Clinton undermines U.S. hero, helps Saddam dodge inspections - Iraq - weapons inspector William S. Ritte
Insight on the News, Sept 28, 1998 by Amos Perlmutter
If authoritative reports are true that President Clinton undermined, in 1996 and 1997, the courageous and penetrating work of the United Nations Special Commission, or UNSCOM, then he unwittingly has become an ally of Saddam Hussein. The continued efforts in the last two years on the part of the administration to compromise its own rhetorically asserted bold policy should be of utmost concern, for it directly impinges on the national interest, the credibility of the United States and its president.
The architect of this policy is Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. While touting during the January 1998 crisis that the United States would not tolerate anything short of an "unfettered" regime of inspections, if the reports are correct, both she and National Security Adviser Sandy Berger have deceived the American people. This cover-up was blown by inspector William S. Ritter Jr., the most experienced, effective and courageous member of the UNSCOM team. In an interview with the New York Times on Aug. 27, Ritter asserted that: "The Administration had been secretly trying since late last year to find a diplomatic solution to its confrontation with Hussein. In doing so, he said, it abandoned a policy in effect since the end of the Persian Gulf War in 1991 to use sanctions and the threat of military force to compel the Iraqi leader's cooperation."
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Ritter resignation letter 26 August 1998
The Special Commission was created for the purpose of disarming Iraq. As part of the Special Commission team, I have worked to achieve a simple end: the removal, destruction or rendering harmless of Iraq's proscribed weapons. The sad truth is that Iraq today is not disarmed anywhere near the level required by Security Council resolutions. As you know, UNSCOM has good reason to believe that there are significant numbers of proscribed weapons and related components and the means to manufacture such weapons unaccounted for in Iraq today.
Unfortunately, the recent decisions by the Security Council to downplay the significance of the recent Iraqi decision to cease cooperation with Commission inspectors clearly indicates that the organization which created the Special Commission in its resolution 687 (1991) is no longer willing and/or capable of the implementation of its own law, in this case an enforceable resolution passed under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. This abrogation of its most basic of responsibilities has made the Security Council a witting partner to an overall Iraqi strategy of weakening the Special Commission. The Secretary General and his Special Representative have allowed the grand office of the Secretary General to become a sounding board for Iraqi grievances, real or imagined. In fact, the Secretary General himself has proposed a "comprehensive review" of the UNSCOM-Iraqi relationship, an action that would result in having the investigators becoming the investigated, all at the behest of Iraq. Such an action, in addition to being a farce, would create a clear distraction from the critical disarmament issues related to Iraq and its compliance with Security Council resolutions.
Iraq has lied to the Special Commission and the world since day one concerning the true scope and nature of its proscribed programs and weapons systems. This lie has been perpetuated over the years through systematic acts of concealment. It was for the purpose of uncovering Iraq's mechanism of concealment, and in doing so gaining access to the hidden weapons, components and weapons programs, that you created a dedicated capability to investigate Iraq's concealment activities, which I have had the privilege to head. During the period of time that this effort has been underway, the Commission has uncovered indisputable proof of a systematic concealment mechanism, run by the Presidency of Iraq and protected by the Presidential security forces. This investigation has led the Commission to the door step of Iraq's hidden retained capability, and yet the Commission has been frustrated by Iraq's continued refusal to abide by its obligations under Security Council resolutions and the Memorandum of Understanding of 23 February 1998 to allow inspections, the Security Council's refusal to effectively respond to Iraq's actions, and now the current decision by the Security Council and the Secretary General, backed at least implicitly by the United States, to seek a "diplomatic" alternative to inspection-driven confrontation with Iraq, a decision which constitutes a surrender to the Iraqi leadership that has succeeded in thwarting the stated will of the United Nations.
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US Senate Moves Decisively; Aziz threatens UNSC
Iraq News, SEPTEMBER 3, 1998
By Laurie Mylroie
Scott Ritter will testify today, Sept 3, in a joint hearing of the Senate's Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees, 2:00 PM, Hart Bldg, 216. That, even as "Iraq News" has heard a report that the Clinton administration is preparing a major smear campaign against him. The Wash Post broke the story of the administration's blocking UNSCOM inspections. Reportedly, the administration has leaked Ritter's FBI file to the NYT, in the expectation it will dig for dirt. On Sept 1, CNN's Late Edition asked Sec State Albright about Ritter's criticism. She replied, "I think that Scott Ritter has his piece of the story. He was a good inspector. I'm not going to criticize him. However, he doesn't have a clue about what our overall policy has been. We are the foremost supporter of UNSCOM, we have directed�-have inspired, really, more inspections than anybody else. If it weren't for the United States�and I must say, me, personally�I doubt very much that the sanctions regime would be in place as strongly as it is.
Though I admire Scott Ritter for his inspections abilities, he is not the one putting together US policy which has managed to keep the strongest sanctions regime in the history of the world on Saddam Hussein. We will continue to do so. . . I am not going to speak ill of Scott Ritter-- he's a great American�-but he does not know the policy that we are carrying out."
Who are they kidding? Also, this will likely affect US foreign policy more generally. Aaron Lerner, in today's Jerusalem Post, wrote, "The Clinton administration has demonstrated only too well its penchant to avoid fulfilling its leadership role. Revelations by former UN weapons inspector Scott Ritter that US Secretary of State Albright has been responsible for blocking more critical inspections in Iraq than Saddam Hussein send a clear warning to anyone who advocates basing Israeli security on third-party supervision."
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A CNN: Pair Of Quick Arrests
The FBI brings home suspects in the Nairobi bombing, but the evidence in Sudan is shaky
By Douglas Waller/Washington
Bombing investigations can often take months of sifting tiny bits of debris to piece together who the suspects are, so the bureau was beaming that it had two key arrests just three weeks after the embassy attacks. The rest of the Administration was relieved as well. It hadn't been a good week for the credibility of Washington's fight against the forces of evil. Scott Ritter, a former Marine who headed the United Nation's inspection team in Iraq, resigned. He was frustrated that while the U.S. talked tough about opening Iraq's weapons facilities to inspectors, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright secretly pressured the U.N. to back off intrusive checks that might spark another confrontation with Iraq. The two-faced policy created "the illusion of arms control," Ritter complained in his resignation letter. Albright bristled at charges that she was being soft on Saddam Hussein: "It is not for nothing that I have earned from him the sobriquet of 'snake' and 'witch.'"
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