Posted on 10/19/2004 6:29:22 PM PDT by TFine80
"Mr. President, today as we hear much rhetoric in the U.S. Senate about the spread of communism throughout the world and the need of the United States to make efforts to try to respond to that so-called threat."
He said this in the context of supporting his resolution to pressure Marcos and the Phillipines for democratic reform. He may have been right on some aspects, but once again his rhetoric was naive and dangerous.
bttt
Wow, great find. I'd love to hear this one get out into the media for discussion.
is it on tape?
bookmark bump
Now, this what I was talking about in another thread today. This kind of information about Kerry needs to be made front and center. "Preaching to the choir" won't help much, it's the independent and undecided voter that needs to hear this.
It was from Senate testimony. He later tries to claim that pressuring the Marcos government would give it more credibility and reduce the risk of a Communist takeover.
But we are now free of the "inordinate fear" of that so-called threat. Not.
Kerry is the most useless idiot in DC. Perhaps he is even the most useless idiot in america.
Please please don't let him be president oh lordy lordy.
Ha, this coming from the mouth of Hanoi John the communist sympathiser?
Also, I'm not sure if this is worth posting because of the current political opinion on this, but you should see what he said about South Africa.
Is that like the "exaggerated threat" of terrorism?
That's right, John F'n Kerry, I am questioning your patriotism!
sKerry has a PROVABLE track record of a Pro Communist, Anti-America Agenda!
Him being the chosen candidate of the democraps is not to be taken lightly, imho.
sKerry times indeed!
The Boston Globe wrote:
"Sen. John Forbes Kerry's trip to Nicaragua bears out what many relatives on the Forbes side of the family, and most politicians who know him, contend. He's a shrewd opportunist whose personal political ambitions dictate every move he makes.
The arrogance he often displays came through in his boastful assertion last week that his conversations with the Sandinistas 'were longer than any the Secretary of State has had with the Nicaraguan government in five years.'"
Below are the most relevant excerpts from a series of articles that appeared in the Boston Globe in 1985.
*****************
KERRY, HARKIN ARRIVE IN MANAGUA
Published on April 19, 1985
Author(s): Walter V.
MANAGUA, Nicaragua - Sens. John F. Kerry and Thomas Harkin (D-Iowa) arrived here last night, expressing hope that their two days of meetings with Nicaraguan leaders will provide them with enough information to sway congressional votes on the issue of aid to anti-government rebels.
*****************
NICARAGUA OFFERS TRUCE IF US HALTS CONTRA AID
Published on April 21, 1985
Author(s): Walter V. Robinson, Globe Staff
MANAGUA, Nicaragua - President Daniel Ortega Saavedra, after intensive talks with Sen. John F. Kerry and Sen. Thomas R. Harkin of Iowa, said yesterday that Nicaragua would agree to an immediate cease-fire and other measures to end the country's civil war if the United States ended all support for Nicaraguan rebels.
In a document handed to the two Democratic senators as they left, Ortega also said he would immediately restore civil liberties in Nicaragua and end press censorship if the
*****************
GOLDWATER SUGGESTS REPRIMANDS OF KERRY, HARKIN FOR TRIP
Published on April 24, 1985
Author(s): Eileen McNamara, Globe Staff
WASHINGTON - Sen. Barry Goldwater yesterday accused Sens. John F. Kerry of Massachusetts and Tom Harkin of Iowa of violating a federal law that prohibits private citizens from negotiating with foreign governments.
Goldwater, expressing what Sen. Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.) called "the repressed anger" of Senate Republicans, suggested that the freshman Democrats be formally chided for meeting last week in Managua with Nicaragua's president, Daniel Ortega Saavedra.
*****************
LIBERAL ACTIVISTS WORRY SOME STATE DEMOCRATS
Published on April 30, 1985
Author(s): David Farrell, Globe Staff
Sen. John Forbes Kerry's trip to Nicaragua bears out what many relatives on the Forbes side of the family, and most politicians who know him, contend. He's a shrewd opportunist whose personal political ambitions dictate every move he makes.
The arrogance he often displays came through in his boastful assertion last week that his conversations with the Sandinistas "were longer than any the Secretary of State has had with the Nicaraguan government in five years."
*****************
CONGRESSMEN DISPUTE SHULTZ ON THEIR ROLE
Published on May 25, 1985
Author(s): Associated Press
WASHINGTON - Congressional Democrats say they are not about to give the Reagan Administration a free hand in Central American policy, even if Secretary of State George P. Shultz considers their behavior "undesirable and reprehensible."
"The Congress more clearly represents the views of the American people, who overwhelmingly disapprove of the Administration's policies in Nicaragua," said Sen. Tom Harkin (D-Iowa), who traveled to Managua last month
*****************
ORTEGA'S TRIP TO MOSCOW LOOMS LARGE ON CAPITOL HILL
Published on June 8, 1985
Author(s): Eileen McNamara, Globe Staff
WASHINGTON - The major foreign policy debate of this session of Congress is turning not on issues of national security or international stability but on one man's travels.
The April visit to Moscow by President Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua is cited by enraged Republicans and embarrassed Democrats alike as cause for the most recent resuscitation of debate on Capitol Hill over aid to rebels fighting Ortega's government.
*****************
While I agree with your thought, the word 'useless' should be replaced with 'dangerous'.......
