Ok, so if I understand you correctly, you believe that the evolutionary model will not be believable until it accounts for
the origins of life rather than just explaining the processes of evolution within life. Am I right? If not, I'll wait for further elucidation.
Now; on to your quote from Pearson, which you note Pattee presents as "the original challenge." I would like to suggest that you examine exactly what the challenge is to which Pattee refers. It is not to define life in terms of purpose or normative values, but rather to propose a standard upon which to build an alternative to what he describes as the "reductionist" approach that has come to dominate within biology that uses the pre-quantum theory language of Physics when building biological models and systems. Pattee wants biologists (molecular, evolutionary, etc.) to develop a new symbolic communication that treats life and its processes differently than non-life. And he argues that scientists operating within the outdated epistemological framework of the "reductionist" era of Physics cannot accurately approach the dynamic nature of biological systems since they attempt to reduce them to constituent parts through the "measuring constraints" they impose, and in the process insert their own subjective judgement that natural laws permit them to accurately observe the phenomena from which they wish to draw scientific generalizations. And Pattee argues that this fails to incorporate the dynamic nature of the process of measurement when dealing with life, he says you must have "dynamical laws" as a complement to "natural laws," and is really only accurate in measuring the constraints scientists impose before making their observations. Note the following quote, I'm removing footnote notations again, taken from part 9 of Pattee's treatise:
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. . . The most convincing general argument for this irreducible complementarity of dynamical laws and measurement function comes again from von Neumann. He calls the system being measured, S, and the measuring device, M, that must provide the initial conditions for the dynamic laws of S. Since the non-integrable constraint, M, is also a physical system obeying the same laws as S, we may try a unified description by considering the combined physical system (S + M). But then we will need a new measuring device, M', to provide the initial conditions for the larger system (S + M). This leads to an infinite regress; but the main point is that even though any constraint like a measuring device, M, can in principle be described by more detailed universal laws, the fact is that if you choose to do so you will lose the function of M as a measuring device. This demonstrates that laws cannot describe the pragmatic function of measurement even if they can correctly and completely describe the detailed dynamics of the measuring constraints. . . ."
What Pattee is doing here is applying the language of quantum physics to scientific observation of biological phenomena by pointing out that observing life itself changes the rules. It is the same logic Neils Bohr used (and Pattee cites him) when he proved that you could measure the speed of an electron without knowing its location or conversely you could ascertain the location without measuring the speed because the observer acted as a subjective participant choosing to target one or the other and that both could not be known simultaneously, thus contradicting one of the key principles of Newtonian physics, which is that knowledge of all phenomena could be known. In the same way that quantum physics moved science beyond Newtonian "natural law" philosophy, a new dynamic form of reasoning that accounts for life as something distinct from non-life and recognizes the subjective role the observer plays is needed, according to Pattee and Von Neumann. Quite frankly, it's brilliant. But that is the context in which Pattee asks the question "what is life"? Because he views it as a dynamic system whose observable phenomena must be handled within a new context of observation that accounts for the role of the observer. He is not asking the question in reference to the origins of life, he is insisting that life functions under a dynamical system all its own.
And finally; Semiosis and the "rise of information both in biological systems and the universe." I wish I had caught something I now see in this precondition you set because, when discussing the Theory of Evolution, the
rise of information in biological systems is relevant while the rise of information in the universe is irrelevant. The first condition is a scientific query. The second is a metaphysical one that can never be proven or disproven and has no place in a scientific discussion of the Theory of Evolution. Semiosis, according to its adherents,
is the control mechanism of evolution, explaining how it proceeds from one step to the next. As a control mechanism that starts, runs its course, finishes, and then starts again it is circular in nature but
it does explain how the rise of information proceeds from one stage to the next. To view the entirety of the rise of information you need a linear model, which is how Von Neumann presented "open ended evolution." Semiosis does not offer an explanation that begins before the origins of life, as Pattee makes clear in part 10 of his paper:
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. . . We speak of the genes controlling protein synthesis, but to accomplish this they must rely on previously synthesized and organized enzymes and RNAs. This additional self-referent condition for being the subject-part of an epistemic cut I have called semantic (or semiotic) closure. This is the molecular chicken-egg closure that makes the origin of life problem so difficult. . . ."
So Semiosis does not explain the origins of the first stage of the creation of information in a biological system but it does explain the
dynamics of how that information rises from simple to ever more complex stages. And the joining of the circular model of Semiosis with a linear model is a "Semiotic System" as argued by Cliff Josslyn, another of the Los Alamos scientists building upon Pattee's work, in his paper
The Semiotics of Control and Modeling Relations in Complex Systems. See part 6, "Controls and Models as Semiotic Systems."
Now as I stated in the beginning of this post, I'll have to wait and see whether you will argue that the Theory of Evolution fails because it does not offer an explanation for the origins of life. I will point out that I find none of the experts you have referenced presenting this as a shortcoming of the theory, though I imagine this is viewed as a problem in the Theory of Intelligent Design, which I am gradually coming to view at a distance, though I have not read it personally, as unscientific.