Another Letter from Baghdad

private correspondence | 09-06-04 | an American officer

[Capriole]

I am going to break from one of my rules today. Normally, I only describe things I have heard or seen. Many people have asked me, though, about what happened in an Najaf, so I think it is important to dwell on that today.

To begin with, I would like to tell you what my Iraqi colleagues thought about the situation. One, a devout Shi’a, felt that Muqtada al Sadr was really not such a bad guy, but that his movement had been co-opted by radicals and criminals. He was an exception. Another Shi’a co-worker begged I not put a picture of him on the web because he feared al Sadr’s followers would find it and kill him for befriending an American. Because of his pleas, I will not be able to develop a roll of film until I return home. Another, of unknown religious affiliation, said simply, “Muqtada al Sadr. Saddam Hussein. Two faces, one man.” The rest indicated in broken English and pantomime that he should be killed. None understood what he hoped to accomplish other than to establish himself as the Grand Ayatollah and all wondered how he hoped to do that by blowing up oil lines and killing police officers.

Because my colleagues have thrown their lot with the new government, I did some independent research to see if their views were representative. Even the most anti-Coalition papers asked al Sadr to lay down his arms because he was just giving the US an excuse to stay in Iraq. The moderate and pro-Coalition papers were united in denouncing him and the non-Iraqi Arab press, especially al Jazeera, for making him up as a hero and fanning the flames of terror in this suffering country. I even went to a website of a prominent Western newspaper and read the reader’s responses. Roughly 80% of a considerable number of responses from an Najaf practically begged the Iraqi and Coalition military to kill him and his men and destroy his arms. Not a few poked a finger at exiles living comfortably in the West who praise al Sadr from a café thousands of miles away.

I undertook this research project because I saw some portraying this tyrant’s fight portrayed as an Islamic Alamo. Nothing could be further from the truth. To begin with, the Imam Ali Shrine where he made his “gallant” stand is the Shi’a equivalent to the Vatican, rivaling only Mecca as place of pilgrimage. To my knowledge, the Alamo was no longer in service as a House of God. Furthermore, the Texans took the Alamo because its walls, not its status as a religious building, offered protection. Al Sadr chose to hide his guns, suicide belts, mortars, anti-aircraft artillery and a host of other weapons in the Imam Ali Shrine because he knew we would never strike a place so holy to so many. Finally, the Alamo’s defenders were outnumbered. Our Marines, backed by 1st CAV and the Iraqi Military and Police, were the attackers and outnumbered until the closing days of the fight. The advantage of the tactical defense, knowledge of the terrain, and a sympathetic media belonged to the foe as our Marines and Soldiers entered the graveyard of an Najaf.

This is where I must depart from my story to tell the story of another. Every advantage belonged to the foe. They had numbers. They were willing to ignore the rules of war, using holy sites, medical facilities, and civilians as cover. They were able to use media savvy to portray themselves as heroic defenders of a faith even while they profaned its holiest site. Our Marines and GIs had a technological edge that was largely negated in the rabbit warrens of the ancient city and the packed graveyards of the faithful. As our enemy burrowed through the bones of their ancestors, our Troops advanced, restraining their fire, avoiding the shrine, minimizing the risk to civilians. Where technology could not be brought to bear, they relied on esprit, élan, and dedication, fighting with honor against an enemy who has none, exercising restraint in the face of an evil that knows no bounds. Mistakes were indubitably made, but they were mistakes and not strategy. Though the negotiated outcome to the siege may not have been to our, or even the Iraqis’, liking, the stars on our flag shine brighter today for the actions of our Marines and Soldiers. Should you meet a Marine or a member of the 1st Cavalry Division, please rise, walk over, shake his or her hand, and tell then “Well done!” for their brothers and sisters fought with honor at an Najaf.

The fight at an Najaf gave me pause to reflect on our role here. I originally supported the war because of the perceived threat of chemical and biological weapons. I admit my faith was shaken when our intelligence proved so wrong. Since coming here, though, I am convinced the humanitarian reasons may have been even more compelling. I have watched my colleagues shake the shackles of despotism, exercising minds systematically shrunk over 30 years. I have listened to them plan vacations to Disneyworld, a thought that would have brought a midnight visit and another vanished relative a year ago. Cell phones, tightly controlled by the regime, are a commodity sold in the bazaar, and there is lively debate in a flourishing array of newspapers. There has been onlyone new mass grave since the fall of Saddam, and that was in an Najaf, where al Sadr’s forces tortured, killed and mutilated men, women, and children in “the name of God” in order to “liberate them from US aggression.” They are indeed liberated, gone to a place that knows no suffering and no pain, and I know that God will show mercy and compassion denied them here.

I have come to see in the last few weeks that this campaign is bearing fruit. We made terrible, terrible, mistakes, but we have learned. In the last 3 weeks, our colleagues, with our help, have given policemen the feeling that there is a government behind them, willing and able to send help, and these policemen have started to stand their ground and fight back against the darkness. The Iraqi Army is discovering a new pride, and that too, is in part due to the work we have done here. Like a brace on a broken leg, we are helping and supporting our colleagues, but every day we loosen the brace a little more. Soon, they will stand alone. Like a great sailing ship in the midst of a tack, our sails have started to luff. The question remains: do we have the momentum to see the tack through? 22 million souls stand poised, awaiting our answer.

[Capriole]

Another installment from my young friend, a naval officer who decided that he wanted to serve his country in Iraq and volunteered to be assigned to go in-country. He writes on an erratic basis about what he has seen, not as a blogger but to a small group of friends. He has given permission for his remarks to appear here.

[MarkeyD]

Read later.

[islander-11]

Thanks for posting that. And, most of all, thanks to your friend for defending America. May God bless him and all that serve.

[Miztiki]

I follow the Iraqi bloggers carefully, monitor comments from Iraqis in Iraq (and in Najaf specifically) on other websites, and rely on word from my in-laws in Iraq (one in Najaf), and the VAST majority have no use for Muqtada al-Sadr. Among those who do claim to support him, many do so out of fear. When Sadr's thugs threaten to melt your face off with a blowtorch, you say anything. He is not wanted in Iraq and it's a shame that Sistani had to step in when we were so damn close to ending the Sadr problem once and for all.

I am not at all surprised with the observations of your friend.