Back in 1985, Kerry was really a lunatic on these military issues. I won't make a new thread for this, but let me post another incident from 1985 where he pissed off Goldwater and others by interrupting the discussion of an important immigration bill to insist upon an amendment to block the test of an ASAT (anti-satellite weapon) scheduled for the next day:
Congressional Record -- Senate -- Thursday, September 12, 1985 -- 99th Cong. 1st Sess. -- 131 Cong Rec S 11330
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I understand this amendment will be offered by the distinguished junior Senator from Massachusetts, and that the chairman of the Armed Services Committee is willing to enter into a time agreement -- an hour for the proponents, and a half-hour for the opponents. Then the Senator probably will move to table the amendment.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I very reluctantly agree. No. 1, I do not think this is a matter that is germane to the immigration bill; and, No. 2, I remind my friend from Massachusetts that this test is going to be conducted tomorrow. I do not care what happens in this body. The test is going to be conducted. Since I had my discussion first on the floor, I indicated to my friend from Massachusetts an hour for his presentation, although I said that we can bring General Abramson in here to run the whole show, and he could explain the whole thing in 10 minutes. That would be all right -- and half an hour for our side. I do not like to hold up the Senate that long on something that I frankly do not see any need for, particularly when the test is going to be conducted tomorrow. This section will have absolutely no effect on it at all. But I am not going to oppose the time method which the chairman of the committee has agreed to, or that the leadership has agreed to. I just do not like to sit around here that long.
Mr. DOLE. Does the Senator object to that time agreement?
Mr. GOLDWATER. No. I cannot object to it.
Mr. DOLE. I make that request.
Mr. BYRD. What is the request?
Mr. DOLE. That on the amendment to be offered by the Senator from Massachusetts there be a time agreement of 1 hour for the proponents, 1/2 hour for the opponents, and that no amendments be in order to the amendment.
Mr. SYMMS. Reserving the right to object, will the distinguished majority leader cut that in half? We are trying to concentrate on immigration legislation. If you can cut that in half, it would be less in the way, and interfering with the normal duties of the Senate.
Mr. DOLE. As I understand it, may be cut more than half on this side, Hopefully, after the agreement is reached, it will not take an hour on that side. So I think we can probably do it rather quickly.
Mr. KERRY. Will the majority leader yield? Mr. Leader, I will endeavor to yield back as much time as possible. I doubt that we will use the full hour. I will certainly try not to.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I have no objection if the request is as the distinguished majority leader said -- no amendments to the amendment would be in order.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. DOLE. Are we going to table it?
Mr. GOLDWATER. I wanted to make sure that the debate will end tonight, and we will not resume the debate Tuesday before a vote.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, no. We are going to vote on this in about 1 hour, I hope, or less.
AMENDMENT NO. 597
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. Kerry], on behalf of himself, and Senators Hart, Kennedy, Weicker, Simon, Cranston, Pell, and Larkin, proposes an amendment numbered 597.
On page 125, after line 23, add the following new title:
TITLE VI -- MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
SEC. 601. DELAY OF ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPON TEST.
(a) Congressional Findings. -- The Congress finds that --
(1) the President of the United States and the head of the Soviet Union have agreed to a summit conference scheduled to convene in Geneva, Switzerland, on November 19, 1985;
(2) that conference will present an extraordinary opportunity for an agreement in principle on measures to control the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union, including limitations on anti-satellite weapons; and
(3) a delay in the scheduled test of an anti-satellite weapon against an object in space by the United States until after the conclusion of the summit conference could greatly enhance the climate for fruitful discussions and facilitate the possibility for an accord on anti-satellite weapons.
(b) Delay of Test. -- Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary of Defense may not carry out a test of the Space Defense System (anti-satellite weapon) against an object in space until after the conclusion of the summit conference between the President of the United States and the head of the Soviet Union referred to in subsection (a).
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I sent this amendment to the desk on behalf of myself and Senators Hart, Kennedy, Weicker, Simon, Cranston, Pell, and Harkin.
I would like to say to the distinguished manager of the immigration bill that I recognize that it is not his choice nor really mine that we are discussing this amendment on this bill. If I had another vehicle, I would have chosen it. I appreciate the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee for his willingness to permit this issue to be aired in this manner in order to have opposing views heard.
Mr. President, I know we visited this issue before. It is not a new issue in the Senate. It is not a new issue even to this session. The reason that I am asking the Senate to take a stand tonight, before tomorrow's afternoon test firing of an antisatellite weapon, is that I believe, and many of my colleagues share the belief, that we have the unique opportunity to be able to take a step that might -- not guaranteed but that might -- open the door to more fruitful negotiations, and that certainly would put the United States on the highest moral ground with respect to the arms race and issues of weapons in space.
This amendment is a straightforward attempt to enhance the climate of the summit by preserving the status quo on Asat's for a mere 9 weeks. It is not an effort to say we will never test. It is not an effort to take away from the President the ability to test. It is simply an effort to say that in the interest of trying to achieve an arms control agreement, in the interest of hopefully limiting the opening up of the window of space to space weapons, we will take this opportunity as the Senate, which has already expressed itself in its effort to secure limitations on antisatellite weapons, that we will do so now in the hopes that those 9 weeks might afford us the opportunity to do a better job of restraining the growth in those weapons.
I do not have to tell any of my colleagues here, many of whom have served in public life far longer than I and in far more important positions, the importance of the opportunity for a summit meeting. It takes place infrequently. Obviously, this particular summit is perhaps one of the most important in recent memory in the opportunities that it affords us.
