Chess player Garry Kasparov blames Putin for destroying democracy in Russia

"Business is politics in up-to-date Russia. The government controls all aspects of the nation's life and the commercial field is not an exception," the chairman of the committee "2008: Free Choice", Grand Master Garry Kasparov said on September 13th at the Baltic Forum of Development in Hamburg. Below you can find excerpts from the chess player's speech.

"We must draw a distinction between the current Russian leadership and the citizens of Russia. The rich culture, creativity, the knowledge and humanity of our nation is still alive and means a lot more to the world than the whole Russian oil," Kasparov said. "High oil prices make the only support for Putin's regime. Citizens of other oil-extracting countries do not derive profit from the oil wealth. Both oil and all other natural resources of Russia should have their own markets and open ways to reach those markets."

Garry Kasparov believes that Russia should unite with Europe. "This union would be important to the Russian nation for social and economic reasons. The traditions of the European democracy and the relative economic stability will help Russia become a modern state. However, Putin's regime mixes up the past and the present. A lot of Russia's neighbors are still being suspicious about Russia, and they have reasons for it. An order in the past is necessary for the future progress. The European and Russian governments are living in two different worlds," Kasparov stated in Hamburg.

"One of the examples to prove it is the fact how our media outlets defend the notorious pact of 1939 between Nazis and Soviets. The USSR attacked Finland because of the pact, it invaded the Baltic republics, occupied a part of Poland and assisted in unleashing WWII. Russia needs to acknowledge the crimes of its Soviet predecessors.

"The avowal of guilt is a good spiritual remedy, which also means the acknowledgement of universal moral values, which the Kremlin currently rejects. One of these values is the ability to find common language. Putin's administration does not know how to speak this language.

"The Soviet past still dominates the Russian reality and politics. Putin is aware of that. In his address to the nation after the hostage crisis in Beslan, the president said that the nation is living under the conditions, which have been created with the collapse of a great state, which proved to be helpless in the changing world. It would be the same to say that you have been living in a house without the water supply system," Kasparov said.

"The Soviet Union could not and cannot be a part of modern Europe. It could become a part of Europe only with its conquests. We must distinguish between modern Russia that we need and the Soviet past that Putin is trying to retrieve.

"There is no place for Committee 2008 and the real opposition in the Russian press. However, there is a place for nationalists and Stalinists, who grieve about that "great state." They decline basic democratic values. These talks about the return to the erstwhile glory are becoming more frequent now. The Nazi propaganda is prohibited in Germany, but not in Russia," Kasparov said.

"Unfortunately, this is not the only aspect, in which Putin exercises himself as a Stalinist. He talks about everything in the old Soviet language. He suppresses freedom of speech, freedom of commerce, he has led Russia astray.

"Putin announced that he would cancel elections of regional governors as a measure to struggle against terrorism. Local parliamentarians will have to approve the selected nominees. Putin is destroying democracy at the time when we need it most. Western politicians might say that the Russian Constitution technically allows it. However, if the West keeps silent, we will most likely witness similar changes happening in the presidential election procedure.

"Even the national lucrative oil market does not function according to the standards of the civilized world. The scandal with Yukos and its CEO, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, has exerted a destructive influence on the economy.

"It is impossible for Europe to deal with the current Russian administration. Europe should press on Putin for changes. One should not let Putin mix the Soviet past with the Russian future in an attempt to keep the relations.

"Schroeder and Chirac are using double standards instead, which brings a lot of harm to the Russian nation. It is not time for Realpolitik. Each meeting of the Group of Seven with Putin's participation is perceived as the approval of Putin's home policy.

Putin’s Fascism and Klebnikov's Murder NewsMax ^ | 8/2/04 | Alexandr Nemets

Russia under President Vladimir Putin has become Murder Inc.

The cold-blooded assassination of Paul Klebnikov, editor of Forbes Russian edition, on June 10 in Moscow proves this claim. Western media appeared shocked by the killing of one of their own; though of Russian descent, Klebnikov, 41, was an American working for one of the West’s most influential business publications. There had long been the view that Westerners working in Russia were protected and that Russian crimes were largely fratricidal.

