Posted on 08/30/2004 5:06:20 PM PDT by Horatio Gates
In the case of most Airbus products, the aircraft are pre-fabricated in various places (fuselage/wings in Germany, cockpit/avionics in Italy, tail section in France) and then all assembled in Spain. The tail section of an airbus is BOLTED onto the fuselage, rather than being an "integral part of the fuselage".
If I remember correctly, there have been reported problems with the plastic/composite bolts (non-metal) used in this process before, mostly related to stress fractures and fatigue.
I would also question anything that mentioned terrorism vis-a-vis the Canadian government, which opposes US strategy in the war and which could reasonably, therefore, be expected to NOT release information that would bolster US Government claims that terrorism is a major threat. Especially after the official line from Ottawa, for the last three years, has been that GW Bush is a lunatic.
If terrorism was in fact the case, don't you think that in the post-9/11 era that GW Bush and co would withhold credible evidence of a terrorist attack? Especially since the fight against terrorism is Bush's main weapon? Since Tom Ridge invades our TV screens every few weeks to up the "Terror Alert", I think not.
Please put away your tin-foil hat and THINK.
Islamism until demonstrated otherwise.
Obviously, a very early first step in such an accident would be to establish positive identities for each passenger on the manifest. This has to be done whether accident, sabotage, or terrorist action.
If there had been anything suspicious about any of the passengers, it would have taken a coverup of massive force to suppress that fact.
And I would like to add Mansoor Ijaz to that list. Haven't seen Ijaz on Fox lately. -Tom
The "highly doubtful" part is how a Frogbus loses the tail AND both engines without there being a cause that explains both. And that would be that the plane was out of control before it started shedding large surfaces due to being sideways at 300kts.
However, there is a way to check if this report might be true: Did a body go unclaimed, or did anyone supposedly on the plane turn up alive, but missing their passport?
The bolts didn't fail. The tlephone-book thickness of carbon fiber composite was ripped apart above the bolts. QED: It wasn't a small force that removed the tail.
That happened on November 12, not the 13th.
The vertical stabilizer did come off the aircraft, the attachment points, both on the fuselage and the stabilizer were extensively photographed, and until recently I was in possession of those photographs.
Since I can't find them now, this is from memory.
(See sketches:
http://users.in-motion.net/~jefft/mountains/tail1.jpg
http://users.in-motion.net/~jefft/mountains/tail2.jpg )
There were 6 points of attachment between the fuselage and the vertical stabilizer, in two fore-and aft oriented lines of three, and after the crash, 4 of them were in a state I'll arbitrarily designate State A, with one each in State B and C. The point of attachment in State C was in the forward starboard position of the array, and the point of attachment in State B was the mid port position of the array.
In normal pre-crash configuration the points of attachment are described as follows. Mounted on the exterior of the fuselage were two pieces of "angle iron" (metal unknown) between 18 and 24 inches long. The vertical portion of each was fitted with about 6 to 8 through bolts approximately 1 inch in diameter with heads and nuts approximately two inches across the axis. The method of attachment of these pieces of "angle iron" to the fuselage was not able to be determined from the photographs.
Attached to each "rail" via the bolts were one each, (two per attachment point) vertically oriented triangular "lugs" point up, between 1 and 2 inches thick, about 18 inches along the base, with the apex about one foot above the fuselage. Piercing each lug near the apex was a 4" diameter reinforced hole. Fitted through the holes of each respective pair of lugs was a 4" diameter solid metal "pin". Between the two lugs sat a third "lug", roughly circular on three sides fore, bottom, and aft, and flat on top, through which was another 4" hole and through which the 4" diameter pin passed, attaching the upper lug to the lower pair of lugs.
The upper lug was attached to what was apparantly two pieces of sheet metal which sandwiched fiberglass that appeared to be either the external surface of the vertical stabilizer, or else internal fiberglass structural components of the vertical stabilizer. Through both pieces of sheet metal and the intervening section of fiberglass were hundreds of what appeared to be standard rivets with heads between a quarter and a half inch in diameter.
