Posted on 10/27/2004 4:18:45 PM PDT by hadrian
I looked to see if anyone else had posted this - I apologize if I missed it - about 8 minutes into ABC World News Tonight, Martha Radditz ended up her report on the missing explosives with words to this effect:
Peter, late breaking information from IAEA is that when they last inspected the Al QAQaa facility in (January? March?) 2003, there were not 180 tons of high explosives, but only 3 tons.
She did qualify that I think by stating a particular type of high explosive - either MX(?) or the other of the two types, but whatever it was, sounds like there might have been a lot less left to be "missing" at any time the US forces could have been there.
Hope you are listening to Fox News (Greta Show) you heard right on ABC - congrats. Brett Baier had the IAEA report stating exactly what you said!!
Oh, that's hugh.
i'm pretty sure Martha said they were CONFLICTING reports.. one the Iraq report - 140, and one the UN report - 3
pretty sure, but not 100% positive. do we have a transcript from Martha from ABC yet? maybe i missed it posted already?
i don't get FOX... can you give just an idea.. what did Brett confim?
Thank you very much sdpatriot.
That's correct: 2 reports, 2 qtys RDX, 2 different audit dates ... ABC's Radich/Raditz
141 TONS RDX in Iraqi Audit of JUL'02
003 TONS RDX in IAEA Audit of JAN'03
And latest audit is 2 months before coalition action.
BUMP!
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Media Advisory 2003/1901 - UNMOVIC IAEA Press Statement on Inspection Activities in Iraq
s_26685.pdf
News Center : In Focus : IAEA and Iraq
News Center : In Focus : IAEA and Iraq
News Center : In Focus : IAEA and Iraq
Media Advisory 2002/3011 - Press Briefing in Baghdad, 30 November 2002 - 2 December 2002
Media Advisory 2002/0912b - UNMOVIC/IAEA Press Statement on Inspection Activities in Iraq, 9 December 2002
Media Advisory 2002/1012 - UNMOVIC/IAEA Press Statement on Inspection Activities in Iraq, 10 December 2002
Media Advisory 2003/2401 - UNMOVIC IAEA Press Statement on Inspection Activities in Iraq |
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Media Advisory 2003/1801 - UNMOVIC IAEA Press Statement on Inspection Activities in Iraq
UNMOVIC IAEA Press Statement on Inspection Activities in Iraq. The IAEA inspected two sites: the University of Baghdad in Baghdad and the Tuwaitha site, 24 km east of Baghdad. For the University of Baghdad, two colleges were inspected: the College of Sc Score: 0.77 (Size 9615)
Media Advisory 2003/2101 - UNMOVIC IAEA Press Statement on Inspection Activities in Iraq
UNMOVIC IAEA Press Statement on Inspection Activities in Iraq. An UNMOVIC biological team inspected the College of Agriculture, Baghdad University, in Abu Ghraib, about 30 km west of Baghdad, to verify the tagged equipment. The IAEA inspected the Tuwait Score: 0.77 (Size 8596)
Media Advisory 2003/2301 - UNMOVIC IAEA Press Statement on Inspection Activities in Iraq
UNMOVIC IAEA Press Statement on Inspection Activities in Iraq. A second UNMOVIC missile team inspected the Taji Resin Establishment, 40 km north of Baghdad. One IAEA team inspected the Ashakyli Stores of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission. Score: 0.77 (Size 10060)
Media Advisory 2003/2501 - UNMOVIC IAEA Press Statement on Inspection Activities in Iraq
UNMOVIC IAEA Press Statement on Inspection Activities in Iraq. An UNMOVIC multidiciplinary team inspected the Sumaykah surface-to-surface missile support facility, located 70 km northwest of Baghdad. An UNMOVIC biological team inspected the College of V Score: 0.77 (Size 10405)
Media Advisory 2003/0402 - UNMOVIC IAEA Press Statement on Inspection Activities in Iraq - 4 February 2003
An UNMOVIC multidisciplinary team inspected three sites north of Baghdad: a farm, a helicopter support facility, and the Al Taji Ammunition Depot. One team inspected the Al Mamoun plant of the Al Qa Qaa Establishment south of Baghdad. A second IAEA team Score: 0.77 (Size 9325)