No longer. Now that Klebnikov has joined the list of 15 journalists who have been murdered since 2000 (none of the murders has ever been solved), the regime and oligarchs may have even less restraint in the future in dealing with their enemies, foreign and domestic.

After the Klebnikov killing, I reviewed the pro-government Moscow media for their handling of the case. Most of the major media, especially the broadcast media, are controlled by the government. NTV, the last independent TV network, is now effectively under government control. All of the establishment media played down Klebnikov’s murder. Business as usual.

But there is a small but vibrant opposition media, fractured and less well known. This opposition media expressed shock and disgust at Klebnikov’s assassination.

Putin Regime Tied to Criminal Activity

The most prominent opposition organ, Zavtra weekly, published an editorial about Klebnikov by its editor in chief, Alexandr Prokhanov. Prokhanov says he had close ties to Klebnikov. He blames Klebnikov’s death on Russia’s criminal enterprises – which he argues are all tied to Putin’s regime.

He writes: “Large Russian business is merely a bloody ball of mucus, oil, hexogen, torn-away heads and limbs. ... Now they murdered Paul Klebnikov, the enterprising and meticulous editor of Russia’s Forbes. He came to Moscow for economic reconnaissance, to find out the enormity of criminal business activities in Russia. He named all of Russia’s criminal billionaires. Particularly, he had to explain to world readers why Luzhkov, the ‘poor and disinterested’ mayor of Moscow, has no home of his own but has a billionaire wife, Yelena Baturina, owner of many prosperous enterprises. Klebnikov had also questioned why Moscow terminated the criminal case against the governor of the Saratov region, Ayatskov, who has been engaged in many dirty affairs. Klebnikov’s curiosity has now been satisfied by a shot in the head.

“Almost simultaneously to Klebnikov’s murder, these criminals tried to kill by hand grenade Viktor Cherepkov, who was favored to become the new mayor of Vladivostok city, the capital of the ‘Maritime criminal region.’

“In this Far Eastern city, huge gangs control the fishing, timber and gold business, as well as drug trafficking. They also help to settle Chinese on Russian territory. Brave Viktor Cherepkov is known as a crime fighter.

“Russian large business – that is, that controlled by the oligarchs – is behind all outstanding crimes and all terrible laws adopted by the state Duma. They are closely related to Putin and supported by him. … The forthcoming revolution will destroy the present unnatural Russian world, including both the oligarchs and politicians.”

The same issue of Zavtra commented on Klebnikov’s death, in a survey of outstanding news:

“The murder of Russian Forbes editor Paul Klebnikov became a black mark on the reputation of President Putin and his entire regime. High-level friends of the position of Klebnikov in the American media elite won’t allow the Russian authorities to ‘sink’ this case.

“This tragedy will be intensively discussed by world media in the framework of an emerging anti-Putin campaign. The danger to Putin’s image and reputation is so high that Putin gave unprecedented orders to the Russian Foreign Ministry and its 130 ambassadors abroad, and to his secret services that they should undertake actions that will promote a positive image of Russia in the foreign mass media.

“According to the most probable versions, the murder of Paul Klebnikov was ordered by several Moscow oligarchs, who were taken ‘out of the shadow’ by the publication in Forbes of the ‘100 richest people of Russia’ list. It seems that an investigation of this crime will fail, because the murder’s accomplices and organizers were killed within a day of Klebnikov’s death. This information came from circles close to the Russian Interior Ministry. …”

‘Total criminalization of Russia’

The article “Mafia pays in bullets,” published by the newspaper Sovetskaya Rossiya on July 13, is also of real interest. The brief version of this article follows:

“The Klebnikov murder is a new bold step in the total criminalization of Russia. In the background of this murder was the simultaneous attempt to murder Viktor Cherepkov in Vladivostok, made to look like an ordinary death.

“Paul Klebnikov was shot on the evening of Friday, June 9, near the Russian Forbes building by two killers, who approached a Zhiguli car. Klebnikov took several bullets to the chest and stomach, and died on the way to hospital.

“The 41-year old Klebnikov had gotten an excellent education, spoke fluent Russian and had written several books related to Russian/Soviet history of the 20th century. And Klebnikov’s last book, ‘Godfather of the Kremlin,’ describing the role of Boris Berezovsky, solidified his international reputation.

