Well, here is another article, which is now at Rense, but originally published by US News, unfortunately there is no original publication date, but it appears to have been written during the Clinton Administration. Someone should get hold of that House Report.
Iraq's CAB Weapons:
Moving Targets
http://www.rense.com/political/weapons/movingtarg.htm
Iraq's CAB Weapons:
Moving Targets
Iraq has secretly built chemical weapons plants in Sudan, transferred nuclear materials to Algeria, and sent a dozen of its top scientists to develop a biological warfare complex in Libya.
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U.S. airstrikes cannot eliminate Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction for the simple reason that Iraq has smuggled many of them to other Arab countries for safekeeping.
That is the conclusion of a draft report by the U.S. House of Representatives Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare which was obtained by U.S. News & World Report magazine.
The report -- based on American, German, and Israeli intelligence -- says that Iraq has secretly built chemical weapons plants in Sudan, transferred nuclear materials to Algeria, and sent a dozen of its top scientists to develop a biological warfare complex in Libya.
The Clinton administration has dispatched three aircraft carriers to the Persian Gulf and is now building international support for a military strike to punish Saddam Hussein for defying United Nations weapons inspectors.
But "no bombing campaign against Iraq, and even an occupation of that country for that matter, is capable of destroying the hard core of Saddam Hussein's primary WMD [weapons of mass destruction] development and production programs,'' the congressional report states. "The reason is that under current conditions these programs are run outside of Iraq -- mainly in Sudan and Libya, as well as Algeria (storage of some hot nuclear stuff).''
The transfer of Iraq's nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons technology began even before the Gulf War. As Saddam Hussein realized that the coalition led by the United States was going to bomb his country in 1991, he hastily smuggled know-how, equipment, and key materials to his close allies. And the smuggling has continued right up to the present.
In March/April 1991, Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz got permission from Sudan's president, Umar al-Bashir, to move about 400 Scud missiles and chemical weapons to Sudan for "safekeeping.'' At the same time, Iraq smuggled nuclear materials, documents, and weapons parts -- including 27.5 pounds of highly-enriched uranium-235 -- to Sudan via Jordan using diplomatic mail privileges. For example, barrels of uranium were hidden in a truck marked "furniture'' that went from the Sudanese Embassy in Iraq to Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, in January 1992.
Since Sudan has no nuclear facilities, most of the nuclear materials were later shipped to a Chinese-built research reactor in the Algerian town of Ain Oussera, where they are still being stored, according to the report.
In 1995, Iraq and Sudan jointly built a plant to produce choking mustard gas near Wau in southwestern Sudan. The chemical weapons plant is located in a former fruit factory staffed by Iraqi technicians. The gas has been used at least twice by the Sudanese government against the rebel Sudanese People's Liberation Army in southern Sudan.
In May 1996, the Iraqis and Sudanese tested chemical agents in the desert, and residents got sick when winds shifted suddenly and carried residues into the city of Omdurman.
Last year, Sudan and Iraq completed a far more sophisticated chemical weapons plant along the Blue Nile in the Kafuri region north of Khartoum. The plant is believed to have begun test runs of nerve agents and is producing 122mm and 152mm artillery shells as well as rocket and tactical missile warheads. Iraqi intelligence agents recruited experts from Egypt, Croatia, Bulgaria, and Russia to help with the plant according to the report.
The Iraqis also built a chemical weapons plant at the Yarmook Industrial Complex in the Mayu area south of Khartoum using German-made machines acquired by Iraqi intelligence and smuggled via Bulgaria. Computers were purchased in France. The site includes a mosque, medical clinic, and guest houses for foreign experts from Iraq and Iran. It even has a special farm to keep the "guests'' well fed on fresh milk, vegetables, and dates.
In 1995, the congressional report says, Iraq signed a secret agreement to provide Libyan leader Muammer Qadhafi with experts on ballistic missiles. Iraq also sent nuclear fuel and specialists to work on nuclear weapons development at a secret site in Sidi Abu Zurayq, in the desert about 240 miles southwest of Tripoli.