We seek a 9-week delay by the United States in the face of a status quo that has existed for some 15 years and a weapons system that the Soviets have not tested since 1982. All we are asking for is 9 weeks of cushion to say that the United States is going to make its best effort and put the best foot forward in order to try to limit the further development of weapons in space designed to target and kill satellite.
The first issue that this amendment strives to speak to is the posture of the United States as it enters the summit. Do we or do we not wish to be perceived by the world as the nuclear superpower that is willing to go an extra step to seek real controls or a superpower that brazenly pushes aside a simple opportunity to show restraint?
In testing a new military technology, a homing device fired from underneath the wing of an F-15 aircraft, we will be testing a weapon that I happily acknowledge is superior to weapons of the Soviet Union. But in so doing right before the summit, Mr. President, I believe we play into the hands of those who want to play the propaganda game of characterizing the United States as being responsible for an increase in the space race.
By contrast, a decision by the United States not to test the antisatellite weapons before the summit could put the United States in the posture of offering the Soviets a special incentive to put forward an agreement in principle on limiting Asat's and other weapons and could go a long way to alter the tone in which the United States prepares for the summit.
This amendment does not, and I repeat, Mr. President, it does not, prevent the President from going ahead with an Asat test after the summit if the Soviet Union fails to take a responsible position in Geneva.
Nine weeks.
I ask my colleagues to consider that on two prior occasions the Senate has gone on record as wanting to limit Asat's. It did it when the distinguished Senator from Virginia joined with Senator Tsongas, my predecessor, and it did it again this year when the distinguished Senator from Virginia set up a certification process which did allow tests but which made it clear that there were specific conditions under which those tests should be conducted.
The second thing this amendment tries to do: It strives to respond to the continuing congressional belief that our satellites are important to us for the preservation of the security of our country. The continued security of our satellites is absolutely essential to our ability for command and control, for intelligence, and it is essential, moreover, to almost all of the major military objectives that we have with respect to deterring nuclear war.
If we open space up to a race that will jeopardize those satellites we, in fact, begin to jeopardize our own deterrent ability and we diminish our current posture of security.
The later we take action, Mr. President, the longer that we wait, the more possible it becomes that the Soviet Union will develop more sophisticated antisatellite weapons as will we and the more impossible it becomes to secure some kind of restraint on this dangerous technology.
Mr. President, these facts are not at issue in this Congress. These facts have been accepted by the Senate. That is precisely why we require the President to endeavor to negotiate the strictest possible Asat limitations consistent with the national security of this country.
On August 20, while the Congress was in recess, as many of us predicted would happen, President Reagan informed us that the United States planned to conduct the first test of its new F-15 launched miniature homing vehicle against an object in space. It should be noted we have had two tests with this particular system. One was classified as a success; the other as a partial success. They were against a point in space.
At the time that he made the announcement, the President certified, as required by law, that the United States had endeavored in good faith to negotiate with the Soviet Union a mutual and verifiable agreement with the strictest possible limitations on antisatellite weapons consistent with the national security interests of the United States.
He also certified the other requirements with respect to carrying out a test. Specifically: he certified that pending agreement on such strict limitation, testing against objects in space by an antisatellite warhead of the United States is, in the language that Senator Warner and others proposed that was passed by the Congress -- that such a test must be necessary "to avert clear and irrevocable harm to the national security, that such testing would not constitute an irreversible step that would gravely impair prospects for negotiations on antisatellite weapons, and that such testing is fully consistent with the rights and obligations of the United States under the ABM Treaty of 1972."
Mr. President, to date there has been no close examination by this body of this certification. We pass a law. We require the President to certify. And yet no one in the Senate has formally examined that certification before this test takes place in such a way that we should decide whether or not we approve it.
Mr. President, I believe the certification does not accurately reflect reality and I even believe that it makes a mockery of reality in certain respects.
Let us just take a moment to review the facts.
First and most significantly, the planned test tomorrow -- at least according to press accounts -- does not come after the United States has conducted serious negotiations toward a treaty. As the President himself states in the certification document, the United States has been "unable to identify a specific Asat proposal which meets the requirements defined by the Congress in 1984." Believing as it does that, in the words of the President's certification, "No arrangements or agreements beyond those already governing military activities in outer space have been found to date that are judged to be in the overall interest of the United States and its allies," the administration therefore -- and we know this as a matter of record -- has not undertaken negotiations on an Asat treaty, which is specifically what the certification requires.
For the record, I would like to list at least five possible Asat proposals the Reagan administration could have sought to negotiate, all of which would comply with the intent sought by Congress in the 1984 language. First, a ban on all testing, use and possession of all Asat capability; second, a ban on testing, use and possession of dedicated Asat's as opposed to all Asat's -- dedicated Asat's; third, a ban on the use and testing but not the possession of dedicated Asat's; fourth, a ban on development or use of new types of Asat's, no restrictions on existing Asat systems; fifth, a ban on the use of Asat's, no restrictions on possession or testing.
Now, I will concede there is some expert consensus that the first type of agreement is unattainable at the present time because some non-Asat systems have some theoretical capability to serve as Asat's. And we can point to the GALOSH system as an example of that. So residual capabilities would remain even if dedicated systems were banned.
But, Mr. President, the second type of agreement is something that we could negotiate if the administration desired, and it would help protect our satellites and it would limit competition in space weaponry. Even if the administration believes that verificiation problems prevent the second type of agreement, the second being a ban on testing and use of a dedicated Asat such as the system which the Soviets now have, then we could go into the third agreement or the fourth agreement or the fifth. Even the fifth type of agreement, despite its obvious limitations, is possible if the United States and Soviet Union chose to try to codify rules of the road.