Media Advisory 2003/0202 - UNMOVIC IAEA Press Statement on Inspection Activities in Iraq - 2 February 2003
An UNMOVIC missile team inspected the Al-Samoud Factory, approximately 40 km west of Baghdad. An UNMOVIC chemical team visited the Al-Warda Store, 30 km south of Baghdad, which belongs to the Baghdad Water Supply Authority. An UNMOVIC joint biological t Score: 0.77 (Size 8991)
Media Advisory 2003/0302 - UNMOVIC IAEA Press Statement on Inspection Activities in Iraq - 3 February 2003
3 February 2003 -- Four UNMOVIC biological teams inspected four separate sites. A fourth team, together with a multidisciplinary team, inspected a storage area owned by the Al Nida Moulds Plant, 15 km southeast of Baghdad. An UNMOVIC chemical team inspe Score: 0.77 (Size 8552)
Media Advisory 2003/2502 - UNMOVIC IAEA Press Statement on Inspection Activities in Iraq - 25 February 2003
Four UNMOVIC missile teams performed five inspections. An UNMOVIC multidisciplinary team inspected the Al Falha Egg Production Company located approximately 100km southeast of Baghdad. A second IAEA team inspected the Al Tahdi electronics research and el Score: 0.77 (Size 10979)
Media Advisory 2003/0503 - UNMOVIC IAEA Press Statement on Inspection Activities in Iraq - 5 March 2003
5 March 2003 -- An UNMOVIC missile team supervised the destruction of 9 more Al Samoud 2 missiles. One IAEA team inspected a State-owned trading company, and another IAEA team inspected the computer centre of a State bank. NOTE TO EDITORS: For additiona Score: 0.77 (Size 8376)
Media Advisory 2003/0903 - UNMOVIC IAEA Press Statement on Inspection Activities in Iraq - 9 March 2003
9 March 2003 -- An UNMOVIC missile team supervised the destruction of 6 more Al Samoud 2 missiles and 11 more warheads at the Taji Technical Battalion. Another missile team went to the Al Qaa Qaa storage site for the verification of emptying and tagging Score: 0.77 (Size 9017)
Bulletin 44-2_F_01.qxd
Lors de l'établissement du rapport, l'AIEA a estimé que les quelques incertitudes qui demeuraient ne l'empêchaient pas de mettre efficacement en oeuvre son plan de contrôle et de vérification continus (CVC) du respect, par l'Iraq, de son engagement à ne Score: 0.77 (Size 370211)
GOV/2816/Add. l-GC(39)/10/Add. 1
Following the arrival in Jordan, on 8 August 1995, of Lieutenant-General Hussein Kamel Hassan Al Majid, the former Minister of Industry and Military Industrialization of Iraq, the Director General was invited to send an IAEA delegation to Baghdad to acqui Score: 0.77 (Size 8021)
film-script.doc
MISSION IRAQ(Film Script)1. Film: Multiple shots of destroyed buildings in Al- Atheer. This is what remains of the secret weapons research centre at Al- Atheer in Iraq. It had to be dismantled as part of a clandestine nuclear programme uncovered by insp Score: 0.77 (Size 40334)
GOV/2816/Add. l-GC(39)/10/Add. 1
Following the arrival in Jordan, on 8 August 1995, of Lieutenant-General Hussein Kamel Hassan Al Majid, the former Minister of Industry and Military Industrialization of Iraq, the Director General was invited to send an IAEA delegation to Baghdad to acqui Score: 0.77 (Size 8037)
Doc04.qxd
Activities of the IAEA Iraq Action Team. The first IAEA inspection in response to its mandate under UN Security Council Resolution 687 commenced in Iraq on May 15, 1991. As of October 1997, the IAEA had completed a series of 30 inspection campaigns in Score: 0.77 (Size 64352)
IAEA action report in Jan 2003 is 130+ tons less than they say is missing in report of Oct. 2004 = you can also check Breaking News there is another report on the fox report
Good work.
Jamie Rubin on Greta's show. Fighting for his job right now.
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2003/ebsp2003n003.shtml
27 January 2003 | New York, USA
Statement to the United Nations Security Council
The Status of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq
by IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei
exerpt
.......
