[Cboldt]

Bear in mind that Rood was part of a first beaching, and Kerry's boat was a second beaching, 800 yards or so from the first. Also,"attacking a numerically superior enemy" would, I would think, mean more VC than crew on a Swift boat. Even if you look at the more narrow event of Kerry on land, even if there were two VC, there were two, or three Swifties, counting Kerry.

Also, attacking into intense fire ... S/A and one-off rocket were typical, not intense.

Anyway, my general point was to not focus on the single VC. There is mmore there, as Elliott's recent affidavits "hint" at, as well as his dust-up with Kranish and the Globe earlier this month.

[Fedora]

"Anyway, my general point was to not focus on the single VC. There is mmore there"

Good point. I think it might help shed some light to reconstruct the broader operations which Kerry's incidents occurred in. I'm curious what prompted him and the other Swift Boat commanders to agree to the beaching plan in the first place--seems to me like the opposite of what you'd want to do in that situation. My understanding is that if you get ambushed you want to get *out* of the kill zone, not stop in the middle of it. How Kerry persuaded others to do otherwise puzzles me, unless there was a minimal threat and it was all a stunt to get medals from the get-go.

[R. Scott]

Also, attacking into intense fire ... S/A and one-off rocket were typical, not intense.

To a person who has never been under fire, a single antique Mauser firing from 500 yards would qualify as “intense” fire.