Instead, the administration has said that no Asat proposal of any kind is in the national security interests of the United States and therefore has not sought to negotiate one -- that is the clear reading of the language that has been submitted in the certification to the Congress.
Now, one reason that the administration gives for its refusal to negotiate an Asat Treaty is the issue of verification, that limits on Asat's are allegedly nonverifiable. But, Mr. President, I find it hard to believe how you can make that argument on the face of what we know today about the Soviet system by which assessment, Mr. President, we are now making the decision that we ought to go ahead and supposedly test. It is verification that has given us that very information. The truth is that despite the administration's claims that verification is an obstacle to any Asat agreement we know that they have a system. We know how big it is. We know how many tests have been conducted. We know how many of those tests have succeeded. We know how long it takes to intercept an object in space. We know in what orbital inclinations. We know they have not tested it in more than 3 years. We know from numerous nonclassified reports and testimony that in all it has been tested 20 times. We know it has failed to intercept a target 11 times, for an overall success rate of just 45 percent. We know the Soviet Asat is not exactly a modern state of the art weapon. It was introduced in 1968. We know it was lofted into orbit atop an SS-9 booster rocket, a large liquid fueled intercontinental ballistic missile, weighing more than 2,000 kilograms and 6 meters long. We know in each test it has been launched from Tyuratum into orbits with a narrow range of inclination. And we know that to test it the Soviets have launched satellites into orbits within the same range of inclination. We know it takes the Soviet Asat one to two trips around the Earth before its orbit crosses that of the target and interception occurs. We know that it can only live for the period of those two revolutions and then because of its short life, because it is battery operated, it dies and it falls.
Mr. President, we know a great deal about the system and whatever the intent of the Soviet Asat Program, it clearly does not today threaten most U.S. satellites. And that is a matter of record from various responsible officials in our military who have testified before our committees in a nonclassified fashion, and they have publicly stated that that level of threat is indeed minimal. The administration says it can reach 5,000 kilometers. We know it has never been tested at more than 2,400 kilometers. Now, that might enable the Soviet Asat system to threaten some few weather satellites and some military spy and communications satellites.
Mr. President, I am not saying to the distinguished Senator from Ohio or to the distinguished Senator from Virginia that this system cannot go up and knock down a couple of satellites. Yes, it can. But the majority of our most vital satellites are at much higher levels outside the range of this system. Mr. President, as sure as it has happened every time in the arms race, if we create a capability that is beyond that of the Soviet Union, they will surely follow.
There are also basic conceptual flaws in the Soviet system. First, the satellite can only be attacked when its ground track runs close to the launch site of the Asat system of the Soviet Union, a condition that is satisfied only for satellite orbits with inclinations higher than the latitude of the antisatellite's launch site. That only happens, Mr. President, twice a day, twice a day and there are delay periods of up to 6 hours or so, an average delay period of 6 hours before they can shoot.
When you put all this together, when you make a considered, rational judgment about U.S. security, about the threat to this Nation, it is difficult to understand how this particular system at this moment in time presents such a compelling and irrevocable danger to the United States that we cannot wait 9 weeks until the President sits down in Geneva and says to Mr. Gorbachev, "Are we really going to go ahead with this process?" I think in the interest of that effort we should take a second look. There is no reasonable military scenario arising between now and the summit meeting whereby the Soviet Asat threatens clear and irrevocable harm to the national security -- clear and irrevocable harm to the national security.
Would it, if we went on interminably and they had an effective system? Yes, I would probably agree with the Senator from Ohio and others. But that is not what we are talking about. We are talking about whether or not at this moment in time that is the condition that exists.
I believe that the certification does not merit the stamp of approval of the U.S. Senate. I believe, instead, that a test of our Asat at this time against an object in space jeopardizes ultimately our national security; because if we do not get an agreement, then our satellites will ultimately also be threatened. We have much to lose from this. We rely on our satellites for information that is vital to our national defense, from command and control of our military forces to early warning of military attack. Our military forces are far-flung. We have bases around the world, and the preponderance of our nuclear weapons is located beyond our shores. If our satellites were to be threatened, we would risk the decapitation of both nuclear and conventional forces, making it difficult for the United States to maintain a credible response to a sneak attack.
As the United States begins flying more frequent space shuttle missions to service, to fly, and to bring fresh crews to continuously inhabited space stations, the threat to the U.S. interests from Soviet deployment of Asat technology will continue to grow.
The long-term damage to our strategic security from the further development of Asat technologies by both sides thus far outweighs whatever short-term theoretical advantage the administration has claimed from going ahead with the testing of our current Asat.
It is for these reasons of national security that we moved to request the President to negotiate an Asat Treaty with the strictest possible limitations. I believe that it remains in the interests of our national security that we reach such an accord on Asat.
Mr. President, every scientist and every expert who has looked at this system will tell each and every Senator that this system we are testing tomorrow is superior, vastly superior -- if it works -- to the system of the Soviet Union. Every time any side has unilaterally made a technological breakthrough in the arms race, the other side has followed. That history and pattern of action and reaction has been the history of the arms race.
We exploded the first atomic bomb. The Soviets followed in 1949.
In 1948, we unveiled the first intercontinental bomber capable of carrying nuclear weapons. The Soviets followed suit 7 years later.