In all four attachment points in State A after the crash, the main 4" diameter pin was still in place through the two fuselage mounted lugs, apparantly undamaged with the entirety of the upper lug missing. The thickness of the missing upper lug was between two and four inches of apparantly cast and machined solid metal. For the upper lug to have been removed without removing the 4" pin from the two lower lugs would have required the upper lug to have either seperated into at least three pieces or else to have seperated into two pieces with severe deformation of the solid metal shape.
A single crack from the hole in the upper lug to the perimeter of the upper lug would not have permitted the upper lug to escape the 4" diameter pin without severe deformation, i.e. a 4" seperation between the sides of the crack.
The attachment point in State B, mid port in the 6 point array, failed in the following manner. The fiberglass sandwiched between the two metal plates attached to the upper lug was subjected to severe tension or torsion stress and the fibergalss itself had failed around the two plates. The entire assembly, both lower lugs, pin, and upper lug, was intact with long, perhaps 6", of fiberglass still remaining around the two plates, and the edges of the fiberglass exhibited long (12 to 18") "hairs" or fibers which had been ripped from the missing fiberglass.
The attachment point in State C at the forward starboard location in the 6 point array was missing the 4" diameter pin and the upper lug, with the two lower lugs and their angle iron attachment to the fuselage intact and apparantly undamaged.
The fuselage under the entire 6 point array was apparantly undamaged, no burns, no piercings, no dents, essentially in pristine condition.
In the absence of damage to the fuselage surrounding the attachment array for the vertical stabilizer, the conclusion that the vertical stabilizer was seperated from the fuselage by laterally imposed aerodynamic forces along appears inescapable.
Explosive devices attached to the 4 upper lugs which seperated while leaving the 4" diameter pins intact (State A) would have had to have been in such close proximity to the intact fuselage as to leave some scorching after the crash, but none was apparant. It is conceivable that the upper lugs had been manually cut entirely through or partially through in at least two places each prior to takeoff, but this seems unlikely for two reasons.
One, all six would have had to pass pre-flight and regular maintenence inspections, and two, any use of the rudder during take-off above minimal groundspeed would have resulted in the entire vertical stabilizer separating from the fuselage prior to or shortly after takeoff.
No in-cabin explosive device had any direct connection to the separation of the fuselage and the vertical stabilizer. The fuselage between the interior of the cabin and the attachment points for the fin was undamaged.
The vertical stabilizer was the earliest sign of damage to the aircraft, being found alone at the very leading edge of the debris field, well "upstream" from any other other debris, the great majority of which fell onto Long Island. The vertical stabilizer, essentially intact except for the damage to the fiberglass at one attachment point as described above (State B) was fished from Long Island Sound, literally miles from any other debris.
It is faintly possible that a terrorist explosive device inside the cabin could have precipitated secondary effects which led to the separation of the fuselage and vertical stabilizer, but the necessary chain of events stretches the credible.
The explosive would have either had to damage critical hydraulic or electrical control circuitry causing a "rudder hard over" condition which resulted in separation of the vertical stabilizer from the fuselage, or else the explosion would have had to take place in the cockpit, again resulting in a rudder hard over condition, all without piercing the exterior of the fuselage in any way except so as to shed pieces of the aircraft with could not float in Long Island Sound, and which were not large enough to register on metal detection searches conducted after the crash.
Prior to contact with the ground, the airframe yawed so violently as to separate both engine nacelles from the underwing attachment points, not at the upper end of the engine pylons where the engines are routinely removed for maintenence, but at the pylon/nacelle attachment on the lower end of both pylons.
This type damage is consistent with violent yaw, which is in turn consistent with either a rudder hard over condition, or complete failure of the vertical stabilizer and subsequent violent yawing oscillation.
Having extensively studied the available information on this incident, I conclude that there was no instance of terrorism consistent with the known facts.