“Recently Klebnikov, engaged in serious investigations, was becoming a weighty figure in Russia’s economic and political life and a frequent participant on Moscow TV shows. Russia’s Forbes enjoyed a growing number of subscribers. The recent publishing by Forbes of Russia’s 100 richest people and the amount of their wealth became a major sensation.

“This report was like thunder out of a blue sky. Russian oligarchs perfectly understand the criminal nature of their fortunes and prefer not to reveal their wealth. Klebnikov’s investigation exposed the following fact, extremely unpleasant for the present Russian ‘elite’: A tiny group controls a formidable part of Russia’s GDP, while the government routinely claims a lack of money for the most essential needs.

“Many criminal oligarchs, who used to enjoy a safety life in the shadows, suddenly appeared inside a bright circle of light. The consequences of Klebnikov’s list are very understandable. The contract killer has become a routine factor of Russia’s economic and political life.

’Bandit Capitalism’

“In America a journalist, exposing the dirty tricks of top corporate executives or even the president himself, would get honor and glory, while his victim is doomed for impeachment, firing or even jail. Russian ‘bandit capitalism’ works in quite the opposite way.

“In Russia, there is a de facto prohibition by police and the legal system to investigate large-scale economic crimes. Their activity is limited to ‘small thieves’ only as well as to prosecuting political opponents. That’s because the criminal oligarchs make up the core of Putin’s regime.

“By the way, Klebnikov’s murder shows perfectly that so-called “media freedom” has become a non-existing phenomena in Russia – if it ever existed here after 1991. In reality, the only remaining freedom here is the freedom for oligarchs and their ‘media lap dogs’ to cheat people.

“In addition, during the last several months, the Kremlin has limited the oligarchs’ access to the microphone and TV cameras. The mass media are presently de facto controlled by bureaucrats, who are smashing the smallest signs of opposition.

“At the same time, Russian oligarchs solved their media problems, to some degree, by eliminating this nasty American journalist. In just a short time, the remnants of media freedom have been suffocated by two forces: by bureaucrats who have used economic and administrative pressure, and by the shadow world of criminal oligarchs, who used contract killers. And this took place immediately after the recent ‘controlled elections’ of the state Duma and the Russian president. The claims about Russian democracy ‘entering the civilized world’ are now laughed at even in the West.

“It is possible to expect now that Putin himself, based on concerns for his reputation, will take Klebnikov’s investigation under his own ‘supreme’ control.

“However, there are no doubts that Klebnikov’s murderers and the direct organizers of his murder won’t be found. That’s because the entire Russian government system, including the police and judiciary, are irreversibly rotten and paralyzed.

“And, of course, nobody will dare to touch the real ‘murder customers’ from Russia’s “Golden 100,” who considered Klebnikov as their mortal enemy after publishing his list in Russia’s Forbes. Simply, Russia’s ‘bandit capitalism’ killed his critic.”

’Fascist’ Russia No Friend of U.S.

Here is one more item of import from Sovetskaya Rossiya, published on July 20, entitled “Execution in gangster style: The murder of Paul Klebnikov”:

“In April 2004, Paul Klebnikov became the editor in chief of Russian Forbes, which received extreme notoriety from Russia’s economic and political elite after publishing the list of the 100 richest Russians.

“Several Russian oligarchs asked Klebnikov not to publish their names and the amount of their wealth. Some of them, reportedly, even offered Klebnikov huge bribes for this purpose. In any case, the murder of Klebnikov frustrated the world media. Many American, British and German papers and magazines are publishing comments extremely unpleasant for Moscow. Their major conclusion is ‘Paul Klebnikov showed the real face of Russian bandit capitalism and was murdered for this.’

“One more conclusion of the foreign media: ‘The word freedom and media freedom are dead in Russia.’ This is correct: Only those journalists in Russia who obey the government and are the members of the ‘Kremlin media pool’ have the freedom to glorify Putin and the government.

“Klebnikov wrote in the first issue of Russia’s Forbes that Russia was now entering a new and better epoch. And he really hoped for this. However, his death proved the opposite. Remarkably, Klebnikov intended to publish a list of Russia’s 500 richest people.”

The Klebnikov death should not be viewed in a vacuum but rather as part of the growing authoritarian takeover in Russia.

