New York: Steady Threats from a Known Source Mean Nothing
Even someone repeatedly threatened by another has no entitlement to police protection until they have been physically harmed.
In 1959, Linda Riss, a New Yorker, was terrorized by an ex-boyfriend, who had a criminal record. Over several months, he repeatedly threatened her: "If I can't have you, no one else will have you, and when I get through with you, no one else will want you." She repeatedly sought police protection, explaining her request in detail. Nothing was done to help her. When he threatened her with immediate attack, she again urgently begged the New York City Police Department for help: "Completely distraught, she called the police, begging for help, but was refused." The next day, she was attacked: a "thug" hired by her persecutor threw lye (sodium hydroxide) in her face, She was blinded in one eye and her face was permanently scarred. The Court of Appeals of New York ruled that Linda Riss had no right to protection. The Court refused to create such a right because that would impose a crushing economic burden on the government. Only the legislature could create a right to protection:
"The amount of protection that may be provided is limited by the resources of the community and by a considered legislative executive decision as to how these resources may be deployed. For the courts to proclaim a new and general duty of protection ... even to those who may be the particular seekers of protection based on specific hazards, could and would inevitably determine how the limited police resources of the community should be allocated and without predictable limits."
Judge Keating dissented, bitterly noting that Linda Riss was victimized not only because she had relied upon the police to protect her, but because she obeyed New York laws that forbid her to own a weapon. Judge Keating wrote: "What makes the city's position particularly difficult to understand is that, in conformity to the dictates of the law, Linda did not carry any weapon for self defense. Thus, by a rather bitter irony she was required to rely for protection on the City of New York, which now denies all responsibility to her." [Riss v. City of N.Y., 293 N.Y. 2d 897 (1968)].
California: An Imminent Death Threat Means Nothing
Even a person whose life is imminently in peril is not entitled to help. On 4 September 1972 Ruth Bunnell called the San Jose (California) police department to report that her estranged husband, Mack Bunnell, had telephoned her to tell her that he was coming to her house to kill her. In the previous year, the San Jose police, "had made at least 20 calls and responses to Mrs. Bunnell's home ...allegedly related to complaints of violent acts committed by Mack Bunnell on Mrs. Bunnell and her two daughters." Even so, Ruth Bunnell was told to call back only when Mack Bunnell arrived. Some 45 minutes later, Mack Bunnell arrived and stabbed Ruth Bunnell to death. A neighbor called the police, who then came to the murder scene. The California Court of Appeal held that any claim against the police department: "is barred by the provisions of the California Tort Claims Act, particularly section 845, which states: Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for failure to establish a police department or otherwise provide police protection service or, if police protection service is provided, for failure to provide sufficient police protection.'" [Hartzer v. City of San Jose, App., 120 Cal.Rptr 5 (1975)].
Washington, D.C.: Rape Is No Cause For Concern
If direct peril to life does not entitle one to police protection, clearly imminent peril of rape merits no concern. Carolyn Warren, of Washington, D.C., called the police on 16 March 1975: two intruders had smashed the back door to her house and had attacked a female house mate. After calling the police, Warren and another house mate took refuge on a lower back roof of the building. The police went to the front door and knocked. Warren, afraid to go downstairs, could not answer. The police officers left without checking the back door.
Warren again called the police and was told they would respond. Assuming they had returned, Warren called out to the house mate, thus revealing her own location. The two intruders then rounded up all three women. "For the next fourteen hours the women were held captive, raped, robbed, beaten, forced to commit sexual; acts upon each other, and made to submit to the sexual demands of (the intruders-ed.)." The Superior Court of the District of Columbia held that: "the fundamental principle (is-ed.) that a government and its agents are under no general duty to provide public services, such as police protection, to any particular individual citizen.' ...The duty to provide public services is owed to the public at large, and, absent a special relationship between the police and an individual, no specific legal duty exists." In an accompanying memorandum, the Court explained that the term "special relationship" did not mean an oral promise to respond to a call for help. Rather, it involved the provision of help to the police force. [Warren v. District of Columbia, D.C.App., 444 A.2d 1 (1981)].