Had the terrorist currently in Canadian custody mentioned any kind of pre-flight sabotage, especially including the stabilizer attachment lugs, I might have re-opened the door, but his claims of using an explosive device inside the cabin simply do not wash.
In any event, whether the root cause of the incident was terrorist attack or wingtip vorticies from an earlier flight that tore the tail off, the vertical stabilizer, did seperate from the fuselage, under no imposed stresses other than aerodynamic. In plain english, the tail did just "fall off".
The engines also came off due to aerodynamic load. The pilons are not designed (in contrast with Boeings) to break in a controlled way in a gear-up "landing," and there is no plausible amount of yaw that would cause the pilons to fail based on mechanical forces.
Which leads one to the question: What made the plane go sideways? As you point out, the tail came off because it was flying sideways. So did the engines.
Some other problem occurred before the plane shed these parts.
IMO, it was a terrorist-related event, until conclusively proved otherwise. And so far, no one has proven anything to the contrary.
Agreed, but what?
I don't see any scenario where a shoe bomb could make an aircraft fly sideways.
Same goes for a missile, unless its packing a nuclear warhead. I'd expect to see some scorching and some additional pieces besides the tail at the leading edge of the debris field in the event of any kind of explosion violent enough to cause something like that.
A thunderstorm could do it, or any other violent crosswind, but the terrorists don't have the capability to create those type conditions.
In the absence of any other plausible exception, I don't see much choice other than to accept the tip vorticies theory offered by the investigating officials.
I've followed a 747 on takeoff while a passenger in a twin Comanche and it was damned rough, even though we were well out of the way of the tip vortices, inside and above.
What else is there that will fail a commercial airframe in a way consistent with what we already know?
The problem with that explanations is that AA587 wasn't "tailgating." That explanation is worth about the same as the "old engine," "thrust reversers" (conclusively disproved), and "bird strike" trial balloons that were planted in the media - always with unattributed sources.
A baggage bomb or shoe bomb could very readily have disrupted controls. This model Frogbus was not fly-by-wire, so it had hydraulic lines. Those are easier to destroy than multiple-redundant fiber optic lines.
Also, if you google up "unusual attitude" you will find all the crash reports where planes were out of control. In MANY of these cases, big pieces come off due to aerodynamic loads. Not unusual at all. But all due to the plane not being in control before it started to come apart.
I can entertain the possibility, but there's a couple of potential objections to overcome.
One, will an explosion commanded rudder hard over condition overcome the engine's thrust to the degree necessary to yaw an aircraft far enough around to impose the kind of lateral forces we saw?
Two, there's at least a possibility that the rudder would separate from the vertical stabilizer under those conditions, which would alleviate the lateral tendency. I remember looking for images of the tail, for the express purpose of seeing if both came off together, and finding them, but I can't remember whether the rudder was on or off the tail.
Also of possible note, the engine nacelles separated much later than the vertical stabilizer, impacting with the bulk of the airframe. That's more consistent with yaw oscillation induced by the lack of the stabilizer than with a single instance of violent yaw.
I'm going to take another look for those images, maybe an old backup has them intact.
CVR transcript from planecrashinfo.com
November 12, 2001
Belle Harbor, Queens, New York
American Airlines Flight 587
Airbus A300-600
N14053
Three minutes after taking off and while in a climbing left turn, at 2,800 ft., parts of the plane, including the vertical stabilizer and rudder, fell from the aircraft. The crew soon lost control of the plane which nose dived and crashed into a residential neighborhood. After flying into the wake turbulence of two aircraft about two minutes into the flight, investigators believe a series of quick rudder swings by the copilot whipped the tail so severely that the fin broke off. All 260 aboard were killed.
HOT-1 = Hot microphone - Captain
HOT-2 = Hot microphone - Copilot
CAM = Cockpit area microphone
RDO = Radio transmission from accident aircraft
TWR = Radio transmission from JFK control tower
DEP = Radio transmission from New York departure control
* Unintelligible word
# Expletive
.... Break in continuity
[ ] Editorial insertion
0913:27.6 TWR American five eight seven heavy, wind three zero zero at niner, runway three one left, cleared for takeoff.