Since the mid-1990s, Iraqi agents have been buying sensitive technology in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland, then diverting it to Libya. Late last year, Iraq sent some of its top experts in chemical weapons to the Libyan chemical weapons facility inside a mountain at Tarhunah, 40 milies southeast of Tripoli.
About a dozen Iraqi scientists involved in biological weapons research arrived in Libya at the beginning of this year. They are helping the Libyans develop a new biological warfare complex under the guise of a medical facility called General Health Laboratories. This secret program, codenamed Ibn Hayan, is aimed at producing bombs and missile warheads filled with deadly anthrax and botulism agents, according to the report.
BTTT
Well, I just agreed not to copy this in any way, but that I could make a copy for personal use. Here's my copy and my personal use is to pass it around in this discussion group, as per FR stance of fair use. It is an *outrage* that if this **export program of Iraqi WMD** and this **policy of employment of Iraqi WMD technicians, in cooperation with terrorist nations** was known to Congress, Congress has not addressed it, either before or during Operation Iraqi Freedom. (And what has USN&WR been doing, since 1999 with it?):
______________________________________________________
Title: Stalking Saddam
Highlight: A 'pinprick' is out, but 'getting' the Iraqi leader would take 200,000 troops
Author(s): Richard J. Newman, Bruce B. Auster and Kevin Whitelaw
Citation: February 23, 1998 p 18-21, 24-26
Section: World Report
Copyright © 2003 U.S.News & World Report, L.P. All rights reserved.
Subjects: IRAQ; PERSIAN GULF; US ATTACK ON IRAQ; CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS; DEFENSE DEPARTMENT; MILITARY TARGETS; MILITARY AIRCRAFT; SUDAN; ALGERIA; HUSSEIN, SADDAM
Word Count: 3557
Abstract: Military experts are warning that a U.S. war with Iraq may not accomplish a permanent end to Saddam Hussein's chemical and biological weapons program. With map-chart-graphic: Operation Desert Thunder.
Article Text: RIYADH, SAUDI ARABIA--Operation Desert Thunder, the buildup of U.S. forces here in the Persian Gulf, is nearly complete. The only question is what their mission should be: to eliminate Saddam Hussein's chemical and biological weapons? Or to eliminate Saddam Hussein himself?
While the Clinton administration's mantra is "no more pinpricks," it has set the military on a cautious course with limited aims: retarding Iraq's development of weapons of mass destruction and reducing Saddam Hussein's ability to threaten his neighbors. Republicans in Congress question whether that is enough. "Incremental timidity which only punishes Saddam and leaves him in a place to build weapons is a defeat, not a success," House Speaker Newt Gingrich said after being briefed on the administration's military planning. Added Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott last week: "Our goal should be to get [Saddam] out."
U.S. military planners have studied that option in war games. But what they have found is not encouraging. First, removing Saddam Hussein in an airstrike "is nearly impossible," says a Pentagon war planner, "without some gem of intelligence that would come out of nowhere." By using decoy motorcades and mustachioed look-alikes, moving frequently between his many palaces, and even commandeering private homes from ordinary citizens, Saddam Hussein keeps his location a tight secret. "I don't know how" to target the Iraqi leader, former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft says. "In '91, we hit all the places we thought he would be."
Pentagon war games show that the only way to be sure of prying power away from Saddam Hussein's regime would be to send three corps of ground troops, as well as marines--nearly 200,000 soldiers. And here in the windswept dunes of Saudi Arabia, they are nowhere to be seen. During Desert Shield, the buildup that preceded the 1991 gulf war, the United States sent almost 400,000 ground troops; tanks and trucks rolled bumper to bumper across the desert for days on end. To muster a force even half that size now would require an additional buildup of 60 to 90 days, then a sweep from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia toward Baghdad.
In a full-blown Let's Get Saddam scenario, the sweep could last four months as troops thoroughly scoured the country for hidden weapons sites and command bunkers. Though many Iraqi soldiers would probably surrender, some fighting could be fierce, especially with the Republican Guard. If Saddam were not killed or captured, he might flee to another country. Then the United States would try to prevail upon Iraq's Arab neighbors to set up a new government. U.S. troops would stay at least two months, and possibly much longer, to guarantee stability.
