| 8 | “It is a well known fact that except in times of war, Pakistan stores these warheads in parts...” --Saberwielder at #40 |
| 8 | “most experts agree with my claim that Pakistan's nukes are disassembled” --Saberwielder at #82 |
LOL, that's called "back-peddling"! Pretty soon it's going to be "my cousin Vinny told me"! Maybe it's time for you to post a link. If, as you say, it is such a "well known fact", it should be easy for a man of your talent to find a link.
| 8 | “When a valuable item has components A and B and both are stored in separate places, the people who guard the location of A and the location of B hold the keys to the valuable item.” |
Here's just a few of your logic errors...
For those reasons, your obfuscation doesn't even come close to answering the question. Try again...
Since you claim the nukes are normally kept disassembled (LOL), how could anyone hold the keys to "about a 100 nuclear warheads" if they were both disassembled and stored separately, as you claim?
Waiting...
--Boot Hill
Maybe it's time for you to post a link. If, as you say, it is such a "well known fact", it should be easy for a man of your talent to find a link.
People that say that Pakistan stores its warheads with cores removed from the detonation assembly include: David Albright, Steve Cohen, Michael Krepon, Rodney Jones, Peter Lavoy, Ashley Tellis, Feroz H. Khan, Mahmud Durrani among others. If you go to Project Muse or any scholarly publication database, you can find copious references from the above experts. In essence, the consensus view is the sometime in late 2001/early 2002, Pakistanis disassembled all their warheads and dispersed them to separate locations to both prevent against a decapitating first strike as well as for general security against accidental discharge. Also see the links below:
Having the "keys" to a nuclear warhead is term of art meaning you have command authority and the security codes necessary to launch and/or detonate a nuclear device. Lower level officers and enlisted men don't have such keys.
Wrong. You are changing the ground again with your own definition. For a terrorist group, the goal is to get or make a nuclear or radiological device. They will likely be overjoyed to get a uranium core or two. In case you have forgotten, thanks to A.Q.Khan and his Pakistani facilitators, a workable, proven design for a simple nucler bomb - with detailed specs is available in the open market. See this
"This design would be highly useful to countries such as Iran and North Korea," said Albright, whose Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security has studied the nonconventional weapons programs of both states. The design "appears deliverable by North Korea's Nodong missile, Iran's Shahab-3 missile and ballistic missiles Iraq was pursuing just prior to the 1991 Persian Gulf War," he said.Such a relatively simple design also might be coveted by terrorist groups who seek nuclear weapons but lack the technical sophistication or infrastructure to build a modern weapon, said one Europe-based weapons expert familiar with the blueprints. While such a bomb would be difficult to deliver by air, "you could drive it away in a pickup truck," the expert said.
In other words, terrorists don't need complete warheads and launch codes because they are unlikely to use missiles to hit us. It would, however, be a bonanza for the terrorists if they could just get the cores or enough HEU, both of which are likely guarded by people at the same level as those bing tried. In case you don't know, PAL's are only for detonation mechanisms, not lead containers or Uranium storage facilities.
What makes you think the guards would even have access to those parts? They would guard the facility, not the parts. Security and access are layered like an onion.
And what makes you think that the guards don't? According to Feroz Hassan Khan (who until recently was with the Pakistan army Strategic Plans Division) and Mahmud Durrani (Retired Major General with Pak army recently on a visit to the US), Pakistan has authorized field commanders (Colonel or Brigadier level) to use nuclear weapons in case an enemy (India or even the US) launches a preemptive decapitating strike on the capital. In a presentation in Washington recently, Durrani said this when asked about the type of people guarding these facilities and I quote: "There is an urgent need to improve the technical skills of personnel charged with the security of nuclear installations and develop an institutional security culture."
What follows is that there are ways for the mid level army officers to get access to the launch codes, if they don't have them already. Durrani also said that airforce pilots can bypass the two-man code system because they need to. The arrested people included many PAF men, adding to the concern.
In addition, every available report (ISIS, Carnegie, Monterrey Institute, Stimson Center etc) indicates that Pakistan's facilities and nuclear estate in general is woefully unsafeguarded and also the Pakistanis have issued a redline to us that stops short of giving us access to the physical facilities. While it is one thing for Musharraf to agree to install PALs on detonation assemblies, it is another thing for him to allow American individuals access to locations. The Pakistani troops would likely go berserk if they saw a foreigner trying to enter their Fort Knox. They won't even give us a teeny weeny Uranium sample so that we can nail the Iranians on their lies, for crying out loud.
If hundreds of Pakistani troops, including those at Colonel level can sympathize with the jihadists enough to face death, why is it unlikely that a group of men guarding one of the many Pakistani facilities would not fulfil a dream to help out their fellow muslim fighters with some uranium or cores? All it takes is one group to turn. Are you prepared to say that this will never happen?
Even if two guards in two separate localities somehow managed to gain access to the parts without triggering all manner of alarms, they would have to steal the correct trigger for the correct core, and they would have to steal both of these items at the same time, and they would have to meet together later to assemble the device, and they would have to know how to assemble it. But most importantly, they'd have to be able to defeat the security interlocks that were designed by people far more experienced and far smarter than someone who didn't even have enough talent to do better in life than being a security guard.
Wrong again, as explained above. There are open market bomb designs available, with the minutest level of detail including the type of fasteners to use and the torque and machining precision required. This was also courtesy of Pakistan. So why would any terrorist group waste efforts to acquire a full warhead when all they have to get is the core or enough fuel? Even a crude bomb with a few pounds of HEU could kill and maim thousands in an urban population center.
In conclusion, despite the likelihood that Pakistan's nukes are dispersed, jihadist sympathies and insubordination trends in the low to mid level of Pakistan soldiers that likely guard the facilities, poses a particular and severe threat to the US. These people could and, if the right opportunity comes up, would seek to help those who wish us greivous harm. Ergo, they hold the keys to Pakistan's dangerous nukes.