0913:31.7 RDO-1 Cleared for takeoff, American ah, five eight seven heavy.
0913:35.3 HOT-2 You happy with that distance?
0913:38.5 HOT-1 Aah, he's.... we'll be all right once we get rollin'. he's supposed to be five miles by the time we're airborne, that's the idea.
0913:45.5 HOT-2 So you're happy. lights?
0913:47.1 HOT-1 Yeah, lights are on.
0913:47.8 HOT-2 Takeoff check's complete, I'm on the roll. thank you sir.
0913:53.5 HOT-1 Thrust SRS, runway.
0913:54.7 CAM [Sound similar to increase in engine RPM]
0914:03.8 HOT-2 You got throttles.
0914:08.9 HOT-1 Eighty knots, thrust blue.
0914:23.4 HOT-1 V one.
0914:24.3 HOT-1 Rotate.
0914:25.7 HOT-1 V two
0914:28.5 HOT-1 V two plus ten.
0914:30.4 HOT-2 Positive rate, gear up please.
0914:31.5 HOT-1 Gear up.
0914:33.1 CAM [Sound of thump and two clicks]
0914:38.5 HOT-2 Heading select.
0914:41.9 HOT-1 Clear left.
0914:42.6 TWR American five eight seven heavy, turn left. Fly the Bridge Climb. Contact New York departure. Good morning.
0914:48.3 RDO-1 American five eighty seven heavy, so long.
0914:51.4 HOT-1 Gear's up.
0914:52.5 HOT-2 Check speed, level change.
0914:54.8 HOT-2 Flaps up.
0914:56.5 HOT-2 Climb power.
0914:57.1 CAM [Sound of click]
0915:00.0 RDO-1 Ah New York, American five eighty seven heavy, thirteen hundred feet, we're climbing to five thousand.
0915:04.7 DEP American five eight seven heavy, New York departure. Radar contact. Climb maintain one three thousand.
0915:10.2 RDO-1 One three thousand feet, American five eighty seven heavy.
0915:14.6 HOT-2 One three I see, slats retract.
0915:16.5 HOT-1 Slats.
0915:17.2 CAM [Sound of several clicks]
0915:28.5 HOT-1 Clean machine.
0915:28.5 HOT-2 [Sound similar to yawn] thank you.
0915:36.4 DEP American five eighty seven heavy, turn left, proceed direct WAVEY.
0915:37.3 HOT-1 [Sound of brief squeak and a rattle]
0915:41.0 RDO-1 Uh, we'll turn direct WAVEY, American five eighty seven heavy.
0915:44.4 HOT-2 Left turn direct WAVEY….
0915:44.7 HOT-1 Little wake turbulence, huh?
0915:45.6 HOT-2 …yeah.
0915:47.3 HOT-2 [Sound similar to five sets of stabilizer trim switch clicks]
0915:48.2 HOT-2 Two fifty thank you.
0915:51.0 [Aircraft encounters second wake vortex]
0915:51.8 CAM [Sound of a thump]
0915:52.3 CAM [Sound of click]
0915:52.9 CAM [Sound of two thumps]
0915:54.2 HOT-2 Max power. [spoken in strained voice]
0915:55.0 HOT-1 You all right?
0915:55.3 HOT-2 Yea, I'm fine.
0915:56.3 HOT-1 Hang onto it. hang onto it.
0915:56.6 CAM [Sound of snap]
0915:57.5 HOT-2 Let's go for power please.
0915:57.7 CAM [Sound of loud thump]
0915:58.5 CAM [Sound of loud bang]
0916:00.0 HOT-2 [Sound similar to human grunt]
0916:00.2 CAM [Roaring noise starts and increases in amplitude]
0916:01.0 HOT-2 Holy #.