Noriega's lesson. One reason Pentagon planners concluded that a full occupation of the country would be required was their sobering experience in Panama and Somalia. Says a former senior defense official: "You never think of a military option to get a [particular] guy. You take down a regime." Prolonged attempts to capture Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega--which were ultimately successful--and Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid--which failed--demonstrated the pitfalls of planning around a single living target. (The Noriega arrest mission in 1989 took 24,000 troops 14 days in a small city. Nearly two dozen U.S. troops, and hundreds of locals, were killed. And Iraq is much larger.)
And even if the Pentagon were confident of finding and targeting Saddam in a surgical strike, there remains one big hitch. In 1981, President Reagan signed Executive Order No. 12333: "No person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination." A retired senior officer who ran major operations puts it this way: "Because of the law, we can't directly target him. If you're purposely tracking him and he's in Building 2 and we target Building 2, that's assassination." Though, he adds, there might be a creative way around that: "If we hit all eight buildings, that's the way life is."
Barring a yearlong commitment with hundreds of thousands of ground troops--which far exceeds anything publicly proposed by the Clinton administration or its critics--America's options for trying to get rid of Saddam are limited. One idea now gaining attention is the establishment of a safe haven on Iraqi territory, under U.S. military protection, for an Iraqi resistance movement. But that option has already been tested, with meager results--dissidents who received covert U.S. assistance in the supposedly protected Kurdish region of northern Iraq were systematically routed and executed by Saddam's forces in 1996.
Other ideas include blockading Basra, the only Iraqi port with access to the Persian Gulf and the source of considerable oil smuggling. But because Iran is believed to shelter many of those smugglers in its territorial waters--for a take of the action--a blockade might require a difficult rapprochement with Tehran. A radical approach would be to place a U.S. division in southern Iraq, more for psychological reasons than military ones. "A lot of it is perception," says the former senior defense official. "You want to let everyone know he is not a massive ruler."
Bosnia's lesson. But both methods of eliminating Saddam--invasion or siege--appear unlikely. Defense officials say they have not even considered a blockade, and any discussion of long-term commitments of ground troops raises concerns about "exit strategies" and unfavorable comparisons to Bosnia. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has publicly ruled out the use of ground forces.
Some of America's allies in the region also fear that if Saddam Hussein suddenly disappears, Iraq could disintegrate into civil war between Kurds in the north, Sunni Muslims in the middle of the country, and Shiite Muslims in the south. Turkey is worried about a Kurdish insurgency in the north, and the gulf states fear that the Shiites might welcome Iran into the oilfields in the south. President Bush's policy team faced exactly the same problem in 1991--and decided that leaving a weakened Saddam Hussein in place was a pretty good solution.
Richard Perle, an assistant secretary of defense under President Reagan and a critic of the Clinton policy, argues that removing Saddam "is not something we should attempt to do with U.S. military force." Rather, he says, "It is something the Iraqis should do for themselves." Perle is one of Washington's leading proponents of arming Iraqi dissidents. "The Iraqi opposition is kind of like an MRE [meal ready to eat, or U.S. Army field ration]," he says. "The ingredients are there and you just have to add water, in this case U.S. support."
But at the moment, there is no one friendly to the West in a position to take over in Iraq. Ahmed Chalabi, head of the Iraqi National Congress resistance group in London, concedes that "the Iraqi opposition doesn't have any resources right now." The opposition living in exile "is not credible," adds George Joffe, deputy director of the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London. "The only viable alternatives to the regime must come from within the regime itself." These would be members of Saddam's ruling Tikriti clan, top military leaders, or a faction of the Baath party. "It will be essentially the same regime, perhaps less competent or brutal," Joffe says.
Saddam's revenge. Still another reason to be wary of targeting the Iraqi leader: He may become more dangerous than ever. If Saddam Hussein thinks his life is over, that could be the moment he actually decides to use his chemical and biological weapons, warns Michael Eisenstadt, a military specialist at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. "It is dangerous to be glib" about taking out Saddam, Eisenstadt says.
