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An excerpt from Spetsnaz. The Story Behind the Soviet SAS, written by Suvorov Viktor, written in 1987!

"I do not know how or when World War Three will start. I do not know exactly how the Soviet high command plans to make use of spetsnaz in that war: the first world war in which spetsnaz will be a major contributor. I do not wish to predict the future. In this chapter I shall describe how spetsnaz will be used at the beginning of that war as I imagine it. It is not my task to describe what will happen. But I can describe what might happen.

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The last month of peace, as in other wars, has an almost palpable air of crisis about it. Incidents, accidents, small disasters add to the tension. Two trains collide on a railway bridge in Cologne because the signalling system is out of order. The bridge is seriously damaged and there can be no traffic over it for the next two months.

In the port of Rotterdam a Polish supertanker bursts into flames. Because of an error by the captain the tanker is far too close to the oil storage tanks on the shore, and the burning oil spreads around the harbour. For two weeks fire brigades summoned from practically the whole country fight an heroic battle with the flames. The port suffers tremendous losses. The fire appears to have spread at a quite incredible speed, and some experts are of the opinion that the Polish tanker was not the only cause of the fire, that the fire broke out simultaneously in many places.

In the Panama Canal the Varna, a Bulgarian freighter loaded with heavy containers, rams the lock gates by mistake. Experts reckoned that the ship should have remained afloat, but for some reason she sinks there and then. To reopen the canal could well take many months. The Bulgarian government sends its apologies and declares itself ready to pay for all the work involved.

In Washington, as the President's helicopter is taking off, several shots are fired at it from sniper's rifles. The helicopter is only slightly damaged and the crew succeed in bringing it down again safely. No one in the craft is hurt. Responsibility for the attack is claimed by a previously unknown organisation calling itself 'Revenge for Vietnam'.

There is a terrorist explosion at Vienna airport.

A group of unidentified men attack the territory of the British military base in Cyprus with mortars.

A serious accident takes place on the most important oil pipeline in Alaska. The pumping stations break down and the flow of oil falls to a trickle.

In West Germany there are several unsuccessful attempts on the lives of American generals.

In the North Sea the biggest of the British oil rigs tips over and sinks. The precise reason for this is not established, although experts believe that corrosion of main supports is the culprit.

In the United States an epidemic of some unidentified disease breaks out and spreads rapidly. It seems to affect port areas particularly, such as San Francisco, Boston, Charleston, Seattle, Norfolk and Philadelphia.

There are explosions practically every day in Paris. The main targets are the government districts, communication centres and military headquarters. At the same time terrible forest fires are raging in the South of France.

All these operations — because of course none of these events is an accident — and others like them are known officially in the GRU as the 'preparatory period', and unofficially as the 'overture'. The overture is a series of large and small operations the purpose of which is, before actual military operations begin, to weaken the enemy's morale, create an atmosphere of general suspicion, fear and uncertainty, and divert the attention of the enemy's armies and police forces to a huge number of different targets, each of which may be the object of the next attack.

The overture is carried by agents of the secret services of the Soviet satellite countries and by mercenaries recruited by intermediaries. The principal method employed at this stage is 'grey terror', that is, a kind of terror which is not conducted in the name of the Soviet Union. The Soviet secret services do not at this stage leave their visiting cards, or leave other people's cards. The terror is carried out in the name of already existing extremist groups not connected in any way with the Soviet Union, or in the name of fictitious organisations.

The GRU reckons that in this period its operations should be regarded as natural disasters, actions by forces beyond human control, mistakes committed by people, or as terrorist acts by organisations not connected with the Soviet Union.

The terrorist acts carried out in the course of the 'overture' require very few people, very few weapons and little equipment. In some cases all that may be needed is one man who has as a weapon nothing more than a screwdriver, a box of matches or a glass ampoule.(Poster's Note: Can you say "boxcutters"?) Some of the operations can have catastrophic consequences. For example, an epidemic of an infectious disease at seven of the most important naval bases in the West could have the effect of halving the combined naval might of the Soviet Union's enemies.

