Personally I'm familiar with the classification standards and procedures from former exposure, and if you want to go right to the source, most of formal standards are freely available on the Internet.
Pertinent docs include DCID 1/7 (and others in DCID series); Executive Order 12958, As Amended, Classified National Security Information; Executive Order 13233; and you can poke around on the National Archives Web site to get a sense of document handling procedures there.
The handling of inactive classified documents within the Archives is very different than the handling of classified materials in their active usage environment. The Archives Web site clearly states that documents are to be requested and delivered in stacks, not as individual documents. And this would make sense, since researchers and historians would not necessarily know which specific documents to request. The NA is a research institution and by definition has a different mission, standards, and procedures that an operating intelligence environment. The information you've gotten from your friend is accurate but would not be sensible as procedure at the Archives.
If you think the standards are static across these two very different contexts, that would be wrong, and it would not make sense.
Aside from that, the news reporting makes clear that Bergler was accompanied within the reading room, but made repeated requests to be alone to take "pribate phone calls" or some other ruse. As for the phone itself, we do not know what the standard is for phones within the NA. Yes, it is normal to prohibit phones within a secured facility (a SCIF), but we do not know what level of security is applied within the NA reading rooms (again, it's not as static as you may think). And since Bergler was permitted to make calls it is possible that the phone prohibition doesn't exist. Again, different SCIFs handle this issue differently, according to the judgement of the Security Officer and the guidelines of DCID and other published guidance.
You seem very perturbed that Bill Clinton might be involved in granting access to the documents. I'm sorry, he is. Very much so. You need to read Executive Order 12958, As Amended, Classified National Security Information and Executive Order 13233. There's also an excellent history of Presidential libraries (including authorities and access) at http://www.ekt.gr/links/egov_docs/egov_papers_ft/GovInfQua_article4.pdf.
Executive Order 12958 actually includes very specific provisions for access by "former presidential appointees" such as Berler to archived classified materials (IIRC, it's Section 4.2). So, yes, Sandy Berger does have stautory access to the materials. But he needs a clearance waiver to get at them, and that comes through the Clinton Presidential Materials Project Services which is part of the NA but based in Little Rock, and which is currently the formally designated administrator of the materials. Clinton Presidential Materials Project Services would work closely with Bill Clinton and Bruce Lindsey on a variety of issues (including access).
I do stand by the notion that the NA staff was shocked by Bergler's behavior, and handled it more-or-less appropriately under the circumstances. You seem to have the impression that the NA staff is/was loaded for bear, and ready to jump on Bergler the very moment they suspected his filching. No, they're librarians with an oversight job, and Bergler apparently tricked them into leaving the room. Once their suspicions arose (which appears to have occurred only after Bergler left the premises), they would have contacted their own Chief Security Officer, and reportedly did in fact contact Bruce Lindsey (who again is the legal interface between NA and Bill Clinton). These people are not armed LEOs, they're career librarians with clearance. Again, I believe they'd not ever before encountered the bizarre ruses and wanton theft that Bergler pulled-off, and did the best they could to follow procedure and get (some) of the documents back.
That they ran a sting against Bergler on his next visit makes it clear that they were doing their jobs (it takes a lot of gonads for librarians to run a sting against one of the most powerful men in Washington).
So yes, I'm partially speculating about some of this, but its reasoned and pragmatic speculation. The newspapers (except Susan Schmidt of the Wash Post) have done a very, very sloppy job of trying to understand and explain what happened.
Just that the President ordered all previous papers placed under control of the Fed.
Executive Order 12958
Which just goes classification schemes.
But section 4.4 does seem to make some bizarre waiver for anyone appointed to a policy making position by a former administration (?), under certain code. That shoots all security considerations in the . . . whatever. If it applies to former administrations, who the heck knows what such people have 'gotten into' in the meanwhile?
There is a proviso, however:
(b) Waivers under this section may be granted only if the agency head or senior agency official of the originating agency:
(2) takes appropriate steps to protect classified information from unauthorized disclosure or compromise, and ensures that the information is safeguarded in a manner consistent with this order;
Now that seems to place responsibility for Sammy's heist not on the 9/11 commission, as I might have believed, but on whichever agency head in the Bush Administration authorized Sammy's escapade without taking the necessary precautions, which clearly were not taken. Is there another way to read that section? Do you think they held Clinton to be that officer?
I couldn't find anything on 'stacks', btw, except that certain 'stacks' are used as repository for various documents. But it gives the sense that these are physical areas or logical designations, not that people in the 'reading rooms' are delivered stacks identified only by stack. After all, the people at the Archives, apparently knew what was missing, and even that some of what Sammy returned had supposedly not been reported missing (which is strange enough). It would seem likely that every paper was catalogued and recorded, in some way.
But this should eventually come out, one way or another. More than anyone ever wanted to know about procedures or abuse of same at the National Archives.
it's not as static as you may think).
You don't mean, static. You mean, consistent. And if security is inconsistent for the very same documents, of the highest classification, then I would have to disagree here, that it doesn't make sense. If you have a custody chain, then the weakest link is where the chain is likely to break.
that comes through the Clinton Presidential Materials Project
But does it really read that way? As I read that section, above, it refers to the administration, that in office, not that of FDR, or Bill Clinton. Bill Clinton doesn't have an agency or administration at this point.
I don't see how it could be read that way. Of course, I'm not saying it isn't. But I don't see how they could.
If it were true that provision 2, guaranteeing the integrity of the documents is the responsibility of authorizing officer, then what sense would it make if the officer, himself, is not really an officer, but a former officer out of government for four years? Or is that what you're getting to - that Bill Clinton, by this statute, for his negligence is himself in violation of the law?
But I just find it difficult to believe that the wording of such would make Clinton that responsible officer. It just doesn't seem to read like that.
Again, I know this is speculation.
have the impression that the NA staff is/was loaded for bear
Yes, that's what the guards were paid to do. Surely you allow that he was under guard the whole time? The question is, why did the guards leave and allow him to pinch the documents? particularly since the WAS no video surveillance. This may be one of the reasons that the House was moved to conduct its own parallel investigation. It's a stunning dereliction of duty.
But, yes. You wouldn't expect the staff to just mutter among themselves that they saw him stealing, and then with eyes downcast reluctantly hold the door for him as he walked out. You expect them to go over and say, please wait, for a minute. There might be a problem. Or - did I just see you . . . etc? You never find such a reluctance in a doctor's office, at the DMV, at the receptionist's desk in the corporate lobby - why here? Why at the NA of all places. I'm afraid I do have to disagree with you, here. They have to know they are safeguarding classified documents for the entire nation. They have to be aware of what it is they are doing there. If they weren't, it's a serious problem, and may still be.
ran a sting against Bergler on his next visit
Well, it's like allowing 'Fingers' to break into the safe, steal the diamonds, hold the door as he walks out, tips his hat the guard, and then says he'll be back on more 'business' tomorrow. They discover the safe has been ransaked. What do they do? Call the cops? Arrest 'Fingers'? No, they put more diamonds in the safe, leave 'Fingers' alone, yet again, and see if any of the diamonds are missing this time, after he leaves.
I just don't get it. If they saw him stealing, the first time, have the guard get in the 4WD, or whatever, run every stop light, alert the local police to put out an APB on the guy, and get him. Period. What's the point of trying to 'trap him' into stealing again?