After demonstrating incompetence at analyzing both the Afghan and Iraqi campaigns, Peters concocted with McCaffrey a theory that our troops were understrength -- even though we were never overwhelmed by enemy forces owing to our superior command communications, quick mobility and precise firepower.
Putting a soldier (read, stationary target) on every corner was Peters' solution to every problem, as Lyndon Johnson's solution to Vietnam was to increase troop strength by a half million. Unfortunately, Peters never took into account the unavailable Turkish front as a factor limiting the troops in the initial stages of the war nor the disastrous Soviet experience of too many soldiers in Afghanistan, attendant with vulnerable supply lines.
Peter's has been wrong on nearly every issue, and his usual out-of-sync thinking prmoted increasing our footprint when the Pentagon was planning its exit by turning over responsibilities for security to newly trained Iraqis as soon as they were able to handle them.
While Peters rails against columnists who exploited Abu Ghraib for their own purposes, he is one. Peters' could well have written the extraordinarily biased New York Times articles on the subject, as well as its editorial today. His irrational quest for revenge (for what, I don't know), transcended any damage he was doing to the reputation not only of the US but its military. Peters, you will recall, said Abu Ghraib dishonored all service personnel who ever wore the uniform.
I beg to differ with Lt. Col. Half-Track: It is Peters who dishonors the military, his country, and the New York Post.
There has never been to my knowledge any picture or anecdote coming out of Abu Ghraib that did NOT include one of those 7 or 8 soldiers who are at the center of this controversy. THEIR cellblock was out of control. No others. There was an entire MP battalion operating in and around Abu Ghraib (maybe even an MP Group...my memory is lacking...)
If this was "policy" and "encouraged," then it's odd that those 7 or 8 are the only ones who "understood" those imaginary orders.