In 1952, we exploded the first hydrogen bomb, and the Soviets followed the next year.
In 1957, the Soviets launched the first satellite into orbit and perfected the first intercontinental ballistic missile. The United States followed suit on both scores within a year.
In 1960, the United States fired the first submarine-launched ballistic missile. The Soviets followed suit 8 years later.
In 1964, the United States developed the first multiple-warhead missile, and in 1968 the United States tested the first multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle. The Soviets did not score that breakthrough until 1973.
In 1982, we successfully completed testing the first long-range cruise missile and began bomber deployments of this system. In 1984, we began deployment of submarine-launched cruise missiles. The Soviets are still racing to catch up.
This action and reaction is the history of the arms race. If we are serious about trying to stop that arms race, if we are serious about not wanting to militarize space, then why is 9 weeks too much for us to ask to delay a test which might make it irrevocable for us to go back? Why? Because an F-15 is a mobile, already-deployed platform for firing this missile. That means that if we are successful in this test and you are a Soviet planner, you will say to yourself, "Every F-15 in the United States military has a potential ability of being a platform for firing this missile," and the arms race is out of control, and the ability to verify can be lost, and the ability for reaching an accord to limit this technology is also lost.
Remember the planning and strategy about MIRV. The distinguished Senator from Arizona was here then, and it was argued then that MIRV is going to be our response to the Soviet defensive ability.
When we deployed the MIRV, the Soviets and the United States had already agreed to the ABM tready, and there was at that time no defensive or offensive threat that mandated our doing it, but we did it anyway.
The result today is that because they have 70 percent of their weapons in land-based missiles, they have developed, by MIRVing, a counterthreat which in fact has put at risk our land-based missiles; and by making that decision, we exposed ourselves to a danger and lessened our security. We are paying the price of that decision today. Today, we are trying to get rid of it, and today there is not a strategic planner who does not say that it was a mistake to MIRV. But we did it because we did not have the courage or the gumption to say no at that time.
I liken this decision about antisatellite weapons to the same process. This is the time to try to say no. As everybody who has been following the issue knows, antisatellite weapons testing is not limited merely to antisatellite goals and purposes. Antisatellite testing is integrally tied to our SDI capacity, to tracking midcourse flights, to doing a host of things which we cannot do under the ABM Treaty but which we can do in antisatellite testing.
Therefore, we risk the danger that we tie the two so closely together that, given the Soviet situation with respect to SDI, we may make the probability of success at the talks a real impossibility.
Mr. President, I know that even if this amendment were to be adopted today, this would not stop the test, because this bill will not be through Congress in that period of time.
So that is not what we are doing here, and I do not pretend that is what we are doing here. What we are doing here is trying to execute one of the most solemn responsibilities we have as U.S. Senators and which this body alone fundamentally has because of our purview over treaties and our purview over the nuclear arms race because of the jurisdictions of the Foreign Relations Committee and the Armed Services Committee.
I think it is important for U.S. Senators who pass legislation that calls on us to have limits on antisatellite weapons; for U.S. Senators who talk about peace; for U.S. Senators who believe that this Nation takes daring steps to end the arms race; for Senators who watched John Kennedy in 1963 take that kind of step, with the limited test ban as a consequence -- for those Senators to say to the President, by voting tonight for this measure: "Mr. President, won't you please entertain the thought of holding off for 9 weeks in the interest of putting the Soviet Union on the defensive, in the interest of hopefully keeping us out of space"?
I believe that is a worthy goal, and I am sorry it has to be tied to the immigration bill, but that is the only vehicle present, and the time is short. I believe that, in the interest of peace, it is worth it.
I was in Geneva during the recess, and I had occasion to talk to delegates of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference, from more than 125 nations. Universally, including our own allies, who may smile and say nice things publicly, behind the scenes they are concerned, desperately concerned, about this move we are about to make. They are desperately concerned that we may be on a course that may embroil them s a battleground, nuclear or otherwise, and that may make it impossible for them to give true meaning to something like the Nonproliferation Treaty.
So I ask my colleagues to consider and consider hard. I know that the Senator from Ohio is going to say that the Soviets have a system; they have had it for 17 years, and we do not have one. Mr. President, we had one. We were the first ones to do it.
We tested one and we decided it was not very good so we dismantled it -- the Nike-Zeus -- we dismantled it.
The Soviets began after we had started but they have not tested for 3 years. They have two launch pads from which they can currently put something up.
If anyone here were President of the United States and the Soviets shot one of our satellites from one of those two pads and you know you have 5 or 6 hours before they can shoot again, you know and I know that something is going to happen in the course of those 5 or 6 hours to either resolve that problem or to not have it happen again.
If it does happen again, Mr. President, if it does happen again after 6 hours I do not believe there is a person here who would not consider the obliteration of Tyuratum, and deny them the ability to do it one more time.
Mr. President, when we talk about the abilities of the Soviets to knock down all our satellites, that is not a realistic problem today, but if we test tomorrow and if we cannot take that extra step to be able to prevent it, it may be the realistic problem, and it will be because we have not had the courage and we have not had the gumption to stand up and say that 9 weeks is worth the effort for peace.
Thank you, Mr. President.
.....
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 25 minutes remaining.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, how much time remains?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The opponents have 20 minutes.
Mr. GOLDWATER. And the proponents?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The proponents have 25.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Twenty-five.
I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Ohio and if he needs more just ask for it.
Mr. GLENN. I thank the Senator very much.