All these complications factor into the administration's formula for a strike that would seriously harm Saddam Hussein--but not necessarily kill him. The bombing campaign that Pentagon planners have developed looks a lot like the air war portion of Desert Storm. First, cruise missiles launched from B-52 bombers and Navy ships and submarines would clear the way for manned airstrikes by knocking out Iraqi radar sites, surface-to-air-missile batteries, and the heavily fortified command-and-control centers of Saddam's military. Even though Iraq's air defense system was pounded during the gulf war--and pummeled during three later attacks to punish Saddam for defying U.N. resolutions--it has been partially rebuilt and is "a formidable threat," according to one Pentagon war planner. The missile strikes would create "safety funnels" free of antiaircraft missiles in which larger "strike packages"--groups of warplanes with specialized functions--could fly. EF-111 and EA-6B aircraft would electronically jam any Iraqi radars still turned on, and HARM missiles fired from F-16CJs and F-18s would home in on remaining radars. Strike jets such as F-15Es, F-16s, and F-18s would deliver the bombs, with F-117 Stealth aircraft hitting the most heavily defended targets.
Statements by President Clinton and others indicate that the main targets would be facilities suspected of producing and storing chemical or biological weapons and the missiles to deliver them.
Getting smarter. The celebrated "smart bombs" of Desert Storm would have a much greater role this time. In the gulf war, precision-guided munitions accounted for just 7.5 percent of all bombs dropped, though they captivated public attention. Today, PGMs make up 40 percent of the arsenal of the Navy's two carriers in the gulf; the Air Force does not release figures for its bomb load, but they are probably similar or slightly higher. A greater portion of PGMs means pilots can hit more targets with fewer bombs and fewer sorties. That could be an important improvement, since the roughly 300 U.S. and British strike aircraft in the gulf now are far fewer than the 1,300 allied jets that flew in Desert Storm.
A further advantage is the location of the Navy's two carriers. In 1991, Iraqi-laid sea mines kept carriers 200 miles offshore; today they are stationed about 50 miles from Iraqi territory. That will let pilots get to targets more quickly and fly more often, if necessary. Still, PGMs would not be the whole show; wide-area "carpet" bombing by B-52 and other bombers could still ravage ammunition depots, airfields, Republican Guard emplacements, and other sprawling sites.
Some even smarter American bombs could be good news for the Iraqi civilians Saddam is likely to use as human shields in his so-called presidential palaces and other likely targets. A prototype weapon known as the "hard target, smart fuse" bomb, for example, is designed to explode at a predetermined depth or burrow through a set number of floors. That lets the air planners target the specific room in which something valuable is likely to be held, while minimizing damage to the surroundings. New bombs designed to penetrate underground targets require less explosive material, since getting closer to the target means it takes less of a blast to destroy it. And the big 5,000-pound "bunker buster" bombs designed to demolish the deeply buried facilities that have proliferated in Iraq since the gulf war are now in regular production; the first two had been custom made in the waning days of Desert Storm.
But all of that high-tech wizardry cannot make up for other factors crucial to an effective air campaign. Most important is the intelligence required to know what building to hit--let alone what room. Intelligence sources say that Republican Guard and armor units began dispersing from their usual positions three weeks ago. U.S. military officials have been straightforward in saying that they do not know where all of Saddam Hussein's chemical and biological weapons materials are--which is one reason Defense Secretary William Cohen and others have been trying to lower expectations for what a military strike can accomplish.
Measuring success. Another nagging weakness is "bomb damage assessment," determining whether a strike has met its objective, such as disabling a radar site or rendering a building unusable. "We have precision weapons, but no precision BDA," says Sam Gardiner, a retired Air Force colonel and Rand analyst. The surest way to tell whether chemical or biological weapons have been destroyed, he says, is to send teams of inspectors--which Saddam would probably resist even more strongly after a bombing.