The 'overture' could last from several weeks to several months, gradually gathering force and embracing fresh regions. At the same time the GUSM would become involved. Photographs compromising a NATO chief appear on the front pages of Western newspapers. A scandal explodes. It appears that some of the NATO people have been having meetings with high-ranking Soviet diplomats and handing over top secret papers. All efforts to refute the story only fuel the fire. The public demands the immediate dismissal of NATO'S chiefs and a detailed enquiry. Fresh details about the affair are published in the papers and the scandal increases in scope. At that moment the KGB and GRU can take out and dust off a tremendous quantity of material and put it into circulation. The main victims now are the people whom the Soviets had tried to recruit but failed. Now carefully edited and annotated materials get into the hands of the press. Soviet Intelligence has tried to recruit thousands, even tens of thousands, of people in its time. They include young lieutenants who have now become generals and third secretaries who have now become ambassadors. All of them rejected Soviet efforts to recruit them, and now Soviet Intelligence avenges their refusal. The number of scandalous affairs increases. The nations discover to their surprise that there are very few people to be trusted. The Soviet intelligence service has nothing to lose if the press gets hold of material showing that it tried to recruit a French general, without saying how the attempt ended. It has even less to lose on the eve of war. That is why the newspapers are full of demands for investigations and reports of resignations, dismissals and suicides. The best way of killing a general is to kill him with his own hands.

There is a marked increase in the strength of the peace movement. In many countries there are continual demands to make the country neutral and not to support American foreign policy, which has been discredited. At this point the 'grey terror' gathers scope and strength and in the last days of peace reaches its peak.

From the first moment of the first day of war the main forces of spetsnaz go into action. From then on the terror is conducted in the name of the Soviet Union and of the Communist leadership: 'red terror'.

But between the 'grey' and the 'red' terror there may be an intermediate period — the 'pink' terror, when active military operations have not yet begun and there is still peace, but when some of the best spetsnaz units have already gone into action. The situation is complicated by the fact that, on the one hand, Soviet fighting units are already in battle, but that, on the other hand, they are not yet operating in the name of the Soviet Union. This is an exceptionally risky moment for the Soviet high command. But he who risks nothing gains nothing. The Soviet commanders want to gain a great deal, and so are ready to risk a lot. A great deal has of course been done to reduce the level of risk. Only a relatively small number of spetsnaz troops take part in the 'pink' terror, but they are the best people in spetsnaz — professional athletes of Olympic class. Everything has been done to make sure that not one of them should fall into the hands of the enemy before the outbreak of war. A great deal has also been done to ensure that, if one of them should fall into enemy hands at that moment, it would be very difficult to establish his connection with any country whatsoever.

The 'pink' terror may continue for no more than a few hours. But those are the most important hours and minutes — the very last hours and minutes of peace. It is very important that those hours and minutes should be spoilt for the enemy and used for the maximum advantage to the Soviet side. It must be pointed out that the 'pink' terror may not be carried out at all. It is used only when there is absolute certainty of the success of the operations and equal certainty that the enemy will not be able in the remaining hours and minutes to assess the situation correctly and strike the first pre-emptive blow."

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More from Spetsnaz. The Story Behind the Soviet SAS

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The spetsnaz network of agents has much in common with international terrorism, a common centre, for example — yet they are different things and must not be confused. It would be foolhardy to claim that international terrorism came into being on orders from Moscow. But to claim that, without Moscow's support, international terrorism would never have assumed the scale it has would not be rash. Terrorism has been born in a variety of situations, in various circumstances and in different kinds of soil. Local nationalism has always been a potent source, and the

Soviet Union supports it in any form, just as it offers concrete support to extremist groups operating within nationalist movements. Exceptions are made, of course, of the nationalist groups within the Soviet Union and the countries under its influence.

