The limb is gone, but the nerve that serviced it is still there. The nerve ending where it was cut is still coiled in the end of the cut limb. The nerve ending may be transmitting, or the nerve itself may have a signal induced onto it by surrounding activity that the brain decodes as coming from the limb that isn't there anymore.
Dear marron, do you mean to suggest that the brain is here making a false report about the factual state of the system it governs? I.e., that the brain registers the severed limb as still attached, based on neuronal inputs? If this is the case, and mind or consciousness is merely the epiphenomenon of the brain, would mind be able to do anything other than confirm the brain’s false report?
If that is the case, then how can we – that is, you and I and all the other “epiphenomena” out there – form any kind of accurate picture of reality? How could science itself be possible under such conditions?
Thus we are merrily led into such conundrums to the extent we are persuaded by the materialist/mechanistic understanding of nature promulgated by the Cartesian/Newtonian worldview. It has become increasingly fashionable to regard the universe as having the nature of a clockwork: Once built, deterministic physical laws kick in and so the clock just keeps running along forever after without any further intervention needed. Somehow -- I can’t imagine why -- folks of materialist persuasion/imagination are content with this formulation of the ultimate questions.
The most salient thing the materialist seems to overlook in order to guarantee his contentment is one simple fact: Every single machine in the universe that we know about, or possibly could know about, is an artifact. Having said that, the other thing we know is that every artifact necessarily presumes an artificer — a creator, an artist, an architect, a poet, a scientist, et al.
But the question of “artificer” is the very thing that materialists want to leave out of the picture, the reason why they insist the brain, and not the mind, is “sovereign” when it comes to living beings. Thus the materialist position appears inherently self-contradictory. They want the artifact, but not the artificer by which the artifact is made possible in the first place.
The other really interesting thing that machines of all descriptions have in common is that they are really good at following the physical laws. But the reason they are able to do this presumably is because they have been designed, engineered, and tooled to achieve that outcome from “outside” themselves. Similarly, the very functions they are to execute are specified and supplied by an extra-systemic source; i.e., by their programmers.
Yet logically it appears that, when it comes to mechanistic systems, according to the “sovereign” brain/epiphenomenal mind model of metaphysical naturalism, it appears that it’s actually the epiphenomena – i.e., the “programmers” – that implicitly have been hoisted into first place regarding the actual design and function of the machine (whether the fact is explicitly recognized or not); and moreover probably, similarly (by analogical extension) the design and function of natural systems. Arguably, under such conditions, it would be the brain (and matter itself) that is the “epiphenomenon” of a greater principle of Nature.
In conclusion, we may define a material system as one that follows the laws of physics, whose behavior fits to the pathway computable from the physical laws on the basis of its initial and boundary conditions.
Please forgive me for suspecting that there is a heck of a whole lot more going on in LIFE than this definition recognizes or can explain.
Well thank you so much, dear marron, for your provocative suggestion, offered (I feel pretty sure) in the spirit of pure, unrestrained, vital merriment! :^) It is always a joy to chat with you.