A particular issue of focus has been the attempted procurement by Iraq of high strength aluminium tubes, and the question of whether these tubes, if acquired, could be used for the manufacture of nuclear centrifuges. Iraqi authorities have indicated that their unsuccessful attempts to procure the aluminium tubes related to a programme to reverse engineer conventional rockets. To verify this information, IAEA inspectors have inspected the relevant rocket production and storage sites, taken tube samples, interviewed relevant Iraqi personnel, and reviewed procurement contracts and related documents. From our analysis to date it appears that the aluminium tubes would be consistent with the purpose stated by Iraq and, unless modified, would not be suitable for manufacturing centrifuges; however, we are still investigating this issue. It is clear, however, that the attempt to acquire such tubes is prohibited under Security Council resolution 687.
Another area of focus has been to determine how certain other "dual use" materials have been relocated or used - that is, materials that could be used in nuclear weapons production but also have other legitimate uses. A good example is the Iraqi declaration concerning the high explosive "HMX" - which states that, out of the HMX under IAEA seals in Iraq at the end of 1998, some had been supplied to cement plants as an industrial explosive for mining. The whereabouts and final use of the removed material are matters that will require further investigation - although it will be difficult to verify the disposition of the HMX that is declared to have been used.
A fourth focal point has been the investigation of reports of Iraqi efforts to import uranium after 1991. The Iraqi authorities have denied any such attempts. The IAEA will continue to pursue this issue. At this stage, however, we do not have enough information, and we would appreciate receiving more.
We are also making progress on a number of other issues related, for example, to the attempted importation of a magnet production facility. ........
Anything new? Haven't found a link to this anywhere yet.
One Mohammed al Baradei, who Pres. Bush announced a week or two ago would NOT be re-nominated to that post, as in "You're fired, sucker!"
There's some suspicion this was al Baradei's way of getting back at Bush.
If I were him, I'd be looking over my shoulder...
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2003/ebsp2003n002.shtml
9 January 2003 | New York, USA
Status of the Agency's Verification Activities in Iraq As of 8 January 2003
by IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei
1. The following information is provided to update the Council on the activities of the IAEA pursuant to Security Council resolution 1441 (2002) and other relevant resolutions. It describes the verification activities performed thus far, next steps, and where we are at this stage.
VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES
exerpt:
Other Dual Use Items
11. The relocation and consumption of some dual use materials has been among the questions raised in connection with Iraq's backlog of semi-annual declarations. The high explosive "HMX" is a prime example of such material. The removal of Agency seals on the HMX and the declared relocation and consumption of some of the HMX must be explained and documented by Iraq before the Agency can reach a conclusion with regard to the use of such material. The Iraqi declarations indicate that out, of the 228 tonnes of HMX available in Iraq at the end of 1998, 196 remained at the facility where the HMX was previously under IAEA seal. Iraq also declared that it had blended the remaining 32 tonnes with sulphur and turned them into 45.6 tonnes of "industrial explosive" provided mainly to cement plants for mining. The material balance, current stock, whereabouts and final use of such material are currently being investigated.
Now, they are acting surprised that the US may not be able to account for all the explosives in Iraq. Now, they are pretending that having explosives under the central command of a malicious dictator was somehow safer than the possibility the explosives may be dispersed among the population or elsewhere.
As scary as it may sound, I would prefer that the insurgency contained within Iraq have the explosives than for Saddam to have the explosives and the rest of his arsenal in a few years to sow the seeds of terror against the US. Regardless of the number of troops deployed the risk that large amounts of explosives would disperse through the countryside was always very high.
It was a risk Kerry and others were willing to take at the time. What has changed?
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2003/ebsp2003n005.shtml
14 February 2003 | New York, USA
Statement to the United Nations Security Council
The Status of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq: 14 February 2003 Update
by IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei
exerpt
Use of HMX
The IAEA has continued to investigate the relocation and consumption of the high explosive HMX. As I reported earlier, Iraq has declared that 32 tonnes of the HMX previously under IAEA seal had been transferred for use in the production of industrial explosives, primarily to cement plants as a booster for explosives used in quarrying.
Iraq has provided us with additional information, including documentation on the movement and use of this material, and inspections have been conducted at locations where the material is said to have been used. However, given the nature of the use of high explosives, it may well be that the IAEA will be unable to reach a final conclusion on the end use of this material. While we have no indication that this material was used for any application other than that declared by Iraq, we have no technical method of verifying, quantitatively, the declared use of the material in explosions. We will continue to follow this issue through a review of civilian mining practices in Iraq and through interviews of key Iraqi personnel involved in former relevant research and development activities.
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