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I hate to puncture anyone's tinfoil hat or underwear, but the basic damage to the airplane was that the vertical stabilizer came off. To do that with explosives would have required access to the internal structure. You could do it in flight, but not during takeoff. It wouldn't be easy or unnoticed either. I suppose that some sort of blast path from the passenger cabin up through the overhead to the attachment structure might have been available, but that might have scattered evidence of explosives over a wide area.

NAMSMAN sends.

While the logistics of a possible explosive incident will remain the topic of debate for some time to come, I was simply pointing out the total lack of conviction in the duck and weave statements made by this spokesman for the NTSB.

In my view it does more to promote an attack theory than to dispell it.

You are correct. All investigations of this crash clearly indicate the problem was with the connection point between the vertical stabilizer and the fuselage. The composite componets were stretched beyond there limits due to the overreaction of the first officer on the control inputs. Also, jet wake may have contributed. They examined similar aircraft and have found stress cracks in this area. Independent investigations have revealed that the Airbus rudder inputs are much more sensitve than similar aircraft. The REAL CONSPIRISY here is that these Airbus (French) aircraft continue to fly!

If it ain't Boeing, I ain't going!

Hey Namsman, could this hypothesis (from usread.com) provide a reasonable sequence where a bomb could have led to events which the caused then caused tail stabilizer to fail?

1. The pilot was not battling wake turbulence (although he may have thought he was) but the effects of an event inside the aircraft, which occurred at least 8 seconds before the tail separated.

2. The NTSB's Human Performance Group, operating under the assumption that the pilot was reacting to wake turbulence, stated that the turbulence was "barely perceptible", not typical, and entirely inconsistent with the very aggressive series of control inputs by the pilot. The pilot was using all the controls at his disposal (roll, yaw, and pitch controls) and called for maximum power three times in a span of only 7 seconds.

3. The vertical tail separation came later in the crash sequence than the NTSB has concluded, and was not the first object to depart the aircraft. Therefore, the vertical tail separation was a consequence, not a cause, of a crash sequence that was already underway and inevitable. This conclusion is supported by the radar data, the ECAM system, the tollbooth video, and the eyewitnesses––all which indicate that the tail, and engines, departed later in the crash sequence.

4. The initiating event was very likely an explosion or fire onboard the aircraft that occurred no later than the time of the 2nd alleged wake encounter––when the pilot began his aggressive control inputs. Dozens of eyewitnesses who saw the tail separate reported an explosion or fire which preceded tail separation.