Charles A. Duelfer, who in January replaced David A. Kay as a special adviser to the CIA, reported finding no caches of weapons in Iraq. But in a public statement released by the CIA, he stressed a refocusing of the U.S. effort. "My strategy is to determine the regime's intentions for all the activities" being uncovered by the Iraq Survey Group. The group's new task, he said, is "to investigate Iraq's WMD programs and to determine the truth about their existence, their extent, their capabilities, and where the regime was headed." Duelfer evinced frustration with the lack of cooperation from Iraqi scientists and engineers. But he was adamant that "there is more work to be done to gather critical information about the regime, its intentions, and its capabilities, and to assess that information for its meaning."
Duelfer stressed new information developed from recovered documents, debriefings of relevant personnel, and scrutiny of research and production facilities. Iraq's dual-use facilities and ongoing research programs, he contended, would have allowed Iraq "to produce biological and chemical agents on short notice."
He cited "a crash program" to build new chemical production facilities that was in effect up to March 2003, when a U.S.-led coalition invaded Iraq. A few of these plants were slated to produce dual-use chemicals such as N,N-dicyclohexylcarbodiimide. Before 1991, Duelfer said, Iraq used DCC as a stabilizing agent for the nerve agent VX.
-- "IRAQ'S WEAPONS: TOP U.S. INSPECTOR BRIEFS CONGRESS; Lack of cooperation thwarts effort to define suspected arms programs," BY LOIS R. EMBER, Chemical & Engineering News, ISSN 0009-2347, Copyright © 2004, April 1, 2004
(* My note : Tuwaitha was formerly thought to be a purely nuclear research site )
MARCH 30, 2004 : (DEMOCRAT SENATOR LEVIN COMPLAINS THAT THE CIA DIDN'T SPIN DUELFER'S IRAQ SURVEY GROUP INTERIM THE WAY HE WANTED IT TO BE SPUN) Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.), who sits on the Armed Services and Select Intelligence Committees that heard Duelfer's testimony, complained that the public version released by the CIA was misleading "in a number of instances." It "includes material that suggests that Iraq had an active WMD program while leaving out information that would lead one to doubt that it did." Levin called on the CIA to declassify Duelfer's interim report in its entirety, if possible.-- "IRAQ'S WEAPONS: TOP U.S. INSPECTOR BRIEFS CONGRESS; Lack of cooperation thwarts effort to define suspected arms programs," BY LOIS R. EMBER, Chemical & Engineering News, ISSN 0009-2347, Copyright © 2004, April 1, 2004