0916:01.0 CAM [Sound similar to single ECAM chime]
0916:02.0 CAM [Sound similar to single ECAM chime]
0916:04.4 CAM [Sound similar to stall warning repetitive chime for 1.9 seconds]
0916:06.2 CAM [Roaring noise decreases and ends]
0916:07.5 HOT-2 What the hell are we into *. We're stuck in it.
0916:07.5 CAM [Sound similar to continuous repetitive chimes for one second]
0916:09.6 CAM [Sound similar to continuous repetitive chimes for three seconds]
0916:12.8 HOT-1 Get out of it, get out of it.
0916:14.8 END of RECORDING
From the transcript, looks like the interval between AAL 587 and the JAL 747 was too short. Sorry if this is too long.
Shoe bomb 1, shoe bomb 2, and things go to hell.
Ok, I found some pictures online, mine are gone for good.
Image 1:
http://users.in-motion.net/~jefft/mountains/lugs1.jpg
Observations:
1. No apparent scorch or burn marks (from intense heat), except "road dirt" similar to that found on the lower suspension parts of most automobiles, in the areas that would have been inside the skin of the vertical stabilizer and therefore inaccessible to ground cleaning crews.
2. Fuselage paint missing, as if burned off.
3. Paint burned off automobiles in background, tires flat consistent with melting.
4. Ground thoroughly wet in background, numerous fire department personnel, one fire truck.
5. Both port side upper lugs intact, aft port upper lug with composite attached, mid starboard upper lug intact, aft starboard upper lug missing.
Image 2:
http://users.in-motion.net/~jefft/mountains/Attach_Pts_from_Right2.jpg
Observations:
1. Probably scorching from intense heat below aft starboard attachment point. Scorch pattern does not indicate forward velocity at time of occurence.
2. Delamination of composite attached to aft port upper lug consistent with lateral torsion to port.
3. Outline of vertical stabilizer external skin apparant on fuselage, indicating thatthe attachment points were connected to the internal structure, not the skin of, the vertical stabilizer.
Image 3:
http://users.in-motion.net/~jefft/mountains/Fwd_Attach_Points.jpg
Observations:
1. Port and starboard forward attach points indicate intense heat and scorching. Scorch pattern on fuselage indicates forward velocity at the time of occurance, as evidenced by overall trailing shape and "burn shadows" (areas of lesser scorching) thrown by inner and outer starboard lower lugs. The scorching aft of center of the two lugs (behind and between them) indicates upper lug not in place at time of occurance.
2. Forward port upper lug partially in place, forward starboard upper lug missing.
3. Red paint application most likely preceeded scorching as some pigment is darkened/discolored consistent with scorching aft of starboard attach point.
Image 4:
http://users.in-motion.net/~jefft/mountains/vert_stab.jpg
Observations:
1. No scorching.
2. Rudder entirely missing.
Image 5:
http://users.in-motion.net/~jefft/mountains/whole_rudder.jpg
Observations:
1. Montage of debris images Photoshopped together after the fact, depicting the majority of the aircraft's rudder.
2. Rudder seperated into three pieces.
3. No scorching.
Image 6:
http://users.in-motion.net/~jefft/mountains/Vert_Stab_Base_Aft.jpg
Observations:
1. Base of vertical stabilizer viewed from aft.
2. No scorching.
3. Missing composite in base area immediately left of coiled hanging wires consistent with composite remaining on aft post upper lug shown in earlier images.
4. Missing composite on upper edge forward compatible with mid starboard upper lug remaining on fuselage.
Conclusions:
1. Absence of scorching on vertical stabilizer, vertical stabilizer base, and rudder indicates speperation prior to fire/explosion.
2. Voice logs indicate at least two instances of pilot concern over wake turbulence, prior to takeoff and during passage through wake turbulence.
3. Absence of discussion of wake turbulence or any other problem during passage of presumable second tip vortex possible indicates both pilots already familiar with the problem.
