18 USC 912: Whoever falsely assumes or pretends to be an officer or employee acting under the authority of the United States or any department, ... and acts as such, or ..., shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.
You left out parts of the statute, not that it matters. The key words here will be "and acts as such." Taken literally and broadly, the statute would criminalize playing a Yankee Officer in a Civil War battle re-creation, and giving orders.
Whoever falsely assumes or pretends to be an officer or employee acting under the authority of the United States or any department, agency or officer thereof, and acts as such, or in such pretended character demands or obtains any money, paper, document, or thing of value, shall be [fined, imprisoned or both].
Even disregarding the parts of the statute that "narrow" it to money, paper, or anything of value, and taking the statute as forbidding a person from falsely presenting himself to another for the purpose of getting the other to follow an order, e.g., to submit to a medical examination, that offense has not been committed.
Why not? Because the order has -NO- present effect, even if it is genuine and authentic.
The order does not "cause the deceived person [GWB] to follow some course he would not have pursued but for the deceitful conduct."
And, as you pointed out, the "whoever" that could violate this statute would have to be Killian.
1473 Element Issue -- 18 USC 912 -- Intent to DefraudBefore the 1948 revision, 18 USC 912 made "intent to defraud" an essential element of both offenses. The words "intent to defraud" are omitted from the present language of section 912 because the decision in United States v. Lepowitch, 318 U.S. 702 (1943), appears to render them meaningless. Reviser's Note, 18 U.S.C. § 912 (1948). Only the first offense was directly considered in Lepowitch, which held that "intent to defraud" did "not require more than the defendant had, by artifice and deceit, sought to cause the deceived person to follow some course he would not have pursued but for the deceitful conduct." The court said of the second offense, however, that "more than a mere deceitful attempt to affect the course of action of another is required" because that clause of the statute "speaks of an intent to obtain a "valuable thing." One court of appeals now doubts that Lepowitch renders the requirement of fraudulent intent meaningless and holds that it continues to be an essential element of the second offense where it means "an intent to wrongfully deprive another of property." See Honea v. United States, 344 F.2d 798, 802-03 (5th Cir. 1965). Furthermore, United States v. Randolph, 460 F.2d 367, 370 (5th Cir. 1972), held that "intent to defraud" is an essential element of prosecution under Part I of 18 U.S.C. § 912. Contrary views have been expressed in United States v. Cord, 654 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1981); United States v. Rosser, 528 F.2d 654 (D.C. 1976); United States v. Rose, 500 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 422 U.S. 1031 (1975); United States v. Mitman, 459 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Guthrie, 387 F.2d 569 (4th Cir. 1967).
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm01473.htm
18 USC has quite a few statutes that are "tempting" at a glance, but in my opinion, none of them fits the fact pattern of forging history.
http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/18/pI.html <-- Title 18, Part 1 (Crimes)
The forger was acting as Killian, an officer of the US.
" The order does not "cause the deceived person [GWB] to follow some course he would not have pursued but for the deceitful conduct.""
The intended decieved person(s) is the electorate of the US. The forger, posing as an officer of the US, forged a memo, not an order, to deceive the public for the explicit purpose of influencing an election. The intent was to defraud the electorate, for an intangible thing of value-that Kerry would be chosen and the Ds would win.
The forger's intended effect would be obtained in the forger's mind, because of the libelous memo he generated regarding the R candidate in the name of a particular officer of the US, Killian. Hypothetically, the forger could have done the same thing and posed as an officer of the US, to deceive citizen's of the US regarding some matters, or particulars, of war for some decisive benefit of the enemy. The key here is that the officer impersonated is dead and can't make a correction, or point out the fraud.
" Taken literally and broadly, the statute would criminalize playing a Yankee Officer in a Civil War battle re-creation,"
The key is that the poser is actually attempting to present the real authority of an officer of the US. As in counterfeiting, the particulars are important.