or North Korea looming on the horizon, funding a missile-defense system that not only does not work as designed, but even if it did, would not be capable of defending America from threats such as the Topol-M missile, makes no sense.
The Bush administration would do well to reconsider its commitment to a national missile-defense system, and instead reengage in the kind of treaty-based diplomacy that in the past produced arms control results that were both real and lasting. This would not only save billions, it would make America, and the world, a safer place.
• Scott Ritter is a former intelligence officer and weapons inspector in the Soviet Union (1988-1990) and Iraq (1991-1998). He is author of 'Frontier Justice: Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Bushwhacking of America.'
Scott Ritter? Give me a break. This guy's 15 minutes of "fame" (or infamy if you prefer) were over 2 Burger Kings ago...
The faulty premise of this article is that we were trying to counter the Russians with this missile defense system. I'm more concerned about the Chinese and the North Koreans, someday soon about the Iranians.
Why is a pedophile being published on the Christian Science Monitor?
It depends upon the country we are focusing on. I doubt North Korea would have such sophisticated technology as the Russians. Same with China. I think those are the countries that worry our policy makers the most, not Russia. At least with Russia, there is MAD to act as a deterrent.
P.S. Ritter is a tool.
What's this guy smoking? Everyone knows the Commies always violated their own treaties.(See every missle ban treaty and Oil for Food.) What kept them at bay was overwhelming firepower to destroy them. I know...maybe we should sign a non-nuke treaty with Al Queda!
As well as a known pedophile and all-around piece of sh@t..
we werent ever attempting to counter the Russians....we are more worried about the North Koreans, the Iranians, the Pakis or the Chinese.....
Yeah why should anyone take him seriously?
Oh, that's why he hates Bush. Because he likes little girls. It makes more sense now.
Can't possibly succeed, so don't even try. Never mind that there could be some very valuable spin-off technology.
Or that this research could lead scientists and engineers in a different direction not initially envisioned as the concepts of missle defense are defined and explored.
I wonder, when was it that this country founded and built by fearless explorers turned it's back on this rich heritage and became content with blind, but very safe, conformity?
We will bury the Russia (economically they can't keep up) if they try to keep up with counter measures to our missile defense. This was expected and is just part of the evolution of this defense system.
We must have a defense against incoming missiles and we shall if the idiots don't once again get control of our government.
In case you were wondering what Scott Ritter is up to these days...
By the same logic, since armor piercing bullets are available that easily go through bullet proof vests, the police and military should stop wearing body armor.
When it sticks to purely technical issues, like publishing cutting edge research or developing standards, the IEEE is excellent. On political issues, the IEEE is just another leftist advocacy group.
Yes, I AM an IEEE member.
I think the early vision was to counter the Russians, but you are right that countries like China or North Korea are a substantially greater threat. But I think the point that I'm trying to make here is that from various accounts (even forgetting about Scott Ritter for a second), missile defense is an iffy proposition at best. IMHO we'd have better odds of destroying the programs up front (e.g. North Korea and Iran) than we would stopping missiles once they have launched.
Even if we succeed in building a working defense, a country like North Korea or Pakistan could simply smuggle weapons into ports of major cities and detonate them there.
Scott Ritter is an imbecile.
There will never be a boost phase fast enough using solid fuel or otherwise to defeat a heat-bloom sensor and spaceborne laser of sufficient power to disable such a weapon mid-flight.
This missile platform in development by the new Soviets represents the last dying gasp of an obsolete delivery system.
Does it represent a setback for a missile defense shield? Sure, as one of the few facts Ritter got right is that it was developed to counter an older delivery system. Does it make the concept of a multi-tiered missile defense shield unviable? Not only no...Hell no.
Our most serious threat now and in the future remains smuggled weapons placed in strategic locations to effect the maximum damage on our infrastructure and economy. The ballistic missile will stop being a credible threat in my lifetime. Nuclear proliferation and smuggling will not.
A poor analogy, given that developing the vests didn't cost a few trillion dollars.
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