If groups of extremists emerge in areas where there is no sure Soviet influence, you may be sure that the Soviet Union will very shortly be their best friend. In the GRU alone there are two independent and very powerful bodies dealing with questions relating to extremists and terrorists. First, there is the 3rd Direction of the GRU which studies terrorist organisations and ways of penetrating them. Then there is the 5th Directorate which is in charge of all intelligence-gathering at lower levels, including that of spetsnaz.

The GRU's tactics toward terrorists are simple: never give them any orders, never tell them what to do. They are destroying Western civilisation: they know how to do it, the argument goes, so let them get on with it unfettered by petty supervision. Among them there are idealists ready to die for their own ideas. So let them die for them. The most important thing is to preserve their illusion that they are completely free and independent.

Moscow is an important centre of international terrorism, not because it is from Moscow that instructions are issued, but because selected terrorist groups or organisations which ask for help may be given it if little risk is attached to doing so. Moscow's deep involvement with terrorism is a serious political affair. One 'resistance movement' has to have more financial help, another less. One 'Red Army' must have modern weapons and an unlimited supply of ammunition, another one will do better with old weapons and a limited supply of ammunition. One movement is to be recognised, while another will be condemned in words but supported in practice. 'Independent' terrorists give little thought to where the money comes from with which they travel the countries of the world, or who provides the Kalashnikov submachine-guns and the cartridges to go with them, or who supplies the instructors who teach them and train them.

But just look at the 'independent' Palestines: they virtually throw their ammunition away. And if one watches a film about the fighting in Afghanistan and then one from the streets of Beirut the difference is very striking. The Afghan resistance fighters count every round, whereas the groups fighting each other in the streets of Beirut don't even bother to aim when they fire; they simply fire into the air in long bursts, although it means they are wasting someone else's money. Whose money is it?

When I was beginning my military service I was taught to count every round. Cartridges are metal and a lot of hard work. It is more difficult and more expensive to make a cartridge than to make a fountain pen. And another reason for being careful with ammunition is so that you are never without it at a critical moment. Supplying an army with ammunition is a complex logistical problem. If the transport carrying ammunition arrives even a few minutes after you have spent all your ammunition without thinking, then you are dead. But there are no such problems in Beirut. Nobody tells the conflicting groups what the ammunition costs. Nobody tells them the cost of the lives they cut off every day. Nobody mentions the danger that the regular supply of ammunition may be late. The suppliers are certain that it will not be late.

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The Soviet Union condemns the civil war in the Lebanon. But there is no need for it to condemn the war. All it has to do is hold back the next transport of ammunition, and war will cease.

Apart from military and financial support, the Soviet Union also provides the terrorists aid in the form of training. Training centres have been set up in the Soviet Union for training terrorists from a number of different countries. Similar centres have been set up in the countries of Eastern Europe, in Cuba and elsewhere. I know the centre in Odessa very well. Officially it belongs to the 10th Chief Directorate of the General Staff which deals with the export of weapons, sends Soviet military advisers to foreign countries and trains foreigners to be fighters and terrorists. In the early 1960s this centre was a branch of the higher infantry officers school. An intelligence faculty was formed in it for Soviet students, many of whom ended up in the GRU and spetsnaz, while the remainder of the huge area, classrooms and living quarters, was given over entirely to the centre for training foreign fighters. When I was in Odessa most of the people under training were intended for work in black Africa. Not all of them came from Africa, quite a lot of them were from Cuba, but that was where the majority were destined. The difference between the training and the living conditions of the Soviet and the foreign students was tremendous.

The foreigners were better fed and wore Soviet officers' field uniforms, though without any badges of rank. They had practically no theoretical tuition at all. But their practical training was very concentrated, even by Soviet standards. For them there was no shortage of ammunition. Shooting went on in their camp day and night.