Mr. President, we all agree we would like to have a total and complete verifiable ban on antisatellite weapons.
If past history is any indication of our arms negotiating capacity at Geneva, however, that agreement is unlikely in the foreseeable future.
Therefore, I believe it is in the best interest of our national security for us to proceed with the testing of our own antisatellite system.
I would say in starting out, Mr. President, I dislike the position I am in very much, that of opposing the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts. Few in this body or in the House of Representatives have a more distinguished combat record, or have sacrificed more for this country, and feel more strongly about the need to control future warfare than Senator Kerry. And I feel much the same way. I have had a lot of combat, too, but I did not suffer as much as the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts. I know he is the recipient of I believe three separate Purple Hearts, and he has a very distinguished combat record.
The Senator has pointed out, Mr. President, the fact that we have stayed ahead in technology. He enumerated numerous instances where we have gone ahead, and where we have developed new weapons systems and the Soviets have followed behind.
I can only say that I am very thankful for that, and that it is not the other way around. If the Soviets had been ahead and we were the ones lagging along behind, history might not show that deterrence has worked as well as it has with us in the lead, as it would have with the Soviets in the lead.
Granted, our Asat system, if it works, as the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts said, if it works, will be a superior system. But that "if it works" is what we are trying to find out with the test tomorrow.
Recent intelligence briefings, the latest of which was just yesterday, which some of us including the distingusihed Senator from Massachusetts attended, showed the Soviets have been moving ahead with their Asat capabilities on several different fronts.
Now, what is our vulnerability to the Soviet antisatellite capability? The distinguished Senator from Colorado made the point that we are dependent on our national technical means for verifying everything the Soviets do, and they are dependent on the same thing against us. But they have the advantage of a subscription to Aviation Week and to the Congressional Record. So they have 98 percent of their job done for them. We do not have that.
What is at risk are our low-altitude satellites which give us the most detailed view of the Earth. These satellites can detect weaker electronic signals than we can from far out in space, they do our best photographic work, and they do ocean surveillance. These are the satellites that the distinguished Senator from Colorado referred to, and these are the satellites at risk with the Soviet system.
The very heart of our intelligence system is at risk when the Soviets have their antisatellite systems deployed.
What have the Soviets done or what are they doing in research? They cover at least four major areas of Asat technology.
The one antisatellite system they have deployed right now is the coorbital interceptor.
I will not try to explain this system in detail, but it is a launch vehicle that gets on the same orbital plane as the vehicle which it intends to attack, slowly overtakes it, and then destroys it.
A second system which they have is a direct-ascent interceptor, which in theory is similar to the miniature homing vehicle that we are trying to develop.
The Galosh, which the Senator from Massachusetts referred to, can be a direct-ascent interceptor. We do not know quite what it can do, but the best estimates are it may have a capability against our satellites.
Third, they are also developing directed energy weapons, such as lasers and particle beam weapons. These are not in place yet, but they are working on them. They would endanger our satellites.
Fourth, they are working on electronic countermeasures of sufficient power to damage or interrupt satellite functions.
So there are four major areas that they are working on now: coorbital interceptors, direct ascent interceptors, direct energy weapons, and electronic countermeasures.
What has gained the most attention is the coorbital interceptor. They have had it deployed since 1968, and they have conducted 20 tests of their coorbital Asat system.
The best estimates are exactly what the Senator from Massachusetts said, that only nine of these tests have been successful. Senator Kerry points with great pride to the fact that the Soviets have only been 45 percent successful.
But I submit, Mr. President, that is 45 percent more capability than we have in the United States of America. We have zero, because we dismantled our comparatively primitive system in the mid-1970's.
So to run a critique of the system of the Soviets and to point out its inadequacies when we do not even have a system to compare it with -- we are zero; we are zero in our capability -- leads me to believe that we should not postpone the scheduled test any longer, even for 8, 10, or 11 weeks.
The last test of their interceptor, it is true, was held in 1982, but that was the 20th test. We have conducted exactly one against a hole in space and our test vehicle did not have the homing device on board.
So they tested their orbital interceptor the last time in 1982. I guess perhaps we could read that a different way than was interpreted by the Senator from Massachusetts. I could interpret that to mean they are quite happy with their program and feel it is worthy of being deployed without any more tests. That may or may not be the case, obviously, I cannot speak for them.
The Soviet's coorbital interceptor has the ability to threaten all of our military intelligence satellites in low Earth orbit. Let us not confuse these satellites in low Earth orbit with the communications satellites in geosyncronous orbit. The satellites we would depend on the most for our national technical means -- the low orbit satellites -- are the very satellites that they would be able to take out most readily.
Now, whether they could do this within 24 hours, or a week, or even 2 weeks is not what is at issue here. The issue is that they have the capability to do this and, we have no capability to do it.
The other Soviet antisatellite research -- on directed energy weapons, direct-ascent interceptors, and electronic countermeasures -- put our satellites in higher orbits at some risk. However, we do not give them a whole lot of capability against our geosyncronous satellites at this time.
As I stated earlier, we have conducted one test of our antisatellite system in January 1984, and that was directed at a point in space, not at the target, and the miniature homing device was not even on board. So to assume that the Asat system we are currently developing is more flexible and effective than the current Soviet system may be a bit premature, because we have not even put our system to a real test yet, and that is really what we are talking about. There is no question the Soviets are interested in a moratorium because it would ensure them a unilateral advantage in Asat capabilities.