As the New York-based Russian-language TV channel RTV recently reported, the Klebnikov killing came as the Kremlin is taking the final steps of seizing Yukos, one of Russia’s largest oil companies.

At about the same time, Putin signed the decree expanding FSB (KGB) powers to an unprecedented level.

And RTV notes that the last "semi-independent" Moscow TV channel, NTV, had fired its last independent-minded journalists.

Russia is being transformed into a fascist state ruled by its secret police and the organized criminal mafias the state secretly controls.

Be warned: Russia is no friend of the United States.

What is particularly alarming is that the FSB has recently established a special division – with huge financing and great authority – to control and influence Russians who live in the U.S., Israel and elsewhere. Reportedly, a large network of FSB agents already "works" on American territory for this purpose.

Back in 2002, I wrote that Russia had turned the corner and was fast becoming a Nazi-style regime. At that time the view was not popularly held. Today in Russia it is.

STRATFOR: Russia: Putin Moves the Pieces STRATFOR ^ | July 20, 2004

Summary

Russian President Vladimir Putin replaced several key military figures, including the general chief of staff. With these moves, he restores the balance of power in Russia, a necessary condition for him to remain firmly in charge. This will also lead to Putin's somewhat moderating his pro-Western course, though by no means abandoning it. The new appointments will finally push forward military reforms, but it is far too early to say whether Russian military might will be restored.

Analysis

President Putin dismissed General Chief of Staff Anatoly Kvashnin, Interior Forces Commander Vyacheslav Tikhomirov, Deputy Federal Security Service Director Anatoly Ezhkov and North Caucasus Interior Troops Commander Mikhail Labunets on July 19. He also replaced North Caucasus Military District Commander Vladimir Boldyrev with Alexander Baranov. Other new appointees included new General Chief of Staff Yuri Baluyevsky and First Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Belousov.

The reshuffle does more than change the nameplates; it also shifts power within the government, with the defense minister taking direct control over the General Staff. This shift was explicitly designed to alter the balance of power within Moscow and will have major consequences for Russian foreign and security policies.

On the surface, the current shake-up is a direct consequence of the June 21 attacks in Russia's tiny republic of Ingushetia in the North Caucasus. Despite the involvement of hundreds of militants linked to neighboring Chechnya -- where Russia maintains a garrison of nearly 80,000 troops -- very few of the attackers were found. All the senior officers dismissed are in some way linked to Russia's Chechen war, but that logic was not the dominant reason for the mass dismissal; it was merely the last straw, which exhausted Putin's patience and allowed him to implement his plans.

Former Chief of General Staff Kvashnin was a wily character in Russian politics. While he did not formally ally himself with any of the dominant Russian power factions, he had business relations with Anatoly Chubais -- long the boogeyman of the Putin government -- and the Yeltsin family of oligarchs that Putin had to politically neuter in order to secure power. After Kvashnin successfully pushed for the dismissal of former Defense Minister Igor Sergeev, his desire to displace Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov and perhaps even Putin made the Kremlin view him as a "military Khodorkovsky," particularly once he started blocking the rise of some key security personnel linked to factions loyal to Putin. Mikhail Khodorkovsky is an oil oligarch who used his company in a failed attempt to springboard into Russian politics; he is currently on trial for tax evasion and fraud. At the time of his arrest, sources in the Russian Security Council told Stratfor that Khodorkovsky was developing a close relationship with Gen. Kvashnin, apparently viewing him as his ally in military affairs.

Kvashnin also presided over much of the post-Soviet Russian military decline. All military planning flowed from Kvashnin's office, not the Defense Ministry, and Kvashnin largely ignored or suppressed efforts to revamp the military into a more technologically advanced or more efficient force, various sources inside the Russian military, including those inside the Kvashnin-led General Staff, told Stratfor. Such an attitude severely hampered operations -- particularly in Chechnya, where Kvashnin regularly countermanded the initiative of even low-level commanders -- leading some in the military to wonder just whose side Kvashnin was on. Sources in the Russian Security Council indicate Putin feared the direction in which Kvashnin would ultimately lead the Russian military -- hence the July 19 dismissal.

But the core reason for the reshuffle runs even deeper. Putin is attempting to strike a balance of power in Russia, a key condition if he is to remain firmly in charge.