The foreigners were kept in strict isolation. The only outsiders who could see them were the Soviet students and then only through the barbed wire. The total isolation had a bad effect on some of the foreign students. But since they could not break out of it, the Cuban minister of defence stepped in and ordered some girls to be sent from Cuba who were trained as nurses for partisan units at the Odessa centre. It was interesting to note that the soldiers were under training for one year and the officers for two years, but the nurses' training lasted ten years or more. At the end of their training the nurses were sent back to Cuba and some younger ones were sent to replace them. There were no more psychological problems at the training centre.

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Foreigners belonging to 'liberation movements' who turn up in the Soviet Union are not generally recruited by the Soviet intelligence services. Experience has shown that the terrorist who considers himself independent and who kills people because of his own beliefs is more effective than the one who fights on the orders of other people. For his own ideas the terrorist will take risks and sacrifice his life, but he is scarcely likely to do so merely on instructions from foreigners. So why recruit him?

But there are important exceptions. Every terrorist is studied carefully during his training, and among them will be noted the potential leaders and the born rebels who will not submit to any authority. Of equal importance are the students' weaknesses and ambitions, and their relationships with one another. Some time, many years ahead, one of them may become an important leader, but not one approved by Moscow, so it is vital to know in advance who his likely friends and enemies will be.

As the students are themselves studied during training, some emerge as exceptions among the crowd and as likely material for recruitment. Recruitment at the training centres is carried on simultaneously by two different GRU organisations. The 3rd Direction recruits informers, who will subsequently remain inside the 'national liberation movements' and will pass on to the heads of the GRU the internal secrets of the movements. The 5th Directorate of the GRU recruits some of the students to be part of the spetsnaz network of agents. This is a fairly complicated process. Formally the candidate remains in his 'liberation movement' and works there. In fact he starts to operate on instructions from the GRU. It is a very delicate situation and all possible steps are taken to protect the reputation of the USSR in case of failure. With this aim in view the carefully selected candidate, unaware of his position, is transferred to training in one of the countries under Soviet influence. Recruitment then takes place, but not by Soviet Intelligence, rather by the Intelligence service of one of the Soviet satellite countries.

The recruitment of a full-blown terrorist is a very different matter from the recruitment of an informer-agent. The terrorist has to go through very tough training which becomes a daily, and a nightly nightmare. He dreams of the training coming to an end: he yearns for the real thing. The instructors talk to him and ask him what he would like, as a terrorist, to do. The terrorist tells them. The instructors then 'think about it' and a few days later tell him it is not possible. The torture of the training continues. Again the question of what he wants to do is raised, and again he is turned down. Various reasons are given for refusing him: we value your life too highly to send you on such a risky mission; such an act might have unwanted repercussions on your family, your comrades, and so on. Thus the range of choice is gradually narrowed down until the terrorist suggests exactly what the heads of Soviet Military intelligence want. They 'think about it' for a few days and finally give their agreement in such a way that it does not appear to be something wanted by the GRU but rather a compromise or a concession to the terrorist: if he really thinks it necessary to do it, no obstacles will be put in his way.

I have of course simplified a process which is in practice a very complicated affair.

The reward for the GRU is that a terrorist doing work for spetsnaz does not, in the great majority of cases, suspect he is being used. He is utterly convinced that he is acting independently, of his own will and by his own choice. The GRU does not leave its signature or his fingerprints around.

Even in cases where it is not a question of individual terrorists but of experienced leaders of terrorist organisations, the GRU takes extraordinary steps to ensure that not only all outsiders but even the terrorist leader himself should not realise the extent of his subordination to spetsnaz and consequently to the GRU. The leader of the terrorists has a vast field of action and a wide choice. But there are operations and acts of terrorism on which spetsnaz will spend any amount of money, will provide any kind of weapon, will help in obtaining passports and will organise hiding places. But there are also terrorist acts for which spetsnaz has no money, no weapons, no reliable people and no hiding places. The leader of the terrorists is at complete liberty to choose the mission he wants, but without weapons, money and other forms of support his freedom to choose is suddenly severely curtailed.