The Soviet squeals about how we should not upset this balance when there is no balance -- all the balance is at their end of the scales -- as far as I am concerned, should fall on deaf ears.
I think we would be much better off to look at the upcoming summit as an opportunity to negotiate with the Soviets, not by our own weakness or by our lack of testing, but by saying, "OK, we will go ahead and show we can hit an incoming satellite," and then by saying, "OK, you have a system and we have a system. Let us negotiate and both take our systems out of existence."
And we can do it from a position of strength at that time, of proven capability, not by going and saying we have forsworn testing against your system when we do not even have a capability.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
Mr. GLENN. Mr. Preisdent, will the Senator yield me 3 more minutes?
Mr. GOLDWATER. I am happy to yield 3 more minutes to the Senator from Ohio.
Mr. GLENN. I thank the Senator.
That, to me, would be a much more realistic negotiating position on which to go to Geneva. The Soviets must indeed laugh when they think they can force postponement of a system of ours that is a response to a system that they have had in place for some 17 years.
It would be just as ludicrous if we thought we could say to the Soviets,
We have had aircraft carriers with a tremendous power projection capability for many, many years. Now, Soviet Union, you should not develop this weapon system. You should not develop aircraft carriers. You should not develop that kind of force projection because you have never had it before. It is going to upset a balance that previously was all on the side of the United States.
I am sure the Soviets would think that was preposterous.
A couple of years ago, I proposed that we not deploy our GLCM's ground launched cruise missiles, for a period of time because the Soviets had not deployed theirs. I thought that once we crossed that threshold, there would be a great deal of difficulty in verifying any future arms control negotiations. So I asked the deployment be put off for 90 days so we could make one last attempt at negotiating with the Soviets.
But this is a different situation. This is a situation where the Soviets have an existing system. It is in place. We can question its capability, but even with the estimates of the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts of it being only 45 percent successful, that is 45 percent more capability than we have in this country. I think we can go to Geneva with a stronger position if we go with a system that has had at least one successful test. Hopefully, then, we can say, "We have a system and you have a system. Let's negotiate.
I yield back the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, if I may, I wish to ask the distinguished Senator from Ohio a question or two. What I would like to do, if I may, Mr. President, is talk about where we are today.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I believe the Senator indicated that this time would come off his time.
Mr. KERRY. Yes; I did indicate that.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts is using time under his control.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, as we are here tonight on the eve of this test, it is true, is it not, that the current Soviet capability to knock down satellites is from the Tyuratum site and its current co-orbital system? That is today's ability -- correct?
Mr. GLENN. Although we are getting into an intelligence area, I believe there is another site which they can launch from, but the majority of their capability is from the Tyuratum site.
Mr. KERRY. What the Senator is talking about with respect to direct energy, laser capability, direct descent capability, we are also working on -- correct?
Mr. GLENN. We are, indeed.
Mr. KERRY. And with respect to today's decisionmaking, we must make a determination of current threat to the United States as it exists today. My question to the Senator is: If we are working on those systems as they are, if the only existing system is Tyuratum, and perhaps another site where the same kind of system could be launched, then the only threat to our satellites today is a system where you could have two shots, maybe three, and an interval of 4 to 6 hours; is that correct?
Mr. GLENN. When you speak of reload time, I am not willing to confirm or not confirm the times, although it takes a definite period of time to reload.
Mr. KERRY. This is from unclassified published sources, Scientific American magazine, and other things, where this has been pretty thoroughly discussed. Of course, I am taking my information from there. Assuming that is the range, we will agree at least there is a delay period.
Mr. GLENN. There is, indeed.
Mr. KERRY. The delay period is a delay period of hours.
Mr. GLENN. That is correct.
Mr. KERRY. In reality in terms of our decisionmaking and response after one or two satellites have been hit, we get some time to do some thinking before responding, do we not?
Mr. GLENN. I presume after our satellite has been hit, we would be doing a lot of very fast thinking.
Mr. KERRY. Or responding?
Mr. GLENN. That is the question. Are we going to start World War III after they take out one satellite? Would it be two satellites? Do we take out Tyuratum? After one satellite, or would it require two Satellites being blasted out of space? Would it be three? That is a horrendous decision that the President of the United States would have to make, as to whether we obliterate a major city in the Soviet Union after we lose one satellite or two or whatever. I say to the Senator from Massachusetts that I would much rather have the ability to take out one of their satellites if they take out one of our satellites. We cannot do that right now without the test and without developing our own system. That would be a more logical response that would not lead automatically to World War III.
Mr. KERRY. In the long run, Mr. President, I agree with the Senator from Ohio. I am not standing here making an argument that if we cannot get an agreement, if they continue to improve their system, we should not build a satellite system. I am not somebody who believes that we should not have the strongest defense of any nation on the face of this planet. Of course we should. But the issue is today's threat. Why, if that is the threat, is there a clear and irrevocable harm to the United States national security by not testing 9 weeks later? This very same threat that the Senator has just described in answer to my question has existed for 15 years. Why is there an irrevocable national security threat in 9 weeks?
Mr. GLENN. I agree completely with the Senator from Massachusetts. To put this off for 9 weeks is not going to do irrevocable damage. However, I think it indicates to the Soviets that every time they squeal about something we are willing to jump through hoops, and give more credibility to their squeals than I think is necessary. We put off for 17 years not developing our capability. Is 9 weeks more going to hurt us? No, probably not. But I want to see us get on with it. We need this capability. If we are going to reduce the risk of World War III by us not having to take our Tyuratum when they take out one or two of our satellites, I would much rather that we have the capability of taking out one or two of their satellites. Then maybe we can negotiate.