Until now Putin has heavily favored the St. Petersburg clan of power brokers, who favor the West for a mix of personal and ideological reasons, over other power groups such as the oligarchs loyal to former President Boris Yeltsin (the "Family") or the military, security, intelligence and foreign service officials who would like to see a great Russia re-emerge (the "siloviki").

His explicit backing of the St. Petersburg liberals encouraged them to move against the siloviki on economic, political and foreign policy levels. The assault had reached the point that the St. Petersburgers had succeeded in deposing key siloviki officials such as Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, and were beginning to target popular Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov. The net result was a government sliding rapidly and heavily into the St. Petersburgers' control.

That is not something Putin could allow to get out of hand. Putin was originally selected in 1999 to succeed Yeltsin because he was a nobody. He was a member of the siloviki who had spent much of his career abroad attempting to steal technologies from the West, while happening to be from broadly pro-Western St. Petersburg. That made him an ideal compromise candidate to all the Russian power groups.

In the years since, he has expertly played one group off another and advanced from the man in the middle to The Man in the Middle; he is now a major power broker in his own right. While he may sympathize with the St. Petersburgers more from an ideological viewpoint, he wants relations with the West as a means of strengthening Russia, not just relations for their own sake. Since the St. Petersburgers were beginning to target Sergei Ivanov -- the most charismatic and publicly loved member of the siloviki -- Putin knew he had to act, or soon face an all-powerful St. Petersburg clan.

The solution was a purge of the military brass and appointments of men who were close not only to Putin, but to Sergei Ivanov as well. The organizational reshuffling inside the military severely limits the role of the General Staff -- once a lucky rival to the Defense Ministry, under Kvashnin -- and put all Russian forces in the field under the direct control of the Defense Ministry's head: Sergei Ivanov. This gives him the independent power base he needs to blunt the St. Petersburgers' attacks. The political field is once again balanced, with Putin once again the indispensable fulcrum on which it all rests.

The reshuffle will have major consequences for Russian foreign and security policies. Most importantly, it puts some wind back in the sails of the siloviki so far as foreign policy is concerned.

The question will largely be one of degree. Putin is not putting anyone in power who opposes his broad pro-Western policy, but that does not mean that any of them are pushovers. Unlike many St. Petersburgers -- such as Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin or Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Zhukov -- who want to Westernize Russia, the new crop of security personnel wants stronger Western relations in order to strengthen Russia. That means there will be more of an emphasis on equality in relations than on imitation and subjugation to the will of the West.

At the end of the day, Putin still holds the final word on all major decisions, but with the siloviki not constantly on the defensive, some of the cold edge is likely to return to Russian-Western -- and particularly to Russian-U.S. -- relations. But because Putin will still drive Russia toward the West, those ties are not likely to worsen dramatically. In particular, this reshuffle is unlikely to influence Putin's consideration on whether to send troops to Iraq at Washington's request.

Finally, there will be a new effort within Russia to seriously begin the long-delayed revamping of the Russian military. Kvashnin strongly favored the old-style mass tactics used in the Soviet era, despite a shrinking recruit pool and a dwindling budget. Those two factors will not change simply because of a new leadership, and any attempt to salvage -- much less strengthen -- the Russian military remains a mammoth task. But unlike Kvashnin, new General Chief of Staff Yuri Baluyevsky has already expressed a willingness to change gears to meet reality rather than wish for a past that is not coming back. A military intellectual with an enormous experience in strategic and operational analysis as well as planning, Baluyevsky is expected to rise to the occasion.

Moreover, since the current reform puts forces in the field, combat training and combat activities in the Defense Ministry's basket -- taking these vital functions from the General Staff -- now Sergei Ivanov has the opportunity to implement the military reforms needed to revive Russian armed forces. Time will show whether he will rise to the occasion too.

Angry Putin rejects public Beslan inquiry Guardian.UK ^ | 9/7/2004 | Jonathan Steele

Jonathan Steele in Moscow Tuesday September 7, 2004 The Guardian

The Russian president, Vladimir Putin, last night refused to order a public inquiry into how the Beslan school was captured by gunmen and then ended with such a high death toll, and told the Guardian that people who call for talks with Chechen leaders have no conscience. "Why don't you meet Osama bin Laden, invite him to Brussels or to the White House and engage in talks, ask him what he wants and give it to him so he leaves you in peace? Why don't you do that?" he said with searing sarcasm.