Illinois: School Teachers Get No Help Either
On 20 April 1961, Josephine M. Keane, a teacher in the Chicago City Public Schools was assaulted and killed on school premises by a student enrolled in the school. Keane's family sued the City of Chicago, claiming that, "the City was negligent in failing to assign police protection to the school, although it knew or should have known that failure to provide this protection would result in harm to persons lawfully on the premises (because) it knew or should have known of the dangerous condition then existing at the school." The Appeals Court affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court of Cook County. Presiding Judge Burke of the Appeals Court held that, "Failure on the part of a municipality to exercise a government function does not, without more, expose the municipality to liability." Justice Burke went on to say that: "To hold that under the circumstances alleged in the complaint the City owed a special duty' to Mrs. Keane for the safety and well being of her person would impose an all but impossible burden upon the City, considering the numerous police, fire, housing and other laws, ordinances and regulations in force." [Keane v. City of Chicago, 98 Ill App2d 460 (1968)].
North Carolina: Helpless Children Don't Count
Even defenseless children merit no special care. On 3 June 1985 police tried to arrest a man and his "girlfriend," both of whom were wanted on multiple murder charges, and who were known to be heavily armed. The alleged murderers -- along with the "girlfriend's two sons, aged nine and ten years -- tried to flee in a car. As the police closed in after a running shoot out, the children were poisoned with cyanide and then shot in the head either by the mother or her "boy friend," one of whom then blew up the vehicle, killing both. The boy's father -- who had filed for divorce - sued the law enforcement agencies and officers for "wrongful death" of his sons. The North Carolina Court of Appeals held that: "the defendant law enforcement agencies and officers did not owe them (the children -- ed.) any legal duty of care, the breach of which caused their injury and death ...Our law is that in the absence of a special relationship, such as exists when a victim is in custody or the police have promised to protect a particular person, law enforcement agencies and personnel have no duty to protect the individuals from the criminal acts of others; instead their duty is to preserve the peace and arrest law breakers for the protection of the general public. In this instance, a special relationship of the type stated did not exist ...Plaintiff's argument that the children's presence required defendants to delay (the) arrest until the children were elsewhere is incompatible with the duty that the law has long placed on law enforcement personnel to make the safety of the public their first concern; for permitting dangerous criminals to go unapprehended lest particular individuals be injured or killed would inevitably and necessarily endanger the public at large, a policy that the law cannot tolerate, much less foster." [Lynch v. N.C.Dept. of Justice, 376 S.E.2nd 247 (N.C.App. 1989)].
Virginia: Wrongful Release = Wrongful Death? Wrong!
Marvin Mundy murdered Jack Marshall in Virginia. Mundy -- convicted for carrying a concealed pistol -- was sent to jail by a judge who expressed concern that Mundy, "might kill himself of a member of the public." Mundy was mistakenly released from jail 8 days later. Nine days later he was re-arrested on an unrelated charge. Five hours later, the same jailer and sheriff released him, apparently without checking to see if that was proper. Three weeks later Mundy robbed and murdered Marshall. Marshall's widow sued, alleging negligence on the part of the sheriff and jailer, and asserting a violation of Jack Marshall's right to due process. The Court rejected the claim: " ... a distinction must be drawn between a public duty owed by the official to the citizenry at large and a special duty owned to a specific identifiable person or class of persons. ... Only a violation of the latter duty will give rise to civil liability of the official. ... to hold a public official civilly liable for violating a duty owed to the public at large would subject the official to potential liability for every action he undertook and would not be in society's best interest." ... no special relationship existed that would create a common law duty on the defendants to protect the decedent (Marshall -- ed.) from Mundy's criminal acts. Similarly, without a special relationship between the defendants and the decedent, no constitutional duty can arise under the Due Process Clause as codified by 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Therefore, plaintiff's (Mrs. Marshall -- ed) due process claim also must fall." [Marshall v. Winstonm, 389 S.E.2nd 902 (Va. 1990)].
The case of Tracy Thurman vs. The City of Torrington (1984) further influenced policy changes. Tracy Thurman from Torrington, Connecticut several times sought and did not obtain police protection against the violent attacks of her estranged husband. Eventually in June 1983, Tracy was critically assaulted in the presence of the police who stood by and did nothing (Hampton, 1999, pp. 186). She subsequently won a civil suit against the police for $1.9 million dollars. http://www.uic.edu/classes/socw/socw517/whywomenstaymaharaj.htm
So in this case, there wasn't a mere promise to protect that was broken - the police were already there and did nothing about a violent crime in progress, while it was happening. This case goes considerably beyond the ones I cited in my previous post.