The reluctance of countries such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia to allow the use of strike jets based in their territory poses other problems. The use of the aircraft themselves is a minor issue; the Pentagon can amass attack planes elsewhere. But the loss of Saudi Arabian bases in particular deprives the United States of one of the closest launch points to Iraq. That will slow down the sortie rate and draw out the operation.
If sorties are restricted to Kuwait, Bahrain, and the carriers, that could produce some other challenges. Robert Chandler, a retired Air Force colonel who has written several books on weapons of mass destruction, thinks that such limited "access of attack" could make U.S. planes vulnerable to Iraqi defenses. During the gulf war, allied warplanes flew into Iraq from various directions. But this time, they may all fly from the south, which could make it easier for air-defense gunners. The Iraqis may also have learned not to turn on their radar until they are ready to lock onto American aircraft. "There will be surprises in this thing," says Chandler. "I think we're going to lose some airplanes."
A bombing campaign with today's precision-guided weapons could level Saddam's military infrastructure but still fail to destroy the chemical and biological weapons that U.N. inspectors suspect are hidden across Iraq (box, Page 25).
Moreover, bombing Iraq cannot destroy all its chemical weapons for the simple reason that they have been moved to other countries. According to a February 10 draft report of the U.S. House of Representatives Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, Iraq transferred chemical weapons and 400 Scud missiles to Yemen and Sudan in the summer of 1991. The following year, Iraq also sent materials from its nuclear program--including 27.5 pounds of highly enriched uranium-235--to Sudan, some of it in a truck from the Sudanese Embassy in Baghdad that traveled through Jordan marked "furniture." Since Sudan has no nuclear facilities, the materials were later shipped to the Algerian reactor in Ain Oussera, where they are still being stored.
In 1995, according to the report, Iraq and Sudan jointly built a mustard gas weapons plant near Wau in southwestern Sudan. Located in a former fruit production facility taken over by the military, it has Iraqi technicians and has produced weapons used by the Sudanese government against rebels in the south. And over the past two years, Sudan and Iraq have completed two far more sophisticated chemical weapons plants in the Kafuri and Mayu areas near Khartoum, using German-made machines smuggled via Bulgaria. The Kafuri facility has made initial test runs of nerve gases and is producing artillery shells as well as rocket and tactical missile warheads, the report says.
Russian tiff. Building support for a strike against Iraq, President Clinton has been calling two or three world leaders each day. So far, countries supporting the use of force include Britain, Australia, Canada, Poland, Portugal, Germany, Sweden, Norway, and Brazil. But in Moscow, Secretary of Defense Cohen and Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev exchanged sharp words last week. Sergeyev accused America of being "uncompromising" on Iraq, while Cohen dismissed Russia's "so-called compromises."
Congress also went into a weeklong recess without voting on a resolution to support military action. Some Democrats were unwilling to support a broad resolution on force, while some Republicans want to target Saddam. If Congress does not approve additional funds, the cost of the operation would have to come out of money already earmarked to upgrade aging weapons systems.
The military brass is trying to prepare the public for the costs, both financial and human. "We will lose some people, and that weighs heavily," Gen. Henry Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said bluntly last week.
And although the U.S. attack--if it occurs--is unlikely to target Saddam specifically, there is always the chance that it could eliminate him, directly or indirectly. Amatzia Baram, an expert on Iraq at the U.S. Institute of Peace in Washington, believes that Saddam's biggest worry is not American bombs themselves but his temporary loss of control if electricity and communications are cut. Says Baram: "Saddam is afraid that in such chaos, a group of military [officers] can take the communications facilities and declare that he is dead." That may be America's best hope; short of such serendipity, neither Saddam nor his weapons programs seem likely to go away.
Operation Desert Thunder U.S.-led airstrikes against Iraq would include a mix of the aircraft listed below. Dozens of these planes may be grouped in "strike packages." Attack aircraft would carry a variety of guided missiles, penetrating bombs, and cluster munitions.
Missiles & Stealth Cruise missiles. Launched from submarines and ships in the Persian Gulf and B-52 bombers flying from Diego Garcia, these missiles would target Iraqi command-and-control centers, radar sites, and surface-to-air-missile batteries. Stealth aircraft. F-117 Night Hawks based in Kuwait would target command, control, and communications nodes and air defense sites with 2,000-pound laser-guided bombs.