"You find it possible to set some limitations in your dealings with these bastards, so why should we talk to people who are childkillers?

"No one has a moral right to tell us to talk to childkillers," he added.

"Correct me if I'm wrong, but Margaret Thatcher, whom I've met more than once said: 'A man who comes out into the street to kill other people must himself be killed'," he told the Guardian.

At times grim-faced, but always calm, Mr Putin's comments came in the midst of an extraordinary three-and-a-half-hour meeting with a group of foreign journalists and academics with long experience of Russia, invited for a special conference.

Held in his country house outside Moscow, the question-and-answer session ended after midnight. It was his first meeting with foreigners since the Beslan catastrophe.

He said he would hold an internal inquiry into the Beslan tragedy, but not a public one. "I want to establish the chronicle of events and find out who is responsible and might be punished," he said.

If the Russian parliament wanted to set up its own inquiry, he would not object, but he warned that it could become "a political show".

"If that happened, it would not be very productive," he said.

The long discussion covered a wide range of topics but returned to the issue of Chechnya more than once.

Russian officials believe Shamil Basayev, the most extreme Chechen commander, was responsible for the hostage-taking, which ended with at least 335 dead, hundreds injured and scores missing.

Witnesses have reported that the hostage-takers had attempted to justify their brutality by claiming it as an act of revenge for the killing by Russian forces of Chechen children.

Mr Putin's words yesterday followed the unending stream of funerals as the people of Beslan buried their children, relatives and friends, while others sought information on those still missing.

The president admitted Russian forces had committed human rights violations in Chechnya but, like the torture by US soldiers in the prison of Abu Ghraib in Iraq, these were not sanctioned from the top, he said.

"In war there are ugly processes which have their own logic," he said.

Striking the table with the side of his right hand, he said there was no connection between Russian policies in Chechnya and the events in Beslan.

"Just imagine that people who shoot children in the back came to power anywhere on our planet. Just ask yourself that, and you will have no more questions about our policy in Chechnya," he said.

The president made it clear he sees the drive for Chechen independence as the spearhead of a strategy by Chechen Islamists, helped by foreign fundamentalists, to undermine the whole of southern Russia and even stir up trouble among Muslim communities in other parts of the country.

"There are Muslims along the Volga, in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. Chechnya isn't Iraq. It's not far away. It's a vital part of our territory. This is all about Russia's territorial integrity," he said.

Russia was interested in a political solution in Chechnya, he insisted. It was going to hold elections to a Chechen parliament there shortly "and we will try to attract as many people as possible with different views to take part".

"We will strengthen law enforcement by staffing the police with Chechens, and gradually withdraw our troops to barracks, and leave as small a contingent as we feel necessary, just like the US does in California and Texas," he said.

He could not agree that a war was still going on there five years after he first sent in troops. "It is a smouldering conflict. There have been attacks but not like the big operations of 1999," he said.

Putin Bears Responsibility for Terrorism

Alexandr Nemets, NEWSMAX Thursday, Sept. 9, 2004

If you believe the press reports and spin from Russia, that nation is under attack from “terrorists,” who bear full responsibility for a spate of attacks against civilians – including the recent school massacre.

But the facts suggest something more.

Consider the recent chronology of terrorism in Russia:

1) On Aug. 21, around 8 p.m. local time, about 300 Chechen guerrillas entered Grozny, the capital of Chechnya. Russian experts say the operation was planned thoroughly and its organizers were certain of its success. That’s why they came into the city long before nightfall. This fact alone smashed the multiple claims of high-ranking Moscow officials – Putin, Defense Minister Ivanov, etc. – that “terrorists in Chechnya are almost beaten and peace is near.”

This operation is comparable to the guerrilla attack on Nazran, the capital of neighboring Ingushetia Republic, on June 21, but the scale of the action in Grozny was probably greater. The guerrillas attacked dozens of objectives in Grozny: police stations, voting polls (prepared for the election of a new president of Chechnya), army and police checkpoints, army barracks and the city market.

Guerrilla groups of five to seven fighters each moved freely all over the city, stopping cars and checking documents for the purpose of “revealing” army and police officers and local officials.