3. Comments of First Officer (probably actually piloting the aircraft throughout) indicate severe turbulence, ("What the hell are we into, we're stuck in it") consistent with expected passage of second tip vortex.
4. Comment from Captain ("Get out of it, get out of it") reinforces conclusion drawn in 3.
5. No evidence from flight crew to indicate any explosion, or any problem other than those they previously discussed.
6. Two failed starboard upper lugs with all three portside upper lugs probably indicates lateral aerodynamic stress imposed from the starboard side. Once the starboard fore and aft upper lugs failed and the mid starboard upper lug separated from the composite, resultant forces would tip the vertical stabilizer towards the port side. The weakest point in the port structure would be the composite, and we see splintering and all three upper lugs remaining, consistent with this sequence of events.
At the time of the incident and for the first 24 hours afterwards, my opinion was that this was almost certainly a terrorist attack. On analysis at that time, I simply could find no support for that scenario.
Further analysis performed recently has done nothing to change that conclusion, and indeed has solidified my belief that this accident was caused by wake turbulence/wingtip vortices as reported.
The aircraft most likely grazed the under extent of the initial tip vortex, and then climbed directly into the second tip vortex, where it was unable to escape.
Composite sources retrieved after the event indicate that during maximum deviation from normal flight, the aircraft was rolled 25 degrees to port, yawed 10 degrees to port, and nose down 30 degrees.
Wingtip vorticies spin out from the wingtips, then up and over to complete a circle ending at the wingtip. Viewed from behind, the vortex off the JAL 747's left wingtip (the first flight 587 encountered as they were east of KAL's line of advance with the prevailing wind from the west) would have been circulating clockwise and probably higher than Flight 587. The flow at the lower extent of the vortex would have been moving to the west or starboard from 587's point of view, and would have affected the upper part of the airframe, notably the vertical stabilizer, more than the lower parts.
On matching altitudes with the second vortex, 587 would have entered from the left side of the second vortexwhich would be perceived as a downdraft. Any pilot's response to a downdraft on climb out would be to increase power. A trained airline pilot, already alerted to the presence of wake turbulence and specifically tip vorticies, would attempt a vortex escape maneuver, which initiates with an increase to maximum power. From the logs, it is clear that this is precisely what happened.
On passing into the interior of the JAL aircraft's starboard tip vortex, 587 would be subject to a roll to port, which instruments indicate.
If slightly below the center of the vortex but still climbing, 587 would have first been subject to a left to right airflow, which would tend to yaw the aircraft nose to the left. Response to the yaw would be right rudder, which the flight data recorder shows.
The left roll would decrease lift to the wings, indicating a response of applying power, which the voice logs show. At this point the aircraft mould have topped out on its climb and and held level for a bit, since it takes a few seconds for the turbines to spin up. If the top of the climb exceeded the altitude of the center of the vortex, the vertical stabilizer would then be subject to a right to left lateral airflow, precipitating a nose right yaw. Response to same would be rudder left, which the flight data recorder confirms.
It is my belief that the rudder separated the vertical stabilizer at this time, coinciding with the thumps heard at 15:51.8, and the two thumps at 15:52.9. Three thumps, three pieces of rudder.
Detaching the rudder overstressed the vertical stabilizer's attachment points, and most likely the entire tail section of the fuselage, and at 15:57.7 we have a loud thump, possibly an upper lug letting go, and then at 15:58.5 a loud bang as the entire vertical stabilizer departed the fuselage.
It is my opinion that the flight went wild divergent at some point after this, detaching the tail section of the fuselage forward of the mid stabilizer attachment points, and that between this point and ground impact, there was some sort of mid-air explosion, brought on by further airframe disintegration, that scorched the forward stabilizer attach points but not the surrounding fuselage. At some point subsequent to this event, the remaining aft fuselage containing the forward attach points seperated from the main body of the fuselage. This could have occurred with ground impact.
Adding it up, over and over, I just can't piece together any scenario in which a shoe bomb, or any other terrorist attack, fits in with the available information. It's just not there.
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