Fighters Air-to-air defense aircraft. F-15 Eagles flying form Bahrain and carrier-based Navy F-14 Tomcats would provide air defense for the attacking planes.
Antiradar planes Antiradar planes. Specially equipped F-16s would carry high-speed antiradiation missiles (HARMs) that can home in on Iraq's radar-equipped air defense batteries.
Jammers Radar jammers. Navy EA-6B Prowlers and Air Force EF-111 electronic warfare planes would use their on-board radio transmitters to jam radars and trick them into tracking false targets.
Ground attack & bombers Bombers. Bomb-carrying planes would target Iraqi chemical and biological weapons sites, hardened command bunkers, and ground forces.
Bombers include carrier-based F/A-18 Hornets and F-14 Tomcats, B-1B Lancers from Bahrain, B-52s from Diego Garcia, F-117 Night Hawks, F-16 Fighting Falcons, and British GR1 Tornados from Kuwait
[Illustration labels]: Tomahawk cruise missile; F-117 Night Hawk; F-14 Tomcat; F-15 Eagle; F-16 Fighting Falcon; EA-6B Prowler; F/A-18 Hornet; B-52; B-1B Lancer; GR1 Tornado; Ankara; Turkey; Incirlik; Lebanon; Damascus; Amman; Israel; Jordan; Mediterranean Sea; Red Sea; Jerusalem; Syria; Iraq; Saudi Arabia; Iraq; Baghdad; Riyadh; Basra; Kuwait; Kuwait City; Tehran; Dhahran; Bahrain; Qatar; Iran; Persian Gulf; U.A.E.; Concrete slab; Soil
Iraqi military forces Total armed forces: 387,500 Republican Guard divisions: 6 (60-75,000 troops) Reserves: 650,000 Tanks: 2,000-2,700 Armored personnel carriers: 2,000 Artillery: 1,500-1,950 Air defense guns: 5,500 Helicopters: 500; 120 armed Aircraft: 300-350 (100 are operational) Ships: 21
Lakenheath, England
45 F-15E Eagles (fighter/bomber) Only planes able to carry the GBU-28 Bunker Buster bomb.
Saudi Arabia (permission to launch bombers not yet granted)
30 F-15 Eagles (fighter)
18 F-16 Fighting Falcons (fighter/bomber)
4 ER-111 Ravens (electronic combat)
6 British GR1 Tornados (bomber)
Diego Garcia
14 B-52s (bomber)
Turkey (permission to launch bombers not yet granted)
5 F-15 Eagles (fighter)
20 F-16 Fighting Falcons (fighter)
6 British GR1 Tornados (bomber)
Kuwait
12 F-117 Night Hawks (bomber)
6 F-16 Fighting Falcons (fighter/bomber)
18 A-10/OA-10 Thunderbolts (attack)
8 British GR1 Tornados (bomber)
Bahrain
12 F-15 Eagles (fighter)
36 F-16 Fighting Falcons (fighter/bomber)
3 B-1B Lancers (bomber)
Persian Gulf
Two U.S. aircraft carriers with 14 support ships, including two attack submarines and 103 attack planes. Eight of the ships can fire cruise missiles.
One British aircraft carrier Aircraft include:
24 F-14 Tomcats (fighter/bomber)
70 F/A-18 Hornets (fighter/bomber)
9 EA-6B Prowlers (electronic combat)
Bunker Buster The Hard Target Smart Fuse fits into a variety of bombs or missiles, including the 5,000-pound GBU-28 Bunker Buster, which can penetrate 20 feet of concrete.
Advanced guidance systems permit the bomb to enter the target from any angle. The fuse measures the deceleration of the bomb and counts the layers of concrete and rooms it has penetrated to explode precisely on target.
Sources: The Military Balance 1997/98; Air University; U.S. Navy; U.S. Air Force Compiled by Doug Pasternak Graphic by Stephen Rountree and Robert Kemp--USN&WR
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