For the entire night the city was in guerrilla hands. Guerrillas left the city at sunrise, and Russian army and police forces made no attempt to pursue them. Guerrilla losses reportedly were no more than 15, while Russian losses amounted to about 100.

2) On Aug. 24, about 11 p.m. local time, two Russian passenger planes exploded almost simultaneously and fell on the ground. Both had departed from Moscow’s Domodedovo airport and headed south. One of them, a huge TU-155, fell in the Rostov region; the other, a TU-134, fell in the Tula region. Eighty-eight people, including 16 crewmembers, died in the two catastrophes.

It took KGB/FSB and the Russian Interior Ministry (police department) about four days to recognize that “evidently, the two aircraft were destroyed as a result of a suicide terrorist action. Women with Chechen names were among the passengers of both aircraft.”

3) On Aug. 31, a suicide terrorist action took place near the metro station “Rizhsckaya” in the northern part of Moscow. A young Chechen woman exploded herself – one more “black widow” from the North Caucasus –killing 10 persons and wounding 50. Reportedly, she intended to blow herself up inside the subway itself (i.e., to reproduce that huge terrorist action in a subway train in February 2004), but she got scared of policemen at the entrance.

These actions alone cost Russia, by the estimate of most informed Moscow journalists, more than 200 lives.

4) Finally, on Sept. 1, about 50 “Chechen fighters,” calling themselves the Islambuli Brigade, seized the school in Beslan in the North Ossetia Republic, about 100 kilometers west of Grozny. The terrorists were heavily armed with automatic rifles and grenade launchers.

The action took place on the first day of the new school year. Initially it was supposed that around 300 children and their parents were taken as hostages. Later it appeared that the number of hostages probably approached 1,200. The terrorists immediately concentrated the hostages in the school gymnasium and mined the entire school building.

Seven people were killed during the hostage taking and in skirmishes around the school building on Sept. 1. The terrorists demanded the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya and the release of the fighters captured during the attack of Nazran on June 21. A very grim detail: For the first time in the nine-year history of “Chechen terrorist actions,” terrorists “deployed” the children at the school windows as a “live shield”.

Sept. 2 passed comparatively quietly; the terrorists released 26 women and babies under the age of 2.

On the afternoon of Sept. 3, Russian troops “spontaneously and accidentally” (if we are to trust the Russian officials) initiated the school storming, which was accompanied by multiple explosions inside and intensive use of artillery from outside. Hundreds died during the storming of the school.

Who Is Guilty?

During the past several days, Russian journalists independent of the Kremlin (the leftist media belonging to the “democratic opposition”) and Russian-language journalists in New York (from RTV TV channel, Forwerts weekly and other newspapers not connected with Moscow) have been asking the same, traditionally Russian question: “Who is guilty?”

Impressively, all these journalists, in both Moscow and New York, of both leftist and moderate democratic orientation – from the chief editor of the Zavtra weekly, Alexandr Prokhanov, up to the former coach of the NTV channel (earlier the twin of RTV and now a Russian-government-controlled TV channel) Viktor Shenderovich – are giving the same answer, with insignificant variations: “Kremlin, Putin, Moscow!”

A more detailed answer, cleaned of emotion, is as follows:

# The recent series of terrorist actions was primarily the result of the presidential election in Chechnya. This position became vacant on the death of the previous president, Akhmad Kadyrov, on May 9, in an explosion in the Grozny stadium. The new election took place on Sunday, Aug. 29.

Supported by Moscow, Chechen Interior Minister Alu Alkhanov received around 75 percent of the votes, winning the election. Moscow proclaimed this election to be “honest and legitimate,” but the independent Russian media have another point of view.

# Recent events prove that the phenomenon of a “normal government fulfilling its duties” has ceased to exist in Russia.

Of course there are still several million people clad in the uniforms of the Russian army, police, FSB and other security forces. They are strong in looting, taking bribes, extorting tribute, shooting and arresting innocent people, and they are ruling supreme. They are absolutely helpless, however, in dealing with a real enemy!

These security forces, including Russian army officers deployed in Chechnya and the neighboring North Caucasus republics, are mostly corrupt. They probably wouldn’t arrest even Osama bin Laden entering a Moscow subway with a nuclear device, if he paid them handsomely enough.