Mr. KERRY. I appreciate the Senator's comments. My only problem is if I were sitting in the Soviet Union making decisions and I must make a judgment about building or not building or trying to put the genie back in the bottle on a missile that fits under the wing of an F-15 that has a homing ability versus my coorbital ability, I would be worried, and it would be darned hard for me as a leader in that country to say to my people that I feel any more secure or more especially that I am in a position to negotiate from strength.I do not know a nation in the world that negotiates out of weakness. I do not want to and I do not think you can. But if we test this successfully and put them in the position of weakness, they then, just as we have throughout the arms race, will wait until they build the same system before they negotiate.
Mr. GLENN. How does the Senator feel he puts them in the position of weakness?
Mr. KERRY. We have been though the history of bargaining chips here ad infinitum. We know the history. Here we are with one more bargaining chip theory 9 weeks before summit with no increase in threat to the United States. The Senator said it himself. There is no difference in 9 weeks. The Senator also said it is not irrevocable harm. If it is not irrevocable harm, then the certification given us by the President of the Untied States is false.
Mr. GLENN. I am not here to verify what the President of the United States said. I have some doubts about some of that verification myself and about how hard they negotiated in Geneva. He certified they did. I am not here to really argue with him about it. But I think when we go to Geneva, we would be in a far better negotiating position if we had a successful satellite test under our belt to compare with their system, and then we can really negotiate from a position of equality, or at least partial equality. We will not have a deployed system, but we will have at least one test that shows proof of intent, which we do not have right now. It might fail.
Mr. KERRY. It may well fail, as the distinguished Senator says. I just cannot for the life of me understand why the President -- I cannot say, "Mr. Gorbachev, I am willing to hold off 9 weeks, and if we do not get an agreement in Geneva, or you are not serious about talking, I am going to test the thing, and I am going to have Senator Kerry and others voting for it because you have it." It is not a huge loss.
I reserve the remainder of my time, Mr. President.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry: How much time does the proponent have left?
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Chafee). The proponent has 17 minutes.
Mr. GOLDWATER. If the proponent has 17 minutes left, how about the opponent?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Eighteen minutes.
Mr. GOLDWATER. I will yield 3 minutes to my friend from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the memorandum for the Secretary of Defense and the certification be printed in the Record at this point in the debate.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION NO. 85-19
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Pursuant to Section 205 of the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1985, as enacted by P.L. 98-525, I hereby determine and certify that:
The United States is endeavoring in good faith to negotiate with the Soviet Union a mutual and verifiable agreement with the strictest possible limitations on anti-satellite weapons consistent with the national security interests of the United States.
Pending agreement on such strict limitations, testing against objects in space of the F-15 launched miniature homing vehicle anti-satellite warhead by the United States is necessary to avert clear and irrevocable harm to the national security.
Such testing would not constitute an irreversible step that would gravely impair prospects for negotiations on anti-satellite weapons.
Such testing is fully consistent with the rights and obligations of the U.S. under the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 as those rights and obligations exist at the time of such testing.
You are directed on my behalf to report this determination and certification to the Congress.
You or your delegatee are authorized and directed to publish this determination and certification in the Federal Register.
Ronald Reagan.
....
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, how much time remains?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona has 15 minutes and the Senator from Massachusetts 11 minutes.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I will not take long. The arguments have been made, and I think they are very succinct, against the amendment of the Senator from Massachusetts. The Senator from Colorado who participated in the conference report will remember that this was one of the most hotly contested arguments that we had. The House took a very strong position on a satellite and we had not taken such a strong position. Nevertheless, the decision was finally reached as related by the Senator from Virginia.
I agree with the Senator from Colorado, that we should discuss these things on the floor, even though the prerogative of foreign policy rests with the President, and even though attaching such an important amendment as this to an immigration bill I think is entirely, nongermane. But we will wait and see what happens to that.
Mr. President, I really believe the job of the U.S. Senate, the job of the Armed Services Committee, is to do our best to provide a strong United States. To me, that is paramount. I do not give a particular hoot about what the Russians think about what we do. The negotiations in Geneva, in my estimation, are going to be a total waste of time whether we conduct this test tomorrow, the next day, 9 weeks from now, or anytime. I think the attitude that prevails in the Soviet Union is the attitude that we should have in this country: That whatever we have to do to make this country strong enough to preserve our freedom we are going to do.
Here is s system of antisatellite that has been worked on for a long time. It was worked on for a long time and then abandoned. Now, tomorrow, an F-15 is going to take off and attempt to hit a target a little bit above the average target. We do not know if it is going to work. There is no way in the world for us to know it is going to work. If it does not work it becomes another ball game.
If it does work, then we have taken one more step in what we should be doing, providing for the strength of the United States and not forever worrying about what the head of the Soviet Union thinks about or what the Soviet military thinks about.
Personally, I do not think we are going to war, and I do not think that anything we are talking about here on the floor tonight is going to help prevent war.
Mr. President, I am going to move at the proper time to table this amendment. The vote will not come until Tuesday. I would hope that Members of the Senate would take advantage of the Congressional Record and read it.
Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.
I can get you those articles off of Lexis if you want, and you should allow read Harkin and Kerry's "report" of their trip to the Congress. It is lunacy.
Kerry is the jar the spread of communism comes from.
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