And the mighty network of Chechen-controlled businesses in Moscow and other major Russian cities pays handsomely to key figures in the administration and security forces. These same businesses, enjoying a substantial share of the “oil-dollars rain” over Russia, have a lot of money to finance the guerrilla struggle in Chechnya and the most sophisticated terrorist actions in the North Caucasus republics and elsewhere in Russia.

Don’t look for another explanation for what’s happening, and be ready for even more terrible – much more terrible – terrorist strikes. Perhaps even the rumors about “nine nuclear suitcases stolen from former Soviet armories in the beginning of the 1990s, purchased by terrorists and installed in key points in Moscow for X hour” are not groundless.s

# The 9/11 terrorist attacks were a blessing for Putin & Co. After 9/11, he formally joined the “world crusade against terror” and enjoys the support of Western politicians. This gives Putin and his associates an excuse to behave in a very cruel manner, to torture and murder tens of thousands of innocent people, to make millions of people – not only Chechens but also other “Kavkazians” (who don’t mix with Caucasians) and even ethnic Russians as well – the objects of intensive state-run terrorism. Correction: police-military terrorism, because the normal state no longer exists in Russia.

What is happening in Chechnya and the bordering republics is actual armed military conflict, having nothing to do with the worldwide war on terrorism, despite some ties of guerrilla leaders with al-Qaida and some presence of Arabs among Chechen guerrillas. But ethnic Russians are here as well. The flame of war now embraces the entire North Caucasus, and its sparks are falling on Moscow and elsewhere.

# This conflict was initiated by Boris Yeltsin in December 1994. Putin, his successor, fueled the conflict in August-September 1999 after a series of apartment house explosions in Moscow and Volgodonsk.

By the way, who was to blame for these actions? Chechen terrorists? In two Chechen wars, the Russian army and police-security forces killed more than 100,000 civilians and deeply harmed millions of them. This created a fertile ground for the emergence of many thousands of ruthless young terrorists of both sexes, who know nothing except hate and death. Their ultimate goal is to bring death from Chechnya to Moscow.

The Kremlin sowed the seeds of hatred, and now Russia deals with the harvest. A multitude of Chechen “black widows,” young women eagerly becoming suicide bombers, has evolved during the last two years into an outstanding component of terrorist-guerrilla activity. Most of them lost close relatives or were deeply insulted by Russian troops.

# The North Caucasian war (not the “Chechen war” that is already going on) could continue indefinitely, because this war and related terrorist actions are extremely profitable for the Russian “ruling elite.” This group of people includes (a) corrupt “civilian” officials of all kinds who misuse money for the war itself as well as a huge financial flow for the “postwar reconstruction of Chechnya”; (b) oligarchs of all sizes, sharing the income with these officials; and (c) several thousand generals, the actual rulers of Russia now, who belong to the FSB, police, other security forces and army. The last group uses the war/terror environment for “black business” purposes and for expansion of its power as well.

What to Do?

While discussing all these facts and trends, Moscow journalists and their New York colleagues could not miss the problem of “media freedom” in Russia or, more correctly, its absence.

Anna Politkovskaya, a Russian journalist famous for her truthful description of the Chechnyan war, tried to reach Beslan. Her trip ended on Sept. 2 in a hospital in Rostov-on-Don, halfway between Moscow and Beslan. According to reliable data, Anna was poisoned and remains in very grave condition. Other “Putin unfriendly” journalists trying to reach Beslan by air were involved in fighting with the police at an airdrome and had been arrested.

Russian journalists in Moscow and New York, while admitting the unacceptability of the present situation in Chechnya, cannot find a comprehensive answer to one more famous Russian question: “What to do?” However, even if they find the answer, the Kremlin won’t change its policy. That’s because the independent media’s influence on and general public opinion of the present rulers of Russia are negligible.

More important, what should America do?

First of all, to recognize the truth, which no doubt is very close to the conclusions of the Russian independent media presented above. Our administration should make the right choice based on this truth.

Dr. Alexandr V. Nemets is co-author of "Chinese-Russian Military Relations, Fate of Taiwan and New Geopolitics" and "Russian-Chinese Alliance."

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